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Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
The author’s interest in EU law was originally generated by participation in European 
law-making in 1992-1998 as an officer of the European Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers. We worked for an acceptable Posted Workers Directive that would cover 
cross-border posting of workers in the framework of freedom to provide services. In that 
job, I realised how significant the role of the Court of Justice in law-making was. The 
famous obiter dictum in Rush Portuguesa (later followed by Vander Elst) on the Member 
States’ right to extend their laws and collective agreements to workers posted into their 
territory temporarily was our defence against a compulsory threshold period in applying 
the host state wages and other terms and conditions of employment to the posted workers. 
We acted against social dumping. The welfare and interests of construction workers’ had 
been close to my heart since the beginning of my professional career in 1975 in the 
Construction Workers’ Union (Finland). However, promoting their interests in Europe 
was radically different from my previous experience at the national level. This law-
making required general understanding of the legal status and consequences of EU 
directives, and in particular of positioning of the Posted Workers Directive under the 
legal umbrella of free provision of services. Our struggle for a decent posting directive 
was of general importance, I dare to say, was successful and helped in producing the 
outcome in 1996.  
 
After returning to Finland, a book, Collective Agreement and Competition Law in the EU 
(DJØF, Copenhagen 2001), edited and partially written jointly with Professor Niklas 
Bruun, enriched my vocation in legal scholarship. However, for numerous reasons I was 
not able to start a thorough research project concentrating on the relationship between 
internal market law and European labour law until 2004. Since the beginning in June 
2004, I have worked under his tutorship in this project entitled ‘From Internal Market 
Regulation to European Labour Law’ which, when the second publication was nearing its 
maturation, led to the decision to submit the outcome of the whole study project as my 
doctoral thesis. 
 
Conducting this study has been above all a learning process, and in the first article 
(publication) I realised that it is more useful to write more elaborately on selected items 
than one person trying to shape ‘everything of interest’. This ‘deep but not broad 
investigation’ then resulted in the first publication, especially in the conviction that the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights) Directive also applies to cross-border 
transfers, and so within groups of companies. Thus, it is very educative to see the fruits of 
one’s own life-long learning. In the same publication my reasoning on the theory of 
converse pyramids generated the ambition to come up later with a re-thought theoretical 
conceptualisation of European labour law and its positioning in the legal Union. The first 
three chapters of the second publication (on posting of workers) naturally have their roots 
in my European service. The fourth chapter was again a question of life-long learning. 
That attitude was necessary in writings on the right to collective action that penetrated the 
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study plan in the form of the Laval case and imposed the shape of the basics of a 
European right to collective action, Laval being later followed by the strike case The 
International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking. 
Writings on the right to strike again imposed ‘spill-over’ learning in the necessity to 
understand the basics of the effect of (general) international law in EU law. The third 
publication broadly followed the study plan, while there, too, the more concentrated 
approach led to a refined understanding of the interplay between the ‘general economic 
interest’ in the wording of Article 86(2) and the particular social tasks of general interest 
already covered by that provision in case-law.  
 
The Laval and Viking strike cases later also pushed for an approach beyond the original 
study plan in the synthesis article. It became essentially more than a mere synthesis, 
seeking to lay the foundations of a new collective EU labour law paradigm. It hopefully 
pushes the necessary debate on the European Community labour law further.  
 
*             *            * 
 
Thanks and acknowledgements are appropriate at the end of this research project. First 
and foremost, without the institutional and intellectual support of Professor Niklas Bruun 
since preparing the project and resolving its various problems, this study would have 
been radically more difficult to carry out, if not impossible. I also warmly thank the five 
anonymous national referees who gave their recommendations on the original study plan. 
I also want to thank Professor Brian Bercusson cordially for acting not just as my 
opponent, but also as a preliminary examiner who made many valuable comments. His 
academic works have also given me much inspiration and support. Likewise, Professor 
Tuomas Ojanen has directed me, especially in the challenging and developing field of 
fundamental rights, not only as a preliminary examiner but also through his comments 
and encouragement throughout.  
 
Financing the study is a result of the Finnish tripartism, meaning contributions by the 
tripartite and law-based Finnish Work Environment Fund (which is financed by the 
private sector employers), the Ministry of Labour, and a considerable number of trade 
union organisations. In guaranteeing the financing, Mrs. Kirsti Palanko-Laaka, former 
head of the work environment department of SAK, the Central Organisation of Finnish 
Trade Unions, had a prominent role. Pekka Hynönen (who once made me a lawyer), 
former chairman of the Construction Trade Union, was obviously the first to promise a 
trade union contribution for the project. Jorma Rusanen from SAK later found further 
trade union contributions. At the Ministry, Matti Salmenperä, its then leading labour law 
officer, saw the study’s importance and Jouni Lemola later led the Ministry steering 
group. Ilkka Tahvanainen at the Work Environment Fund has always supported the 
project, even when delayed.  
 
The trade union organisations contributing to the study financially are (in alphabetical 
order): AKAVA, the Confederation of Unions for Professional and Managerial Staff in 
Finland; the Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions, SAK; the Chemical Workers’ 
Union; the Construction Trade Union; the Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees, 
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STTK; the Finnish Metalworkers’ Union; the Finnish Paper Workers’ Union; the Finnish 
Public Services Unions’ EU Working Party (FIPSU); the Finnish Seamen’s Union; the 
Service Union United, PAM; the Transport Workers' Union, AKT; the Union of 
Professional Engineers in Finland, UIL; the Union of Salaried Employees, TU and the 
Wood and Allied Workers Union. I am grateful to all those responsible in their various 
unions.   
 
On this occasion, I also recall with pleasure the many debates during my years in 
Brussels with Rosendo Gonzalez Dorrego, Paul Windey, Jean-Jacques Paris and Mikko 
Huttunen (including his more recent comments and encouragement) from the European 
Commission, who all stimulated my European law exercises. David Lanove, as an 
honourable employer representative, showed the value of genuine European social 
partnership. Ove Bengtsberg, Jan Cremers, William van der Straeten and Frank Leus 
have been true friends and colleagues in the European Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers. Some of the debates with these friends and colleagues reached even the 
effect of photogrammetry in explaining case-law. 
 
On the national scene, Olavi Sulkunen (deceased 2005) encouraged dealing with the right 
to collective action in a European context through a European and international approach. 
In the third article (at TEL, the pension scheme) I was able to rely on professional 
feedback from Jukka Rantala, Mrs. Riitta Korpiluoma, Mrs. Kaija Kallinen, Pertti 
Parmanne and Matti Leppälä. Otherwise Petteri Ojanen, Markus Penttinen, Heikki Pohja, 
Kyösti Suokas, Simo Zitting, Markku Kiikeri, Heikki Lehtinen, Anders von Koskull, Juri 
Aaltonen and Professor Kauko Wikström have variously shared my (sometimes our joint) 
European problems over the years.  
 
I also gratefully thank the Library of the Finnish Parliament, where Mrs. Hilkka Salasmaa 
at the Interlibrary Loans Service especially has been burdened with my requests. 
 
There remains the private level of gratitude. Hence, I address the most cordial thanks to 
my cohabitee Hannele and to my children Sohvi-Maari, Eljas and Aarni. Love and 
understanding within the family have guaranteed the necessary peace to concentrate on 
the study. Last but not least, my mother has endured my considerable absence; my 
deceased father once understood the value of classical education: haec habui, quae dixi. 
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Foreword 
The article “On Social and Economic Factors in Developing European Labour Law. 
Reasoning on Collective Redundancies, Transfer of Undertakings and Converse 
Pyramids” published in this report was written by the researcher Jari Hellsten. The 
report is the first publication from the research project “From Internal Market 
Regulation to European Labour Law”. 
Looking at the interrelationship between social and economic factors is an interesting 
approach to EC employment law. The discussion has its concrete basis in existing EU 
legislation in the form of the Directives on Collective Redundancies and Transfer of 
Undertakings, both discussed in the first part of the report. It also reveals some new 
openings for a European debate, such as the cross-border applicability of the Transfer 
of Undertakings Directive, explored earlier by Professor Jonas Malmberg. The second 
part is mainly theoretical and contributes to understanding and explaining the 
developments and the state of the art of EU labour law, not just in the context of the 
internal market but also in a broader sense.  
The project is financed by the Finnish Work Environment Fund, the Finnish Ministry 
of Labour and several Finnish trade union organisations. It has been conducted in 
cooperation with the Swedish National Institute for Working Life 
(Arbetslivsinstitutet) and its labour law research group. The project focuses on issues 
such as the social dimension of the free provision of services and of competition law, 
subjects which have been studied by the Arbetslivsinstitutet for several years. 
The Finnish project is led by Niklas Bruun as research manager and Jari Hellsten as 
researcher. It is based at the Centre of International Economic Law (CIEL) at the Law 
Department of the Hanken School of Economics and Business Administration in 
Helsinki. The work does not emerge from a doctrinal vacuum since the project is well 
coordinated with the research activities in Stockholm. CIEL is engaged in permanent 
co-operation with the Institute and the Law Department at the Copenhagen Business 
School, one result of which is the EU labour law newsletter EU & arbetsrätt. As part 
of this collaboration the ideas of the second part of the report now published were 
subject to an extensive discussion in November 2004 with many useful comments and 
suggestions from the members of the EU labour law group at Arbetslivsinstitutet 
during Jari Hellsten’s visit to Stockholm. Since Arbetslivsinstitutet has established 
itself as the leading Nordic research environment for EU labour law it is well suited to 
publishing the article in its publication series “Arbetsliv i omvandling”. The choice of 
forum will hopefully result in the article reaching interested circles not only in the 
Nordic countries but also in other European Union member states. 
On behalf of Jari Hellsten and myself I wish to express my thanks to the Finnish 
authorities and organisations for financing the project and to Arbetslivsinstitutet for 
publishing this report. 
 
Stockholm, 10  May 2005 
Niklas Bruun 
professor 
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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the relationship and interplay of economic and social dimensions 
in the EC legal order. The paper comprises two interlinked chapters. The first one 
includes a recap of the history until the 1970s of the E(E)C as necessary to discuss the 
directives on collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings (acquired rights). 
When EC employment law emerged in the 1970s, the Treaty of Rome remained 
intact, which means that only a change in the shared system of values explains this 
emergence. This change does not reveal any surprises in the Collective Redundancies 
Directive but with the Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights) Directive the 
‘what, when and why’ questions inevitably lead to a recognition of the cross-border 
applicability of the Directive. It is logical to assert that the Directive also covers cross-
border corporate transfers. The transfers so governed occur between EC/EEA Member 
States and from them to third countries. This requires us to reconsider many of the 
central notions of the Transfer Directive. The natural normative question is: what are 
the rights and obligations transferred? It seems that at least the notion of transfer, 
economic dismissal reasons at a transfer, collective agreement and law applicable 
necessitate rethinking and even reconsidering settled case law. This way ‘social’ 
(fundamental social rights) faces ‘economic’ (fundamental economic freedoms) on a 
cross-border level. Corporate cross-border transfers highlight many of these problems 
which, besides, may depend on a Community approval of larger mergers. 
  
The second chapter of the article explores some theoretical attempts to explain the 
relationship between economic and social. It first presents the theory of converse 
pyramids as maintaining a rather straightforward dominance – even up to minutiae - 
of economic (and an undistorted internal market) over social. Such a rigid hierarchy 
thinking maybe was justified until the 1970s. However, the author maintains that this 
theory is liable to several structural problems, linked even to the nature of the 
Community and its competence. The EC is a unique legal order, and its social 
constitution is a fortiori of such a nature. Examples concerning amongst others the 
right to strike, safety of machinery and competition rules in relation to collective 
bargaining (on the basis of case Albany) prove that precedence has been given, in at 
least some cases, to the social factor. Accordingly, sometimes, such as with safety of 
machinery, there is just one normative pyramid left. However, the author does not 
maintain any predicted dominance of the social factor either. It remains to be seen 
whether and to what extent the European Constitution will affect this issue. 
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Chapter I 
 
1. On the Development of the Social Dimension in the EU 
 
The Intergovernmental Conference in October 2004 adopted the Constitutional Treaty 
for Europe. Even as not ratified and entered into force, this landmark development 
justifies, with respect to social and labour law, a retrospective review of some 
important normative developments that have occurred since the foundation of the 
European Economic Communities.  
My aim is to discuss the interplay of economic and social considerations since the 
beginning the European Economic Community. There is no doubt that the EEC was 
founded on an overwhelmingly economic Treaty. The social dimension was merely 
ancillary. However, it has grown significantly over the years and today the question 
about EC Labour Law is already justified - let it be that this historical continuum has 
no end. In other words, my thesis is that with the entry into force of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe the originally ancillary social factor in the EU 
would finally attain in general terms an equal footing with the economic dimension. 
Still, the EU on the one hand remains bound by the internal market philosophy while 
on the other hand it already seems to be close to declaring a breakthrough of 
independent European Labour Law. However, in order to be able to assess the present 
situation and the likely shape of future developments, it is necessary to recap the 
history in its main outlines.  
As a background factor I would mention that in reality the economic and social 
dimensions are inseparable. I would also mention that ‘economic’ and ‘social’ do 
have many meanings, depending on the context. These two underlying facts can be 
assumed to apply to everything discussed in this article without further repetition. 
There can e.g. be no real social rights without an adequate economic basis. All 
economic activity pays, but it is a separate issue whether we should be concerned with 
how much something pays if it does not destroy the payer, i.e. the employer. 
However, this distributive aspect is not explored further here. My main focus is on 
development of the justifications for European Labour Law, describing the path up to 
nearly declaring the breakthrough of a real European Labour Law. The fairness or 
integrity of the justifications is one important angle.  
 
My historical coverage must also remain limited to the parts of EC labour law that are 
discussed here. I shall pick up from issues prior to Maastricht, especially the 
Directives on Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings.   
 
  
1.1. Origin in the EEC Treaty 
 
International agreements between independent states do not emerge in a social and 
political vacuum. Hence, before entering into reasoning on a European and at the 
same time normative level, it is appropriate to recall in brief the broad Europe-wide 
social climate in the founding Member States of the 1950’s. I rely on a nutshell 
explanation given by Jean Degimbe, a high officer emeritus of the DG Social Affairs 
of the Commission. 
 
 2  
When negotiating the Treaty of Rome, the wounds opened by the Second World War 
were barely healed. At the same time, economic expansion without precedent was 
already happening, which presumably helped to solve the social problems that were 
present after the war. Lack of manpower prevailed instead of unemployment. The 
majority of economic and trade union leaders assumed further growth in favour of 
employment and better working conditions. Among the social partners in the founding 
Member States, diversity existed, of course, but across the six states a strong culture 
of negotiation prevailed, often anchored in the war-time resistance. Besides, the 
communist trade union movement was strong in Italy and France. Therefore, it was 
understood at the time that the various European texts should not take initiatives that 
could have disturbed or been misunderstood by the political ‘circles’, by preferring 
(European) law instead of negotiations. All these factors formed at least one 
background reason why social policy did not gain more weight in the Treaty of Rome. 
1 To this explanation I may just add that at an organisational level the social partners 
were more than halfway national: UNICE was certainly established in 1958 (with its 
roots tracing back to 1949) but the ETUC in its present form was established only in 
1973. 2 
 
This broad explanation can be transferred to the normative level via the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It shows that the contents of the EEC Treaty as to 
the role of social policy were not entirely inevitable. The ECSC incorporated some 
social dialogue and it included a wider competence for the High Authority of the 
ECSC than for the EEC Commission, even the competence to regulate minimum 
wages (Article 68 ECSC). The ECSC conducted an adaptation policy for surplus 
manpower (retraining) as well as for social housing. In sum, it was more social in its 
content than the EEC. 3  But the ECSC embodied only a partial (functional and 
sectoral) integration, and the forthcoming EEC was functional too, especially after the 
failure of the draft European Political Community. 4 Economic integration should 
precede political integration, as was highlighted in the Beyen Plan of 1952-3 and a 
later Benelux memorandum of 1955, the latter laying the foundations for the later 
conclusion of the EEC Treaty. 5 The European Economic Community emerged. 
 
While the leading Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Rome did not include any ‘social 
policy’ (only the Preamble included it, in ‘economic and social progress’), the flag 
provision of the EEC’s social policy was for decades in Article 117 EEC. It first 
                                                 
1 Jean Degimbe, La politique social européenne, Du Traité de Rome au Traité d’Amsterdam, 
p. 18-19. This is not to say that there would not have been struggles at the national level 
during 50’s. Further on, Degimbe also refers to a qualified diversity in legislation and praxis 
of the six states: between the German “Mitbestimmung” and the Italian and French praxis, 
there were even conceptual differences in trade unionism and also different approaches in 
leading economic activities. 
2 Degimbe denotes neutrally that at that time the power relations at the Community level were 
‘strongly different’ from today, ‘notably from the social point of view’ (my translation). Ibid., 
p. 61. See that the union side also started its cross-border co-operation within the European 
Coal and Steel Community. 
3 See e.g. Brian Bercusson, European Labour Law (Bercusson 1996), p. 45-6, Degimbe, pp. 
49-58.  
4 See e.g. Kapteyn and van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities, 
third ed. 1998, p. 9-13.  
5 Ibid., p. 11 and 13. 
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declared the necessity to promote improved working conditions and standard of 
living, ‘so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being 
maintained’ (upward harmonisation). It then added a credo, as follows: 
 
‘[The Member States] believe that such a development will ensue not only 
from the functioning of the common market, which will favour the 
harmonization of social systems, but also from the procedures provided for in 
this Treaty and the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action.’ 
 
How did this almost religious faith in the fruitful effect of the Common Market 
emerge at the intergovernmental level, next to the socio-political developments 
mentioned above? 6  
 
The Treaty founders relied on two preceding reports: an economic report produced by 
the ILO (Ohlin Report) 7 and an economic-political Spaak report. 8 The latter’s broad 
line as to policy areas to be harmonised, as well as to the institutional structure of the 
Community, was realized quite as such in the Treaty of Rome. 9 Both reports rejected 
any general harmonisation in the social sphere, counting on the market’s basic ability 
to correct distortions of competition. The Ohlin report anyway noted the economic 
impact of differences in social legislation and benefits 10  that might justify 
harmonisation in certain limited areas such as equal pay and working time. In the case 
of harmonisation, the report foresaw that clarity would be required. Otherwise trade 
would be seriously distorted and the harmonising measures would not be directed 
against the essential prerogatives of the States concerned. 11  However, in general 
terms the report relied on higher productivity balancing the burden of better social 
standards. Changes in exchange rates were a possible further means of achieving the 
same balance, thus preventing any ‘race to the bottom’. This position also relied 
essentially on ‘… the strength of the trade union movement in European countries and 
                                                 
6 I recall that Article 100 EEC (now Article 94 EC) also required – to work as a legal base for 
E(E)C law approximating national laws etc. – a direct effect to the establishment or 
functioning of the common market.  
7 International Labour Office, ‘Social Aspects of European Economic Cooperation’ (1956) 74 
International Labour Review (ILR) 99. 
8 Officially : Rapport des Chefs des Délégations, Comité Intergouvernemental, 21. Apr. 1956. 
The whole report is available in French on the address 
http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00000996/01/Spaak_report_french.pdf . In German it is e.g. in 
Schulze und Hoeren, Dokumente zum Europäischen Recht, Band 1, Gründungsverträge; 
Springer, Berlin 1999, p. 752-822. An abridged English version (20 pages) is available on the 
address http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00000995/. 
9 Catherine Barnard, however, refers (Barnard, EC Employment Law, 2nd ed., Oxford 2000, p. 
4), to Otto Kahn-Freund who has asserted that the Spaak committee’s views were perhaps not 
as clearly reflected as might have been the case, perhaps because the relevant provisions were 
drafted only at the end of a crucial conversation between the French and German Prime 
Ministers. Kahn-Freund, ‘Labour Law and Social Security’, in American Enterprise in the 
European Common Market: A Legal Profile, eds. Stein and Nicholson (University of 
Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960) 
10 ILR, p. 85 
11 Ibid., p. 116. 
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the sympathy of European governments towards social aspirations, to ensure that 
labour conditions would improve and not deteriorate.’ 12  
 
The Spaak report was built essentially on regarding workers and employees as market 
factors. 13  Free movement of labour was seen as crucial for any prosperity but 
otherwise the Community should not interfere in the States’ powers to regulate 
working conditions. Hence, the EEC Treaty essentially enshrined only the free 
movement of workers, supplemented by the European Social Fund (Article 123 EEC) 
and the co-ordination of social security for migrant workers (Article 51 EEC, now 42 
EC). However, former Judge of the European Court of Justice, G. Federico Mancini 
has succinctly described the status of labour law in establishing the Community. I 
present it here as explained by Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, with his quotations. 
Hence, according to Mancini, the Treaty of Rome was concerned primarily with the 
creation of ‘a European market based on competition’; employed labour was only 
‘inextricably involved’; the free movement of labour may have ‘beneficial social 
effects’, for example on discrimination or low pay: if so, all the better – but ‘it is 
nothing more than that’. 14   Catherine Barnard has called this basic structure ‘a 
victory for the classic neo-liberal market tradition: there was no need for a European-
level social dimension because high social standards were “rewards” for efficiency, 
not rigidities imposed on the market.’15 - The limited nature of Community labour law 
in the beginning of the EEC must also be assessed in the light of the state of national 
labour law in the six founding Member States at that time. In broad terms, it was still 
in its post-war evolution and did not contain much basis for Community regulation.   
 
In describing the features of EC labour law as enshrined in its initial Treaty model 
Spiros Simitis and Antoine Lyon-Caen in their essay Community Labour Law: A 
Critical Introduction to its History 16 set forth (and distinguish) three elements: (i) 
harmonisation, (ii) justification for regulatory activity for the Community and (iii) 
statist or public syndrome.  
 
(i) As a perceived principle, Article 117 EEC proclaimed ‘upward harmonisation’ but 
Article 100 included as a method only the ‘approximation’ of law, which meant a 
realistic coexistence of different social systems. Upward harmonisation, as carefully 
distinguished from either co-ordination or approximation, was ‘not concerned with 
the expression of legal rules, only their teleology’. 17  
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 87. 
13 See e.g. pages 19-20, 60-1and 88-91 of the Spaak report.  
14 Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, European Community Law and Workers’ Rights After 
1992: Fact or Fake? In Lord Wedderburn, Labour Law and Freedom, Further Essays in 
Labour Law, Lawrence & Wishart, London 1997, p. 251. In his note 17 (p.275) Lord 
Wedderburn refers to Mancini, ‘Labour Law and Community’, (1985) 20 Ir. Jur. (n.s.) 1 at 
pp. 2, 12, 15.  
15 Barnard, EC Employment Law, 2. ed., Oxford University Press 2000, p. 2.  
16 In Davies et al., (eds.), European Community Labour Law, Liber Amicorum Lord 
Wedderburn. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996, pp. 1-22. 
17 Ibid., p. 4 where (in footnote 9) they refer to Rodière, ‘L’harmonisation des législations 
européennes dans le cadre de la CEE’, [1965] Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, p. 336. – 
Judge Romain Schingten has remarked that one should read Article 117 in the context of the 
Preamble of the Treaty (economic and social progress, second recital), as well as in the light 
of Article 2 EC (high level of social protection and raising of the standard of living). He, too, 
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(ii) ‘Justifications’ for Community legislation Simitis and Antoine Lyon-Caen note as 
restrictive, being linked exclusively to competition. Besides, they note how 
Community experience ‘to date’ [until 1995-96] supports the thesis that no such 
approximation is necessary. 18 They further ask how one might distinguish between 
selfish or opportunistic action by enterprises and a genuine distortion, and ‘what 
argument will demonstrate convincingly that some particular disparity is likely to 
affect the functioning of the Common Market’. While these arguments were still 
raised against to the draft Posting Directive during the 1990’s, they conclude how, 
‘[a]t all events, the close tie between Community social policy and the requirements 
of competition lends all its weight to a severe diagnosis which has lost none of its 
relevance: “the Treaty of Rome did not go as far as the 1919 Treaty of Versailles 
went”’. 19  
 
(iii) The third element in the initial model for Simitis and Lyon-Caen, the ‘statist or 
public syndrome’ meant that the Treaty, notwithstanding the conviction that labour 
law is in every Member State a result of independent evolution, conferred on the 
Community authorities the power to construct a form of Community labour law, 
however limited its justifications and scope. At the same time this crucially meant 
action covering only public entities, state provisions and co-operation between 
Member States (under Article 118 EEC). Hence, no social partners were seen or 
recognized by the text of the original Treaty. 
 
Resuming, Simitis and A. Lyon-Caen describe this model as 
 
‘social harmonisation as its perceived principle, competition as its dynamic, 
and an institutional view of labour law as associated with the State…’ 20 
 
This conclusion Simitis and Lyon-Caen anchored by referring to three cases. In Zaera  
the Court affirmed that Article 118 in no way affected the regulatory competence of 
individual Member States in the social field. 21 Already in Defrenne III 22 it declared 
that Article 117 was essentially programmatic. In Sloman Neptune it asserted that 
‘Article 117 of the EEC Treaty is essentially in the nature of a programme. It relates 
only to social objectives the attainment of which must be the result of Community 
action, close cooperation between Member States and the operation of the Common 
Market.’23  
 
                                                                                                                                            
ex cathedra notes the social factor as corollary and some kind of sub-product of the 
reinforcing economic power. Schintgen, La longue gestation du droit du travail 
communautaire: De Rome à Amsterdam ; in Mélanges en hommage à Fernand Schockweiler, 
Nomos, Baden-Baden 1999, p. 551-2. 
18 Ibid., p. 5. 
19 Ibid., p.5-6. 
20 Ibid., p. 6. 
21 Case 126/86 Zaera [1987] ECR I-3696, paragraph 16. In Zaera the Court however added 
that while Article 117 EEC was programmatic, it was to be taken into account in interpreting 
and applying the other provisions of the EC Treaty and secondary Community legislation in 
the social field; paragraph 14. 
22 Case 149/77 Defrenne III [1978] ECR 1365. 
23 Case C-72/91Sloman Neptune [1993] ECR I-887, paragraph 25. 
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The broad analysis of Simitis and Lyon-Caen is easy to share. The original Treaty was 
controversial in itself and foresaw no social partners. In sum, the lot of any 
community social and labour law was hard in the beginning of the EEC. Together 
with monetary and budgetary policies, social policy remained, as the Spaak report 
recommended, purely a matter for the member state governments.  
 
As to competition-linked provisions in the Treaty, two addenda are still in place. First, 
Article 91 EEC was enacted as a measure against possible dumping in the internal 
market. There is no way of linking this with its possible application of social grounds. 
Presumably such practice never appeared. It was only in the Treaty of Amsterdam that 
this provision was repealed. Second, as further safety valves against market 
distortions, Articles 101 and 102 were enacted, justifying Community action to 
combat distortions of competition due to disparities in existing or draft laws. In theory, 
these provisions also covered distortions due to disparities in labour law.   
 
From today’s perspective it is, however, worth noting that already the Spaak report 
mentioned areas for corrective and distortion eliminating action: equal pay, working 
time, as well as overtime bonuses and paid holidays. 24  This ‘second pillar’ of 
European labour law Maximilian Fuchs has denoted, referring to Rolf Birk, as ‘labour 
law motivated by competition’. 25 However, in this way the Spaak report already 
incorporated the future ‘duality’ (or interplay) between the economic and social 
dimensions. In any case, following equal pay in Article 119 EEC, the retention of the 
existing equivalence of paid holiday schemes was enshrined in Article 120 EEC. This 
provision still exists in Article 142 EC; it was not referred to by the Working Time 
Directive 93/104/EC (WTD) notwithstanding the minimum paid annual holiday 
established by the WTD. Furthermore, it appears in rudimentary form even in the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Article III-215), but for whom and 
what? 
 
A third prominent example of these ‘aspirations of competitive labour law’ was the 
third Protocol annexed to the EEC Treaty on ‘Certain Provisions Relating to France’. 
According to its letter, the Commission was to authorise France to take protective 
measures if the establishment of the common market did not lead, by the end of the 
first stage (1962), regarding the basis for overtime payments (hours worked beyond 
which overtime pay was due) and the overtime payments themselves, to a result 
corresponding to the average in France in 1956. France never invoked this safety 
valve. And without checking, it is evident that in the preparations for the 1993 
Working Time Directive nobody read out this Protocol in a Council Working Group 
or in the European Parliament. 
 
 
                                                 
24 The Spaak report denotes these as both sources for distortion (p. 62-3 of the French report, 
p. 791 in the compendium of Schulze and Hoeren) and as in any case subject to a special 
effort of progressive harmonisation measures (p. 65-66 of the French report, p. 793 in Schulze 
and Hoeren). 
25 Fuchs, The Bottom Line of European Labour Law (Part I), IJCLIR, Vol. 20/3 2004, p. 158. 
He refers to Rolf Birk, ‘Arbeitsrecht – Freizügigkeit der Arbeitnehmer und Harmonisierung 
des Arbeitsrechts’, in: C.O.Lenz (ed.), EG-Handbuch. Recht im Binnenmarkt, 2nd ed., 
Herne/Berlin, 1994, p. 369. 
 7  
1.2. Summing up the Founding History of the EEC 
 
Historically the end result of the European project as a European Economic 
Community was a semi-inevitable outcome. It meant, modifying a little the 
description of Simitis and A. Lyon-Caen of European labour law, social (upward) 
harmonisation as its proclaimed principle; competition as its dynamic; and an 
institutional view of labour law as something that was associated with the State. The 
sole piece of law dealing with a social issue, was essentially the market orientated free 
movement of workers.  
 
Following the functional integration idea (theory) the EEC also established, in its 
particular way, the dichotomy between the economic and the social dimensions. With 
the almost sole exception of gender equality, there was the corresponding competence 
dichotomy between the Community and the Member States. Hence, the economic and 
social dimensions were, at this level, in a broader sense but also normatively divided. 
The point is that at the EEC level the division between economic and social became 
crucially more highlighted than is at present the case nationally. At the national level 
it is easier to see that, as in real life, the economic and social dimensions are not 
divisible, while on the normative level the division is, of course, everywhere. 
However, in real life wage (or salary) for a worker (or employee) is a social factor, up 
to Omega, but it is at the same time pecuniary, i.e. it is economic. From an employer’s 
point of view it is at least economic. It may also have a social dimension too, but I 
will not explore for the present whether it is relevant to speak about the social 
meaning of pay from an employer’s point of view. In addition, no social benefit can 
be realised without the necessary economic foundations.  
 
The original EEC Treaty, even with its fragmented social provisions and its 
ideological and practical dominance of economic integration, still managed to 
incorporate the necessary foundations for future development including development 
of the interplay between the economic and social dimensions. In trying to explain this 
I will use the normative instrument of dividing (or disecting) the economic and social 
dimensions.  
 
European social and labour law developed very little from the beginning of the 
Common Market until the early 1970’s (one exception to this was Regulation 
1612/68). 26 In order to cover in this paper the broad line of developments up to today, 
I will pass over this early dormant period in this paper. 
 
 
2. New Wave of 1970s  
 
During the 1970’s the Community increased essentially its legislative activity in 
social matters. This took place without changing a comma in the EEC Treaty. The 
Equal Pay Directive (75/117/EEC), 27  the Collective Redundancy Directive 
                                                 
26 I recall that the debate on the Commission’s possibility to come up with initiatives was high 
from the beginning. See e.g. Kåre F. V. Pedersen, Steg för steg in I framtiden, 
Arbetslivsinstitutet, Sverige, Arbetslivsrapport 1997:12, p. 6-8.  
27 Officially: Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men 
and women. 
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(75/129/EEC), 28 the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC) 29 and the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive (in UK called the Acquired Rights Directive; 77/187/EEC) 30 
were adopted. It is also appropriate to add to this wave the so-called Insolvency 
Directive (80/987/EEC). 31 The confirmation in the case Defrenne II 32 of the direct 
effect of Article 119 EEC on gender equality in pay fits into the same wave.  
 
We may ask: what was behind this legislative activism? There are several explanatory 
political and economic factors. First, trade unions became more active vis-à-vis the 
Community since the late 1960’s. During the same period, especially in France and 
Italy, a strong political movement occurred being directed at modifying the prevailing 
economic policy and system. Thus, the standing tripartite Standing Committee on 
Employment was founded in 1970 and the European Social Fund was reformed in 
1971. In addition, important political moves concerning the EEC occurred in 
Germany and France. Chancellor Willy Brandt ‘had several reasons for making the 
development of an EEC social agenda an early goal of the new German political 
philosophy. He and his party, the Social Democrats, were committed to social 
progress, particularly in the employment field. In addition, the introduction of 
Community worker protection and worker rights legislation compatible with German 
legislation would undercut the argument of German employers that the proposed 
domestic legislation would reduce the competitiveness of German industry. 
Community employment legislation would also eliminate the incentive for employers 
to shift investment from Germany to other European countries.’ 33 In France President 
De Gaulle retired in 1970 and his successors were much more Europe-minded. The 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined a Community in which the Franco-
German axis was dominant.  
 
At the same time, the first signs of future economic problems were seen as the 
Community acquired three new Member States.  
 
With this background the Heads of State (with the new Member States’ presence) 
decided to give a signal in favour of the social dimension of the Community. The 
communiqué of the Paris summit in 1972 noted that economic expansion was not a 
goal in itself but it was especially a means of alleviating differences in standard of 
living. The economy also required the participation of all of the social partners. This 
should lead to better quality of life. It also noted that the Member States  
 
                                                 
28 Officially: Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies. 
29 Officially: Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working conditions. 
30 Officially: Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses. 
31 Officially: Council Directive of 20 October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their 
employer. 
32 Officially it was case 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena, [1976] ECR 455. 
33 M Shanks, ‘The Social policy of the European Communities’ (1977) CMLR 377. Michael 
Shanks was Commissioner for Social Affairs in 1970’s. 
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‘attached as much importance to vigorous action in the social field as to the 
achievement of Economic and Monetary union. They consider it essential to 
ensure the increasing involvement of labour and management in the economic 
and social decisions of the Community.’ 
 
Following this, the Council on 21 January 1974 adopted the Commission’s proposal 
for a Social Action Programme. 34 It included more than 30 different measures, but 
strictly read, only three direct and new legislative initiatives were mentioned: the 
Transfer of Undertakings and Collective Redundancy Directives. The third initiative 
was achieving gender equality in access to employment and vocational training, 
advancement and working conditions (realised via the Equal Treatment Directive 
1976/207/EEC). Already before the adoption of the Action Programme the 
Commission had submitted a proposal for an Equal Pay Directive (1975/117/EEC). 
The progressive involvement of workers and their representatives in the life of 
undertakings was a fifth issue in the sense that it later led, after preparations lasting 
some twenty years, to the European Works Council Directive 94/45/EC. A sixth issue 
in the field of employment law was ‘the designation as an immediate objective of the 
overall application of the principle of a standard 40-hour working week by 1975, and 
the principle of four weeks annual paid holiday by 1976’; thus an objective and a 
principle. The latter became realised by the Working Time Directive 93/104/EC but 
the former is just inside the 48 hours’ week that includes over-time work. A seventh 
issue in employment law was the protection of workers hired by temporary 
employment agencies. No legislative instrument was expected, and the issue is still 
open. 
 
An interesting offshoot was the commitment ‘to facilitate, depending on the situation 
in the different countries, the conclusion of collective agreements at the European 
level in appropriate fields’. This, the legal preconditions included, was also subject to 
debate in the doctrine. 35 From today’s perspective this idea is easy to describe as 
ultra-voluntaristic at that time, given the normative base in the EC Treaty. However, 
the mere inclusion of this point in the Action Programme reflects an attempt to create 
something new. 
 
It is a matter of taste whether these four directives and three issues (as added to by the 
offshoot) are sufficient to qualify this new approach as a social policy approach or 
sozialstaatlicher (social policy) approach as the German term used by Maximilian 
Fuchs reads. 36 Given the market-driven Treaty of Rome, maybe the term is justified  
in the EC context, as backed up by the measures outside employment law (on migrant 
workers, vocational training, social security, safety and health etc.). Jeff Kenner has 
                                                 
34 OJ C13, 12.2.1974. 
35 See e.g. Gérard Lyon-Caen, Négociation et convention collective au niveau européen. 
Revue trimestrielle du droit européen, 9(1) janv.-mars 1973, p. 589-593. 
36 Fuchs, p. 159. In The Bottom Line of European Labour Law (Part II), Fuchs denotes the 
period of 1970s as ‘the heyday of European social policy-making and European labour law; 
IJCLLIR Vol. 20, Issue 3, 2004, p. 436. In the conclusions, loc.cit. p. 443, he describes it how 
‘the genuinely social concern adopted by national labour law systems managed to establish 
itself on the European stage’, as reflected by the 1974 Social Action Programme. I don’t 
doubt this ‘genuinely social concern’ as such. I, however, denote that it wasn’t too powerful 
on the European stage, as my example of the Collective Redundancy Directive, explained 
infra, shows. It remained essentially procedural.        
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called it a ‘New Deal’ that was intended to give the Community a ‘humane face’. 37 
Commissioner Shanks has asserted that it: 
 
‘…reflected a political judgment of what was thought to be both desirable and 
possible, rather than a juridical judgment of what were thought to be the social 
policy implications of the Rome Treaty.’ 38 
 
In the context of ‘what was both desirable and possible’, it is clear that resorting to the 
enactment of secondary EC law in the field of labour law in a way meant a 
recognition that the Common Market, contrary to what is implied in the Treaty 
(Article 117 EEC), did not bring about any quasi-automatic approximation, let alone 
harmonisation, of national social systems. Under their heading ‘Impasses’ Simitis and 
A. Lyon-Caen manifest this by referring to the Green Paper of 1975 on employee 
participation where the Commission stated candidly: 
 
‘A sufficient convergence of social and economic policies and structures in 
these areas will not happen automatically as a consequence of the integration 
of Community markets.’ 39 
 
The Commission, however, tempered this judgement with some hope, by stating: 
 
The objective is gradual removal of unacceptable degrees of divergence 
between the structures and policies of the Member States.’ 
 
Because the objective was not enforced by any instrument, integration of the market 
did not nurture harmonisation, but rather disparities just seemed to increase. For 
Simitis and A. Lyon-Caen, ‘as a consequence, the initial plan lost all credibility.’ 40 
They note the lack of real questions about the credibility of an EC social law (‘unified 
Europe with a social ambition’) and further pick up a prompted search of new 
vocabulary: ‘the appearance of the word ’convergence’’. This did not just reflect 
exhibited growing uncertainty but – for Simitis and A. Lyon-Caen – affected the very 
conception of Community social policy, witnessed by the manner in which it was 
partially recast in the Single European Act. 41  Hence, Simitis and A. Lyon-Caen 
clearly mean the withdrawal from any real attempt towards upward harmonisation as 
masked by this ‘convergence’. We will come across this magic word later in my 
explanation of the Collective Redundancy Directive. 
 
‘Harmonisation’ (‘alignment’) was another magic word, forming the link or synthesis, 
as Bercusson puts it, between the European labour law and social policy. Expressing 
the latter in the language of the Common Market law resulted in this harmonisation 
(alignment) by directives of the 1970’s that are reflected in an ECOSOC publication 
of that time: The Stage Reached in Aligning Labour Legislation in the European 
                                                 
37 Jeff Kenner, EU Employment Law, Oxford 2003, p. 24. 
38 M Shanks, European Social Policy Today and Tomorrow (1977), p. 13. Quoted by Brian 
Bercusson, op.cit., 51. 
39 Employee Participation and Company Structure, Green Paper of the Commission of the 
European Communities, EC Bull., SU 8/75, p. 10. Referred to by Simitis and Lyon-Caen, p. 
7. The point was the role of employees in the decision-making process within companies. 
40 Ibid, p. 7. 
41 Ibid., p. 8. 
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Community. 42  We will also find ‘harmonisation’ in the Collective Redundancy 
Directive, questionable as to its credibility.  
 
Whatever term (harmonisation, convergence, social policy approach, New Deal) is 
used, this legislative activity had Article 94 (ex 100) EC as the legal base, apart from 
Article 308 (ex 235) EC for the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC). Both 
Articles employ in their very wording the effect of national and EC law on the 
common (internal) market.  43 The simple reason for resorting to Articles 94 and 308 
EC was that the original Social Chapter of the Treaty did not contain any legal base 
like Article 42 (ex 51) in social security. It is therefore appropriate to look a bit deeper 
into the directives on Collective Redundancies and Transfer, so as to verify to what 
extent the common market effect was a real one or whether it was just paying lip 
service for an appropriate choice of the legal base. These two directives a priori did 
have the possibility of enacting on core issues in an employment relationship.  
 
These directives are fruits of the common market thinking, as applied in 1970’s. 
Although their basics are still in force today, I will take the liberty of describing them 
up to the present. I will later on note the possible effect of the Treaty amendments and 
the 1989 Social Charter of the EU. 
 
 
2.1. Collective Redundancy Directive  
 
The Collective Redundancy Directive (CRD), with Article 100 as its legal base, is a 
landmark of the legislative activity of the 1970’s, a time-related product of the 
market-orientated social (employment) law of the EEC. Its basics have not evolved 
since then. Some of its features describe the overall state-of-art in EC employment 
law, even up to today. It further addresses the problem of the interaction of, or the 
striking of a balance between the economic freedom of an employer to stop his 
activities (or to be imposed to do so in liquidation) and the needs and/or social rights 
of the workers concerned.  
 
Both the original directive (75/129/EEC) and the present one (98/59/EC) refer in the 
Preamble (third Recital) to an ‘increasing convergence’ of national provisions as to 
procedure but also, remarkably, to measures ‘designed to alleviate the consequences 
of redundancy for workers’. I will mention the background to the directive. In 1973 
AKZO, a Dutch-German multinational enterprise in chemicals, engaged a major 
restructuring by dismissing some 5,000 workers as a consequence of the oil crisis. 
The apparent strategy was to dismiss workers in countries where it was cheapest to do 
so. 44 The ensuing outrage led to a proviso in the Social Action Programme and to the 
Directive in 1975. While the Preamble of the directive (first Recital) regarded it as 
important to afford greater protection to workers, the Directive was still adopted as 
being essentially procedural. And so it is still today.  
                                                 
42 Economic and Social Committee of the EEC, Brussels 1978, p. iv; referred to by 
Bercusson, European Labour Law, Butterworths, London 1996, p. 51.  
43 Article 94 EC deals with approximation of national rules that ‘directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the common market’. Article 308 EC may be resorted to as a 
legal base for EC measures ‘necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common 
market...’  The difference in wording is not worth of too much attention.   
44 Blanpain, European Labour Law, 7. rev. ed., Kluwer Law International 2000, p. 381.  
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Dismissing where cheapest is a rather manifest ‘common market effect’. Redundancy 
(severance) payments are, next to being essential factor in dismissal costs, core 
provisions in alleviating the consequences of mass redundancies for workers. Still, the 
original directive only imposed an obligation to consult workers’ representatives on 
the means of mitigating the consequences of redundancy, with a view to reaching an 
agreement. The revision in 1992 (92/56/EEC) supposed that such payments are made, 
and, if so, imposes an obligation to consult the employee representatives on ‘the 
method for calculating any redundancy payments other than those arising out of 
national legislation and/or practice’ (Article 2(3)(vi)). The amendment of the 
Directive in 1998 was only of a consolidation nature and naturally kept this watered-
down solution. The reality still today is that there are essential differences in 
redundancy payments. The broad line is that there are no statutory or collective 
agreement-based payments in Finland and Denmark (except for certain white collar 
workers) while in Sweden since 2004 the payments are covered by a confederal 
collective agreement between the Swedish LO and the employers central organisation 
Svenskt Näringsliv (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise). The highest payments are 
in Austria, Germany and Spain.45 In the new Member States such payments exist at 
least in Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic. 46   In its last official proposal of 
January 2002 on corporate restructuring, the Commission misleadingly asserted that 
fair compensation in the form of redundancy payments would be a ‘well-established 
practice in all [the then 15] Member States’.  47 
 
Hence, the Preamble of the original Directive referred, after the ‘increasing 
convergence’, this being the new jargon of the 1970’s 48, to the ‘measures designed to 
alleviate the consequences of redundancy for workers’, as does the Directive in force 
(of 1998). Still, the Directive does not harmonise the most essential alleviating 
measure, at the same time also the most essential cost factor, namely the severance 
payments.   
 
However, one may also see a real ‘common market effect’ in Article 4(1) of the 
directive, according to which  
 
‘Projected collective redundancies notified to the competent public authority 
shall take effect not earlier than 30 days after the notification referred to in 
                                                 
45 On the major differences of these payments, see Jari Hellsten, Provisions and Procedures 
Governing Collective Redundancies in Europe, Finnish Metalworkers’ Union; September 
2001 (Hellsten 2001). As an example of high payments one may refer to a case called 
‘Kimberly Clark’, in fact France v. Commission, C-241/94 [1996] ECR I-4551. The judgment 
denotes the key figures (paragraph 28). A paper mill in Rouen, France, dismissed 207 workers 
and salaried employees. The collective agreement concerned required average severance pay 
of EUR 21,340 (FF 140,000). The sum fixed in the social plan that was implemented was 
EUR 60,260 (FF 395,000) inclusive of training contribution. In addition, the State 
Employment Fund paid training aid (that was regarded as prohibited state aid). First phase of 
consultation of the Community cross-industry and sectoral social partners, p. 13;  
46 See Hellsten (2001). 
47 See the document Anticipating and managing change: a dynamic approach to the social 
aspects of corporate restructuring. ). First phase of consultation of the Community cross-
industry and sectoral social partners, p. 13; 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/labour_law/docs/. 
48 See the description of Simitis and Lyon-Caen on p. 4, supra. 
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Article 3 (1) without prejudice to any provisions governing individual rights 
with regard to notice of dismissal.’ 
 
This de facto set up a minimum length for negotiations. Besides, Article 4(3) enabled 
the authorities to prolong the period up to 60 days and accepted even wider extension 
powers enacted by the Member States. 49  In this sense the right to prolong the 
negotiation period up to 60 days was a peculiar mix of a minimum and maximum 
provision. In the end, the 60 days’ maximum is not strictly true, and, indeed, Article 5 
stated and still states the minimum nature of the Directive. However, setting up the 
minimum length of negotiations, unless the authorities accept a shorter period in 
given cases, is a relatively small interference in the functioning of the (labour) market 
and imposes the necessary time frame for, in most cases, seeking solutions for 
retraining and other mitigating measures. Hence, the directive is essentially 
procedural. It does not lay down substantives rules as to which reasons and 
circumstances justify dismissals.  
 
Bercusson discusses the harmonising effect of the Directive, also by referring to two 
surveys covering Belgium, Frances, Germany, Italy and UK. The first one, concerning 
redundancy provisions in the textile industry, revealed essential differences also after 
the Directive both in consultation and selection procedure, and in financial 
compensations. The second survey, concerning formal law in these countries revealed 
essential differences regarding the definition of ‘collective dismissal’, procedures 
prior to dismissal and redundancy payments. In conclusion, he states ‘it is difficult to 
describe this process as, or ascribe it to, a wholly effective policy of harmonisation of 
labour law in the European Community’. 50 
 
The European Court of Justice has also discussed the nature of the Collective 
Redundancy Directive. Amongst others the lack of employee representation generated 
the infringement case Commission v. United Kingdom. 51  The Court characterised the 
directive, as follows: 
 
16 By harmonising the rules applicable to collective redundancies, the 
Community legislature intended both to ensure comparable protection for 
workers' rights in the different Member States and to harmonise the costs 
which such protective rules entail for Community undertakings.  
 
This characterisation of general type e.g. Catherine Barnard has presented as marking 
a recognition of the dual nature, economic and social, of the Collective Redundancy 
Directive. 52  The dual nature is true, indeed by definition: it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to find real protection of workers (social factor) that would not cause 
costs (economic factor) to the employer. However, even the harmonisation of 
procedure was just partial, as the Court noted later in the judgment (paragraph 25). It 
                                                 
49 See Article 4(3), second subparagraph.  
50 Bercusson 1996, p. 53-64; citation at 64. The survey on the textile industry was first 
published in European Industrial Relations Review No 51 (March 1978), p. 7; referred to by 
Bercusson 1996 on p. 62. The survey on formal law was published in European Industrial 
Relations Review No 76 (May 1980); Bercusson 1996 p. 63 refers to a table on its p. 19.  
51 Case C-383/92.  
52 Catherine Barnard, EC Employment Law, second edition, Oxford, University Press, 2000, 
p. 24. 
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was sufficient to invalidate (i.e. to declare as contradicting with the Directive) the 
traditional voluntary trade union recognition system in the UK (paragraphs 26-7 of the 
judgment). A further necessary clarification concerning this case is in that the Court 
by no means assessed the cost factor but obviously deduced the economic (cost) 
factor expressed in paragraph 16 from the first Recital of the Directive that referred to 
‘taking into account the need for balanced economic and social development within 
the Community.’ 53 There was no point in the case necessitating any such assessment 
of costs. In fact, so far as I know, no official document of the EC machinery entails 
any comprehensive assessment of these costs. They are left hanging in the air while 
any expert accepts that the cost factor is still a real thing.  
 
However, one may still maintain that the Court’s reference to harmonising the costs of 
collective redundancies as a purpose of the Directive was essentially illusory. It 
harmonises them only in so far as the employer is burdened by the minimum period 
(30 days) for negotiations prior to giving the notice.       
 
 
2.1.1 Corporate Responsibility  
 
Within the procedural framework there is, however, one provision that is worthy of 
remark, namely the establishment by the 1992 amendment (Directive 92/56/EEC) of a 
corporate responsibility in Article 2(4). The information and consultation obligations  
 
‘shall apply irrespective of whether the decision regarding collective 
redundancies is being taken by the employer or by an undertaking controlling 
the employer. 
 
In considering alleged breaches of the information, consultation and 
notification requirements laid down by this Directive, account shall not be 
taken of any defence on the part of the employer on the ground that the 
necessary information has not been provided to the employer by the 
undertaking which took the decision leading to collective redundancies.' 54 
 
Article 2(4) means in practice that a daughter company must hold the consultations 
before the mother company decides on redundancies. Otherwise there is a breach of 
procedure, leading to compensation for the workers. The Explanatory Memorandum 
of the proposed Amending Directive gave details on the impact of the internal market. 
Growing internationalisation was seen as resulting increasingly in cross-border 
corporate restructuring of companies on which there was a loophole in the original 
directive. The Amending Directive was intended to block it by setting up a strict 
responsibility on the daughter company for decisions taken. The structure was not, 
however, a complete novelty because already in case Rockfon A/S v 
Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark the ECJ confirmed the interpretation that the 
employer could not free itself from the directive’s obligations by entrusting, in a 
group of companies, decision-making to a unit separate from the employing unit. 55 In 
                                                 
53 The same statement still flourishes in the second Recital of the Directive in force, 
98/59/EC.  
54 On this provision, see e.g. Bercusson 1996, p. 230-3.  
55 Case C-449/93 Rockfon [1995] ECR I-4291, paragraph 30. 
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sum: establishing this corporate responsibility had a real common market reason, and 
the Amending Directive was intended to improve the position of workers. Within this 
procedural framework the economic and social factors were combined. 
 
As Bercusson has pointed out, in the preparations of the original directive there was 
some debate about also covering the grounds for dismissal. At least France wanted 
this. It ‘considered that the aim of the directive should be to protect workers against 
collective dismissals. But the text proposed by the Commission…was more concerned 
with the interests of the undertakings.’ German and UK delegations reported that the 
proposal of the Commission was intended to establish criteria by which the labour 
marked worked properly. 56 Anyway, given the reference in the Preamble also to 
Article 117 EEC, it would have been a reasonable expectation that the directive would 
have tackled at least the level of redundancy payments. While this did not happen, the 
cost balancing effect of the directive in reality is confined to the effect of establishing 
the minimum period for negotiations, if it is discernable at all.  
 
In covering the deficiencies in the Collective Redundancy Directive, it is necessary to 
mention how the obligation to alleviate the consequences of mass redundancies is 
weakened by being only an obligation to consult the employee representatives on 
these measures. There is no European framework set up for a social plan although 
there are examples that are well established (with necessary traditions) in Austria, 




2.1.2 Looser Requirements for Multinationals? 57 
 
A further issue falling under the common market effect would have been, by 
definition, the substantive grounds for collective dismissals that are mainly the so-
called ETOP-reasons: economic, technical, organisational and productivity reasons. 58 
Another aspect is that the directive covers comprehensively any reason that is not 
linked to the workers. 59  Anyway, the question on substantive grounds, i.e. 
appreciation of the ETOP-reasons is in a common (internal) market context 
emphasized by the further pinpoint whether the grounds are looser for multinational 
companies.  I maintain that in future, not just internationally but also within the 
internal market, as enlarged in 2004, we will face relocations à la Hoover (France – 
Scotland in 1994) towards the new Member Sates with radically lower wage and 
overall production costs. Immediately, a sharp question arises whether a simple drive 
to greater profit justifies closures and redundancies in ‘old’ Member States. The issue 
                                                 
56 Bercusson 1996, p. 51. Citations presented by him, with reference to European Industrial 
Relations Review No 2 (February 1974), p. 2 at pp. 3 and 5; No 4 (April 1974), p. 18 at p. 19. 
57 This section draws on Hellsten 2001, p. 35-6 but merits to be also presented in this wider 
context discussing the development, scope and rationale of EC employment law.   
58 On ETOP-reasons, as well as on governing collective redundancies in general in Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and UK, see Umberto Carabelli and Leonello 
Tronti (eds.), Managing Labour Redundancies In Europe: Instruments and Prospects. Labour, 
Volume 13, Number 1, Blackwell Publishers 1999.   
59 See e.g. a recent judgment Commission v. Portugal, C-55/02, 12.10.2004, nyr. Portugal has 
infringed its obligations because the national implementation law covered only redundancies 
for structural, technological or cyclical reasons. E.g. liquidation cases fall out. 
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is also by definition linked to Transfer of Undertakings Directive while the closures 
and relocations may well take place within a multinational group of companies 
(maybe even in the context of a merger of two multinationals). Other way round, the 
Transfer Directive includes provisions (in Article 4) on dismissals by ETO-grounds 
(economic, technical or organisational grounds), and one essential issue is, of course, 
which entity on the employer side satisfied these ETO-grounds. 60 
 
To simplify, at least in Austria, Belgium, France and Germany the national law 
defines dismissing with ETOP-reasons as an ultima ratio. This tends towards 
dismissing simple profit-maximisation as legally valid grounds for a closure and/or 
transfer of production within the national jurisdiction. A national SME presumably 
cannot escape such an ultima ratio condition. While CDR is silent on dismissal 
grounds, it seems that the only real brake or imperative for multinationals comes from 
their need to safeguard their image, i.e. that a too rough closure/redundancy policy 
might harm their image and make it less attractive. Besides, a multinational often has 
possibilities to adjust its economic results in its different units. Furthermore, the case 
law referred to by Gérard Lyon-Caen from France hints towards the outcome that a 
multi-sectoral multinational has no corporate responsibility to help its divisions if they 
get into trouble. In conclusion, Gérard Lyon-Caen asserts that we come close to 
admitting that different, and looser, rules exist for multinationals, as this is manifest to 
an increasing extent. 61  
 
This issue, i.e. whether there are looser rules for multinational companies regarding 
dismissal grounds, should be debated officially in the EU. They are forerunners in 
relocating production to new Member States within the internal market, as well as to 
third countries. The issue is, whether they are entitled to do it with the sole purpose of 
improving profitability. Irrespective of whether the answer is ‘yes’ or ‘no’, these 
relocations may happen with the benefit of EU subsidies from the Cohesion Fund or 
state aids accepted under Article 87(3) EC. This just sharpens further the question 
about fair compensation for workers made redundant from establishments that are 
closed down in the ‘old’ Member States. If the answer is ‘no’, the conditions for it 
should become defined by the EU. If the answer is ‘yes’, as stated above this further 
sharpens the question about fair compensation (redundancy payment) to workers 
made redundant This would be a minimum in balancing economic and social factors 
regarding the Collective Redundancy Directive. 
 
 
2.1.3 Concluding on Collective Redundancy Directive 
 
My conclusion on the Collective Redundancy Directive is clear. The original 
Common Market intention was and still is in fact real, and the first Recital promised 
and still promises greater protection for workers, but the corpus Articles keep very 
little thereof. Except the strict responsibility of the daughter company in Article 2(4), 
the Directive remains essentially procedural. My thesis is that the enlarged internal 
market imposes an obligation to reconsider this lack of substantial protection. On the 
                                                 
60 See section 2.2, ‘Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights’) Directive’, infra. 
61 Gérard Lyon-Caen, Sur le transfert des emplois dans les groupes multinationaux. Droit 
social, mai 1995, pp. 489-494. The case he refers to is Thomson, Cour de cassation 5.4.1995. 
This French conglomerate transferred a tv-tube factory from Lyon to Bresil. 
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other hand, the EC Treaty since Nice offers the tiny possibility of legislating on 
termination of employment contracts by qualified majority, if the Council first 




2.2. Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights’) Directive 
 
The Transfer of Undertakings Directive is, especially as to its scope, a Pandora’s box 
with some 40 judgments of the Court of Justice, augmented by several rulings of the 
EFTA Court. I will leave out most of the details in the case law and discuss only two 
interesting aspects directly connected with the common market justification, effect 
and nature of the Directive: the procedure and cross-border applicability of the 
Directive. 
 
As usual, the common (internal) market context in the Directive is described in its 
Preamble with short terms, only, as follows: 
 
(2) Economic trends are bringing in their wake, at both national and 
Community level, changes in the structure of undertakings, through transfers 
of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses to other 
employers as a result of legal transfers or mergers. 
 
(3) It is necessary to provide for the protection of employees in the event of a 
change of employer, in particular, to ensure that their rights are safeguarded. 
 
(4) Differences still remain in the Member States as regards the extent of the 
protection of employees in this respect and these differences should be 
reduced. 
  
While every word is potentially significant in this description, I will pass over any 
detailed reasoning thereon in this article and concentrate on my two main points. 
However, the scope is worth a couple of general remarks. First, it is essential to 
understand that the Directive, since its amendment by Directive 98/50/EC, also covers 
undertakings in the public sector if they are engaged in economic activities, whether 
or not they are operating for gain. An administrative reorganisation of public 
administrative authorities, or the transfer of administrative functions between public 
administrative authorities, is not a transfer within the meaning of this Directive 
(Article 1(1)(c)). On the other hand, the Directive does not apply to seagoing vessels 
(Article 1(3)). It is reasonable to suppose that there are detailed rules in national laws 
and that there are particular problems related to employment conditions of seagoing 
staff. Nonetheless, it is a legitimate expectation that the European legislator would 
openly ground this kind of exclusion that has been valid already for nearly 30 years. 
Seagoing staff is in principle in special need of protection by European law, 
procedural rules included, due to working onboard.  However, in conclusion one may 
state that the traditional double purpose and interplay of economic and social factors 
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2.2.1 Procedures and Nature of Directive 
 
The procedural part, hence information for and consultation of employee 
representatives in the Transfer Directive includes certain but now negligible 
differences in relation to the Collective Redundancy Directive. This is illustrated by 
infringement case Commission v. UK of 1992 (hereinafter ‘Transfer judgment’). 62 As 
in its sister infringement case concerning UK law regarding collective redundancies, 
63 explained supra, the Court of Justice confirmed that the traditional, voluntary trade 
union recognition system in UK did not comply with the compulsory employee 
representation scheme of the Transfer Directive. It seems clear that the cross-border 
applicability of the Directive also creates tension in its procedural provisions. The 
question about possible/alleged cross-border information, consultation and 
negotiations arises. I will take the liberty of leaving it as a question in this paper, 
without attempting to answer it. 
 
In addition the overall purpose of the Transfer Directive was described in terms 
identical to those in the sister case: ensuring comparable protection for workers’ rights 
and harmonising the costs for employers (paragraph 15 of the Transfer judgment). As 
in the sister case, neither did this case display any real analysis of the cost factor. 
Further on, also in this case the Court noted the purpose of partial harmonisation on 
the procedures. One has to see the reference to workers’ rights and harmonisation of 
costs as an overall description by the Court, without that having any real legal 
consequences. It is also noteworthy that Advocate General did not present this dual 
purpose of the Directive. 64 
 
The dual purpose as noted by the Court is, of course, true in the sense that the 
Directive deals with workers’ rights that in this case have a direct cost effect. The 
elementary provision in the Directive (Article 3(1)) transfers the obligations arising 
from an employment contract or relationship to the transferee, by virtue of the 
transfer. This was a direct penetration into UK law that foresaw a termination of a 
work contract in the context of such a transfer. 65  Furthermore, the Directive 
guarantees in (now) Article 3(3) the previous working conditions, as follows: 
 
Following the transfer, the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and 
conditions agreed in any collective agreement on the same terms applicable to 
the transferor under that agreement, until the date of termination or expiry of 
the collective agreement or the entry into force or application of another 
collective agreement. 
 
Member States may limit the period for observing such terms and conditions 
with the proviso that it shall not be less than one year.  
 
Whether a cliché or not, this provision means a certain prohibition (for at least one 
year) against competition with low (or lowered) labour standards, even a fundamental 
                                                 
62 Case C-382/92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435. 
63 Case C-383/92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2479. The Court gave this 
judgment, as well as the judgment referred to in the previous note, by sitting in plenum. 
64 Joint Opinions (on 2 March 1994) of Advocate General Van Gerven in cases Commission v 
United Kingdom, C-382/92 and C-383/92. 
65 See e.g. Catherine Barnard, op. cit., p. 446. 
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prohibition, as Bercusson has described it. Even in the French law the Directive 
imposed changes, at least in protection of workers’ representatives, transfer of debts 
and safeguarding the workers’ rights arising from collective agreements. 66  The 
prohibition is just emphasised when read together with the principle of continued 
employment relationships.67 However, the economic or managerial prerogative was 
guaranteed by enshrining already in the original Article 4(1) that the Directive does 
not prevent dismissals for ETOP-reasons. 68  In Germany the interpretation of the 
national implementing law (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Section BGB 613a) has meant 
a rather straightforward application that Labour Courts quite easily hold dismissals 
within the guaranteed period as consequences of the transfer, leading to essential 
compensation. Besides, such a lawsuit reflects an individual right which is not 
possible to outlaw in a collective solution (agreement) in a transfer situation. This 
often leads to individual agreements in which the worker resigns with a considerable 
severance payment. 69  
 
However, enshrining the right to dismiss for ETOP-reasons has lead Fuchs to denote 
the dual nature of the directive, but differently from that marked by the Court in the 
case Commission v. UK. Namely, Fuchs interprets ‘economic’ in the overall legal 
construction in such a way that the Directive does not endanger (or challenge) 
restructuring of enterprises by transfers (mergers included). 70 The right to dismiss 
with ETO-reasons finally guarantees this restructuring as such while the absolute 
prohibition against competition with low (or lowered) labour standards, at the end of 
the day, is limited to one year following the transfer. Hence, in discovering the most 
fundamental issue within the dual (economic and social) nature of the Directive, it 
seems logical to adhere to the position of Fuchs instead of that expressed, in general 
terms and obiter dictum, by the Court in the case Commission v. UK. Fuchs 
highlights, as I do, the realisation of restructuring; differing from this the Court 
referred to harmonising costs. The Directive harmonised the costs, indeed, but only to 
the extent of the period of one year with guaranteed working conditions.  
 
Seen from another angle, the Transfer Directive was and still is important because it 
introduced collective agreements into the normative structure of EC employment law. 
It used and uses them as direct sources of rights, even though any definition of the 
agreements was left up to national law. The original Collective Redundancy Directive 
                                                 
66 See A. and G. Lyon-Caen, Droit social international et européen, 8th ed., Dalloz 1993, p. 
306, fn 2.   
67 Bercusson 1996, p. 235.  
68 Article 4(1) (first subparagraph): ‘The transfer of the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the transferor or 
the transferee. This provision shall not stand in the way of dismissals that may take place for 
economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce.’ To be 
precise, Article 4(1) counts only ‘ETO-reasons’ (economic, technical or organisational ones) 
while productivity related ones are not counted.  
69  Experience from Finnish multinationals show that these payments for people made 
redundant in Central Europe can be even of some 60.000 to 80.000 euros plus possible 
retirement benefits.  
70 Fuchs, The Bottom Line of European Labour Law (Part II), IJCLLIR Vol. 20, Issue 3, 
2004, p. 437. 
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did not recognise them at all, 71 and even the revised Directive 92/56/EC used them 
only indirectly, requiring information concerning planned severance payments if they 
deviated from the collective agreement concerned. At a similar level, hence as a direct 
source of law, the EC legislator used collective agreements as direct instruments in 
employment law just in the Posted Workers’ Directive in 1996 (96/71/EC).  
 
A further difference in relation to the Collective Redundancy Directive was the 
penetration of EC law into individual employment relationships that the Transfer 
Directive established. In that sense it was elementary for the development of EC 
employment law. The biggest part of the ECJ’s 40 or so rulings concerns the very 
definition of a transfer, i.e. the scope of the Directive. The most important in this 
sense is the case Christel Schmidt. 72 The Court (fifth chamber) concluded that the 
Transfer Directive was to be ‘interpreted as covering a situation in which an 
undertaking entrusts by contract to another undertaking the responsibility for carrying 
out cleaning operations which it previously performed itself, even though, prior to the 
transfer, such work was carried out by a single employee’. Fuchs denotes how the 
Court has often attempted to solve the problems that have arisen by applying an 
extensive and teleological interpretation based on the aim of protecting and ensuring 
employee rights as found in the Preamble. 73  
 
As to the broad line of the Transfer Directive, changes in 1998 by Directive 98/50/EC 
were essential ones, when it e.g. established the corporate responsibility in Article 
7(4) as in the Revised Collective Redundancy Directive (Article 2(4) of Directive 
92/56/EC). The definition of a transfer was also added in 1998, based on case-law and 
it now reads as follows: 
 
1. (a) This Directive shall apply to any transfer of an undertaking, business, 
or part of an undertaking or business to another employer as a result of a 
legal transfer or merger. 
 
(b) Subject to subparagraph (a) and the following provisions of this 
Article, there is a transfer within the meaning of this Directive where there 
is a transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity, meaning an 
organised grouping of resources which has the objective of pursuing an 
economic activity, whether or not that activity is central or ancillary.  
 
The amendments in 2001 were of consolidation, only. One may well criticise the 
definition as being still vague as Mulder, who does not discuss any cross-border 
applicability of the Directive, does in his recent monograph. 74 On the other hand, he 
equally regrets that the structure is rigid and that there is no space for practical 
solutions by collective agreements. 75 Well, in fact there is space for better, hence 
stronger, national laws and collective agreements due to the minimum nature of the 
                                                 
71 See that Article 2(1) of the CRD imposes to negotiate with the aim to reach an agreement. 
It clearly can be a collective agreement under a national Act on Collective Agreements (if 
there is any; there isn’t in UK and Denmark).  
72 Case C-392/92 Schmidt [1994] ECR I-1311. 
73 Fuchs, op.cit., p. 437.  
74 Bernard Johann Mulder, Anställningen vid verksamhetsövergång, Iustus Förlag, Lund 
2004, p. 349. He finds it as a ’vague and undefined wording in the Directive’. 
75 Ibid, p. 357 (in English summary). 
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Directive (Article 8). In this sense it is a sui generis product of the Common Market 
thinking of the 1970’s, having kept this strong tie to the ‘market’ where employees 
are de facto commodities to be bought and sold. Remarkable is also that the Council 
kept the legal basis of Article 94 (ex 100) EC, without any objection by the 
Parliament. As a whole, the Transfer Directive represents a logical path of evolution, 
where the Court has been the driving force. I leave aside in this paper whether the 
judicial activism of the Court has maintained its line after Schmidt.  
 
From a constitutional point of view one may of course ask whether it still is logical to 
keep Article 94 EC as the legal basis for an instrument whose ‘main purpose is…to 
ensure that restructuring of undertakings within the Common Market does not 
adversely affect the employees in the undertaking concerned.’ 76 Article 94 EC keeps 
the European Parliament in a consultative position, while Article 137 EC as the basis 




2.2.2. Cross-Border Application of the Directive 
 
While the Transfer Directive is the crystallisation of the single market justification in 
EC employment law in force, it is strange that out of some 40 preliminary rulings of 
the Court on this Directive (plus six rulings of the EFTA Court), there is no European 
case involving a cross-border transfer. Does the Directive apply to such transfers, 
when the employer e.g. relocates a factory from one Member State to another? The 
answer is in the interpretation of Article 1(2) that reads, as follows: 
 
This Directive shall apply where and in so far as the undertaking, business or 
part of the undertaking or business to be transferred is situated within the 
territorial scope of the Treaty. 
 
The Commission published its first proposal for the Directive soon after adoption of 
the Social Action Programme by the Council in 1974. 77 Already that proposal gives 
the final answer to the basic question about the cross-border applicability of the 
Directive. Namely, the Commission laconically reasoned, as follows: 
 
‘From the territorial point of view it appears necessary to protect the rights of workers 
whether these changes in undertakings take place within the territory of one Member 
State or within the territories of Member States.’ 78  
 
Hence, the cross-border applicability was a deliberate intention. A further 
consideration was that the protection should cover transfers from a Member State to a 
third country, as follows: 
 
                                                 
76 COM (94) 300 final, 8 September 1994, paragraph 1. 
77 See COM (74) 351 final/2 of 29.5.1974. The title was ‘Proposal for a directive of the 
Council on harmonisation of the legislation of Member States on the retention of the rights 
and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers and amalgamations.’ 
78 Ibid, p. 5. 
 22  
‘For the same reasons it appears necessary to extend Community legal protection for 
workers to cover changes which take place in undertakings within the territory of one 
or more Member States and within that of a non-member country.’ 79 
 
Here, too, no hesitation is noted. Thus, in principle the Directive covers a case in 
which a US multinational company decided to relocate a plant from Finland to China. 
However, the Commission saw the enforcement problems involved, as follows: 
 
‘For legal reasons, however, it is not possible to impose the planned Community rules 
on non-member countries. In such cases, therefore, Article 1 provides for the 
application of this proposed Directive only in so far as undertakings situated within 
the territory of the Common Market are involved. This can be of practical importance 
first and foremost when undertakings or plants in non-member states are incorporated 
in undertakings situated in the Community.’  80 
 
Again, the proposal is convincing. The China case is covered, as to obligations 
burdening the transferor within the Community. Equally, a transferee within the 
Community is subject to the Directive’s rules. But the Commission went on, as 
follows: 
 
‘But the proposed Directive is also legally applicable when undertakings or 
companies situated in the Community are incorporated in undertakings in non-
member states. This is the case when the change affects the rights of workers in plants 
which, irrespective of such incorporation, are situated in the territory of a Member 
State and to which the laws of that Member State are applicable in accordance with 
the rules of international private law.’ 81 (italics by JH) 
 
The rights in a Member State bestowed by the Directive clearly cover first and 
foremost dismissal protection where the core of the Directive according to Article 
4(1) means that the transfer of the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or 
business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the transferor or the 
transferee. Employment relationships are transferred.  A separate issue crucially is 
who may resort to dismissals for economic, technical or organisational reasons. This 
issue formed one of the two questions answered in judgment Dethier, delivered in 
1998. The outcome prima vista looks simple: both transferor and transferee may 
resort to ETO-dismissals.82 However, I will come back to this point (see section 3.3.1) 
in discussing the practical consequences of a cross-border application of the Transfer 
Directive. 
 
However, coming back to the principal cross-border effect, the Commission proposed 










82 Case C-319/94 Jules Dethier Équipment SA v. Jules Dassy and Sovam SPRL, paragraph 37, 
ECR [1998] I-1061. 
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‘…irrespective of whether such merger or takeover is effected between undertakings 
in the territory of one or more Member States or it is effected between undertakings 
in the territory of member States and undertakings in the territory of member States 
and undertakings in third countries.” 83 
  
In 1975 the Commission published a revised proposal that strengthened further this 
cross-border aspect. With the logic of the 1974 proposal it proposed a corpus text in 
its draft Article 1(3), as follows  
 
‘This Directive shall apply where and insofar as the transferring or dependent 
undertaking is situated in the territory of the Member States of the European 
Economic Community or the transfer or concentration affects an undertaking within 
that territory involved in such a transaction.’ 84  
 
This proposal led to the adoption of the Directive in 1977 with Article 1(2) in the 
form still in force, as quoted above. The wording was shortened but the logic of a 
basic cross-border applicability was kept. At the same time, the Council replaced the 
expression ‘the territory of the Member States’ of the 1975 proposal by a more 
straightforward ‘the territorial scope of the Treaty’. This illustrated the non-
significance of national borders in this context, taking cross-border transfers as 
something that would arise naturally within the territorial scope of the Treaty. 85 
 
I would like to develop the argument on Article 1(2) briefly with a somewhat 
simplified CILFIT-test. 86 First, there are linguistic differences in other places of the 
Directive, but not here regarding the cross-border applicability as such. 87 It is of 
course true that notions like ‘undertaking’, ‘business’ and ‘a part of a business’ might 
become more difficult to handle on the European rather than on a national scale, but I 
will set this aside now. Second, the wording in Article 1(2) purely textually operates 
with the location of the business or undertaking to be transferred. It might be unclear 
                                                 
83 See COM (74) 351 final/2, fourth page of the text including the draft directive (there is no 
page numbering in this part of the COM document). The Preamble (the sixth ‘whereas’) 
backed this up with the following wording: ‘Whereas workers must be likewise safeguarded 
where the merger or transfer is effected in the territory of the Community and the acquirer is a 
person or undertaking situate[d] in the territory of a third State.’ The expression ‘situate’ is 
unambiguous in this context; for clarity’s sake I add a letter ‘d’. 
84 See COM (75) 429, p. 4 of the text including the draft directive. Its grounds in the sixth 
‘whereas’ of the Preamble read, as follows: ‘Whereas employees must likewise be protected 
in the territory of the Community where a person or undertaking situated in the territory of a 
third country is involved in the transaction.’ Ibid, p. 3. Underlining is original. The Preamble 
of the Directive 77/187/EEC, as adopted, did not include any such ‘whereas’. This perhaps 
paved the way for the cross-border application becoming de facto forgotten. 
85 In fact, lacking ‘the Member States’ in the very wording of Article 1(2) first drew my 
attention in exploring a possible cross-border applicability of the Directive. Otherwise the 
Directive includes 18 references to different legislative options within the Directive plus that 
the Directive is a minimum Directive, as enacted in Article 8. Indeed, the Member States have 
no substantially legislative role concerning the territorial ambit as defined by Article 1(2). 
86 Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415. As to a CILFIT test, see e.g. Tuomas Ojanen, The 
European Way. The Structure of National Court Obligation Under EC Law, Gummerus 
Kirjapaino Oy, Saarijärvi 1998, p. 192-96. As to case CILFIT, also see footnote 187, infra. 
87 As to these differences, see e.g. case 135/83 Abels [1985] ECR 469. I pass here to what 
extent the present Directive 01/23/EC manages to iron out the differences. 
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whether the seat of management or of actual activities is decisive if they are in 
different Member States. Jonas Malmberg notes that a permanent place of running the 
business might decide, not the formal location of the seat of management. 88 However, 
in most cases the seat and business place are in the same country. Hence, purely 
textually, Article 1(2) operates with a business situated within the Community, 
broadened now by the EEA; thus, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway are also covered. 
A textual interpretation thus leads to the conclusion that it covers cross-border 
transfers. This is confirmed by the lack of any contravening element in the text. Third, 
a contextual interpretation, bound first to the Common Market of 1970’s, leads to the 
same interpretation. Namely, there was no real reason, and it would have been in fact 
illogical, to exclude the protection from cross-border transfers. Besides, given the 
clear intention of the Commission to cover cross-border transfers it would have led to 
a storm if the Council had tried to invalidate it. Nothing shows such an intention and 
it would be insulting to suppose that there would have been any such hidden agenda.  
 
Further on, the European legislator repeated Article 1(2) TD as such in the amending 
directive 98/50/EC. This is elementary in interpreting the EC law provision concerned 
in its historical context, in the light of its travaux préparatoires, in its evolution and 
application, and finally in the light of Community law as a whole. Besides, the 
interpretation of ‘Community law as a whole’ has to be effective and consistent as 
judgment Albany, paragraph 60, tells us. 89 I therefore maintain that the cross-border 
applicability of the Transfer Directive is a fact of EC law.90 This is also the starting 
point of Jonas Malmberg in his excellent article ‘Arbetstagares ställning vid 
gränsöverskridande företagsövergångar’ where he reasons over 15 pages mainly on 
the practical consequences of this as to jurisdiction, choice-of-law and practical 
consequences of changes in the labour law applicable. 91 I believe that the reason for 
the lack of any European case law on this provision is that trade unions and 
employees have either been unable to bring the cases to courts, or they have reached 
negotiated solutions that have excluded the court. 
 
The only somewhat grey issue regarding the cross-border application of the Directive 
is the fact that the Council in 1977 dropped from the wording of Article 1(2) the 
second element of the 1975 proposal, namely the applicability of the Directive by 
virtue of an effect of a transfer: 
 
‘…the transfer or concentration affects an undertaking within that territory involved 
in such a transaction…’ 
                                                 
88 Jonas Malmberg, Arbetstagares ställning vid gränsöverskridande företagsövergångar, 
Svensk Juristtidning 2004 No. 4, p. 794-5. He refers to Lunning & Toijer, Anställningsskydd, 
8 uppl. s. 243, and to Klingsten, Ansættelsesretlige aspekter ved virksomhedsoverdragelse, 
DJØF 2002, p. 17. 
89 See case C-67/96 Albany International [1999] ECR I-5751. The English wording of 
paragraph 60 (‘interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole which is both 
effective and consistent’) is a bit clumsy. The French version (‘interprétation utile et 
cohérente des dispositions du traité, dans leur ensemble’) proves that ‘effective’ and 
‘consistent’ do qualify the interpretation, not the Treaty. – As to judgment Albany, see 
Chapter II, section 2.6, infra. 
90 It is, by definition, a case as such whether the national implementing laws manage to realise 
this. I pass it in this paper. 
91 See footnote 97, infra. 
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This draft proviso either would have broadened the applicability even to transfers 
taking place between employers (companies) established outside the EEC, or it would 
have established good grounds to maintain so. Therefore, because it was ambiguous 
and it lacked enforceability outside the Community, the Council obviously dropped it. 
The inevitable conclusion seems to be that there is a lack of any protection under EC 
law for transfers from third countries into the EC (and EEA), as well as for formal 
transfers between two countries outside the EC/EEA. These transfers may adversely 
affect the position of workers who are already employed by receiving companies. The 
former feature is what Catherine Barnard has also found, calling it ‘a significant gap 
in the protection of workers’. I know there is a similar lack in national laws. However, 
she does not discuss further the cross-border applicability of the Directive to cross-
border transfers within the EC/EEA. 92 
 
However, this was the ‘what, when and why’ 93 of the wording  
 
‘…undertaking, business or part of a business to be transferred is situated 
within the territorial scope of the Treaty.’  
 
Thus, how it became the very tool in the territorial applicability of the Directive. It 
applies to cross-border transfers. It is finally clear that only this interpretation is in 
harmony with the establishment of the Common Market and its evolution to the Single 
Market, reaching now the qualification of the Internal Market. One has to see this 
cross-border applicability also in the light of the philosophy prevailing on the Internal 
Market: a development of improving working conditions as enshrined already in 
Article 117 EEC that (i.e. the improvement) for a part should ensue ‘from the 
functioning of the common market’. It still lies in Article 136(3) EC. The Treaties are 
not blind to a gaping hole in the protection of workers when they face the very crux of 
the internal market effect at issue: a cross-border transfer of an undertaking whose 
simple motive is just an improvement of profitability. There is no hole, as I am sure 
will be confirmed by a court judgment in future. 
 
                                                 
92 Catherine Barnard, EC Employment Law, 2. ed., Oxford University Press 2000, p. 469. She 
also notes the exclusion of a transfer between subsidiaries outside the EEA whose head office, 
only, is located within the Community. As to other literature, e.g. Silvana Sciarra (ed.), 
Labour Law in the Courts, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001, includes 98 pages dealing with the 
Directive, produced by Davies, Laulom, Valdés Dal-Ré and Lo Faro, but none of them seems 
to discuss cross-border transfers.  
93 See Spiros Simitis and Antoine Lyon-Caen, 1996, (see note 15) p. 3, assert that it is better 
not to think EC law solely as a product of the legal system itself or as a compromise of the 
social forces. Both may be true at the one and same provision. Hence, Simitis and Lyon-Caen 
highlight that there is no EC labour law per se. The implication is obvious: what has to be 
studied is when and why a shared system of values emerged, qualifying the concepts we have 
on EC labour law. To my mind, the same approach (‘what, when and why’) is mutatis 
mutandis normally useful at separate norms, too. 
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2.2.3. Applicability to Corporate Cross-Border Transfers 
 
There remains one important question, namely the applicability of the Directive when 
the cross-border transfer takes place within an international group of companies 
(consolidated corporation).  
 
The necessary additional issue of applying the Directive to a group of companies is in 
Case Allen et al. v. Amalgamated Construction Co. Ltd 94 in which the European 
Court of Justice gave its preliminary ruling on 12 December 1999. I will hereinafter 
refer to it, with one exception, as Amalgamated Construction because this better 
captures the essentiale of the case. Even the very titles of the proposals of the 
Commission for the Directive in 1974 and 1975 referred to ‘the retention of the rights 
and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers and amalgamations’ 
(italics by JH). The applicants in the main proceedings were twenty-three of the 
miners who worked for Amalgamated Construction Co. Ltd (ACC) until they were 
made redundant. They were taken on, after a break of a weekend, only, by its sister 
company AM Mining Services Limited (AMS) under less beneficial terms and 
conditions of employment. Being later made redundant by that company, they were 
taken on again by ACC but with worse employment conditions than those earlier 
applied to them by ACC. The miners claimed these previous conditions with their 
suit. ACC and AMS belonged to AMCO Corporation PLC (AMCO) that had some 
ten other companies within the AMCO Group. There was a Group headquarter which 
performed certain functions, such as personnel, payroll and accountancy, on a central 
basis for the subsidiary companies. 
 
The rationale for the European Court of Justice in blocking this kind of spiral, instead 
of a direct race, to the bottom within a group of companies was to apply to it the 
Transfer Directive that is normally, and tellingly, called the Acquired Rights Directive 
in the UK. The judgment follows the Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer who presented a succinct but sufficiently detailed overview ex officio of the 
previous case law and he consistently applied it and the purpose of the Directive in 
this concrete case. 95 With his framework the Court reasoned and concluded on the 
applicability to a group of companies, as follows: 
 
16. The Directive is therefore applicable where, following a legal transfer or merger, 
there is a change in the natural or legal person responsible for carrying on the 
business who by virtue of that fact incurs the obligations of an employer vis-à-vis 
employees of the undertaking, regardless of whether or not ownership of the 
undertaking is transferred (Case 287/86 Ny Mølle Kro [1987] ECR 5465, paragraph 
12, and Case 324/86 Tellerup v Daddy's Dance Hall [1988] ECR 739, paragraph 9).  
 
17. It is thus clear that the Directive is intended to cover any legal change in the 
person of the employer if the other conditions it lays down are also met and that it can, 
therefore, apply to a transfer between two subsidiary companies in the same group, 
which are distinct legal persons each with specific employment relationships with 
their employees. The fact that the companies in question not only have the same 
ownership but also the same management and the same premises and that they are 
engaged in the same works makes no difference in this regard.    
 
                                                 
94 Case C-234/98 Allen et al. v. Amalgamated Construction Co. Ltd. [ 1999] ECR I-8643.  
95 Opinion delivered on 8 July 1999. 
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There is nothing ambiguous in this assertion. The Directive does cover transfers 
between subsidiary (‘sister’) companies within a corporate business structure. 
Besides, I recall that this conclusion is a natural consequence of previous case law. It 
was just a small Chamber of the Court that ‘visited’ Ny Mølle Kro in 1987 and then 
Daddy’s Dance Hall in 1988 but these landmark cases, too, were part of a natural 
evolution. 96 
 
Unusual but telling in Amalgamated Construction at the same time was the argument 
put forward by the employer (the alleged transferee) that a group of companies fell 
outside the Directive because the subsidiaries are not autonomous economic actors. 
Hence, the employer resorted to the hard core of any Internal Market regulations: 
competition rules that notoriously are fundamental in the internal market. 97 The Court 
weighed this argument vis-à-vis the social purpose of the Directive, as follows:  
 
18. That conclusion [i.e. to apply the Directive to transfers within a group of 
companies] is not affected by the judgment in Viho v Commission, cited above, [ 98] 
in paragraphs 15 to 17 of which the Court held that Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty 
(now Article 81(1) EC) does not apply to relations between a parent company and its 
subsidiaries where those companies form a single economic unit within which the 
subsidiaries do not enjoy real autonomy in determining their course of action on the 
market, but carry out the instructions issued to them by the parent company 
controlling them.  
 
Thus, the Court outlawed the argument in law without any hesitation. It then gave its 
two grounds, the first one reading, as follows: 
 
19. That concept of undertaking is specific to competition law and reflects the fact 
that, without the concordance of economically independent wills, relations within an 
economic unit cannot constitute an anti-competitive agreement or concerted practice 
between undertakings within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.  
 
This meant that the employer had put forward arguments in the wrong context. A 
clearer translation might perhaps express, at least in Euro-English the fact that 
competition rules cannot apply to agreements within a group of companies because 
the subsidiaries are not independent. The authentic French wording spells this out 
better.  99 However, the second argument, in fact the concluding argument in weighing 
                                                 
96 As to these cases in this evolution, see Barnard, EC Employment Law, Oxford University 
Press 2000, p. 455-7. 
97 I rhetorically recall paragraph 36 of case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time v. Benetton 
[1999] ECR I-3055, where the Court stated, as follows: ‘36 However, according to Article 
3(g) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 3(1)(g) EC), Article 85 of the Treaty 
constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks 
entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal market. The 
importance of such a provision led the framers of the Treaty to provide expressly, in Article 
85(2) of the Treaty, that any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to that article are to 
be automatically void.’ The keywords of the judgment are: ‘Application by an arbitration 
tribunal, of its own motion, of Article 81 EC (ex Article 85)’ and ‘Power of national courts to 
annul arbitration awards.’ It deals with the very judicial constitution of the EC. 
98 See Case C-73/95 P Viho v Commission [1996] ECR I-5457. 
99 ‘19 En effet, cette notion d'entreprise est propre au droit de la concurrence et résulte du fait 
que, en l'absence de concours de volontés économiquement indépendantes, les relations au 
sein d'une unité économique ne peuvent être constitutives d'un accord ou d'une pratique 
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competition rules and the social purpose of the Directive, came one step further, as 
follows: 
 
20. Nothing justifies a parent company's and its subsidiaries' uniform conduct 
on the market having greater importance in the application of the Directive 
than the formal separation between those companies which have distinct legal 
personalities. That outcome, which would exclude transfers between 
companies in the same group from the scope of the Directive, would be 
precisely contrary to the Directive's aim, which is, according to the Court, to 
ensure, so far as possible, that the rights of employees are safeguarded in the 
event of a change of employer by allowing them to remain in employment 
with the new employer on the terms and conditions agreed with the transferor 
(see, in particular, Ny Mølle Kro, cited above, paragraph 12, and Daddy's 
Dance Hall, cited above, paragraph 9). [italics by JH] 
 
The outcome is easy to summarise: the social purpose of the Directive weighed more 
than the economic governance factor (or any competition law thinking). ‘Nothing’ 
justified an outcome a contrario. One may also presume that there will never come a 
‘something’ to turn this conclusion one day the other way round. It also shows the 
context, role and reach (’so far as possible’) of the safeguarding effect of the 
Directive. Even though this reasoning comes only from a Chamber, it is not merely 
obiter dictum but a precise stock-taking of the principal defence of the employer. I 
think it is worth presenting again later in this article when discussing on a more 
general level the interplay and balance between economic and social factors in the EU 
(see chapter “On Pyramid (Hierarchy) Thinking” 100).  
 
The Court followed in full the proposal of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer. 
He just used a few more words in arguing the invalidation of the competition law 
argument. 101  102  I maintain that the (ad astra) absolutely same ‘nothing’ in 
Amalgamated Construction applies equally to cross-border transfers and therefore 
nothing justifies an exclusion of cross-border corporate transfers from the scope of 
                                                                                                                                            
concertée entre entreprises, restrictifs de concurrence au sens de l'article 85, paragraphe 1, du 
traité.’ 
100 See Chapter II, section 2.7, infra. 
101 See paragraphs 45-47 of the Opinion. For him the competition law argument was just an 
aberratio ictus, a hit in the air, and ‘of no assistance…in deciding’ on the applicability of the 
Directive to transfers within groups of companies (paragraph 47). 
102 A case quasi-identical to Amalgamated Construction is C-449/93 Rockfon A/S v 
Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark   [1995] ECR I-4291. It concerned  
 the interpretation of Article 1 of Directive 75/129/EEC on Collective Redundancies. 
Paragraphs 29 and 30 show that an ‘establishment’ forming part of a group, as well as the 
group itself, cannot, by playing with an establishment’s dependant position, to circumvent the 
Directive’s obligations. In paragraph 30 the Court stated, as follows: ‘[…] an interpretation of 
the term "establishment" like that proposed by Rockfon would allow companies belonging to 
the same group to try to make it more difficult for the Directive to apply to them by 
conferring on a separate decision-making body the power to take decisions concerning 
redundancies. By this means, they would be able to escape the obligation to follow certain 
procedures for the protection of workers and large groups of workers could be denied the 
right to be informed and consulted which they have as a matter of course under the directive. 
Such an interpretation therefore appears to be incompatible with the aim of the Directive.’  
 29  
the Directive. Corporations or their constituent parts can be formed, sold, bought, 
merged etc. as much as the owners decide. The essential point of labour law is that it 
takes or regulates the employer and employees taken together, not the latter as 
puppets tied to the owners’ pens. This is also the core of the Transfer Directive that is 
intended to allow the workers ‘to remain in employment with the new employer on 
the terms and conditions agreed with the transferor’ (end of paragraph 20 of G. C. 
Allen and Others v. Amalgamated Construction CO. Ltd). At the same time it is a real 
thing. 
 




3. Cross-Border Transfers in Practice 
 
Given my reasoning supra, it is necessary to test it in brief on concrete cases. They 
are from a legal point of view, so far as I can see, of three types: (i) an intra-
Community transfer, hence between two EC/EEA Member States; (ii) a transfer from 
an EC/EEA Member State to a third country; and (iii) from a third country to an 
EC/EEA Member State. Any fourth alternative is not relevant, I think, because the 
Council in 1977 dropped from the scope of the Directive transfers between sister 
companies with a seat outside EC/EEA and just a headquarters in the EC/EEA. 
 
An inevitable preliminary context is the practical transfer of the workers and 
employees concerned. In real life it takes place only seldom, mainly involving 
executives and some experts. Anyway, the right to move is by definition covered by 
the fundamental right to free movement within the EC (type (i)). In fact, it is not just a 
right but EC law (the very Transfer Directive) even pushes, or, as stated ex curia, 
allows them the opportunity to remain in employment with the new employer on the 
terms and conditions agreed with the transferor 103 - the workers and employees to 
move along the transfer. I repeat that I will set aside now an essential part of the 
practical and legal difficulties linked up to this, and would again refer to the 
presentation of Jonas Malmberg in SvJT. 104  
 
An elementary doctrinal paradigm is that it is impossible to give fully-fledged 
answers to all the problems that the cross-border applicability of the Transfer 






3.1. Type (iii), Transfers From Third Countries into EC/EEA 
 
I take the liberty to say some words first on type (iii), a transfer from a third country 
into EC/EEA. I first venture to repeat my presumption that there are hardly any 
national employment laws dealing with this type of case. The right to enter the EC, 
                                                 
103 See Amalgamated Construction, paragraph 20, quoted supra. 
104 See footnote 88, supra.  
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i.e. the immigration law also enters this legal framework and this seems to be worthy 
of further reasoning (but not here). The only landmark exception in the employment 
law (mainly dismissal and possible career rules) worthy of separate reasoning in 
another place, might be the Swedish system of selection order, in which the 
employees are qualified (put into a dismissal order; ‘turordning’) strongly depending 
on their entrance to service. It is a detailed legal structure, to an essential degree 
governed, or governable, by collective agreements with particularities á la suédoise. 
105 Workers and employees transferred enter the system but then we face the question 
on the dismissal rules that perhaps bound the transferor. In any case, the second ruling 
in case Dethier 106 seems to mean that the extra-Community workers and employees 
may address claims against an intra-Community transferee. 
 
The minimum nature of the Transfer Directive might also have relevance under type 
(iii). Additionally, the terms and conditions / rights and obligations transferred might 
even be exotic ones, in theory, because the business transferred under this type can 
come from any place in the world. There can be special questions even linked to 
fundamental rights. 107  It is clear that the EC/EEA applies its fundamental rights in 
such a case. But I close case (iii) in this paper. 
 
 
3.2. Type (ii), Transfers From EC/EEA Member States to Third Countries 
 
Reasoning on the case of type (ii) is a priori heavily dominated by the lack of any 
enforceability outside EC/EEA – with perhaps relevant exceptions e.g. in the case of 
Switzerland which has special arrangements with the EU/EEA. When a US 
headquarters in 2004 decided to relocate an accumulator factory from Kemijärvi, 
Finland, to China, it seems reasonable to suppose that the removal, quite apart from 
the practical quasi-impossibility of the workers moving, did not give much scope for 
the application of EU Directives. EC law is not enforceable in China. The 
enforceability problems diminish if the parties agree to apply Finnish law to those 
who are removing. However, the question about the protection guaranteed by the 
Transfer Directive also arises in this case, even if it is in, let us say, normal cases 
enforceable only against the transferor within EC. Here we come close to 
enforceability making social protection a real thing.  
 
But, and here comes the hard point derived from the purpose of the TD, as applied in 
Dethier: dismissals shortly before the transfer by the transferor may be in many cases 
unlawful under Article 4 TD. Here we might face even some mailbox problems if let 
us say the company running the plant in Kemijärvi happens to be ‘emptied’ before 
relocating the factory to China. This is what might be a relevant angle.  Without 
                                                 
105 As to a nutshell explanation on order of selection, see e.g. Tore Sigeman, Employment 
Protection in Scandinavian Law, in Peter Wahlgren (ed.), Stability and Change in Nordic 
Labour Law; Legal Abbreviations. Scandinavian Studies in Law, Volume 43, Stockholm 
Institute for Scandinavian Law, 2002, p. 270-1. 
106 See section 3.3.1., infra.  
107 As an example, let it be other way round, I may mention the case of Saudi-Arabia where 
e.g. collective agreements are still banned. This became clear in judgments of the Labour 
Court of Finland, cases TT 169/1979 and TT 135/1980, concerning construction works of a 
Finnish company in Saudi-Arabia. The Finnish collective agreement of building sector also 
covered works carried out abroad by workers posted from Finland. 
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trying to point out any separate case I note that we might face situations where it is 
even justified to maintain abuse (such as by establishing a mail box headquarters 
outside the EC/EEA) of EC law occurring, especially if the transferor’s right to resort 
to ETO-dismissals is recognized for cross-border transfers. In case Centros the Court 
had to take stock on a case where a Danish family company registered its seat in the 
UK and wanted to register only a branch in Denmark despite all the business 
occurring only in Denmark. By this means the company evaded the application of the 
rules governing the formation of companies which in Denmark are more restrictive as 
regards the paying up of a minimum share capital. As imposed by the Treaty, the 
Court had to accept this. However, the Court – with all 15 judges present – added a 
safety valve against any abuse of EC law by stating in the second part of the ruling, as 
follows: 
 
“That interpretation does not, however, prevent the authorities of the Member 
State concerned from adopting any appropriate measure for preventing or 
penalising fraud, either in relation to the company itself, if need be in 
cooperation with the Member State in which it was formed, or in relation to its 
members, where it has been established that they are in fact attempting, by 
means of the formation of a company, to evade their obligations towards 
private or public creditors established in the territory of the Member State 
concerned.” 108 
 
I would highlight that the lack of enforceability in third countries on the one hand and 
the close connection, even a possible joint responsibility, between the transferor and 
transferee may lead to a search for guidance in cases like Centros. Its labour law angle 
is that the case deals with share capital of a company that is meant to protect both 
public and private creditors of the company. Employees are also in the potential 
position of private creditors with their pecuniary claims on severance payments, 
notice payments, compensations for information and consultation infringements etc. 
However, I close cases of type (ii) with these short remarks. 
 
 
3.3. Type (i), Intra-Community (EC/EEA) Transfers 
 
The effects of transfers under type (i) are complicated. I will consider it from a strictly 
legal angle and omit any references to any practices and policies e.g. in inducing 
investments. The cases may also be rather complicated. They might involve a 
European Company (Societas Europaea (SE)) but I will not consider this feature at 
present. Equally, they might include collective agreements of variable categories. 
They might also include the joint consideration of the Collective Redundancy 
Directive and the Transfer Directive. There might be European Works Councils 
(EWC) involved or labour-intensive temporary agencies.  
 
                                                 
108 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, .judgment by the full Court, 
[1999] ECR I-1459. The judgment created a vivid debate on theories concerning the company 
law applicable; see e.g. the papers for a Symposium on “The Centros Decision of the 
European Court of Justice and Its Consequences”, April 28-29, 2000, King’s College, 
London. In judgment C-167/01Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR I-1155, the full Court 30.9.2003 
again confirmed that freedom of establishment was justified to invoke, ‘save where the 
existence of an abuse is established on a case-by-case basis’; see the end of the second ruling.  
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I shall add one structural aspect under my type (i). Namely, in practice mergers may 
imply a concentration covering more than two Member States but ‘collecting’ the 
workers and employees by a cross-cross-cross-border transfer into one (or two or 
three) Member State(s). This can happen in the modern world e.g. when some expert 
removes immediately following a removal of IPRs (like a watch dog lawyer). Is it a 
part of a ‘business’ transferred? 
 
The transferor and transferee are not entitled to dismiss by virtue of the transfer. 
However, an important issue is whether both the transferor and transferee are, in the 
cross-border context, entitled to resort to Article 4(1), second sentence, hence to the 
proviso: 
 
‘This provision shall not stand in the way of dismissals that may take place for 
economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in the 
workforce.’ (italics by JH) 
 
The wording seems to imply that each of them could dismiss workers for ETO 
reasons in the same way that they could reduce any other expense of operation. In this 
context I recall that judgment Dethier 109 recognised the use of ETO dismissals for 
both parties. I note two types of problems.  
 
First, this proviso also applies ‘economic’ as a notion under this ‘undertaking’ in a  
cross-border move. I maintain that it also raises a question about the meaning of 
economic in this cross-border context. I refer to the distinction made by Pélissier 
between qualitatively economic (‘cause économique qualificative’) and justificatively 
economic (‘cause économique justificative’) dismissal reasons.110  The former means 
to qualify the dismissal, to rank it in the category of ‘dismissal by economic reasons’ 
and to apply consequently all the rules adhering to dismissals for economic reasons: 
procedure, priority in re-engagement, right to retraining. It differs from a justificative 
reason if it is analysed as a simple causal mark without any research on its exactitude 
or reliability. On the contrary, the justificatively economic reason allows the court to 
determine whether the dismissal is justified, i.e. compatible with the law. 111 It also 
requires a double causal link to be established so as to justify a dismissal: (i) between 
abolition or modification of jobs and the dismissal, as well as (ii) between the 
abolition and modification of jobs and the economic difficulties of a company. 112 It 
also implies an in-depth study of whether the grounds invoked by the employer are of 
a real and serious character (‘’caractère réel et sérieux’). Hence, while the wording of 
Article 4(1) seems to imply ambiguously that the employer has rather free hands, at 
least the French doctrine (and jurisdiction, says Pélissier) guides one to read the 
provision as ‘justificatively economic’. The French and German expressions seem to 
lead to the same conclusion: ‘changements sur le plan de l'emploi’ and ‘Gründen, die 
Änderungen im Bereich der Beschäftigung mit sich bringen.’ It remains to see what 
was meant by travaux préparatoires. 
 
                                                 
109 See footnote 82, supra. 
110 Also referred to by Gérard Lyon-Caen; see Droit social, mai 1995, p. 490. 
111 Jean Pélissier, Chronique, La cause économique du licenciement, Revue de Jurisprudence 
Sociale, 8-9/92, p. 527. 
112 Ibid, p. 531.  
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The Commission’s proposal of 1975 denotes in its draft Article 6(1) that ‘A transferor 
or transferee may dismiss employees on the occasion of a transfer…only for pressing 
business reasons.’ The explanatory memorandum states that ‘economic common 
sense’ dictated this. This was said to be of importance e.g. in relation to a transfer to 
be carried out ‘to restore health to economically weak undertakings.’ Dismissals ‘may 
even prove unavoidable.’  Further on, any definition of ‘pressing business reason’ was 
left for the Member States, but, along with the purpose of the Directive, ‘…reliance 
on pressing business reasons to carry out dismissals is possible only if all possible 
solutions within the undertakings such as transfers to another acceptable job, 
measures for readjustment and retraining have first been exhausted.’ 113 This clearly 
means that the Directive did not mean to give a free hand for dismissals but 
entrenched itself behind the justificatively economic reasons. However, the rationale 
for the provision, which corresponds to the present Article 4(1) TD without spelling 
out the ‘pressing business reasons’ but only ETO reasons, was to enact a ‘uniform’ 
provision to cover the situation where some Member States accepted dismissals due to 
the transfer and some did not. As confusing as this may be, I see that the purpose was 
Pélissier’s justificatively economic. This explanation is also in line with the protective 
purpose of the Directive in relation to which dismissing with ETO reasons obviously 
was intended to be an exception liable to a narrow interpretation.  
 
Second, judgment Dethier is there, stating that the transferor is entitled to make ETO 
dismissals. It merits a deeper insight. 
 
 
3.3.1. Case Dethier; Further Basic Questions 
 
I will pass over the issue whether the (groups of) companies really diminish their 
manpower so as to get a better price from the transferee. However, at least in the 
context of a cross-border merger the parties may address each other with demands and 
agreements as to the level of manpower in a forthcoming joint undertaking. In such a 
case both are de facto in a position of transferor and transferee, at least if such a 
merger is viewed on the basis of the transfer as a whole! With this I mean that, in such 
a context, at a level of a subsidiary a simple closing down of a factory may take place, 
by transferring or even breaking up the machines etc., without any formal transfer 
agreement concerning that factory. This might justify maintaining that Dethier is not 
enough to settle at least cross-border mergers, if not at all the cross-border cases. On 
the other hand, Dethier – in the second sentence of its second ruling - operates with 
‘…employees unlawfully dismissed by the transferor shortly before…’ the transfer. 
The issue is that this time factor obviously has to be reassessed at least for larger 
corporate restructuring operations. They may take up to a year within a complex of 
agreements at least allegedly falling under the Directive. A further relevant aspect is 
that such a complex cross-border (European) merger may depend on the approval of 
the Commission under the Merger Regulation No 137/2004. Besides, the approval 
may be conditioned and further affect the time factor.  
 
But the definition of a transfer also looks inaccurate in this kind of a (corporate) 
merger context where a joint venture is established. The definition (in Article 1(1)(b)) 
now operates with the notion of ‘an economic entity which retains its identity, 
                                                 
113 See p. 9 of the explanatory memorandum in document COM (75) 429 final. 
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meaning an organised grouping of resources’ (italics by JH). E.g. a daughter company 
located in Member State A can be transformed into a reseller and its manufacturing 
activities be relocated into Member State B. There they can be transferred to one, two 
or more factories 114  kept within a joint venture. Some parts of the production 
concerned in the new joint venture may be sold out as a part of the business plan. In a 
nutshell, the manufacturing activities can be absorbed to new entities abroad. My 
thesis is that the definition in Article 1(1)(b) does not cover this kind of absorption 
appropriately. 
 
As such, the crucial paragraphs 36 and 37 of Dethier read, as follows: 
 
36 Accordingly, inasmuch as Article 4(1) precludes dismissals from taking place 
solely by reason of the transfer, it does not restrict the power of the transferor any 
more than that of the transferee to effect dismissals for the reasons which it allows.  
 
37 The answer to the first part of the second question referred for a preliminary ruling 
must therefore be that, on a proper construction of Article 4(1) of the Directive, both 
the transferor and the transferee may dismiss employees for economic, technical or 
organisational reasons. 
 
A natural preliminary remark is that Dethier was delivered in 1998 on the traditional 
path of case law. In addition, a small Chamber delivered it, obviously not 
encountering any elementary cross-border questions that needed to be answered. 
Anyway, it includes, in paragraph 36, the idea that Article 4(1) does not restrict the 
transferor any more than the transferee. This might become important in a situation 
where the dismissal protection is not equal in the Member States concerned. One 
might thus defend an interpretation that a restriction imposed on the transferee could 
be enlarged to also cover the transferor. A strong argument against the transferor 
dismissing for ETO reasons is the fact that dismissing for those reasons implies a 
stock-taking on the future need of manpower, which, at least outside winding-up and 
liquidation cases, is by definition a task or obligation of the transferee. In joint 
ventures they act together, of course. To say more would require a complete CILFIT-
test to be done on Article 4(1), second sentence. Besides, also this Dethier context 
may imply collective agreements via manpower clauses as in the case of several 
German multinational groups in 2004 (Volkswagen, Siemens etc.). This means that 
the notion of a collective agreement becomes this way, too, exposed to a CILFIT and 
Albany test 115 in this new cross-border context.  
 
There is also a link to the debate launched by Gérard Lyon-Caen on potentially looser 
requirements for multinational companies. 116 It seems, however, that it is not feasible 
to set up in a consistent manner a separate threshold for multinational companies 
because it would just create a new battlefield concerning the contents of such a 
notion. If Dethier is to be reconsidered in the cross-border context, it seems that only 
the cross-border effect itself may serve as a yardstick. Another issue is that obviously 
                                                 
114 Besides, such relocation can be done – in a highly sophisticated production - in a relay 
stile, meaning that the production flow is not interrupted. 
115 See especially paragraph 60 of Albany that declares the interpretation principle of an 
effective and consistent interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole. On this, see 
Chapter II, Section 2.6, infra. 
116 See section 2.1, p. 15, supra. 
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a merger (where the employer changes) as such would be a possible yardstick, while 
one has to see that a European merger does not necessarily mean realising a formal 
merger at national level concerning every entity covered. However, I take the liberty 
to assume regarding this issue that today the Chamber would refer a cross-border case 




3.4. Applicable Law 
 
It seems appropriate to reason by following the traditional path of evolution in cases 
without doubt within the Transfer Directive, evolution as de facto dominated by the 
Court. In so doing the applicable law etc. consequences for the workers, sensu lato, of 
the transfer are natural ones; the pension rights may cause, as to applicable law, 
perhaps a problem sui generis when the cross-border aspect is added. I do not claim it 
is at the end of the day so it is one classical issue to be put under this cross-border test 
called ‘Amalgamated TD International” (ATDI). However, I will set aside the Rome 
Convention on applicable law, as well the relevant case law. 117 A strong presumption 
is that lex loci laboris prevails. On that basis, I will try to present some case-related 
aspects. 
 
Following the traditional path of interpreting the Transfer Directive, the applicable 
law would obviously change with the transfer itself although the Directive is silent on 
this point.  This could mean e.g. in the case of workers transferred from Finland to 
Germany that they logically come under the German dismissal rules. The special 
regulation in Germany of course is § BGB 613a, with an individual Klagerecht (right 
to complaint and oppose, at least in theory, a transfer), often leading to individual 
agreements with high severance payments. But does enjoying such a right require that 
the worker or employee really use his right to remove? While it is his right, it is 
difficult to reason that it would turn out to be also his obligation by an EC law 
provision that is meant to protect him! This is of practical importance e.g. in a case 
where the restructuring implies a cross-border transfer of type (i) but the works in 
practice still continue for quite a time in a plant to be transferred (closing down, 
continuing for a time the customers’ order etc.) The question is whether the lex loci 
laboris really changes if the workers do not remove in practice as most often happens. 
At least if they claim to be removed but are dismissed by the transferor shortly before 
the transfer, it might be justified to give them the possibility of invoking the law 
binding the transferee. 
 
One could also consider a transfer the other way round, i.e. imagining relocating a 
factory from Germany to Finland. The background is that dismissal protection is in 
Germany essentially stronger than in Finland, although the German system relies a lot 
on practical agreements and a well established practice, courts included. However, 
what would then be the implications for those Germans removing, and for those not 
doing so? For Germans removing, the traditional logic of the Directive seems to 
change the law applicable immediately, always, of course, subject to Article 3(3) as to 
                                                 
117 Malmberg refers – at employees removing along the transfer - to cases C-383/95 Rutten, 
[1997] ECR I-57, paragraph 18; C-125/92 Mulox, [1993] ECR I-4075; and C-37/00 Weber, 
[2002] ECR I-2013, paragraphs 53 and 54. 
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terms and conditions in the collective agreement concerned. I will put 3(3) aside now. 
Anyway, the traditional broad line might be for Germans removing to Finland that 
they immediately end up under Finnish dismissal rules which, as to severance pay in 
law, include nothing (and the practice is quite fragmentary). 118 What happens to those 
remaining in Germany? Does the law applicable to them change immediately by the 
transfer? I recall that so far the case law, contestable as such in this new framework, 
recognises the right of the transferor to resort to ETO dismissals. There are of course 
strong reasons to claim that for all of those remaining in their country, whether 
continuing some close-down works or not, the law applicable does not change, the 
reason being that they do not remove; they keep their locus. But there should be also 
at least a safety valve in the interpretation of the rights and obligations transferred 
meaning that the employees remove with their statutory dismissal protection if it is 
higher than in the receiving Member State. A further justification for this might be in 
Article 4(2) TD that confirms how, in cases with a substantial change in working 
conditions to the detriment of the employee, the employer shall be regarded as having 
been responsible for termination of the employment relationship. 
 
A further source for legal exercises under applicable law comes from the optional 
joint liability under Article 3(1). This, too, inevitably leads one to look at the 
implementation of Directives 77/187, 98/50 and 01/23.  
 
 
3.5. Concluding Remarks   
 
If I try to conclude the approach that seems necessary, it might require some further 
preliminary remarks. First, the Transfer Directive’s evolutionary path is something we 
cannot change. Deriving from this, the classical Transfer Directive analysis should be 
continued in this new framework of Amalgamated TD International (ATDI). There 
are many further questions. What are finally the rights and obligations to be 
transferred? What happens e.g. to the right to strike in this context, which is enshrined 
in and would get its constitutional guarantee in the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for EU? 
 
But I still feel that this ‘classical TD path’ in a new framework is not enough. An 
effective and consistent interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole 
requires more. It strongly implies a social dimension, even at the level of fundamental 
rights, in a cross-border context, in relation to the fundamental economic freedoms. 
Amalgamated TD International requires one to think from a new perspective even 
concerning some fundamental notions applicable to the Internal Market, like 
‘undertaking’ (or business, part of business etc.). There is no definition in the Treaty 
for an undertaking, and the problem continues in the Directive. A joint 
reconsideration of ‘economic’ is a must when reading Article 4 TD in this new ATDI 
framework. In so doing I dare to recommend as a tool the distinction made by 
Pélissier (by some others, too, in other countries 119) with qualitatively economic 
(économique qualificative) and justificatively economic (économique justificative). 
Furthermore, given the example of labour-intensive companies, it seems necessary 
                                                 
118 Anticipating counter-arguments I denote that periods of notice are not essentially longer in 
Finland than in Germany. 
119 In this sense, see the publication in footnote 58, supra.  
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even to think about the relationship between the Transfer Directive and posting of 
workers within the framework of free provision of services.   A particular source of 
problems may lie in the draft Directive on the Provision of Services. 120 What is the 
difference between a TD transfer and a case in which workers are posted to another 
Member State, formally temporarily but in practice on a permanent basis? Another 
pinpoint means that a labour-intensive company is subject to a cross-border transfer; 
consider the effect of putting e.g. the German special protection afforded by § BGB 
613a into this context; is there a risk that the protective effect of ATDI would be 
undermined by quasi-postings? Finally I recall the lot of collective agreements, right 
to strike and EWCs in this context. Research is needed, indeed, bearing in mind how 
corporate cross-border transfers may imply a large economic interest but the 




4. Closing the Historical Circle 
 
As shown above, the essential contents, both the merits and the deficiencies, of the 
Collective Redundancy and Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights) Directive do 
stem from and rely on the Single Market context of the 1970s. The Single European 
Act itself did not change a comma in their wordings. On the other hand, the market 
philosophy introduced corporate responsibility in information, consultation and 
negotiation with a view to reach an agreement with employees’ representatives, first 
in 1992 in the Redundancy Directive and then in 1998 in the Transfer Directive. An 
essential purpose was to fill a legal loophole regarding the cross-border corporate 
responsibility of appropriate procedure, 121  however, without establishing a direct 
possibility of launching law suits against a controlling undertaking abroad. 122 A fact 
is that these amendments did not create any cross-border debate on the substantive 
provisions of these directives. These amendments were (and still are) based on the 
1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers, referred to by the 
respective Preambles.  
 
The Maastricht Social Policy Agreement had only an indirect influence on these 
directives, notably by giving the legal basis for the EWC Directive. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam enshrined the new Social Chapter in the Treaty by incorporating the 
Maastricht Agreement. The Nice Treaty only gave rise to the tiny possibility of 
enacting on dismissals by qualified majority, requiring a prior unanimous decision on 
the procedure (Article 137(3) EC, last sentence). Article 136 EC incorporated the old 
Article 117 E(E)C. In this sense, it is somewhat surprising that the Transfer Directive, 
as codified by the Directive 01/23/EC, thus under the Treaty of Amsterdam, no longer 
refers to social upwards harmonisation, as the original Directive of 1977 did in its 
Preamble’s last ‘whereas’, as follows: 
 
                                                 
120 See COM (2004) 2. As to its implications to employment issues, see a memorandum of 
Professor Niklas Bruun on the public hearing of the European Parliament 11.11.2004; 
www.europarl.eu.int. 
121 See the Commission’s Action Programme of 1989, as quoted by Bercusson 1996, p. 230. 
122 See the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum, as quoted ibid., p. 232. 
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‘Whereas it is therefore necessary to promote the approximation of laws in this 
field while maintaining the improvement described in Article 117 of the 
Treaty,’ 
 
However, this link to upward harmonisation obviously is within reach by relying on 
the Treaty as a whole. But literally, the Transfer Directive is now without its formal 
tie to the Social Chapter. In this sense one might maintain that the Transfer Directive 
is now even more than before exposed to the market philosophy while it is 
substantively essentially stronger than the Collective Redundancy Directive. The 
paradox is that the latter, as codified by directive 98/59/EC still includes this tie to the 
Social Chapter, as follows: 
 
‘(7) Whereas this approximation must therefore be promoted while the 
improvement is being maintained within the meaning of Article 117 of the 
Treaty;’  
 
It is not my purpose to exaggerate the significance of these differences and this 
paradox; they rather might reveal something about the legislative process under the 
flag of Social Europe! I shall not expose them to a ‘what, when and why’ test in this 
paper. However, the letter of the EU Constitution would not change the position and 
legal landscape regarding these directives. It is another story completely what an 
effective and consistent interpretation of the Constitution might be one day. In the 
meantime, it is fair to point out that the Collective Redundancy Directive is blighted 
by essential shortcomings while the Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights’) 
Directive is obviously the strongest and most penetrating element in the legal 
structure that we already partially may call European Labour Law.  
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Chapter II: 
 
1. Social and Economic in EC Law; Pyramid (Hierarchy) Thinking 
 
In his essay Converse Pyramids and the EU Social Constitution 123  Professor Barry 
Fitzpatrick has made a remarkable effort to conceptualise the status of social law in the 
EU’s legal order. It was written just before the adoption of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in 2000. It is worth discussing because it represents a way of 
thinking about the EU from many angles. It is not, however, easy going; his 21 pages 
come with 142 footnotes.  
 
These converse pyramids need to be read as a time-related product of thinking, and, in 
the end, Fitzpatrick, after having reasoned especially on gender equality, addresses first 
the (even ‘revolutionary’) possibilities included in Article 13 EC. Second, he hints that 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights might alter fundamentally the focus of multi-level 
governance on social policy issues. ‘This converse pyramid hypothesis need not be 
deterministic.’ 124  However, the Charter did not alter the division of competences 
between the Community and Member States, not even as incorporated in the draft 
Constitutional Treaty. His pyramids reflect ‘stone work’ (like statues) for acquis 
communautaire for the period from Rome 1957 to (post-)Amsterdam 1997. I will take the 
liberty to present and analyse this pyramid thinking, first without referring to arguments 
now present in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and draft Constitutional Treaty.  
 
 
1.1. Presenting Pyramid Thinking     
 
Pyramid thinking is based upon the dominance of the integrative interplay between 
national and Community competence, Member States striving to retain competence over 
areas central to the their own national hierarchies (or pyramids) of values. Without 
denying theories of multi-level governance within the EU, Fitzpatrick holds that the 
competences, as these “limited fields” have expanded, partly by use of Article 308 EC 
but primarily through Treaty amendments, can be presented as a straightforward 
spectrum, as follows: 
 
“a continuum between pure intergovernmental politics at the one end of the 
spectrum and supranational politics at the other … It is therefore perfectly 
possible for different areas of Community policy to be located at different points 
along the spectrum”. 125    
                                                 
123 In Jo Shaw (ed.), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union, Hart Publishing, 
2000, p. 303-324. (Fitzpatrick 2000). 
124 Ibid., p. 324. 
125Fitzpatrick refers to P Craig, The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy and 
Legitimacy, in P Craig and G De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, University 
Press, 1999), 1-54, at 16-23. On behalf of Paul Craig I can just regret than Fitzpatrick manages to 
hint that it would really be Craig who has come up with the mathematics concerned. In reality 
they were political scientists A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz. They had written ‘European 
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In pyramid thinking this spectrum is essentially hierarchical, which Fitzpatrick then 
























As to the apex (the Preamble), Fitzpatrick notes the laudable aspirations such as “an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe”, and most notably for social lawyers, “the 
essential objective of their efforts the constant improvement of the living and working 
conditions of their peoples”. 126 Further on, he notes how the European Court has “on 
numerous occasions” treated this originally obviously “stratospheric” Preamble “as an 
overarching set of defining Community aspirations. 127 He then refers to the economic 
aspirations of “steady expansion”, “balanced trade and fair competition” and “unity of 
their economies” “with the sound of which the social objectives resonate”. 128 This finally 
and still reflects, “despite a change in nomenclature, an overwhelmingly economic Treaty 
and hence a hierarchy of norms within which economic objectives take priority.” 129  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Integration and Supranational Governance’ in (1997) 4 JEPP to which Craig refers to. It would, 
therefore, be even justified to nickname this spectrum as a ‘Fitzpatrick constant’. Craig well 
presents on the spot concerned the thinking within political science BUT he does not, of course 
not, try to smuggle this kind of mathematics into a constitutional reasoning on European law. 
126 First and third recitals of the Preamble.  
127 Fitzpatrick refers at this point only to case 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena [1976] ECR 455, where, 
in para. 10, the Court invoked the third recital ‘to justify the social objective’ of Article 141 [ex 
119] EC. Fitzpatrick (2000), p. 305, footnote 13. 
128 Fourth and fifth recitals of the Preamble. 
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(Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 305) 
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For me, this is the core of rigid pyramid thinking in the EU context. Economic leads the 
tango, social tries to follow. We’ll see. 
 
In the ‘defining’ or ‘opening’ Articles (2 and 3) of the EC Treaty Fitzpatrick includes the 
minor amendments of Maastricht and Amsterdam, 130  followed by the enshrining of 
European citizenship (Articles 17-22 EC) and the new Treaty base for legislation against 
discrimination in Article 13 EC. These developments reflected, no doubt, ‘at least a 
cosmetic shift of emphasis away from a purely economic pyramid but without altering 
the economic focus of these “apex Articles”.’ 131  
 
Further on in the European economic constitution, the top substantive layer, logically, 
concerns the creation of an undistorted internal market. The fundamental market 
freedoms are followed by essential ancillary policies such as agricultural and transport 
policy, and nowadays by the EMU, vital to the ultimate achievement of an undistorted 
internal market. Only after these core principles have been stated is attention ‘diverted’ to 
‘secondary, “middle layer” issues such as social policy. The ambivalence of the EU 
towards social policy is highlighted by the absence, until Amsterdam, of an effective 
Treaty base for a broad social legislation that could be enacted by qualified majority 
voting (QMV). Further on, the negative integration effects triggered (often referred to as 
“spill-over”) environmental and consumer policy. They are both now striving for positive 
integrationist standards.  
 
As to social policy in the middle layer of the hierarchy, it belongs there because it was 
originally included in the Treaty. Despite this and the ‘more extensive Treaty bases now 
available’, Community social legislation seems to have been rarely (underlining here) 
motivated by internal marker spill-over.’ Exclusion of the rights and interests of 
employed persons from QMV under Article 95 EC contributed to this lack of “spill-over”. 
Finally, internal market issues retain the potential to create such spill-over controversies 
in the future, as evidence of which Fitzpatrick refers to case Albany, a ‘clash between 
competition policy and the right to free collective bargaining’. 132  
 
                                                 
130 Maastricht added ‘high level of employment and of social protection’ in Article 2 EC. 
Amsterdam refined these further, in adding ‘equality between men and women, … [and] a high 
degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance.’ 
131 Fitzpatrick (2000), p. 306. 
132 Fitzpatrick (2000), p. 307. Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie is case C-67/96 [1999] ECR I-5751, judgement of the Court in plenum of 
21.9.1999. As to the judgment in general, see Bruun and Hellsten (eds.), Collective Agreements 
and Competition Law in the EU, DJØF 2001 (Bruun and Hellsten). Albany and its sister cases 
Brentjens, C-115-117/97, and Drijvende Bokken, C-218/97, dealt with a single sectoral pension 
fund - each running a supplementary occupational pension scheme established by a sectoral 
collective agreement that had been declared binding erga omnes. This meant that every worker in 
the three sectors concerned had to be affiliated to the sector’s fund unless the fund itself granted 
an exemption. The companies concerned wanted to dispense with the compulsory affiliation by 
arranging, according to them, similar or better pension benefits for a lower price outside the fund. 
They invoked the EC competition rules (Article 81 [ex 85] EC). 
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Tertiary policies (economic and social cohesion, R&D, education, vocational training and 
youth), falling largely out of any harmonisation, have not challenged the economic core 
of the pyramid itself. Regarding civil and political rights Fitzpatrick refers to the UN 
Covenants that do not include any commercial rights. 
 
Finally, Fitzpatrick recounts the well-known deficiencies in civil and political rights 
while recognising the progress made. However, his conclusion is that  
 
‘…only in the “top level” of the EU pyramid, within the scope of the internal 
market, […] the EU legal system achieves a level of comprehensiveness and 
coherence which justifies the designation of “constitution”. Since the earliest days 
of the European Court, it is this economic pyramid, a European economic 
constitution, which takes precedence over a subsequent, inconsistent national 




1.1.1 A Politico-Socio-Economic / Citizenship Pyramid 
 
As a theoretical but simultaneously traditional example of a constitution Fitzpatrick 

























                                                 
133 Idem, p. 309. 
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(Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 309) 
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With the citizenship pyramid as a mirror, Fitzpatrick maintains that ‘Both within a grand 
sweep through the EC Treaty, and but also within the minutiae of it, the EU’s economic 
pyramid [i.e. EC Treaty pyramid] is almost precisely the converse of … a “traditional” 
constitutional structure.’ 134 However, Fitzpatrick sees social rights as a sandwich both in 
the middle of the Community pyramid and also in the interaction between these converse 
pyramids. Then comes the clue:  
 
‘Despite some occasional willingness to use safety valves to protect significant 
national pyramidal values, “middle layer” areas of competence are intrinsically 
vulnerable to apparently superior EU economic values. Therefore social law 
values have to fight their way on to an internal market agenda, for example, in the 
recent conflict between competition policy and the right to free collective 
bargaining.’ 135 (emphasis JH) 
 
The citation describes the deeds of the European Court of Justice. Within EC secondary 




1.1.2 The EU Social Pyramid 
 
As possible for every area of Community policy, 136 Fitzpatrick constructs the EU social 

















                                                 
134 Fitzpatrick (2000) p. 310; underlining added. I remind that there is no constitution in UK, 
drilling, that too, a visible hole into the pyramid thinking. 
135 Ibid., p. 313. Underlining added. As to the conflict, Fitzpatrick refers – in a footnote - to case 
Albany, C-67/96. 
136 Fitzpatrick also presents conversed pyramids on sex equality. I leave them aside now.  
137 Ibid., p. 315. 






The EU social pyramid 
(Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 315) 
   
 
Fitzpatrick asserts, what is certainly appropriate, that in a genuine social constitution 
freedom of association would top a social pyramid, followed by protection for other core 
aspects of collective labour law, for example the right to strike that is excluded from the 
Social Chapter of the Treaty. Social security and dismissals would also be high up there. 
It is possible to view the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Rights as an attempt 
to convert the pyramids but it includes flaws, is subject to subsidiarity and its potential as 
a source of law is limited by its uncertain status. 138 Anyway, Fitzpatrick recognises that 
some potential exists, next to the then draft EU Charter of fundamental Rights and social 
dialogue 139, in Articles 136-145 EC irrespective of market integration, while neither a 
                                                 
138 Ibid, p. 315-6. Concerning the Charter’s uncertain status Fitzpatrick refers to Advocate 
General Jacobs’ opinion in Albany. I recall that the judgement did not follow – especially as to its 
grounds – the Opinion and the weaknesses counted by Fitzpatrick (and Jacobs). See infra.   
139 Ability of Social Dialogue to provide the momentum towards an EU social constitution 
Fitzpatrick calls as an under-developed aspect in his essay. Anyway, he holds the prospect 
brought by Social Dialogue as ‘not sustained by its output since its inception’. Ibid, p. 323, 
footnote 134. Fitzpatrick refers to Brian Bercusson, “The European Community’s Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers”, (1990) 53 MLR 624 at 641. This point of reference is 
simply too old. Bercusson at the latest in his ‘European Labour Law’ in 1996 presented social 
dialogue as a real prospect, and, besides, was able to refer to the very first European Framework 
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recognisable hierarchy of fundamental social rights nor a consistent and coherent system 
of social law has emerged from this process.  
 
 
2. Criticizing Pyramid Thinking in General 
 
The broad outline of pyramid thinking includes sound perceptions. The EU’s social and 
labour law is generally still market-orientated, fragmented and thin as to collective rights. 
How much the Constitutional Treaty would change, is another story. However, this 
thinking or ‘model’ is liable to severe criticism, as well. Some graves and treasures 
remain undetected both deep in the EU pyramid and even on its face.  
 
A meta-problem is that this conversed pyramid thinking is built upon the use of national 
legal orders not just as mirrors but even as building blocks of the EC pyramid – even up 
to minutiae, as Fitzpatrick puts it. It is not my contention that the EC/EU could be 
separated from its constituent Member States. It is a multi-layer system of governance. 
However, I would highlight that the EC/EU essentially is what the Member States have 
done together – without that being a priori the opposite (converse) to the national legal 
orders. Hence, more adequate than the converse pyramids as the flag of EC law, it seems 
to be taking the EC/EU as a unique legal order. 140  Paradigmatically, its own pyramid 
should be construed and assessed with this assertion as a basis, not its relation to any 
other legal order (creature). This unique legal order the President of European Court of 
Justice 1994-2003, Professor Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias has described, as follows: 
  
“So what really distinguishes the European Community from other international 
organisations is the extent and above all the intensity of the powers which the 
Treaties have conferred upon it. Thus the Treaty powers include wide legislative, 
executive and judicial powers in fields traditionally reserved as sovereign to the 
State, being within its exclusive jurisdiction. 141 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Agreement on Parental Leave, reached on 7 November 1995, see pp. 501-570, especially the 
conclusion on pp. 569-70.  
140 I rhetorically recall case 26/62Van Gend and Loos [1963] ECR 1, case 6/64  Costa v. ENEL 
[1964] ECR 614 and the Court’s Opinion 1/91, [1991] ECR I-6079, on the draft EEA Agreement. 
In the last mentioned the Court declared (as summarised in CELEX): ‘[…] the EEC Treaty, albeit 
concluded in the form of an international agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional 
charter of a Community based on the rule of law. The Community treaties established a new legal 
order for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights and the subjects of 
which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. The essential characteristics of 
the Community legal order which has thus been established are in particular its primacy over the 
law of the Member States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions.’ Outside the Court 
one may, of course, add the prominent role of the Court itself to the essential characteristics of 
this new legal order. 
141 See ‘The European Legal Order from a Constitutional Perspective’; lecture, Copenhagen, 
26.4.1999. 
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I support this assertion and note that the intensity of powers already gives rise to doubt 
about an overarching existence of converse pyramids, thus a couple of pyramids. There 
might be legal features with only one pyramid left.  
 
A related problem is that the hierarchical nature of the EU’s (economically dominated) 
pyramid is, in the converse pyramid thinking, rather directly derived from the (so far) 
division of competences between the Community and the Member States, as well as from 
the neo-functionalist integration theory followed by establishing (only) the European 
Economic Community. First, how come, if the pyramid theory was correct up to its apex, 
that for 51 years there was the European Coal and Steel Community with an essentially 
more social focus (policy) and competences than in the EC/EU? Second, while the 
ECSC, too, resulted from a market driven neo-functionalist integration (theory), the 
Commission of the ECSC was even competent to adopt recommendations (corresponding 
directives in the EEC) on minimum wages (Article 68 ECSC). What would have been the 
place of such (recommendations) directives in the EC pyramid?  This special competence 
was, of course, deeply market-bound but it would have worked, if ever used, also in 
protecting the workers concerned. Anyway, my thesis is that (limited) competence does 
not as such determine the nature of the action very straightforwardly.  
 
A third paradigmatic remark is that while construing pyramids (i.e. conceptualizing EC 
law) is meaningful as such, it easily leads one to lose sight of the evolutionary nature of 
EC law, up to the leading Articles of the Treaty, as we will see below. I rhetorically recall 
the lesson given by the Court in CILFIT. Next to linguistic diversity, legal concepts may 
have different meanings at national and Community level, and, most important now, 
‘every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the 
light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives 
thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be 
applied’. 142   
 
A structural remark is that for unknown reasons Fitzpatrick does not count the 
enshrinement of ‘policy in the social sphere’ in Article 3(i) [now 3(j)] EC by the 
Maastricht Treaty while he clearly uses the expression ‘opening Articles’, hence, also 
covering Article 3. We’ll find Article 3(j) EC later in case Albany. Equally, what 
Fitzpatrick doesn’t express is Article 4(1) (ex 3a(1)) EC, inserted by Article G(4) TEU, 
that refers to common economic policy, internal market and, important here, to the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition. In any case it seems natural 
that the dominance of economic would rely on market economy. Anyway, I leave it open 
whether Article 4 EC belongs to Fitzpatrick’s ‘leading Articles’, and what its impact 
might be. Such court case doesn’t exist that I know. 
 
While Fitzpatrick raises the evidential force of the converse pyramids up to minutiae, 143 
criticism also on the same line has its place. 
                                                 
142 Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415, paragraph 20. As to CILFIT in relation to Albany, see 
footnote 187, infra. 
143 Ibid, p. 310. As a broader source of criticism I refer to the analysis of Miguel Poiares Maduro, 
‘We the Court. The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution’. Oxford, 
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2.1. EU’s Social Pyramid 
 
Some structural remarks preliminarily have their place here. First, the Treaty of Nice 
introduced the possibility to use QMV to ‘middle layer’ areas – except at social security – 
in case that the Council takes a prior unanimous decision thereof (Article 137(2), last 
sentence).  
 
A paradigmatic problem is that the division of competence at social matters between the 
Community and the Member States is far from clear. A more serious issue is that the 
‘bottom layer’ areas in Fitzpatrick’s pyramid, i.e. pay, right of association, right to strike 
and lockout, may fall under EU competence. This is especially possible if the social 
partners at European level conclude an agreement upon them, and the Council transforms 
such agreement into EU law. 144 
 
The ‘Fitzpatrick constant’ (spectrum), leading to one point within a spectrum as 
describing the Community competence, is maybe the most illusory exactly at social 
policy. As Kapteyn and van Themaat put it, Article 3(j) EC on social policy ‘offers no 
peg on which to hang anything about the nature of Community competence or over its 
scope.’ 145  Other Treaty provisions do bring some clarity, of course, but even the 
European Convention noted how e.g. Article 137(5) EC does not exclusively define the 
community competence. 146 And, indeed, e.g. Part-Time Directive (97/81/EC) and Fixed-
Term Directive (99/70/EC) do extend the non-discrimination principle to pay. As to e.g. 
freedom of association, our honourable Lord Wedderburn already in 1992 held that an 
EC law instrument thereof would be possible under Article 94 (ex 100) EC. 147 Further 
hooks invalidating the ‘Fitzpatrick constant’ are safety and health measures within the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hart Publishing, 1998. Maduro distinguishes – instead of any pyramids! – three ideal 
constitutional models in explaining Article 28 (ex 30) EC (the cornerstone provision of  the free 
movement of goods): the centralised, the competitive and the decentralised models. Without 
sticking to any of these his conclusion is to claim further constitutionalism (i.e. in addition to a 
formal constitution that it anyway also requires). Besides, ‘European integration challenges the 
legal monopoly of State and the hierarchical organisation of law (in which constitutional law is 
conceived as the “higher law”)’. Moreover, ‘competition among States’ and ‘competition among 
rules’ challenge the supremacy of law, subject to market competition. All these require a new 
constitutional legal theory. Ibid, p. 175. However, as an intermediate step Maduro has pointed out 
how the Maastricht Treaty stressed ‘not only economic efficiency, but also social and 
redistributive values’, calling for a broader concept of the European Economic Constitution and 
its relation to political values (far beyond anti-protectionism). Ibid. 160 et seq. 
144 In general terms about this, see Jari Hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European 
Communities, EC Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European 
Collective Agreements. Labour Policy Studies No. 259. Ministry of Labour, Helsinki 2004, 
Finland. III + 151. 
145 Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities, 
3. ed., Kluwer Int., p.1045. 
146 See paras 26-28, p. 14 of the Report of WG XI. Document CONV 516/1/03, REV. 1. 
147 Wedderburn of Charlton, Lord, Freedom of Association and Community Protection. A 
Comparative Inquiry into Trade Union Rights in the Member States and into Need for 
Intervention at Community Level. European Commission 1992 (stencil). See paragraph 35.1.  
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free movement of goods and the pay-related Posting Directive under free movement of 
services. I explain both, infra. In conclusion, much more precise than the ‘Fitzpatrick 
constant’, seems to  me to be the assertion that if the Member States may reach a 
qualified majority on a social matter, they are also able to find the necessary EC 
competence. 
 
Fitzpatrick denotes as a challenge the need to elevate the collective rights up to the top of 
the pyramid. That view is easy to share. And, in any case, the Constitutional Treaty 
would enshrine the right of association and the right to strike. It will be difficult, if not 
impossible to qualify them as ‘middle layer areas’ because they will be on an equal 
footing with the fundamental economic freedoms. The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is a step in that direction. It will show up in one of my test cases of pyramid 
thinking, namely in that of Safety of Machinery. 
 
However, I will start with equal pay and the free provision of services because 
Fitzpatrick himself used them as his test cases. 
 
 
2.2. Equal Pay 
 
Describing the overall lot of ‘social’ in the EU, Fitzpatrick refers to case Defrenne II as 
indicating how ‘the Court invoked the third recital of the EC Treaty Preamble to justify 
the social objective of Art. 119 EC.’ 148 To be precise, the Court first declared (para. 8) 
the double aim of Article 119 EC: the need to protect against distortion of competition in 
those Member States with advanced equal pay policy (para. 9); invoking ‘social’ in the 
Treaty Preamble as follows (para. 10): 
 
‘…[Article 119] forms part of the social objectives of the Community, which is 
not merely an economic union, but is at the same time intended, by common 
action, to ensure social progress and seek the constant improvement of the living 
and working conditions of their peoples, as is emphasized by the Preamble to the 
Treaty.’ 
 
After noting how the Treaty founders accentuated this by situating the provision 
concerned into ‘a Chapter devoted to social policy’, and recapping the social progress 
marked by Article 117 EEC (para. 11), the resumption, essential in this ‘pyramidal 
analysis’ came in para. 12, as follows: 
 
‘This double aim, which is at once economic and social, shows that the principle 
of equal pay forms part of the foundations of the Community.’ (emphasis added) 
 
The Court further recalled (para. 13) the proclamation to realise equal pay by the end of 
the first stage of the transitional period (enshrined in Article 119(1) EEC). However, the 
essential assessment is that the Community foundations were (and still are), at once 
economic and social. Besides, the social factor was granted precedence in this particular 
                                                 
148 Ibid, p. 305, footnote 13 referring to paragraph 10 of the judgment.  
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case and not just as a safety valve, but following a detected non-working of an internal 
market spill-over or non-harmonization. Another issue is whether equal pay regulation 
(of the EU) is seen as a huge political ‘safety sever’ (or Cinderella in the cruel internal 
market) that just justifies the use of the word ‘overwhelmingly’ as qualifying the 
economic Treaty. However, equal pay in general terms does not fit into rigid pyramid 
thinking (with economic supremacy) while many details within the ‘equal pay 
developments’ after Defrenne II (and Barber) can be qualified as reflecting the 
dominance of economic over social (equal pay) as Fitzpatrick does. 149 
 
 
2.3. Free Provision of Services 
 
As a means of safeguarding the pyramids, Fitzpatrick brings into the argument the free 
provision of services. His hammer is the case Unborn Children 150 in which the Court 
manifested the inexorable (and possibly too far-reaching) ability of the internal market 
law to ‘harass’ even highly cultural, religious and social areas of life; and in this case 
besides the enacted (in 1984) constitutional values, namely the ban on abortion, of 
Ireland. I agree with this harassment aspect in the pyramid thinking. However, the 
outcome (by the ECJ) in the case was twofold. The ECJ first concluded that medical 
termination of pregnancy, performed in accordance with the law of the State in which it is 
carried out, constitutes a service within the meaning of Article 50 of the Treaty.  This 
illustrates the ability of ‘economic’ to cover in EC law nearly all forms of activity 
whatever the remuneration. However, the applicability of the internal market law in the 
end protected the right of the mother to get information about legal abortion abroad only 
if the clinics (the economic operators) concerned were involved in the distribution of the 
said information. The rest (ban on information on abortion by independent actors such as 
a student organisation) the ECJ left up to national law and thus set aside particularly the 
freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Human Rights 
Convention. This was, in 1991, the Court’s backdoor method of evading any direct 
challenge to the (national) values concerned. An intermediate step taken by the Court was 
to reframe the question of the national court so that instead of a person’s right to produce 
information the Court assessed such an alleged right of a student association. The link 
between the student association and the abortion clinics the Court simply found to be ‘too 
tenuous’ to fall under Article (ex) 59 of the Treaty. Thus, ‘the case can be interpreted as 
indicating that fundamental rights of Community law offer first and foremost protection 
to what might be called “factors” of production, instead of individuals or non-profit 
student organisations.’ 28a However, while the case illustrates very clearly the strong and 
                                                 
149 Later in his essay, Fitzpatrick explains further developments within the gender equality. That 
is highly important as such but, however, doesn’t explain draws (like the concept of indirect 
discrimination) that do not fit in the rigid pyramid thinking. 
150 Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v. Grogan 
[1991] ECR I-4685.  
28a Tuomas Ojanen, The European Way. The Structure of National Court Obligation Under EC 
Law, Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, Saarijärvi 1998, p. 321, fn. 507. On this judgment in critical 
sense, also see e.g. Deirdre Curtin, CMLRev. 29: 585-603, 1992. In a similar case from Ireland, 
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often paradigmatic position of the ‘economic’ dimension in EC law, it does not prove to 
my mind anything regarding employment law.  
 
I take the liberty to present another example within the field of free provision of services, 
namely the Posting of Workers Directive (96/71/EC). A straightforward application of 
the principle of economic dominance would mean that the host country of the posted 
workers would have to tolerate social dumping based on low wages. As case Bond van 
Adverteerders and others v The Netherlands State proves, economic aims cannot 
constitute grounds of public policy within the meaning of Article 46 [ex 56] of the Treaty, 
151 thus grounds to restrict the freedom of cross-border provision of services. In contrast, 
it is, firstly, settled case law that the Member States are entitled to extend their minimum 
wages (set up either in law or collective agreements) also to cover workers posted from 
another Member State. 152 Thus, the Member States are free to combat economic social 
dumping, protecting, of course, at the same time the workers concerned. However, 
adopting a pyramidal way of thinking, this protection of workers, especially that of 
construction workers, 153 under internal market law and predominance of its economic 
values could perhaps be (again!) explained as just an example of a safety valve with 
which values high up in the national pyramids can be safeguarded. Yes or no, I will not 
pursue this due to the more graphic evidence brought by the Posting Directive. 154 
 
The directive has had, since 16 December 1999, one crucial effect. It means that the 
Member States must for all sectors extend their law-based minimum wages to posted 
workers, and, for the construction sector, also wages set up in certain mainly nation-wide 
collective agreements.  
 
The Preamble of the Directive noted the double need for it: ‘(5) Whereas any such 
promotion of the transnational provision of services requires a climate of fair competition 
and measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers.’ Economic and social are 
together (cf. the double aim of equal pay in Defrenne II). Hence, the Directive 
transformed the earlier freedom of the Member States into an obligation in European law, 
thus an element in the EC pyramidal structure. By definition it combats an unlimited 
freedom to provide services and was also, by that reason, heavily opposed.  155 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, The European Human Rights Court deemed that 
the ban on information violated the freedom of expression. Judgment of 29.10.1992, A-246A. 
151 Case 352/85 [1988] ECR 2085, para. 34. 
152 Cases 61-62/81 Seco[1982] ECR 223, para. 14; C-113/90 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-
1417, para. 18; C-43/93 Vander Elst, [1994] ECR I-3803, para. 23; and C-369 and 376/96, 
Arblade [1999] ECR I-8753, para. 41.  The Court gave the judgments in Vander Elst and Arblade 
by sitting in plenum.  
153 See Arblade, para. 36.  
154 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services 
155 Examples of the ultra-liberal concept of freedom to provide services are also in the 
argumentation of companies in cases C-369/96 Arblade, C-49/98 Finalarte, see footnote 30, and 
C-164/01Portugaia [2002] ECR I-787. Mutatis mutandis the principal contractor in case Wolff & 
Müller v. Pereira, C-60/03, judgment 12.10.2004, nyr, invoked its constitutional right to carry on 
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Directive does not fit in to a rigid pyramidal thinking. It is also fully in line with Article 
50(3) [ex 60(3)] of the very EC Treaty that subordinates free movement of services to the 
same conditions that national service providers have in the host country. That provision 
certainly is not any safety valve but, as an incorporated and structural factor, heavily 
opposes any straightforward pyramidal thinking with respect to economic dominance.       
 
 
2.4. Right to Strike 156 
 
What about the right to strike in this context?  It is expressly guaranteed in or indirectly 
protected by several national constitutions. In the EU it was deduced from personnel 
regulations and also, in Danske Slagterier of 1990, from the concept of a prudent 
businessman. 157 Thus, the basis was both somewhat artificial and fragile. A further point 
of reference, although of course not for the UK at that time, was the 1989 EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of Workers. With this thin history the Council adopted the so-called 
Monti-regulation in 1998. 158  
 
For the purposes of this reasoning it is necessary to recall the essential contents of the 
draft Regulation, as published by the Commission in January 1998. Namely, it first 
included a somewhat vague reference to fundamental rights (Article 1). Then, notably, its 
draft Article 2 contained the right of the Commission to decide on the legality of strike 
action blocking the cross-border trade:  
 
‘Where the Commission establishes the existence in a Member State of obstacles 
within the meaning of Article 1, it shall address a decision to the Member State 
directing it to take the necessary and proportionate measures to remove the said 
obstacles, within a period which it shall fix’. 159 
 
If ever realised, this structure would have been a manifest example of the dominance of 
the economic factor (free movement of goods) over the social factor (the right to strike). 
But the Council finally adopted a completely different scheme: essentially an information 
                                                                                                                                                 
an occupation against its law-based liability to pay wages as a guarantor to workers of its 
subcontractor. 
156 As to right to strike in EC law, see Tonia Nowitz, International and European Protection of the 
Right to Strike, Oxford University University Press 2003, especially p. 245-263. With essentially 
similar line but with more detailed contents PhD Olavi Sulkunen explained the developments in 
protection of the right to strike in EC law in his Article (in Finnish) ‘Ammattiyhdistysoikeudet 
Euroopan yhteisön oikeudessa’ (Trade Union Rights in EC Law). Työoikeudellisen yhdistyksen 
vuosikirja 1999-2000, p. 55-195. 
157 Case C-338/89 Danske Slagterier [1991] ECR I-2315. 
158 Officially: Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 of 7 December 1998 on the functioning of the 
internal market in relation to the free movement of goods among the Member States. 
159 OJ C10, 15.1.1998. Even the name of the draft instrument was telling: Proposal for a Council 
Regulation (EC) creating a mechanism whereby the Commission can intervene in order to 
remove certain obstacles to trade.    
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structure, and respect of the national right to strike was proclaimed. 160 While the legal 
effect of the Regulation within the EC law pyramid is liable to different opinions, it in 
any case protects a core labour right and does not subordinate it to an economic 
dominance of the EC treaty pyramid à la Fitzpatrick, to an EC law proportionality test 
carried out by the Commission etc. A safety clause similar to that in the Monti-regulation 
is in the Preamble of the Posting Directive, stating that (Recital 22) ‘Whereas this 
Directive is without prejudice to the law of the Member States concerning collective 
action to defend the interests of trades and professions’.  
 
A proper test case of the right to strike in EC law obviously looms in the High Court of 
London. There, a Finnish ship-owner Viking seeks, in a nutshell, an injunction against 
ITF and the Finnish Seamen’s Union concerning any industrial action (even covering the 
cause of such an action) related to the planned re-flagging of MS Rosella in another 
Member State. The grounds are freedom to provide maritime transport services (EC 
Regulation 4055/86), free movement of workers (Article 39 EC) and freedom of 
establishment (Article 43 EC). Blueprints of both of the EU’s constitutions, economic 
and social, will be on the desk of the Court, most likely finally in the ECJ. 
 
In conclusion, the Monti Regulation (read together with its travaux préparatoires) does 
not fit into rigid pyramid thinking. If it (as the preamble clause in Posting Directive) is 
taken as a safety valve, it is remarkable that the regulation is part of EC secondary 
legislation, enacted by the Council comprising the representatives of the Member States 
(Posting Directive enacted in co-decision by the Parliament and Council). In the ‘safety 
valve way of thinking’ à la Fitzpatrick the role of the Court comes up in a misleading 
way, as if it would be the only body capable of construing these safety valves in the 
somewhat mystical European law.      
 
 
2.5. Safety of Machinery  
 
Before outlining the pyramid problem concerning safety of machinery I recall 
Fitzpatrick’s thesis in its sharpest form: the fundamental economic freedoms of the 
undistorted internal market dominate over social values that are essentially national. 
Thus, at the level of this thesis, typically two sets of norms are present: EC norms and 
national norms. On the other hand, although safety and health tops Fitzpatrick’s EU 
social pyramid, it is paradigmatically subordinated to economic freedom (here free 
movement of goods), in his EC Treaty pyramid. But I also want to highlight that 
Fitzpatrick has not written anything at all about machinery safety in his essay. I do it so 
as to test whether the pyramid way of thinking is capable of describing adequately such 
an important legal topic. 
 
                                                 
160 Article 2 of the Regulation: 
This Regulation may not be interpreted as affecting in any way the exercise of fundamental rights 
as recognised in Member States, including the right or freedom to strike. These rights may also 
include the right or freedom to take other actions covered by the specific industrial relations 
systems in Member States. 
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However, it is not always the case that when economic and social considerations clash 
the economic considerations arise from the EC and the social considerations arise from 
national law. Both the juxtaposed economic and social considerations may arise from EC 
law as well. Safety of machinery is a graphic illustration of this, and here I mean the 
safety of workers and employees using the machines, hence not as consumers. To 
illustrate this, I discuss only the so-called Machinery Directive (MD). Officially it is, as 
last amended, Directive 98/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
June 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to machinery. 
Except for one example, I need to take the liberty to pass over its practical application, as 
well any overall assessment on its effectiveness. It is better suited to safety specialists and 
I will only discuss how adequately the pyramid way of thinking explains the normative 
structure concerned. 
 
MD sets the rules concerning the properties of the Machines. More precisely, according 
to its Article 1, MD applies to machinery and lays down the essential health and safety 
requirements therefore, as defined in its Annex I. These requirements are compulsory 
(see Recital 14) and rather simple in general terms. But as a whole, the MD is a 
remarkable set, almost like a virgin forest of rules. The Directive and its Annexes occupy 
46 pages of the Official Journal. 161  One guide published by the Commission (DG 
Enterprise) is 241 pages long, 162 another one 266 pages. 163 This set of rules has Article 
95 (ex 100a) EC as its legal base.  
 
Article 95(3) EC requires that in making proposals for internal market legislation the 
Commission, concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer 
protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of 
any new development based on scientific facts. Article 95(3) EC, second subparagraph, 
equally requires that ‘[w]ithin their respective powers, the European Parliament and the 
Council will also seek to achieve this objective’. MD puts this into practice by stipulating 
in Article 2(1) how ‘Member States shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that 
machinery or safety components covered by this Directive may be placed on the market 
and put into service only if they do not endanger the health or safety of 
persons…’(emphasis added). This establishes the principle of risk prevention as the 
leading essential requirement. Annex I elaborates this requirement and prolongs it to 
cover, next to normal use of a machine, also uses ‘which could reasonably be 
expected’.164 
 
Hence, the requirement for a high level of health and safety is European law, as enacted 
for the internal market. The Preamble of the MD mentions the internal market twice:  
 
                                                 
161 OJ L207, 23.7.1998. 
162 Community legislation on machinery: Comments on Directive 98/37/EC 
Luxembourg: Eur-Op, 1999 - 241 p.  
163 Machinery: Useful facts in relation to Directive 98/37/EC. Luxembourg: Eur-Op, 1999 - 266 
p.   
164 Annex I, Essential Health and Safety Requirements, point 1.1.2(c). 
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‘(2): Whereas the internal market consists of an area without internal frontiers 
within which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
guaranteed’;  
 
The Preamble thereinafter (Recital (5)) denotes how the Member States are responsible 
for ensuring the health and safety, in particular, of workers, notably in relation to the risks 
arising out of the use of machinery. The seventh Recital refers to approximation of 
existing national health and safety provisions ‘to ensure free movement in the market of 
machinery without lowering existing justified levels of protection in the Member States’. 
Otherwise the philosophy is to produce state-of-art machines; see Recital (14) and the 
essential safety requirements as specified in Annex I. 165 
 
Then comes the clue as to the purpose of the MD. Although the name of the instrument 
operates with approximation of the laws of the Member States, implying some space for 
national rules, the ninth Recital tells us what it is all about: 
 
‘(9) Whereas paragraphs 65 and 68 of the White Paper on the completion of the 
internal market, approved by the European Council in June 1985, provide for a 
new approach to legislative harmonisation; whereas, therefore, the harmonisation 
of laws in this case must be limited to those requirements necessary to satisfy the 
imperative and essential health and safety requirements relating to machinery; 
whereas these requirements must replace the relevant national provisions 
because they are essential’; (emphasis added) 
 
Hence, the MD harmonises. Although it is limited to essential health and safety 
requirements, it anyway harmonises. I recall that Article 95(4) EC leaves a tiny 
possibility for the Member States to notify national norms they want to retain after a 
harmonisation measure. It requires ‘major grounds’ referred to in Article 30 (ex 36) EC. 
Besides, Article 95(4), second subparagraph, leaves it up to the Commission to confirm 
such national rules, ‘after having verified that they are not a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.’ The grasp of 
the Community is quite perfect, as enacted by the Member States (unanimously, by the 
way). 166 
 
                                                 
165 Envisaging criticism I note how Recital (14) also refers to taking account of economic 
requirements in applying the essential safety requirements. This is already fine-tuning debate. It 
reflects e.g. a fact that a minimal or just nominal improvement in health and safety may cost 
enormously and is therefore not feasible. At this fine-tuning level common sense is used in every 
Member State, as well as in the Commission. However, this debate doesn’t invalidate the 
principle in Article 2(1): only safe products are allowed to the market. 
166 For the purposes of this writing it is not needed to verify to what extent the Member States 
have tried or even succeeded in keeping their national safety requirements relating to machinery. 
I take it granted that they are few, not known for the European labour law audience and dealing 
with minor issues. Otherwise there would have been cases on MD in the ECJ. Searching among 
case titles by ‘machinery’ gives some cases but none under MD. That I know the pending case 
AGM-COS.MET is the first one referred to the ECJ under MD. See footnote 169, infra. 
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It is essential to note that this harmonisation measure (MD) has de jure and de facto 
replaced, with respect to the properties of machinery, not with respect to their use, 
national safety requirements, although national norms are required for its implementation 
and the EC measure is still a directive and not a regulation. Normally the national laws 
just repeat the essential safety requirements of the MD and set up the necessary 
administration and executive surveillance rules. This structure means that only machines 
fulfilling the (finally rather detailed) essential safety and health requirements are allowed 
onto the market, even if they would never become marketed in another Member States. 
Put the other way round, the Member States are (save exceptionally under Article 95(4) 
EC) not allowed to set up even higher safety requirements – higher than ‘high level’, as 
to the properties of machines. That is generally possible only with respect to minimum 
health and safety directives based on Article 137 (ex 118a) EC; see the ‘Use Directive’. 
167 In MD, Article 2(2) discerningly notes the Member States’ possibility to lay down 
provisions for the use of machines, ‘provided that this does not mean that the machinery 
or safety components are modified in a way not specified in the Directive’. 
 
However, and now finally comes the pyramid context: high level of health and safety of 
workers (the social factor) is a precondition for enjoying the fundamental economic 
freedom of a product (machinery) to be marketed both nationally and across borders. 
There is no longer any ‘typical’ converse pyramid structure of norms but only one single 
pyramid. Social and economic are so much tied up that it is not meaningful to try to 
distinguish them. They are like one package. Equally, it does not seem very fruitful to 
attempt to distil any rigid, ‘EC pyramidal’ superiority for either of them. High level of 
safety is an absolute precondition for market access. And that covers the core of all 
industries, namely machines. Besides, the same harmonising structure also concerns 
Council Directive 89/686/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to personal protective equipment. 
 
This harmonising structure is obviously difficult to conceive, at least with respect to a 
pending case in the ECJ, namely AGM-COS .MET s.r.l. v. Finnish State and Tarmo 
Lehtinen (hereinafter: AGM-COS.MET). 168 The district Court of Tampere, Finland, has 
made a reference for a preliminary ruling. The case includes a compensation claim by 
this Italian company, based upon some public statements of market inspector Lehtinen 
before the market surveillance decision by which a car lift, that is a machine covered by 
the MD, was accepted in cross-border trade. Market inspector Lehtinen had expressed 
safety concerns about it. Amongst others, one question (3 b)) also implies a reference to 
national safety rules as if they were relevant in the case. A special angle comes from the 
fact that the car lift belongs to the group of specifically risky machines with which even 
fatal accidents may occur because mechanics have to work under a heavy load, up to 
some 3,500 kg. The national court bound its a priori single relevant question (No.2) only 
                                                 
167 Officially Council Directive 89/655/EEC of 30 November 1989 concerning the minimum 
safety and health requirements for the use of work equipment by workers at work (second 
individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC).  
168 Case C-470/03 AGM-COS.MET. The questions subject to preliminary ruling are published in 
OJ C35, 7.2.2004. It is reachable via Internet, <www.europa.eu.int>. 
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to the MD, not to the Treaty. 169  170 Another question too (No. 1) 171  concerning 
restrictions on trade will normally be answered in brief, due to the logic of these 
questions 1 and 2, whereas, consequently, the other questions, such as No. 3(a) dealing 
with proportionality and No. 4 with freedom of expression, will fall. Still, question 2 on 
the conformity of the lift with the essential safety and health requirements will normally 
lead to a positive answer (the lift does not conform) and, therefore, just repeating the 
existing case law concerning question 1: in case of harmonising EC law, alleged trade 
restrictions are assessed only under the harmonising law, not under Articles 28 and 30 
EC.  
 
However, this set of questions also raises a further question about the normative pyramid 
applicable in this case. Where is the pyramidal Apex this time? A further question is the 
possible role of proportionality in this context. 
 
I see it as natural that in applying the MD to this case (i.e. answering question 2), the 
status in principle of protecting human health and life in relation to an economic freedom 
(free movement of goods) will be tackled in the Court’s reasoning. In so doing, it seems 
natural to resort to the principle of high level of safety and health in Article 95(3) EC. 
Further on, a review of the establishment of the internal market in Article 3(c), social 
policy in Article 3(j) and high level of social protection in Article 2 EC would be no 
surprise. But the question is whether this shortlist is exhaustive and enough to derive or 
                                                 
169 The national court asks whether a car lift (used in garages) is contrary to the essential safety 
requirements because ‘in designing the structure account is not taken of the placing of the vehicle 
on the lift in either driving direction and the load calculations of each lifting arm are not done for 
the least favourable loading situation’. Being so, the lift was also designed and constructed 
deviating from the European CEN standard concerned. Indeed, the machine doesn’t respect the 
principle of inherently safe machinery design and construction (Annex I, Essential Health and 
Safety Requirements, point 1.1.2(a)) and doesn’t take account of any reasonably expectable use 
(Annex I, Essential Health and Safety Requirements, point 1.1.2(c)). An affirmative answer to the 
national court’s question seems manifest. 
170 An aberratio ictus is in question No. 2, namely the reference to a national standard SFS EN 
1493, as if the machine would have been manufactured - instead of Italy - in Finland, and as if 
this national standard would have some specific relevance in the case. In reality, harmonised 
European CEN standards show the state-of-art in technical sense and legally create, when 
complied with in designing and construction of a machine, a presumption of conformity with the 
essential health and safety requirements (see Article 5(2) MD). If a standard is not complied with, 
assessment of conformity is stricter (see Article 8(2) MD) but the same level of safety is required.  
171 Question 1 in the case presupposes that the public statements of the market inspector would be 
assessed under Articles 28 and 30 EC (concerning free movement of goods). This proves that the 
national (district) court doesn’t know the relevant case law. If there is a harmonisation measure, 
alleged trade restrictions (or measures with equivalent effect) are assessed only under that 
harmonisation measure, not under Articles 28 and 30 EC. See judgments (by the Court in 
plenum) C-37/92Vanacke, [1993] I-4749, paragraph 9, and C-324/99 DaimlerChrysler AG [2001] 
I-9897, paragraph 32. However, also in another pending case subject to preliminary ruling, 
namely C-40/04 Yonemoto (see OJC 85/15, 3.4.2004), the referring court, this time the Supreme 
Court of Finland, makes in its question No. 1 the same mistake. Hence, it refers to Articles 28 and 
30 EC in the context of MD. These events seem to prove that ‘free movement’ of the ECJ 
judgments is in troubles! 
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establish the principle that protecting human health and life is an honourable aim that is 
not subordinated to any proportionality test. This means that not the smallest fatal risk or 
even risk of injury is acceptable. I recall that, as such, both the overall philosophy behind 
the MD (only safe products are allowed to the market), as well as its wording in Article 
2(1) fully justify a conclusion that the MD in itself is enough to exclude any 
proportionality test in applying the philosophy of the MD. Different semi-, quasi- or fully 
bureaucratic matters are, of course, in a different position. Equally, typing errors in 
instructions can be harmless and rectifiable or allowed by virtue of proportionality, but 
mistakes in instructions may lead to fatal accidents as well.  
 
The proportionality principle is, however, worth a few more general remarks here. The 
Treaty on European Union in 1992 enshrined it in Article 5 (ex 3b) EC. This in formal 
terms seems also to push it into the EC normative pyramid of machinery safety. Literally 
it is (in Article 5 EC) only a sub-principle of subsidiarity. In case law it is, however, a 
rather over-arching principle. 172 Even weighing fundamental rights against each other 
can be seen as one of its reflections, supposing that they in no case could empty one 
another of their respective contents. This might logically suggest the outcome that safety 
and health could never get a status overriding or even blocking the free movement of 
goods. Furthermore, it suggests that a ‘proportionate’ or ‘reasonable’ risk could be 
accepted or something similar in that line. I do emphasize that this is not just of academic 
interest. Seeing proportionality as a restriction on interferences in the market mechanism 
may easily lead to a position where the market freedom is seen as the legitimate driver 
whereas safety and health is just something corollary. And, indeed, this position is 
exactly present in question 3(a) in case AGM-COS.MET. The referring judge sees it as 
possible that even a machine not conforming to the MD could be accepted in the market 
by virtue of the proportionality principle. Equally, the market surveillance decision that 
launched the whole case AGM-COS.MET included, as its bottom line ground affecting 
the case outside the otherwise counted norms and facts, exactly  
 
‘- proportionality principle applied in the legal system of the European 
Community.’ 173  
 
And, besides these convulsions, the MD is only a directive while proportionality is in the 
EC Treaty, a tricky lawyer may say (perhaps invoking lex superior). In practice, he/she 
                                                 
172 As to proportionality principle in general, I confine myself here to a reference to Kapteyn and 
van Themaat, pp. 144-8. As to an essential general interpretation, they state – without saying 
anything at all about machinery safety - as follows: ‘[…] the great emphasis which Articles 2, 3 
and 3a [now 4] EC place on the market economy principle should justify an interpretation of 
Article 3b [now 5] EC in the sense that no more far-reaching interference in the market 
mechanism is permissible than is necessary to achieve the objectives of the EC Treaty’. Ibid. p. 
145-6.  
173 My translation. This needs to be also expressed in the original language, Finnish: 
 “- Euroopan yhteisön oikeusjärjestelmässä sovelletun suhteellisuusperiaatteen.” The decision-
makers obviously mean the legal order of the European Community. However, this is not just of 
unintended comics but a telling example of the sometimes too paradigmatic effect of 
proportionality principle.   
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may intimidate a safety engineer that fully understands the MD and fully respects its 
purpose but is not familiar with proportionality. The MD does not mention 
proportionality at all.  
 
If Articles 2, 3 and 95(3) EC (and the MD or, on the other hand, the MD alone) are not 
enough, and/or if the constitutional traditions common to the Member States are not 
enough, to support the principle ‘no risk of accidents accepted, no proportionality test in 
this respect’, the Court obviously has to base itself on Article 2 EHRC that enshrines the 
protection of human life. In Schmidberger the Court sitting in plenum confirmed how the 
right to life is, unlike freedom of expression or the freedom of assembly, an absolute 
fundamental right. 174 If the Court does not go this far, it anyway seems to be a legitimate 
expectation that it in one way or another will decide in the case AGM-COS.MET that the 
protection of human life and health is an honourable aim or principle without being 
harassed by any proportionality test – it is not possible to be proportionally dead. Neither 
is a proportionality test relevant with respect to injuries while the philosophy in the MD 
means preventing them all. Discussing an invalidity percentage perhaps allowed by the 
MD would be too banal from the outset. This would also mean that safety and health, das 
Sozial, in this case is not be subordinated to the economic freedom, i.e. free movement of 
goods, but the other way round. The economic freedom shall be subordinated to safety 
and health, a social factor, although precisely in the sense that safety is the absolute 
precondition for market access. 
 
If one wants to avoid any ‘stratospheric’ inclusion of Article 2 EHRC in the normative 
pyramid, as well as any normative source above the MD, I do not insist on the above 
arguments, with the condition that the aim to protect human life and health is declared an 
honourable one that is not subordinated to the proportionality principle. Even this would 
mean recognising the de facto overriding role that a high level safety and risk-prevention 
policy have in the combination of economic and social in this type of case. The legal 
basis for this is also in the constitutional traditions of the Member States, as expressed in 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Its Article 31 states, as follows: 
 
 Fair and just working conditions 
 
‘1. Every worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her 
health, safety and dignity.’ 
 
This Article is based – as the Charter’s explanations tell us - on the so-called Framework 
Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the 
safety and health of workers at work. It is the most important community instrument that, 
however, does not cover the properties of machines, as they appear on the market. It is 
not in contradiction with the Machinery Directive but includes a comprehensive 
minimum framework for safety and health measures. Its hierarchy in risk prevention is 
the same as in the MD, ‘avoiding risks’ is the first consideration (Article 6(2)(a) of the 
Directive 89/391/EC).  
 
                                                 
174 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraph 80. 
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There is nothing in the text of Article 31 of the Charter that would hint at any restriction 
as to its application rationae personae. ‘Every worker’ is addressed. Thus, workers using 
potentially hazardous or risky machines are also worthy of appropriate protection. On the 
other hand, the explanations to the Charter refer to Article 140 EC as a source for the 
notion ‘working conditions’. Article 140 EC, fifth indent, does mention ‘prevention of 
occupational accidents’. Furthermore, the Charter’s text draws on the European Social 
Charter (Article 3) and on the Community Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers 
(Article 19). Next to these international instruments, the Member States have 
comprehensively ratified a number of ILO conventions in the field of safety and health. 
In sum, it is justified to hold that there is a common constitutional tradition of safety and 
health between the Member States. 
 
The Court’s forthcoming answers to the AGM-COS.MET referral seem certain to be that 
the behaviour of market inspector Lehtinen was not a prohibited restriction on trade and 
the car lift concerned is not in conformity with the essential safety requirements of the 
Machinery Directive. 
 
Finally, somebody may raise objections to my overall MD reasoning by maintaining that 
also in B to B business only safe products can be marketed, that nobody buys unsafe 
ones; that it is therefore not economic (profitable) to manufacture and try to sell risky 
products. In this case safety and health experts of every Member State, as well as the 
Commission, share the opinion that the machine is risky and does not meet the essential 
safety requirements of the MD. 175  But being cheaper than products manufactured 
according to the European standard (EN 1493) concerned, this lift type has anyway been 
successful on the European market. Economic has this side, too. Manufacturers do have 
their tendency to use, even abuse, the customer’s tendency to save money whenever 
possible. 
 
However, my conclusion is that machinery safety represents one phenomenon that does 
not fit into a rigid converse pyramid thinking with economic dominance. On the contrary, 
it implies a deeply tied package where high level of safety (a social factor) is a 
precondition for a fundamental economic freedom to be exercised. I should emphasise 
that this is no guarantee of reaching that high level in practice. Further on the pyramid 
avenue, there is only one single machinery safety pyramid left for both the EC and 
Member States. The MD embodies this and has replaced the national norms. Hence, 
national norms do not set up the safety level but are purely there for execution and 
reinforcement. But where is the pyramidal apex in the AGM.-COS.MET case? Might this 
be the first case where the European Court of Justice raises the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights into its very reasoning as the Court of First Instance and several 




                                                 
175 Data sheet of the Co-ordination of the notified bodies, document CNB/M/08.016, 
Revision 02 by 1 July 2004. 
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2.6. Competition Rules v. Right to Collective Bargaining 176 
 
Fitzpatrick refers, without any real analysis, twice to case Albany International, 177 first 
in a footnote proving the avenue that ‘internal market issues retain the potential to create 
such “spill-over” controversies [with social policy] in the future.’ 178 Later he notes how  
 
‘”middle layer” 179 areas of competence are intrinsically vulnerable to apparently 
superior EU economic values. Therefore social values have to fight their way to 
an internal market agenda, for example in the recent conflict between competition 
policy and the right to free collective bargaining.’  
 
As an example of these clashes he then refers – again in a footnote - to Albany. 180 
 
In brief, in Albany the question was about the possible immunity of collective agreements 
vis-à-vis competition rules. The outcome established the immunity in so far as the 
agreements by their purpose (in this case remuneration) fall outside Article 81 (ex 85) 
EC. Not everybody celebrates; some have regretted the supremacy granted to labour and 
social dialogue under Article 81 EC. 181 ‘Law and economics’ criticism exists, demanding 
an economic effectiveness test and even with pondering the positive and negative effects 
of unionisation etc. 182 A third type of criticism regrets that the decision was not taken 
directly under Article 81 (ex 85) EC but was based (even) on Articles 2 and 3 EC. 183  
 
In the context of the pyramid approach, it is, indeed, elementary to conceive the way in 
which the Court came to its decision in Albany. A graphic mirror is the Opinion of 
                                                 
176 I recall my aim to publish a separate article on the social dimension in EU competition law. 
Here I set forth only some elementary features, necessary for the assessment of the pyramid 
thinking.   
177 See footnote 132, supra. 
178 Idem, p. 307, footnote 30. Fitzpatrick refers to case notes on Albany by Stephen Vousden. I 
think that Vousden’s article brings one example of an unsuccessful attempt to interpret Albany by 
the maxims of competition law. See Bruun & Hellsten (eds.), Collective Agreement and 
Competition Law in the EU, DJØF, Copenhagen 2001, p. 53, footnote 113. 
179 It is a graphic expression, indeed. For Fitzpatrick, ‘social’ in the leading Articles is mainly of 
lip service. 
180 Idem, p. 313. Fitzpatrick’s footnote 72.  
181 Marc de Vos, Collective Labour Agreements and European Competition Law : an Inherent 
Contradiction in De Vos (ed.), A Decade Beyond Maastricht : The European Social Dialogue 
Revisited, Kluwer Law International, the Hague 2003, pp. 70-72. For him, Article 4 EC ‘clearly’ 
presents the common market and its free competition as overarching goals from which no EC 
policy can be exempted. He laconically continues that ‘(i)f any hierarchy is to be wrung from the 
TEC, precedence should rather go to competition policy over social policy rather than vice versa’; 
p. 72.  
182 Van den Berg and Camesasca,, Irreconcilable Principles? The Court of Justice exempts 
collective labour agreements from the wrath of antitrust. European Law Review, Vol. 25. 2000, 
pp. 492-508.  
183 Xavier Prétot, La Cour de justice des Communautés européennes et les fonds de pension 
néerlandais. Droit social 1/2000, pp. 106-110. 
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Advocate General Jacobs. From a traditional competition point of view, he e.g. asked if 
there is a general exemption of social matters from competition rules regarding 
agriculture and transport.  184  
 
The Court construed and answered a similar (but more limited) pre-question about a 
general exemption for collective agreements from competition rules, but differently. 185 It 
recounted (in paragraph 54) from Article 3 EC how the activities of the Community are 
to include not only a 'system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not 
distorted' but also 'a policy in the social sphere'; it went on by referring to a particular 
task of the Community 'to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and 
balanced development of economic activities' and recalled 'a high level of employment 
and of social protection' (Article 2 EC). It further recounted Articles 118 (promotion of 
cooperation also at collective bargaining) and 118b EC (reference to European social 
dialogue and possible agreements), as well as Articles 1 and 4(1) of the Maastricht SPA. 
186  
 
This way, the Court construed its EC Treaty pyramid (as applicable in this case). The 
answer is graphic in paragraphs 59 (rationae personae) and 60 (ratione materiae) of 
Albany where the conclusion, the setting up of the basic immunity of collective 
agreements was concluded, as follows: 
 
59. It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in 
collective agreements between organisations representing employers and workers. 
However, the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be 
seriously undermined if management and labour were subject to Article 85(1) 
[now 81(1)] of the Treaty when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve 
conditions of work and employment. 
 
60. It therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a 
whole which is both effective and consistent that agreements concluded in the 
context of collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of 
such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling 
outside the scope of Article 85(1) [now 81(1)] of the Treaty. (underlining JH) 
 
                                                 
184 Opinion of AG Jacobs 28.1.1999, paragraphs 123-4.  
185 Noteworthy, as to pyramid thinking, the Court did not discuss whether there is sufficient basis 
in the national law to conclude that there is a fundamental right to collective bargaining, 
recognisable also under EC law. 
186 Paragraphs 55-58 of the judgment. Reference to SPA was no majesty crime since the UK in 
June 1997 declared that it de facto (not de jure) joined the SPA. Besides, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam introduced Article 136 that refers to the 1989 Charter. 
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As the French wording proves, 187  ‘effective’ and ‘consistent’ here qualify the 
interpretation, not the EC Treaty! Anyway, in balancing between the undistorted internal 
market (competition rules) and social policy (collective agreements) the latter was given 
precedence. The Court, in paragraph 59, assessed and declared the (presumably seriously 
undermined) lot of social policy objectives if the negotiating social partners were subject 
to competition rules, not the other way round! Certainly, the final conclusion in 
paragraph 60 did not mean any safety valve for the protection of high national values 
(free collective bargaining) à la pyramid thinking with economic dominance. It was a 
fundamental decision made in applying the EC Treaty.  
 
The immunity, however, allows competition law scrutiny in exceptional cases. It means a 
safety valve for protection of competition values (as in the case of a distortion of 
competition masked by a collective agreement). Even the immunity for collective 
agreements as proposed by Advocate General, too, was finally a balance between two 
sets of norms of the ‘same rank’. 188 However, following his much more competition-
orientated analysis he equipped it with competition law filters (good faith, limited to core 
subjects, no effects on third markets and parties). 189 But it is crucial to understand that a 
rigid pyramid thinking with the economic’s dominance over social would have led first to 
the subordination of collective agreements to competition rules and then construing a 
safety valve for collective labour agreements. 190 The Court did the opposite. 
 
Thus, it was coherent for the Court in this context to take first economic and social 
together as built into the EC pyramidal structure (like the double aim – economic and 
social - of Article 119 EEC and the ‘foundations of the Community’ in Defrenne II) and 
then to strike a balance between them. It was not giving an a priori absolute precedence 
to one of them. Effective (utile) seems to denote more the outcome in this concrete case, 
i.e. the precedence of the social factor.  
 
The ironic situation is that e.g. under Finnish and Swedish law the wrath of competition 
rules on collective agreement has been clearly stricter than the Albany-immunity. 191 
Hence, whether it is of minutiae or not, the pyramids have the ability to be converse this 
                                                 
187 <Il résulte ainsi d'une interprétation utile et cohérente des dispositions du traité, dans leur 
ensemble,…>This is a unique formula in case law that I know. I recall, however, that 
‘interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole’ is also an expression used in case 
CILFIT (see Chapter I, section 2.2.2, supra). Hence, finally the qualification ‘effective and 
consistent’ (interpretation) was the novelty so declared in Albany. 
188 Para 179 of the opinion. Another issue is that the pyramid construed by Advocate General did 
not reach Article 2 EC, neither did he expressly mention ‘policy in the social sphere’ as enshrined 
in Article 3(j) EC.  
189 Paragraph 194 of the Opinion. 
190 Cfr. turning imaginably around the reasoning in para 59 of Albany: ‘competition law 
objectives would be seriously undermined if the negotiating social partners were not subject to 
Article 81 EC’! 
191 See e.g. Jari Hellsten, Collective Agreements and Competition Law in Finland, in Bruun & 
Hellsten (eds.), Collective Agreements and Competition Law in the EU, DJØF 2001 Copenhagen, 
p. 134, paragraph 45; and Jonas Malmberg, Collective Agreements and Competition Law in 
Sweden, ibid, p. 204-5, the newspaper distribution case, referred to in footnote 63 on p. 205. 
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way, too. However, as to EC law, Albany proves that a rigid pyramid way of thinking 
with economic dominance does not give rise to a sustainable model of assessing and 
interpreting the EC Treaty in a comprehensive way, even though many individual cases 
192 with their minutiae, no doubt, reflect the dominance of the internal market rules.  
 
Ultimately, concerning judgement Albany as it stands, the Court did not write out in its 
pyramid, paragraphs 54-58, the ‘stratospheric’ apex of the EC Treaty, namely the 
Preamble, as it did in 1976 in Defrenne II. This time it was no longer needed, following 
the enshrinement (in the Maastricht Treaty) of ‘high level of employment and social 
protection’ in Article 2 EC and social policy in Article 3(j) EC. This is a clear indication 
of a high ‘pyramidal’ (i.e. constitutional) development and its impact on a more practical 
level. Still, ‘the provisions of the Treaty as a whole’ (paragraph 60 of Albany) fully cover 
even that pyramidal apex. 193  
 
 
2.6.1. Some Post-Amsterdam Remarks regarding Albany 
 
The events in Albany took place in the early 1990’s. If the Court should have had to apply 
the EC pyramid as modified by Article 136 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European 
Social Charter and the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights 1989 would 
have perhaps enriched the argument, supporting the outcome reached. Both Charters refer 
to collective bargaining. But, in that case the Court would have been perhaps bound to 
give due weight to the ‘functioning of the common market’ that still hides in Article 
136(3) EC. Notably, neither was Article 117 EC in the Court’s pyramid, which was 
logical in the sense that it did not mention collective bargaining.      
 
There remains the effect of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Constitutional 
Treaty (when and if it enters into force). With enshrined references to collective 
bargaining and even to the right to strike they would further strengthen the line of 





Transfer of Undertakings. Earlier in this article I have shown how the Transfer of 
Undertakings directive also applies to cross-border transfers and mergers, and covers 
transfers within a group of companies too. 194 I further recall how in case Amalgamated 
Construction the alleged transferee invoked competition rules and their application so as 
to prevent the group of companies from falling under the ambit of the Transfer Directive. 
Finally with the famous ‘nothing’ (‘Nothing justifies…’, paragraph 20 of the judgment’) 
the Court rejected the claim of the company where this ‘nothing’ finally is an assertion 
based on social values.  Anyway, these phenomena as such do not fit into a rigid pyramid 
                                                 
192 See, e.g., case C-179/90 Merci [1991] ECR I-5889. 
193 In a way, the Court in Albany applied a ‘Cheops model’; the Cheops pyramid’s apex has 
knowingly got worn some 5 to 7 meters. The top level is flat. 
194 See sections I.2.2 and I.3, supra. 
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way of thinking. Furthermore, if we look at the Transfer Directive as a whole, as a 
structural factor, we find that on the one hand it does not disturb the managerial 
prerogative in realising even transfers primarily and solely benefiting the owners. It just 
smoothens them as any national law in market economy may do, without actually 
preventing them. On the other hand, it is intended to protect the rights of workers ‘as far 
as possible’ (as we have learned at least from Daddy’s Dance Hall and Amalgamated 
Construction), and it would be in any case unjustified to maintain that within these limits 
it would be, even in its minutiae, just subordinated to the economic aspect, the 
managerial prerogative.  
 
On a somewhat different line Bernard Johann Mulder concludes his reasoning (in his 
doctoral dissertation of November 2004) on the Directive by writing that ‘The EU Court 
has in its law-making taken the directive’s aim to safeguard the employees’ rights for 
granted. This aim to safeguard has, however, not in a particular way been confronted with 
the fundamentals of the economic constitution that govern the legal scene in which the 
regulations on the transfer of undertaking directive are applicable.’ 195 My thesis is that 
the cross-border applicability means facing these fundamentals, coming even close to free 
movement of capital. Based on my reasoning supra, there is no reason to believe that the 
Court would turn the Directive concerning this issue into a non-directive à la rigid 
pyramid thinking.  
 
Societas Europaea. The European Company structure means freedom for business 
activities throughout the EU/EEA. The way in which the structure handles the 
representation means in broad terms that an SE gets registered only if there is an 
agreement on employees’ information, consultation and participation. In the way for 
example that only safe machines may circulate freely within the internal market, 196 only 
a SE equipped either with a tailor-made agreement or applying the standard rules may 
enjoy the corresponding economic freedom (freedom of business). Setting up the SE is 
thus subordinated to arranging the representation of workers and employees. It is a 
structural factor that does not fit into rigid pyramid thinking. 
 
 
3. Converse Pyramids in Earth. What Instead? 
 
The EU’s social constitution is so to speak in a marriage of convenience with its 
economic constitution. Divorce is impossible whilst quarrels sometimes awake the 
neighbours. It is difficult to reconcile, on the one hand, the fundamental economic 
freedoms and related provisions guaranteeing the undistorted internal market, and, on the 
other hand, fundamental social rights. 197 
                                                 
195 Mulder, p. 357; italics by JH. 
196 See section II.2.5. 
197 However, some further clarity could be achieved with a debate on Europe’s ‘social contract’. 
Both efficiency and distributive justice may qualify its contents. The first choice is, in terms of 
Maduro, between wealth maximisation and distributive justice; the second is to do with whether 
we favour a model of economic integration or a model of political integration for Europe. As 
Maduro has done, I claim that it is necessary to complement the wealth maximisation brought 
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However, I will take the liberty to omit any pyramid of the EC Treaty, even though my 
examples would justify enshrining the social dimension above the economic dimension. 
As a general description, it would not be correct, given the acquis as a whole. Besides, it 
would hide the reconciliation process. Accordingly, enshrining the undistorted internal 
market and the social dimension on an equal footing would for example ignore the de 
facto precedence of the social dimension in Albany. And, I claim, the reconciliation 
process between economic and social would not end up with the emergence of an 
imaginable full-fledged European labour law. In the meantime, the enlargement of the 
EU will produce some graphic legal illustrations of this economic/social conflict, as the 
pending Rosella case proves. 198 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
about by economic integration with some form of distributive fairness. See Miguel Poiares 
Maduro, Europe’s Social Self: “The Sickness Unto Death” in Shaw (ed.) Social Law and Policy 
in an Evolving European Union, Oxford, Hart Publishing 2000, p. 349. It remains to be seen 
whether the ‘highly competitive social market economy’, enshrined in Article I-3(3) of the 
Constitutional Treaty, together with the insertion of the Fundamental Rights in Part II of the 
Constitutional Treaty, already means some kind of contract, or whether it is just a modified 
framework for future quarrels. It is also linked to the debate about the transformation of the 
original European ‘market citizen’ via the ‘Maastricht citizen’ to a more real ‘European citizen’. 
However, that debate goes far beyond the borders of the ‘rough’ internal market issues that have 
filled this paper. 
198 See section II.2.4.  After closing the contents of this article the High Court of London has 
declared in June 2005 (Case No: 2004, Folio 684) i.a. that an action of the ITF and the Finnish 
Seamen’s Union restricting the ability of the employer (Viking) to negotiate with a union in a 
Member State other than Finland on wages in the context of reflagging the Rosella would be 
contrary to Article 43 EC. Accordingly, the court issued a permanent injunction against an action 
(incl. causing it) for the purpose of requiring Viking to apply, after the reflagging, the Finnish or 
equivalent terms and conditions. The judgment is subject to appeal.   
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Tutkimuksen ensimmäisestä luvusta käy ilmi – ehkä tähänastista kirjallisuutta selvemmin 
– miten lähetettyjen työntekijöiden direktiivi (LD) on aiemman oikeuskäytännön jatke ja 
alistuu sellaisena perustamissopimuksen artiklojen 49 ja 50 EY kehikkoon. 
Oikeuskäytäntö toisaalta osoittaa sisämarkkinoita koskevien käsitysten perustavaa laatua 
olevan luonteen. Sekä oikeuskäytäntö että LD hylkäävät ajatuksen toisista jäsenvaltioista 
tulevan matalapalkkakilpailun sietämisen pakollisuudesta. Lisäksi LD asettaa velvoitteen 
hylätä matalapalkkakilpailu, jos jäsenvaltiossa on sitovat vähimmäispalkat. LD yhdistää 
näin reilun kilpailun ja työntekijöiden oikeuksien suojan. Kokonaan päinvastainen käsitys, 
joka korostaa matalapalkkakilpailua perustamissopimuksesta johtuvana seikkana, on 
vaikuttanut varsinkin Saksassa näihin päiviin asti. Oikeuskäytäntö lopulta osoittaa myös 
sen, miten yhteisöoikeus tällä alueella perustuu kilpailun vääristymiä ennalta ehkäisevään 
sääntelyyn, joka yhdistää työnantajien ja työntekijöiden edut. Se heijastaa myös 
perinteistä työoikeudellista ajatusta, että työvoima ei ole kauppatavaraa. 
 
Tilaajanvastuussa tuore oikeuskäytäntö osoittaa, miten jäsenvaltiot ovat LD:n kautta, ja 
sen toimeenpanemiseksi, oikeutettuja tilaajanvastuun kaltaisiin järeisiin valvontatoimiin. 
Tämä oikeuskäytäntö (jota käsittelee luku II) yhdessä vähimmäispalkan määrittelyä 
koskevan oikeuskäytännön (jota käsittelee luku III) kanssa osoittaa tarpeen lukea ja 
soveltaa LD:tä – kuten yhteisön muutakin, palvelutarjontaa koskevaa johdettua oikeutta – 
yleiseen etuun perustuvien palvelutarjonnan rajoitusten yleisten kriteerien valossa. Sekä 
vastaavuus- että suhteellisuusperiaate ovat asiaan vaikuttavia tekijöitä sovellettaessa 
työntekovaltion oikeutta ulottaa kansalliset vähimmäispalkkamääräykset lähetettyyn 
työvoimaan. Perimmiltään suhteellisuusperiaate, ollen yhteisöoikeuden periaate, toimii 
(vain) varaventtiilinä ns. sosiaalista protektionismia vastaan. Keskustelu ja käytäntö 
tilaajanvastuusta toisaalta havainnollistavat sitä, miten itse matalapalkkakilpailun 
estäminen heijastaa sellaista yleistä etua, joka voi oikeuttaa palvelutarjonnan rajoituksia. 
 
Lähetetyn työvoiman työehdot voivat luonnollisesti johtaa näiden ehtojen taustalla 
vaikuttavan tai niiden kollektiiviseen sääntelyyn nimenomaisesti tähtäävän 
työtaistelu/lakko-oikeuden käytön oikeudelliseen arviointiin. Tämän tutkimuksen IV luku 
päätyy johtopäätökseen, että Kansainvälisen Työjärjestön ILOn piirissä muotoutunut 
työtaisteluoikeus sitoo myös EU:ta, pääosin jäsenvaltioiden aiempia 
kansainvälisoikeudellisia sopimuksia koskevan EY 307 artiklan kautta ja lopuiltakin osin 
yleisen kansainvälisen oikeuden varassa, siten kuin ne molemmat on tähän mennessä 
ankkuroitu EY-tuomioistuimen käytännössä. ILOn piirissä työtaisteluoikeus johdetaan 
nykyään työehtosopimusneuvotteluoikeuden tehokkaasta toteuttamisesta. EU toisaalta 
edistää – myös oikeudellisesti - ILOn työelämän perusoikeuksien toteutumista, minkä 
täytyy koskea myös sitä itseään. EU:ssa työtaisteluoikeus nojautuu myös sen johtaviin 
periaatteisiin (art. 6.1 EU): vapaus, kansanvalta, ihmisoikeuksien ja perusvapauksien 
kunnioitus sekä oikeusvaltioperiaate. Ensimmäisissä työtaisteluoikeutta koskevissa 
tapauksissaan EY-tuomioistuimen haasteena on suojella tätä perusoikeutta 
palvelutarjonnassa. Ennakoidusti se tulee tapahtumaan yhdistämällä aiemmat opit 
palvelutarjonnan rajoituksista ja perusoikeuksien suojasta. Tapaus ’Laval’ koskee lisäksi 




Första kapitlet i denna studie påvisar – kanske tydligare än tidigare litteratur – att EG:s 
utstationeringsdirektiv (96/71/EG) bygger vidare på tidigare rättspraxis och väl låter sig 
inordnas under fördragets artiklar 49 och 50 EG. Av rättspraxis framgår den inre 
marknadens grundläggande karaktär. Såväl rättspraxis som utstationeringsdirektivet 
innebär ett avståndstagande från tanken att medlemsstaterna vore tvungna att tolerera 
låglönekonkurrens från andra medlemstater. Dessutom upprätthåller 
utstationeringsdirektivet en skyldighet att begränsa låglönekonkurrens, då det finns 
bindande minimilöner i respektive medlemsland. Härigenom kombinerar 
utstationeringsdirektivet kravet på en sund konkurrens med hänsyn till arbetstagarnas 
skydd. En helt motsatt uppfattning (som betonar låglönekonkurrens som en 
fördragsbestämd faktor) har särskilt i Tyskland gjort sig gällande ända fram till dessa 
dagar. Rättspraxis å andra sidan ger vid handen hur gemenskapsrätten på detta område 
grundas på förhandsreglering av konkurrenssnedvridningar genom att kombinera 
arbetsgivarnas och arbetstagarnas intressen. Detta återspeglar också ett tänkesätt enligt 
vilket  arbetskraften inte är en handelsvara.    
 
Rättspraxis om det så kallade beställaransvaret ger vid handen att medlemsstaterna 
genom införandet av utstationeringsdirektivet, och för att implementera det, är 
berättigade till starka kontrollåtgärder såsom beställaransvaret. Denna rättspraxis (som 
beskrivs i kapitel II) tillsammans med rättspraxis gällande bestämning av minimilöner 
(som beskrivs i kapitel III) utvisar behovet av att tolka och tillämpa 
utstationeringsdirektivet – liksom annan sekundär gemenskapslagstiftning – i ljuset av de 
allmänna regler gällande det offentliga intresset som motiverar begränsningar i rätten att 
fritt tillhandahålla tjänster över medlemsstaternas gränser. Både motsvarighets- och 
proportionalitetsprincipen är relevanta vid en tillämpning av nationella minimilöner på 
den till landet utstationerade arbetskraften. Slutligen är proportionalitetsprincipen som en 
gemenskapsrättslig kategori en säkerhetsventil mot såkallad social protektionism. Praxis 
och debatt om beställaransvaret ger å andra sidan vid handen hur begränsning av 
låglönekonkurrens kan återspegla ett sådant allmänintresse som kan rättfärdiga 
begränsningar i tillhandahållandet av tjänster.  
 
Den utstationerade arbetskraftens arbetsvillkor kan naturligtvis komma att bestämmas 
under direkta eller indirekta hot om kollektiva kampåtgärder. Det fjärde kapitlet i denna 
studie kommer till den generella slutsatsen att den inom ILO utvecklade rätten till 
fackliga påtryckningsåtgärder är rättsligt relevant också för den europeiska gemenskapen. 
Denna uppfattning stöds på artikel 307 EG och sist och slutligen också på den generella 
internationella rätten i enlighet med EG-domstolens praxis. Både inom ILO och EU ses 
rätten till strejk/kampåtgärder numera som en nödvändig del i det effektiva införlivandet 
av rätten till kollektiva förhandlingar och avtal. Inom gemenskapen är denna rättighet 
bunden också till dess grundläggande principer: frihet, demokrati, respekt för de 
mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna samt till rättsstatsprincipen. I 
sina första mål om strejk/kampåtgärder ställs EG-domstolen inför utmaningen att skydda 
denna grundläggande rättighet vid tillhandahållandet av tjänster. Man kan förutspå att 
detta kommer att ske genom att kombinera de tidigare hävdade synsätten om skyddandet 
av de grundläggande rättigheterna och om tillåtna begränsningar vid tillhandahållandet av 
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tjänster. Det svenska fallet ”Laval” gäller ytterligare till en del den dansk-svenska 




The principle of tripartite co-operation is essential for Finland’s policy in labour market 
matters. It is observed as well by the Ministry of Labour when providing the framework 
and financing for research on various working life issues, European Labour Law included. 
Consequently, the steering group of the study written by Mr. Jari Hellsten has been 
tripartite consisting of the representatives of the Ministry and social partners, and also 
academics. However, the researcher has done independent work. The views expressed do 
not bind the Ministry of Labour or other participants in the group. 
 
This study, co-financed by the Ministry of Labour, traces the development of EU labour 
law and places special emphasis on some of the most current topics of this development. 
 
 




Chairman of the Steering Group 






This study forms part of the wider project ”From Internal Market Regulation to 
European Labour Law’, financed by the Finnish Work Environment Fund, the Finnish 
Ministry of Labour and several Finnish trade union organisations. It focuses especially on 
the relationship between the free movement of services as a basic freedom in the EC legal 
system and the social dimension and protection of workers in situations where they are 
sent to perform services or work in a Member State other than the one where they 
habitually work. 
 
The project leader and research manager is Professor Bruun and Jari Hellsten is the 
researcher. This report is the second published within the framework of this project. The 
first one “On Social and Economic Factors in the Developing European Labour Law” 
was published last year in Sweden (Arbetsliv i omvandling 2005:11, National Institute for 
Working Life). 
 
The topic is of general interest, not least since the enlargement of the European Union in 
2004 lead to greater discrepancies between living and working conditions in different 
Member States. The debate on the still pending Commission proposal for a Services 
Directive and some court cases on the relationship between the freedom to undertake 
industrial action and the basic economic freedoms in the EU system have also brought 
much public attention to the problems that Jari Hellsten focuses on in this study. 
 
We wish to thank all the colleagues and friends who have commented on the manuscript 
and also helped us in different ways. It goes without saying that all responsibility for 
remaining shortcomings lies with the author and his supervisor. We also wish to express 
our gratitude to the Finnish Ministry of Labour for publishing this report in its scientific 
series. 
 









In this study I discuss the Social Dimension in the Posting of Workers in four chapters: 
I: Posted Workers Directive (PWD) in the Treaty Framework; II: Wage Liability of 
Principal Contractor; III: Minimum Wages in Posting; and IV: The Right to Strike in 
EC Law, more particularly in the Framework of Free Provision of Services.  
 
In the first Chapter it is shown – perhaps more clearly than in the earlier doctrine – 
that the PWD is an extension of the preceding case-law and is subject to the overall 
Treaty framework in Articles 49 and 50 EC. Case-law shows the fundamental 
considerations that affect the contents and nature of the internal market. Both case-law 
and the PWD reject the idea of low-wage competition from other Member States as 
inherent and accepted in the internal market. Furthermore the PWD imposes an 
obligatory rejection of low-wage competition if there are binding minimum wages in 
a Member State. In this way the PWD combined fair competition and the protection of 
workers. A diametrically opposite argumentation (endorsing the right to low-wage 
competition as inferred from the Treaty) has existed, especially in Germany, up to 
recently. Finally, case-law shows how the EC law in this field is based on the concept 
of preventing distortion of competition by means of regulation, thus combining the 
interests of workers and employers; it also reflects the concept that labour is not a 
commodity. 
 
Regarding the liability of the principal contractor, recent case-law shows how the 
Member States are mandated by the PWD to resort to heavy structural measures such 
as wage liability in enforcing the PWD. This case-law (discussed in Chapter II), 
together with that concerning the definition of minimum wages (discussed in Chapter 
III), shows in more detail the need to read and apply the PWD, as any other part of 
secondary EC law, in the overall context of justifying restrictions on the free 
provision of services by overriding requirements of general interest. Equivalence and 
proportionality assessment are both relevant factors in applying the host state’s right 
to extend the national minimum wages to posted workers. In the end, the 
proportionality assessment, strictly as a concept of EC law, works (only) as a safety 
valve against social protectionism. On the other hand, the liability debate illustrates 
how the prevention of low-wage competition reflects the general interest that may 
justify restrictions on the free provision of services. 
 
The working conditions of posted workers may naturally lead to a legal assessment of 
the right to strike/industrial action behind these conditions or a striving towards a 
collective agreement thereon. This research (Chapter IV) leads to the conclusion that 
the ILO right to strike also binds the EU, partially as based on prior international 
agreements under Article 307 EC and finally due to general international law, as 
anchored in the existing case-law of the ECJ. In EU law, the right to strike is 
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU which, in the same way as 
the ILO nowadays, derives that right from the right to collective bargaining. Within 
EU law, protection of the right to strike is tied to founding principles of the Union: 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule 
of law. As the first direct strike cases (Laval, and Viking v. ITF and FSU) are now 
pending for a preliminary ruling, the European Court of Justice faces a great challenge 
in applying and protecting the fundamental right to strike/industrial action in the 
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context of the free provision of services. This is normally achieved by converging it 
with the doctrine of justifying restrictions on the free provision of services. The case 
Laval further deals with the position within the Community of the Danish-Swedish 
labour market model, which is crucially based on collective agreements, where it 
deserves its place. ∗    
 
                                                 




This study is part of a wider project covering the evolution of EC employment and 
social law. An article ‘On Social and Economic Factors in the Developing European 
Labour Law; Reasoning on Collective Redundancies, Transfer of Undertakings And 
Converse Pyramids’ has been published1 and a third study will deal with the social 
dimension in EC competition rules. A synthesis book should be ready by summer 
2006 covering in broader terms the developments of EC law in this area, and whether 
and to what extent it is justified to speak about European Labour Law.  
 
The enlargement of the European Union with ten new Member States in 2004 adds 
fresh spices to the principles underlying the EC law on the Internal Market. It raises 
again principal issues related to workers’ rights and fair competition. It reintroduces a 
social reality where a crucially wider gap in the standard of living and income levels 
now exists within the Internal Market. Stating this fact does not imply criticism of any 
of the new Member States. I am amongst the most keen to look at means of blocking 
any possibility of exploiting the workers and employees of those Member States. On 
the other hand, as the Swedish Laval case proves (explored in Chapter 4), such 
attempts occur all the time. 
 
This change in the overall economic reality of the Internal Market may have legal 
repercussions, too. In any case it justifies reducing the scope of this study to posting 
of workers in the framework of the free provision of services. I discuss the free 
movement of workers under Article 39 EC only for demarcation purposes or as a 
reflection to the reasoning of other scholars. On the other hand, I do not deal with the 
transitional provisions relating to the posting of workers under Articles 49 and 50 EC, 
except occasionally. In that specific framework, transitional provisions cover only 
Austria and Germany, and even in that framework the essential differences in standard 
of living and costs will remain long after 2011, which is the foreseen absolute end of 
any transitional provisions.  
 
However, the highly important legal and political feature within the social dimension 
in the free movement of services is the Posted Workers Directive (hereinafter also 
‘PWD’). 2 There is no need to explore it from Alpha to Omega because the doctoral 
dissertation of Eeva Kolehmainen a priori does this. 3 She covers the Directive in a 
first English monograph, with the experience on case-law gained up to 2002. This 
reasoning equally tries to present the essentials in the PWD (based on my own 
                                                 
1 See the scientific serial Work Life in Transition 2005:11 of the Swedish National Institute of 
Working Life. 
2 Officially it is Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services. The author had the opportunity to be involved for several years in its preparation as 
a lobbyist in the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers (EFBWW). 
3 Eeva Kolehmainen, The Posted Workers Directive: European Reinforcement of National 
Labour Protection. European University Institute, 2002. Accordingly, the dissertation of Ulla 
Liukkunen discusses the PWD with some 77 pages: Ulla Liukkunen, The Role of Mandatory 
Rules in International Labour Law; A Comparative Study in the Conflict of Laws. Talentum, 
Helsinki 2004. She looks at the Directive through the framework of the present Rome 
Convention (hereinafter also ‘RC’; OJ L266/1, 9.10.1980) on law applicable to contractual 
obligations. 
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experience in its preparation) but obviously with more emphasis on its position in the 
legal context dominated by the Treaty. Besides, I discuss new judgments or those 
given perhaps minor attention by Eeva Kolehmainen or other PWD issues that I feel 
are worthy of discussion. My focus is by definition on the construction industry, 
which in many countries also covers collective agreements concluded within others 
sectors, such as the metal industry. However, the principles formed concerning 
construction are normally and naturally widely transferable to other sectors. 
 
My leading idea is to discuss the interaction and dependence of economic and social 
factors that the Preamble of the Directive solemnly declares in its fifth Recital. In 
other words, in the field of ideas the aim is to discuss (i) the basic fidelity of this 
description (the marriage of prudence between the economic and social factors), (ii) 
means of trying to fulfil this requirement in implementation and enforcement, and (iii) 
shaping the overall role of the PWD in the structure of the EC law, more particularly 
in the development of EC Labour Law. Under (i) I try to keep in mind the Internal 
Market after the enlargement of the EU. Under (ii) I try to avoid jumping too deep 
into the normative and practical jungle of details (and discuss substantively only the 
German and Finnish national law). Under (iii) my thesis is that making this kind of 
competition-bound labour law was in the final analysis a political and legal necessity.   
 
In more practical terms the first Chapter covers the preparation and main contents of 
the PWD. It is essential to view the PWD as an extension of the case-law since the 
judgment Seco in 1982. I also try to show the necessary details in the development of 
the right of the Member States to extend their laws and collective agreements to 
workers posted temporarily into their territory. I further present the positions of 
scholars in various Member States on the essence of the PWD. The core of this 
Chapter, also serving the reasoning in my Chapters II and IV, might still be to present 
the overall framework of labour law restrictions on the free provision of services as 
laid down and demonstrated in judgment Arblade. 
 
The second chapter covers the wage liability of the principal contractor in enforcing 
the minimum wages of the posted workers, subject to the preliminary ruling in case 
Wolff & Müller v. Pereira in October 2004. The debate in the German doctrine before 
the judgment, and the argumentation of the principal contractor, provide us with a 
useful mirror in assessing the legal status of the liability in the light of the PWD. It 
equally helps in determining the role of the PWD under the Treaty. As is the case with 
all directives, it has to comply with the Treaty (and its interpretations); but on the 
other hand, as based on the Treaty, the PWD legitimises further state measures that 
interfere with the market mechanism, such as the wage liability.  
 
The third Chapter deals with the definition of the minimum wages concerned. It 
shows the direct link between the highly ‘integration-ideological’ level of the PWD 
and the grassroots where the wages consist of a variety of historically and culturally 
determined factors. Definition of the minimum wage was subject to a preliminary 
ruling in the recent infringement case Commission v. Germany where the ECJ gave its 
preliminary ruling in April 2005. It includes certain formal rewriting of the Treaty 
interpretation that forms the basis for the application of the PWD, showing more 
clearly the role of the proportionality assessment in this context.  
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The fourth Chapter addresses the very ‘cat on the table’, the issue that by the right to 
strike in the free provision of services has jumped into the European labour law 
debate. In April 2005 the Labour Court of Sweden decided to ask for a preliminary 
ruling in a posting case (Laval) that will likely form the basis for the right to strike in 
EC law. It also includes reasoning on the status of prior international agreements 
binding the Member States (Article 307 EC) and even general international law. The 
former provision is little discussed in the doctrine, the latter seems to be a wholly 
innovative step in European labour law, generated by the need, arising daily, to try to 
cover the relevant legal aspects in this challenging issue. 
 
I do not discuss the Draft Directive on Services in the Internal Market (DSIM) at all. I 
clearly see, of course, the devastating effect that the Commission’s original proposal 
would have had, especially on the control of working conditions, and many other 
problems besides. 4 However, time and space is limited, the purpose of this particular 
piece of research work is to analyse the past and present EC law while the whole 
DSIM still remains a draft.   
 
The role of the ECJ is central to the lengthy legal development of this whole 
framework towards a more mature European Labour Law. In a preface this would 
amount to a need for special thanks. In ending an introduction it is enough to ‘warn’ 
the reader that this reasoning does not include any separate section detailing the 
evidence in support of my statement on that role (apart from some general remarks in 
section 3.4). It is common ground as all my chapters show.      
 
 
                                                 
4 On this, see the presentation of Professor Niklas Bruun (Employment issues, memorandum) 
at the public hearing on the Proposal for a Directive on Services in the Internal Market of the 




Posted Workers Directive in the Treaty Framework 
 
 
1.1 The Directive and the Rome Convention 
 
The Rome Convention (RC) is not of little importance here. However, my principal 
focus is the balance between fair competition (economic) and guaranteeing the rights 
of workers (social); a reasonable and fair application of the RC does not justify it 
being the most suitable general framework. The PWD is in a legal-technical sense 
supplementary to the RC, but it takes precedence over the RC in any possible conflict, 
as Article 20 RC states. Finally, the applicable law is by definition important with 
respect to the cross-frontier provision of services, but any deep reasoning would differ 
depending on which one is the starting point, PWD or RC. With respect to work 
contracts, the RC is usually more significant in the case of executives and experts 
posted in minor numbers or just individually to other Member States while the PWD 
is more important in the case of blue-collar workers and technicians posted in larger 
numbers. The on-going work on replacing the Rome Convention by an EC regulation 
does not change this general approach.5  
 
A separate issue that justifies establishing the PWD-RC relationship this way round 
rather than other way round (RC – PWD) is that by so doing collective agreements 
can be handled much more easily and more appropriately. In concluding collective 
agreements covered by the PWD the parties consider (or at least they should consider) 
their impact in the framework of the Directive but they hardly dream of the RC. 
Finally, regarding issues not covered by the Directive (like dismissal protection) the 
legal value of the RC increases essentially. 
 
An essential difference between the two approaches is that the PWD is supposed to 
have, when implemented properly, a quasi-automatic and sanctioned effect on 
employment relationships whereas the RC mainly concerns the decision-making of 
the courts. More precisely, it aims at solving problems arising from conflicts of the 
law applicable. The RC has the freedom of choice as its starting point whereas the 
Directive means compulsory changes in the law applicable, guaranteed finally by all 
of the force the directives have under EC law. This also means that the home state 
courts must apply the host state law and collective agreements (with higher labour 
standards) covered either by the Directive directly or by the implementing national 
law. 6 Under the RC the home state courts have discretion over this aspect.   
 
                                                 
5 See the Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention, COM (2002) 654 final. 
6 This way and without reservations also explains Paul Davies, Posted Workers: Single 
Market or Protection of National Labour Law Systems, CMLRev. 34: 571-602, 1997, pp. 
578-9. Kolehmainen first denotes that she is ‘inclined’ to share this opinion but then anyway 
states that it would depend on the national implementation law, op.cit. 89-90. There was no 
intention to treat the workers’ claim differently depending on the forum they chose: home or 
host state court. The forum guaranteed by Article 6 PWD is clearly enacted as a provision 
improving or adding protection. Interpreting the national law in conformity with EC law à la 
judgment Pfeiffer, C-397-403/01, judgment of 5.10.2004, nyr, also leads to the same 
conclusion. Of course, Article 7(1) RC is a backdoor to arrive at the same conclusion.  
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1.2. The Framework in the Treaty 
 
1.2.1 Relation to Free Movement of Workers  
 
The PWD has its legal basis in Articles 57(2) and 66 (now 47(2) and 55) EC. 
Nevertheless, it must be interpreted in the light of present Articles 49 7 and 50 EC. It 
essentially realises the provision in Article 50(3) EC, according to which the 
temporary provision of services in another Member State is allowed under the same 
conditions as those applicable to providers established in that State. As to the legal 
basis, a leaning towards the free movement of workers is natural. 8 Article 48 EC was 
several times proposed as being the necessary legal basis for the instrument but the 
Commission always firmly rejected it. One reason for avoiding Article 48 was to 
reject Article 100, too, and thus keep the Directive under qualified majority voting 
(with the European Parliament in the co-decision position), notwithstanding the 
British criticism. A more formal ground was the decision that had already been made 
in judgment Webb in 1981 where the full Court stated that even the pure hiring-out of 
manpower was to be regarded as falling under the free provision of services. 9 ‘EC 
constitutionally’ the location of the Directive under the Services Chapter of the EC 
Treaty fits well with the fact that the PWD de facto also regulates competition 
between undertakings. As an alternative the Social Chapter of the Treaty, for 
regulating with its accent on working conditions, did not offer a sound legal basis in 
1996 (being of pre-Amsterdam era).  
 
However, a closer look at Webb reveals how the Court found that  
 
‘…agencies for the supply of manpower may in certain circumstances be 
covered by the provisions of Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty and the 
Community regulations adopted in implementation thereof.’ 10 (italics by JH) 
 
The Court did not define what those ‘certain circumstances’ might be. 11 However, a 
reference to ‘Community regulations’ clearly means e.g. Regulation 1612/68/EEC 
which safeguards the equal treatment of national and cross-border workers, including 
remuneration. Furthermore, there was also an element of protection against social 
                                                 
7 Case C-60/03 Wolff & Müller v. Pereira Félix, judgment 12.10.2004, paragraph 45, nyr. 
8 Another adjacent legal sphere is public procurement. It includes, since the directives 
Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport 
and postal services sectors, and Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, a social aspect of its own. 
However, I pass it here. The author aims at publishing a separate article on social dimension 
in competition rules. 
9 Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, paragraph 10. 
10 Ibid. 
11 One example might be transition periods in an accession Act. E.g. in Rush Portuguesa the 
Court stated that hiring-out of manpower (from Portugal) could be against such a period in the 
Portuguese-Spanish Accession Act. See Rush Portuguesa, paragraphs 16-7. It is, anyway, 
difficult, if not impossible, to find relevant substantive limitations for the principle of equal 
treatment, if it is looked at from the perspective of the rights of the workers concerned. 
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dumping in the sphere of free movement of workers. Namely, in an infringement case 
the Court asserted in 1974, as follows: 
 
‘The absolute nature of this prohibition [against discrimination], moreover, has 
the effect of not only allowing in each state equal access to employment to the 
nationals of other Member States, but also … of guaranteeing to the State’s 
own nationals that they shall not suffer the unfavourable consequences which 
could result from the offer or acceptance by nationals of other Member States 
of conditions of employment or remuneration less advantageous than those 
obtaining under national law, since such acceptance is prohibited.’  12 
 
The meaning of this passage is completely clear: the national labour force shall not 
suffer from cheap foreign labour. In practice, e.g. on a construction site, it is 
impossible to justify that those posted, i.e. those removing a priori on the initiative of 
an employer, should be less protected than those (work mates) removing but using 
their own fundamental right to free movement. There is no such justification. And, on 
a more practical scene again, experience shows that abuses are crucially more 
frequent where there is an ‘employer’ (sometimes a letter box company) posting the 
workers abroad.  
 
Summing up, the free movement of workers is another legal framework whose rules 
may apply to posted workers only under ‘certain circumstances’. I claim that this 
aspect is relevant at least with respect to issues falling outside the hard core of Article 
3(1) PWD. It is well defendable that the rules in free movement of workers are of 
secondary application and are of clear interpretative value in posting situations. I will 
come back to this infra. 
 
Article 39 (ex 48) EC has shown up in a posting context in case-law after Webb at 
least in the following cases: Finalarte, Rush Portuguesa and Vander Elst. 13 In case 
Finalarte it was, indeed, in all the four questions of the referring court, Arbeitsgericht 
Wiesbaden, Germany. Companies Finalarte and Portugaia referred to it by 
maintaining ‘that the chances of workers being taken on and posted abroad are 
reduced to the extent that an employer may be deterred, as a result of the extension of 
the paid leave scheme, from exercising its freedom to provide services by pursuing 
activities in the Federal Republic of Germany’ (paragraph 21 of judgment Finalarte). 
The ECJ stated that the posted workers  
 
‘…do not, in any way, seek access to the labour market in that second State if 
they return to their country of origin or residence after completion of their 
work’ (paragraph 22 of Finalarte that referred to paragraph 15 of Rush 
Portuguesa).  
 
The ECJ then ruled that Article 39 (ex 48) EC did not apply (paragraph 23 of 
Finalarte). This labour market concept in the posting of workers, as used by the ECJ, 
                                                 
12 Case 167/73 Commission v France ECR [1974] 359, paragraph 45.  
13 Case C-49/98 Finalarte v ULAK [2001] ECR I-7831, paragraph 22 (hereinafter referred to 
as ‘Finalarte’); case C-43/93 Vander Elst ECR [1994] I-3803, paragraph 21; case C-113/89 
Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417, paragraph 15. 
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requires some critical comments. First, in Rush Portuguesa the Court added 
immediately after the above statement that  
 
‘…an undertaking engaged in the making available of labour, although a 
supplier of services within the meaning of the Treaty, carries on activities 
which are specifically intended to enable workers to gain access to the labour 
market of the host Member State.’(paragraph 16) 
 
Thus, the labour market concept itself was twofold. Second, in Rush Portuguesa and 
in Vander Elst the concept was used in assessing the need to have work permits for 
the posted workers. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find such a reason to 
be valid after the adoption and entry into force of the Posted Workers Directive 
(PWD). Further on, the distinction made between posted workers who return back to 
their home (or living) state and those who do not return is artificial. In that thinking a 
worker moving on his own initiative for one day to the host state enters its labour 
market while a worker posted for a ten years’ project does not. Moreover, freely 
moving workers may also return home, which for logic’s sake should separate them 
from the labour market of the host state. Nobody claims it is so. In sum, it would be 
logical to acknowledge that at the latest since 1992/3 the internal market prevails 
(with the transitional exceptions, only) and that there is just one labour market of the 
Community within which workers are posted. 
 
However, while the principles established under free movement of workers, equal 
treatment in particular, can for good reasons be applied as secondary arguments to the 
posting of workers under the free provision of services, the latter in any case forms a 
legal framework sui generis in the EC legal order. Later we will also see how labour 
law (rights of posted workers) has to be interpreted as being linked to the yardsticks 
and ways of reasoning within the free provision of services whether we like it or not.  
 
 
1.2.2 Pre-Directive Case-law on Posting 
 
Under this heading I will pick up from the cases concerned only issues that are 
directly linked to the basic balance between fair competition and workers’ rights in 
the form of extending the national minimum wages to cover posted workers as well. I 
see it as appropriate to cover under this heading the cases dealing with events that 
occurred before the Directive became compulsory, i.e. prior to 16 December 1999. 
 
For the first time the ECJ confirmed that the possibility of extension was compatible 
in principle with EC law in judgment Seco v. EVI in 1982. This confirmation was not 
just any minor obiter dictum, but it was directly related to the main proceedings 
dealing with contributions for law-based social security in a posting situation. 
Luxembourg wanted to legitimise the offset of a competitive advantage gained by 
service providers from other Member States in paying wages lower than those fixed 
by law or collective agreements in Luxembourg. The offset Luxembourg made by 
imposing its social security contributions on those service providers. The offset issue 
was incorporated into the second question subject to preliminary ruling. The crucial 
point is that the issue reveals entirely opposite views linked to the very nature of the 
internal market. Namely, AG VerLoren van Themaat asserted as main grounds for his 
answer to the second question, as follows: 
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‘It is one of the fundamental features of the Common Market, which is to be 
attained inter alia by the freedom to provide service, that when providing 
services in another Member State any employer may in principle make use of 
the cost advantages existing in his country, including lower wage costs, under 
the conditions of undistorted competition which constitute another objective of 
the Treaty.’ 
 
The full Court, while it (like the AG) rejected the offset argument as such, confirmed 
the opposite view on the contents of the Common Market, i.e. that  
 
‘It is well-established that Community law does not preclude Member States 
from applying their legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by 
both sides of industry relating to minimum wages, to any person who is 
employed, even temporarily within their territory, no matter in which country 
the employer is established, just as Community law does not prohibit Member 
States from enforcing those rules by appropriate means.’ 14 
 
Was this statement, the contents of which can be described as extension right or 
possibility, an example of (law-making) judicial activism? Certainly. First, it was 
judicial activism in the sense that it was not a necessary step in rejecting the offset 
argument. It would have been fully possible to reject it simply by stating that the 
argument did not represent overriding reasons of general interest justifying 
restrictions on the freedom to provide services. That doctrine was already in use at 
that time. However, the Court used this statement as a crucial part of its reasoning by 
concluding, in the same paragraph, that the offset was not of appropriate means as it 
disregarded the contributions paid in the home state and it resulted in no social 
security benefit whatsoever for the workers concerned. Furthermore, a case-related 
feature was that had the Court rejected the offset argument without stating the 
extension right, the obvious risk would have been to face arguments of or at least 
uncertainty about the Court perhaps endorsing the connotation which AG gave to the 
Common Market in his grounds. Second, the Court found the extension right as ‘well-
established’ without being in this sense too much more elaborate than AG with his 
‘one of the fundamental features of the Common Market’. The Court did not refer to 
any precise provision(s) in the Treaty, an inferred purpose of the ‘fondateurs’ of the 
Community, case-law (wages were not present in Webb, decided in 1981) or any 
division of competences between the Community and Member States. Its simple tool 
was a ‘well established’ interpretation’ of ‘Community law’, which, however, is 
notoriously something broader than the ‘Common Market’. ‘Community law’ thus 
also includes the leading articles 2 and 3 EC, as well as the Social Chapter of the 
Treaty. The Common Market connotation of Advocate General was in obvious 
ideological contradiction with the principle of upwards harmonisation, a presumed 
(partial) consequence of the functioning of the Common Market, enshrined in Article 
                                                 
14 Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81 Seco and Desquenne & Giral v EVI [1982] ECR 223, 
paragraph 14. As is shown in my reasoning that follows this passage, we must read and 
understand it (the extension right) in the light of the opinion of Advocate General. Indeed, 
‘[i]n important cases the opinion may be of great assistance to the reader trying to understand 
the full consequences of the Judgment’; Ole Due, Understanding the reasoning of the Court of 
Justice, in Rodríguez Iglesias et al. (éd.), Mélanges en hommage à Fernand Schockweiler, 
Nomos, Baden-Baden 1999, p. 79, in fine. 
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117 EEC. Anyway, the argumentation (see e.g. the position of Dörfler in footnote 72, 
infra) 23 years later with the Common Market connotation of Advocate General 
proves that it was essential for the ECJ to state the extension right. In this sense it is 
appropriate to qualify the extension right as a kind of imposed judicial activism. 
 
In Rush Portuguesa the ECJ (as a Chamber) repeated the extension right in 1990 
(without the reference to ‘minimum’ wages), again as an obiter dictum while ‘in 
response to the concern expressed in this connection by the French Government’. 15 
The main proceedings dealt with administrative conditions for posting, namely work 
permits. In Vander Elst the ECJ in 1994, this time sitting in plenum but again as an 
obiter dictum, repeated the extension possibility, however, now referring to ‘minimum 
wages’ (established by law or by collective agreement). 16 This issue hardly signified 
an intentional change in relation to Rush Portuguesa. The change in wording was 
anyway taken into account in writing the Posted Workers Directive. 17  More 
important, however, was that the repetition of the extension possibility took place in a 
case between two Member States with a generally speaking similar socio-economic 
level. Mr. Vander Elst posted his Moroccan workers, resident in Belgium, from 
Belgium to France. Furthermore, the Court repeated the extension possibility in the 
circumstances that it described, as follows: 
 
‘25 As the Advocate General has rightly observed in paragraph 30 of his 
Opinion, irrespective of the possibility of applying national rules of public 
policy governing the various aspects of the employment relationship to 
workers sent temporarily to France, the application of the Belgian system in 
any event excludes any substantial risk of workers being exploited or of 
competition between undertakings being distorted.’ 
 
The qualification of the Belgian system is noteworthy, as is its assessed consequence, 
avoidance of workers being exploited or competition being distorted. Typical features 
of the Belgian system are e.g. the sectoral social funds based on collective agreements 
and a strict approach of the state to guarantee for its part the rights of workers. 
 
However, the ruling in Vander Elst found its opponents (i.e. some of the construction 
employers concerned) who wanted to provide services with the wages of the home 
state. They advanced this neo-liberal argument and interpretation of the Treaty, inter 
alia, in the cases Arblade, 18 Finalarte 19 and Portugaia. 20 In Arblade they ‘anchored’ 
it on judgment Bond van Adverteerders and others v The Netherlands State where the 
Court confirmed that purely economic aims cannot constitute grounds of public policy 
                                                 
15 To give the official name of the case: Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Ldª v Office national 
d'immigration [1990] ECR I-1417, paragraph 18. 
16 Case C-43/93 Raymond Vander Elst v Office des Migrations Internationales ECR [1994] I-
3803, paragraph 23.  
17 See section 1.3.4, infra. 
18 Joint cases C-369 and 376/96, Arblade and others ECR [1999] I-8453. This French 
company had works in Belgium and pointed out that it had followed the French legislation. 
Besides, it held that the Belgian obligations (including the obligation to pay the Belgian 
minimum wages concerned) were against the Treaty; paragraph 22 of the judgment. 
19 Joint cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98, Finalarte ECR 
[2001] I-7831. 
20 Case C-164/99 Portugaia; ECR [2002] I-787. 
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within the meaning of Article 46 (ex 56) EC, thus grounds to restrict the freedom of 
cross-border provision of services. 21 The case dealt with advertising on TV. However, 
the ECJ in Arblade confirmed the extension principle, as established in Seco and 
followed in Rush Portuguesa and Vander Elst. 22 
 
In Finalarte even the referring court, Arbeitsgericht Wiesbaden, clearly lent towards 
this neo- or ultra-liberal employer argumentation basing itself to a considerable extent 
on the corresponding German doctrine that I explain below in section 1.3.5. The 
national court asserted, according to Däubler, that both the German national posting 
law (Entsendegesetz) and the Directive infringed Article [ex] 59 EC. It found that the 
extension of collective agreements in the building sector rendered the activities of a 
foreign service-provider less advantageous. According to the court, this restriction 
cannot be justified by overriding requirements of interest. In fact, the court had doubts 
whether protection against competition by lower wages could ever meet that condition. 
This reasoning de facto challenged the previous case-law Seco, Rush Portuguesa and 
Vander Elst. 23 Däubler heavily opposed this reasoning of Arbeitsgereicht Wiesbaden, 
alone in the doctrine published in English so far as I am aware, by referring both to 
the same conditions for foreign service providers, enshrined in Article [ex] 60(3) EC, 
and to [ex] Article 91 EC concerning dumping within the common market. Däubler 
even referred, with logical grounds, to equal treatment under free movement of 
workers, hence to Article 48(2) (now 39(2)) EC, and to Article 117 (now 136) EC that 
refers to upward harmonisation (‘…harmonisation while the improvement is being 
maintained’). He stated that ‘A competition based on wages being 50% or 30% of 
those which are normally paid in the host country is just the contrary of ‘maintaining 
the improvement’’. 24  
 
The ECJ in Finalarte did not have to repeat the essential precedents’ Seco, Rush 
Portuguesa, Vander Elst and Arblade validity, as to the extension possibility in 
general. The main proceedings dealt only with the social fund procedure in paying 
holiday remuneration. The imposition of the social fund procedure of the host state in 
paying the holiday remuneration was accepted with the final condition that those rules 
confer a genuine benefit on the workers concerned, which significantly adds to their 
social protection (paragraph 42 of Finalarte). However, the Finalarte judgment was 
built upon the principles confirmed in Arblade.   
 
In Portugaia the main proceedings dealt with a sum of some 68,000€ as outstanding 
wages according to the national minimum wage applicable. The company opposed 
                                                 
21 Case 352/85, ECR [1988] 2085, paragraph 34. The references to the disqualified economic 
aims in Finalarte (para 39) and Portugaia (para 26) are given in a context very different from 
that present in Bond van Adverteeders. Presenting them anyway shows that the Court always 
considers the free movement aspects, too.  
22 See paragraph 41 of judgment Arblade. In Portugaia the Court (a Chamber) naturally 
followed this line (see paragraph 21) but clearly as a lapsus referred to paragraph 33 of 
Arblade that deals with abolition of restrictions on free movement of services. 
23 Wolfgang Däubler, Posted Workers and Freedom to Supply Services. Directive 96/71/EC 
and German Courts, IJL September 1998, Vol. 27, pp. 264-268, especially 265. – See that 
judgment Arblade was not in the national court’s reasoning in Finalarte because it was just a 
pending case at that time. 
24 Ibid. - The Treaty of Amsterdam repealed Article 91, and what is left of this protection 
against dumping in the Treaty is Article 96 (ex 101). 
 13
paying this sum to the (German) state. This implied a claim that it was sufficient for it 
to comply with the home state wage rules. The proceedings were intended to order 
recovery of this pecuniary advantage obtained through a refractory conduct according 
to the German special administrative procedure ‘Ordnungswidrigkeit’ (Law on 
Regulatory Offences). The referring court had again doubts about the compatibility of 
the German minimum wage rules with the Treaty. 25 More precisely, it asked whether 
the grounds of the national law, the aim of protecting the national construction 
industry and the reduction in national unemployment for the purpose of preventing 
social tension, were consistent with Community law. 26  The ECJ ruled that the 
expressed purpose of the national law was not enough as such to render the national 
law incompatible but it did cause a closer scrutiny in that respect. 27  Otherwise 
Portugaia was a natural extension of the previous case-law. 
 
In concluding the discussion about this question in the case-law, namely concerning 
the basic protection against competition from other Member States with lower wages, 
one may state that the answer is consistent and settled. The extension principle has 
been valid in cases that concern events that occurred before the Directive became 
compulsory, on 16 December 1999. Furthermore, it is justified to note that on this 
broader angle, the basic approach against social dumping or low wage competition, 
the Directive itself is as a balance-making instrument just a natural extension and 
confirmation of the previous case-law.  
 
Another aspect to consider is that the Court in this pre-Directive case-law only in 
judgment Vander Elst expressis verbis stated the requirement of fair competition 
between undertakings on a cross-border, i.e. European level. Impliedly this 
requirement was reflected in all judgments establishing the extension possibility. In 
Portugaia the competition aspect was expressed in the grounds of the national law 
which were twofold.  The grounds referred to both the protection of national industry 
(undertakings) and unemployed German workers. This only indirectly implies a 
European competition aspect.28 
 
 
1.2.3 Labour Law Restrictions under the Treaty; Arblade-Test 
 
The labour law restrictions on the free movement of services do follow the overall 
conditions developed by the case-law. A background factor is that Articles 49 and 50 
(ex 59 and 60) EC are directly applicable after the transitional period until 1970, thus 
                                                 
25 See paragraph 12 of the judgment. 
26 Ibid, paragraph 13. 
27 See paragraph 29 of the judgment: ‘As the Court has already held, it is necessary to 
determine whether those rules confer a genuine benefit on the workers concerned, which 
significantly augments their social protection. In this context, the stated intention of the 
legislature may lead to a more careful assessment of the alleged benefits conferred on workers 
by the measures which it has adopted (Finalarte, paragraph 42).’ – I come back to this in 
explaining the social fund system as part of the control policy, section 3.5, in fine. 
28 As such the idea of protecting workers against unfair competition with cheap labour is no 
novelty in EC law.  See the infringement case partially cited at footnote 12, supra. As to 
judgment Portugaia, see i.a. footnotes 20-22, supra, and 55, infra.  
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they are also possible to invoke validly before national authorities and courts. 29 
Article 49 EC requires, following Article 3(c) EC, the abolition of restrictions on free 
movement. Article 50(3) EC grants the service provider the right to move temporarily 
to another Member State ‘under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on 
its own nationals’. The necessary elaboration of the conditions applicable comes from 
the case-law. A pre-question naturally is, whether there is any restriction on the free 
provision of services in nationally applicable terms and conditions of employment. I 
take it for granted here that conditions which are more favourable in the host state 
generally form a restriction, as they make the posting of workers less attractive. 
 
In Arblade 30 the ECJ in a plenum made obviously the last coherent positioning of the 
conditions for restrictions accepted. They have centred on four basic notions or 
concepts, namely: 
 
- overriding reasons of public interest justifying the restriction; 
- mutual recognition (or equivalence); 
- objective justification; and 
- proportionality. 
 
Thus, in Arblade, the Court laid foundations in four steps for the assessment of labour 
law restrictions on the free provisions of services. I call this the Arblade-test. The 
Court noted how Article 49 (ex 59) EC requires  
 
‘[i] also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to 
national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is 
liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of a 
provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully 
provides similar services.’(paragraph 33).  
 
‘Rendering less advantageous’ may arise even in the case of a relatively small amount 
of money. However, this is just a prerequisite and the first step in the general 
justification battery. The Court went on, as follows: 
 
34. Even if there is no harmonisation in the field, [ii] the freedom to provide 
services, as one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty, may be restricted 
only by rules justified by overriding requirements relating to the public interest 
and applicable to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the 
State where the service is provided, [iii] in so far as that interest is not 
safeguarded by the rules to which the provider of such a service is subject in 
the Member State where he is established (paragraph 34). 
 
Here the Court notes, after the standard formula of overriding requirements related to 
the public interest (ii), also the possible equivalence with the home state rules (iii). 
Double requirements are forbidden. However, these were the second and third steps.  
                                                 
29 Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299, paragraph 27, confirmed the vertical direct 
effect of Article 49 (ex 59) EC. Case 36/74 Walrave [1974] ECR 1405 extended it to rules of 
private law nature (horizontal direct effect). On this, see section 4.2, infra.   
30 To give the official name of the case: Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade 
and Arblade & Fils SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL 
(C-376/96), [1999] ECR I-8453. 
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35. The application of national rules to providers of services established in 
other Member States must be [iv] appropriate for securing the attainment of 
the objective which they pursue and must not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain it. 31   
 
The last step (iv) sets forth the proportionality test. All of these statements are general 
justification tests. On the other hand, this test battery is completely developed in case-
law. 32  Obviously, it was not necessary to present this general admissibility or 
justification test in a labour law case, concerning wages. On the other hand, the case 
also involved assessing the host state requirements on keeping the social documents. 
Next to this, the case shows that labour law does not escape the overall justification 
test applicable under the free provision of services that is essentially and finally an 
economic freedom in the Treaty. Thus, the reasoning shows the status of the social 
dimension (protection of workers) in this originally economic framework.  
 
The Court staked out the status of social (i.e. labour law) in the general legal 
framework of free movement of services (only) as a continuum of its case-law, as 
follows: 
 
36. The overriding reasons relating to the public interest which have been 
acknowledged by the Court include the protection of workers (see Webb, […], 
paragraph 19, Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81 Seco v EVI […], paragraph 14, 
and Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa […], paragraph 18), and in particular the 
social protection of workers in the construction industry (Guiot, paragraph 16). 
 
Hence, protection of workers in general may constitute overriding reasons of the 
public interest required. There is no need to discuss in detail the limits of the concept 
of ‘protection of workers’. In any case, the references to Seco, paragraph 14, and Rush 
Portuguesa, paragraph 18, show that it covers pay provisions. Furthermore, the 
reference to Webb shows in principle the coverage of provisions outside pay as well 
(protection in hiring-out of labour in Webb). At the same time, regarding issues under 
EC Regulation 1408/71 on law-based social security schemes, the home state 
provisions apply in most cases to posted workers. The reference to Guiot confirmed 
the basic recognition for the special protection of construction workers. This 
                                                 
31 The ECJ referred to, in particular, C-76/90 Säger,  [1991] ECR Page I-4221 paragraph 15, 
Case C-19/92 Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 32, Case C-
55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procurati di Milano [1995] ECR I-
4165, paragraph 37, and Guiot [1996] ECR I-1905, paragraphs 11 and 13. 
32 Within free provision of services, judgment in joined cases 110 and 111/78 Ministère public 
and Chambre syndicale des agents artistiques et impresarii de Belgique ASBL v Willy van 
Wesemael and others [1979] ECR 35 was the first that operated with the ‘general good’ 
justification of restrictions. The case concerned activities of the fee-charging placement 
agencies. Paragraph 28 referred, besides to ‘general good’ as a justification, also, and as equal 
to that, to ‘the need to ensure the protection of the entertainer’, i.e. the artist placed. Soon 
after, i.e. in 1981 it was followed by judgment in case 279/80 Webb [1980] ECR; its 
paragraph 19 referred to ‘safeguarding the interests of the workforce affected’. On that 
judgment in a PWD context, see section 1.3.6, infra, and in justifying a strike my submission 
in section 4.9.1, in fine. 
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protection is realised in many countries via social funds established by a national 
industry-wide collective agreement.    
 
Had the Court rendered Arblade before the adoption of the Directive, its Preamble 
naturally would have referred to this conclusion. This, i.e. paragraphs 33 to 35 (or, to 
36 in a labour law context), is what nowadays can well be called the ‘Arblade-
justification’ or ‘Ablade-test’. It is elementary to see that these four steps are 
complementary (they operate in turn). A restriction can be deemed as being 
incompatible with EC law on just the last step. If the earlier steps are passed that is 
insufficient to pass the test. The Court naturally also applies this test in post-directive 
cases, unless the PWD as an elaborating instrument includes precise provisions or 
incontestable interpretations imposing developments in it. The first post-directive 
case, namely Wolff and Müller v. Pereira 33 shows that the Court applied exactly this 
formula, i.e. also ‘rules that do not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the 
objective’. It did not elaborate or qualify the fourth step (proportionality) with 
‘whether the same result can be achieved with less restrictive means’, as the Court did 
e.g. in paragraph 39 of Arblade when applying the test battery in that concrete case. 
This evolution might be due to the expiry of the implementation deadline of the PWD 
(in 1999) and the rights and duties thereby established for the Member States. 
Because even a ‘same result’ is subject to interpretations, this distinction between 
these two formulas is subtle but real. The ‘not beyond’ formula is less open to 
undermining labour law elements than ‘same result with less restrictive means’.   
 
Further in its reasoning in Arblade, the Court in paragraph 38 acknowledged that 
substantive protection can be, indeed, must, I claim, be followed by appropriate 
control. The famous obiter dictum in paragraph 18 of Rush Portuguesa, with roots in 
Seco, was the point of reference here, too. 
 
Finally, confirmation of the extension right, as a key element under protection of 
workers (i.e. public interest criterion (ii)) - in paragraph 41 of Arblade (with reference 
to Seco and Rush Portuguesa) impliedly meant that requiring higher pay for posted 
workers did not violate the equivalence criterion (iii). The extension right is finally its 
negation. Later on Portugaia (paragraphs 21 to 30) has shown that (under (ii)) this 
higher pay must ‘confer a genuine benefit on the workers concerned, which 
significantly augments their social protection’ (paragraph 29; on this also see footnote 
55, infra), at least so as to remedy a protectionist purpose of a national law. On 
subjecting the application of host state’s pay provisions to a proportionality test (iv) 
Arblade did not involve any discussion. It came later in cases Wolff&Müller (see 
especially section 2.2.5) and Commission v. Germany (see sections 3.3.3 and 3.4). 
Here it suffices to sum up that Seco established the extension right and Arblade 
anchored it as the answer of the Court to an express question of a national court. It is 





                                                 
33 See case C-60/03 Wolff and Müller v. Pereira [2004] ECR I-9553, explored in section 2.2, 
infra. 
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1.3. Posting of Workers in EC Law; The Prudent Marriage of Economic And 
Social Factors 
 
1.3.1. History and Background of the Posted Workers Directive 
 
Posting workers to carry out work in other Member States was not usual in the 
beginning of the Community. The travaux préparatoires, essentially the Spaak-report, 
only mention posting of personnel. 34 However, already in 1972 a first attempt to 
legislate was published by the Commission, namely a regulation under the heading of 
provisions on the conflict of law in employment relationships within the Community. 
35  The Rome Convention of 1980 later partially substituted it, and the other reason to 
withdraw it was the profound opposition of the British government. The original 
proposal for the Directive had its roots in the Social Action Programme implementing 
the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. It required 
governing the working conditions of posted workers. 36 A first draft Directive was 
published in 1991, 37 followed by a revised version in 1993. 38 The Council reached a 
political agreement – by qualified majority; UK voted against and Portugal abstained - 
on the contents of the Directive on 29 March 1996. The most important issue in the 
‘adoption saga’, to use this qualification by Eeva Kolehmainen, was always the 
inclusion or exclusion of a threshold period for compliance with the pay provisions of 
the host country. The situation was in 1993, before the Commission shortened the 
period from three to one month in its revised proposal, that of the then 12 Member 
States. Only Belgium was, according to the Commission, officially against any 
compulsory threshold period. The European Federation of Building and Woodworkers 
saw already at that time that obviously at least Denmark, France and Luxembourg 
would join Belgium. Following national laws adopted in France in 1994, as well as in 
Germany in February 1996, the situation slowly but consistently turned against any 
compulsory threshold (‘grace’) period.  
 
The reason to oppose any grace period was simply the need to block any social 
dumping by cheap labour. Being excessively difficult to supervise any (even a one 
month’s) compulsory threshold period would have led to structural dumping by 
exploiting foreign workers. An essential impetus to this turn-around came from the 
new Member States, Austria, Finland and Sweden. Besides, Sweden anchored its 
labour market governance model (high importance of self-governed collective 
bargaining and agreements) as linked to its accession agreement. 39  However, an 
essential element in the preparations was the ongoing and increasing trade union 
                                                 
34 Comité Intergouvernemental Créé par la Conférence de Messine, Rapport des Chefs de 
Délégations aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, avril 21, 1956 (Spaak report) p. 41. 
35 Proposition de règlement (CEE) du Conseil relatif aux dispositions concernant les conflits 
de lois en matière de relations de travail à l’intérieur de la Communauté; OJ C49, 18.5.1972.  
36 See the Action Programme, Part II, para. 2.  
37 COM (91) 230 final, SYN 346, 1.8.1991. 
38 OJ C187, 9.7.1993. 
39 See the Declaration No. 46 by the Kingdom of Sweden on social policy, annexed to the 
Accession Act of Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, OJ C241, 29.8.1994: In an exchange 
of letters between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Commission, the Kingdom of Sweden 
received assurances with regard to Swedish practice in labour market matters and notably the 
system of determining conditions of work in collective agreements between the social 
partners. 
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lobby of EFBWW. It first managed to realize a zero-threshold in the construction 
industry, at the end with the active support of the European Construction Industry 
Federation FIEC. Second, it managed to gather a de facto blocking minority against 
Germany’s proposal to make only a ‘certain’ (meaning a lowest possible) wage 
category as generally binding. The EFBWW found such a provision being 
discriminatory (even contradicting the Treaty) except in Germany where it was also 
intended to cover domestic workers outside the normal coverage of the national 
collective agreement in building and civil engineering; hence in cases where either the 
employer or the worker was not a member of the respective organisations. The way 
out was to enshrine in Article 3(1), second subparagraph, that national law or practice 
defines the minimum wage concerned. 40 I come back to the definition of minimum 
wages especially in section 3.4 (in fine), infra. 
 
The position of the European Parliament was consistent from the beginning. It firmly 
opposed any compulsory grace period. 41  This was its essential and important 
contribution to this Directive, subject to co-decision procedure following the Treaty of 
Maastricht.  
 
The role of the Council Presidencies was important in the preparations of the PWD, 
not the least the role of Professor Tiziano Treu chairing the Council of Ministers, as 
well as that of Professor Marco Biagi in drafting with him the overall compromise 
text adopted. Important at the end was also the role of the European Construction 
Industry Federation FIEC. Due to its firm position in support of the PWD, UNICE 
who for a long time opposed the directive, in the end reserved any official position. 
On the employer side at the end the UEAPME also supported the Directive as adopted.   
 
 
1.3.2 Some Market Aspects Behind the Directive 
 
The rationale behind the Directive also tests the limits of regulation in a market 
economy. Namely, for the basic proponents of the Directive, such as the European 
Federation of Building and Woodworkers, the basic justification of the Directive was 
and is the EC law guarantee given to the applicability of the national collective 
agreements, in the construction sector, to workers posted temporarily into another 
Member State. This means, however, just a partial protection in practice. Namely, in 
most of the Member States the wages paid in practice have been more or less widely 
higher than those enshrined in the national collective agreements rendered generally 
                                                 
40 The countries ready to block the whole Directive regarding this issue were Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg. Counting on a guaranteed veto cast against 
any proposal for a directive by UK these countries formed de facto a blocking minority with 
17 (+ 10) votes. The issue was important for the German conservative government; it finally 
lobbied with the formal – although reluctant as such - support of the Commission and a part 
of the Italian administration. - Securing the qualified majority behind the Italian compromise 
text became clear when the Spanish government decided to vote in favour.  
41 See e.g. the Legislative Resolution embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on 
the Commission proposal for the Directive, OJ C72, 15/03/1993 p. 85, and the Resolution on 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ C166, 3.7.1995, p. 
123. 
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binding (erga omnes) or being that de facto (the Danish-Swedish situation). 42 The 
influx of a labour force which is paid only or ready to work for the national minimum 
provisions automatically means a heavy pressure to lower the actual wages that are 
higher than the minimum. This is an economic fact that has been evident since work 
rules were made in Hansa-cities hundreds of years ago. However, as it is impossible 
to protect these higher wages by a national law or by an erga omnes declaration of a 
collective agreement, it is equally impossible on the European level. A notable legal 
exception is the mechanism of the German Ortsüblichkeit that permits a possibility of 
a special lawsuit on an individual basis, by invoking equal treatment within a site. 
Another one is in Swedish and Finnish laws that allow industrial action against a non-
organised employer for a market salary to be paid to posted workers. 43  
 
If one moves from the Hansa era closer to modern times, let us say in the late 19th 
century, the national trade unions and, thereby, collective agreements started to 
emerge. An essential reason first for city-wide agreements was the increased mobility 
of manpower (bicycles, trains, later cars(!)) that challenged the income level of local 
workers. Later on, the local agreements developed in most Member States to national 
agreements. A European regulation (the PWD) is a logical further step in this 
continuum, which is already in some branches, such as in transport, a global 
dimension. 44 In this context the exclusion of merchant navy undertakings as regards 
seagoing personnel from the PWD is not founded at all, while it is extremely difficult 
to develop any workable alternative to the flag-state doctrine and practice. In the other 
transport sectors (rail, road, inland waterways and air traffic) the PWD covers national 
cabotage traffic.  
 
From the point of view of employers the PWD is important because its aim is to 
guarantee fair competition between undertakings. The recent developments in the 
German construction industry are a graphic example of this. Until the 1990’s the 
employer side was not interested in protecting the national wage mechanism. The 
reunification of Germany lead to quite a boom in construction, and the national 
manpower was insufficient. Workers were being posted to Germany from all 
directions with wages often as low as 30 to 50% of the German minima. When the 
situation changed, unemployment rocketed and, in addition, this cheap labour by 
definition pushed down the wage level, even to the extent that the national collective 
agreement no longer worked coherently as a standard, especially in East-Germany. 
The joint lesson of the German social partners in the construction sector was to give 
up partially with Tarifautonomie. The independence of the social partners in wage 
setting, that has its well known historical roots, culminated in Article 9 of the German 
Constitution (Grundgesetz). They accepted minimum wages covering all the workers 
in the industry in a situation where cheap and black labour flourished and law-abiding 
                                                 
42 This is easy to see e.g. in the working condition surveys carried out by the EFBWW during 
1990s. 
43 As to the right to industrial action, see Chapter 4, infra. 
44 The Chinese stone workers’ case from Finland tells how much the world is changing. 
Namely, a Finnish stonework company ordered 12 underpaid workers posted from China to 
Finland. The Finnish user company was not regarded as employer. The estimated illegal profit 
(net) in the form of this underpayment in 17 months was 174,000 €. By charge of the State 
Prosecutor, a District Court condemned in 2004 the manager to a fine of 1,600 € and 
confiscated from the company 174,000 €, as diminished by further wage compensations. The 
case is under appeal. 
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employers already had deep difficulties. Bankruptcy figures were high, as well. The 
acceptance of binding minimum wages erga omnes, however, happened under the flag 
of allowing ‘state intervention only as much as necessary’. On the employer side the 
metal and textile sectors strongly opposed erga omnes wages in construction, as did 
the confederation of employer organisations, Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA). This was in a nutshell the background to the national 
posting law (Entsendegesetz, AEntG), enacted in February 1996. 45  Due to the 
political controversies even inside the conservative government, 46 it wanted to get the 
European Directive, besides its own European merits, as political backing for its own 
contested national law.  
 
The example of the German construction industry, which could be painted in even 
darker colours, has lost none of its force. Its main lesson today is that when a labour 
market goes out of control such that free-riders and even wrong-doers influence an 
essential part of the standard, it is extremely difficult to get the market back under 
control. The compulsory minimum wages have been in force now for eight years in 
the German construction industry, with a remarkable degree of control, but even so 
the industry still suffers from the same problems that it did in the mid-90’s. This 
experience also reveals an elementary aspect of market control or ‘creating’ labour 
law, namely the importance of the grass-root level, where the social partners as self-
regulating market actors may often bring about effective informal control. 
 
 
1.3.3 Once Again: Why a Directive? 
 
A citizen may well ask, why was, and is, this directive so important. He might 
underline the question by referring to the Rome Convention and to the preceding case-
law, notably to Seco, Rush Portuguesa and Vander Elst. Furthermore, the Treaty 
already included its anti-discrimination clause (Article 6 EC, now 12 EC) as well as 
the equal treatment clause in the free provision of services, namely Article 60(3) EC 
(now 50(3) EC), that entitled a service provider to provide services temporarily in 
other Member States under the same conditions as applicable to that State’s national 
providers. Besides, the Rome Convention supplemented the Treaty. Finally, there was 
the Directive 91/533 concerning the information to be given regarding trans-national 
postings longer than one month.   
 
A simplified answer is that the Directive essentially elaborates the regulation (judicial 
law-making) made in case-law. Next to this, the preceding case-law with respect to 
wages merely had the status of obiter dictum (although a strong one in Seco) which in 
principle could be reversed by later judgments. A directive naturally makes this less 
likely, if ever possible in this particular case. The PWD was the political confirmation 
                                                 
45 For more details, see e.g. Koberski, Asshoff, Hold, Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz, 2nd ed., 
Beck 2002, p. 9-14. The official position (in the so called Bargaining Committee) of employer 
organisations of other sectors (metal, textile, etc.) in the process of the erga omnes declaration 
in applying the AEntG of 1996 even led to lowering several times by the social partners in 
construction industry the wage level concerned. The amendment of the AEntG in late 1998 
gave the Ministry the possibility to make the erga omnes declaration without the consent of 
the Bargaining Committee. 
46 The Liberal-Democratic Party inside the government opposed binding minimum wages and 
had strong support within the German Employers Confederation BDA.  
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of the European legislator (the Council and the Parliament) of the case-law. 
Furthermore, the structural change achieved by issuing a directive was to turn the 
possibility to extend the wage coverage to an obligation to cover posted workers by 
national minimum wages set up by law or, in the construction industry, by a generally 
binding (erga omnes) collective agreement. Furthermore, one may maintain that 
structural means are necessary in any effective implementation and supervision, 
means related above all to the use of power in the production chain. It is also 
important to see this (market interferences) legitimising aspect of a directive. This 
becomes clearer in Chapter II, infra, in explaining the liability issue.    
 
The Preamble of the Directive characterised the structure of Article 3(1) PWD as a 
‘hard core’ of clearly defined protective rules. It is, however, appropriate to note that 
in reality the provisions other than those concerning minimum pay and paid annual 
holidays are of a public law nature. 47 They would, therefore, be normally applicable 
to posted workers even without the Directive. On the other hand, the Directive 
increases clarity, e.g. with the reference to working time provisions of the host state. 
Such clarity can hardly be harmful. Furthermore, the ‘hard core’ list is of importance 
while the Member States may impose other provisions (like dismissal rules) on 
foreign service-providers only under the ordre public condition (and respecting the 
Treaty) in Article 3(10).  
 
When reviewing the ‘adoption saga’ and the essential contents of the Directive, some 
issues need to be added to the list of reasons justifying the Directive: 1. the special 
treatment of temporary work; 2. no favourable treatment for companies from third 
countries; 3. defining the status of a ‘worker’ by the host country law (against bogus 
self-employment); 4. the establishment of co-operation between the national 
authorities; 5. recognition of the Danish-Swedish ‘erga omnes de facto’ collective 
agreements; 6. the possibility of covering collective agreements in any sector; 7. the 
possibility of instituting judicial proceedings in the host state; 8. a kind of definition 
of public policy (ordre public); 9. its elaboration by the declarations of the Council, 
Commission and Parliament; and 10. the right to strike not being affected by the 
Directive.  
 
There are still weaknesses and some more or less grey zones. Methods of comparing 
the working conditions in force in the home and host states are perhaps the most 





                                                 
47 Paid annual holidays are, of course, included in the Working Time Directive (Article 7) that 
requires roughly said four weeks’ paid leave. National law in most Member States requires – 
after a certain service – five weeks. The PWD imposes these national holiday provisions on 
foreign service providers. - Däubler has also paid attention – next to gender equality in Article 
3(1)(g) - to ‘other provisions on non-discrimination’ as being difficult to derive from EC law 
provisions (ILJ 1998, Vol. 27, p. 264-5). Later on the Anti-Discrimination Directives 
(00/43/EC on ethnic and racial discrimination and 00/78/EC on a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation) have set up the requirements that these ‘other 
provisions on non-discrimination’ (on belief or religion, disability, age and sexual orientation) 
also apply to posted workers by virtue of those directives. 
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1.3.4 Raison D’Être of the Directive 
 
It is, of course, the cross-border effect of the Directive on the internal market that 
makes it legally really challenging. It operates with the basic notions of labour law, 
such as ‘worker’, ‘pay’ and ‘collective agreement’. These notions do have earlier 
European definitions in case-law but decisions especially about the concept and 
consequences of ‘collective agreement’ under this Directive are up and coming. 
Regarding ‘worker’ the case-law under free movement of workers is quite 
comprehensive, even though there is no uniform European definition of ‘worker’, 48 
and regarding ‘collective agreement’ the judgment Albany settled the basics of the 
status of sectoral collective agreements in relation to EC competition rules. Sectoral 
collective agreements were found to include inherent restrictions of competition and 
got a de facto constitutional protection in relation to EC competition rules. 49 
Regarding minimum rates of ‘pay’ the ECJ has recently decided the first case, namely 
Commission v. Germany 50 that deals with the definition of minimum wage in the 
German construction industry. I explore it later in Chapter 3. 
 
The internal market connection of the PWD is manifest. E.g. in the construction and 
cleaning industries the in-situ wages can be up to a half of total costs. At the same 
time the PWD manifests the inseparable nature of economic and social. For the 
employer, wages are primarily costs in a highly competitive market, for workers they 
are the main, if not single, means of providing for a decent life, to be social human 
beings. Excessive profits made by exploiting cheap labour are both economically, 
from the point of view of fair competition, unacceptable and socially unethical. The 
risk of dumping exists in any sector where workers and employees are posted, and 
today this may concern even high tech professions and/or production workers. 
Besides, the issue is also linked to undeclared work, as the German example from the 
construction sector shows. 51   
 
In publishing its first proposal for the PWD in 1991 the Commission presented in 
brief its view on the competition landscape and social point of view. It simply asserted 
that lower wages would distort competition between undertakings and would be from 
the social point of view ‘completely unacceptable’. 52  
 
As usual, the internal market effect is laconically mentioned in the Preamble of the 
Directive; the first Recital notes how Article 3 EC requires removal of obstacles to the 
free provision of services. The third Recital denotes that ‘the completion of the 
internal market offers a dynamic environment for the trans-national provision of 
services, prompting a growing number of undertakings to post employees abroad’. 
                                                 
48 On this theme, see e.g. Mikko Huttunen’s dissertation, A Comparative Analysis of the 
Legal Position of Professional Sportsmen under Finnish, English and European Community 
Law: the Borderlines of Employment. European University Institute, Florence 2001, passim.  
49 Case C-67/96, Albany International ECR [1999] I-5751, paragraphs 59 and 60. For Albany, 
see the references in footnote 264, infra. 
50 Case C-341/02, judgment of 14 April 2005. 
51 See e.g. Gregor Asshoff, Baubranche: Illegal ist unsozial, WSI-Mitteilungen 11/2004. Also 
see the Council Resolution of 20 October 2003 on undeclared work. 
52 Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal for a Council Directive concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of services, COM(91) 230 final – SYN 346, 
Brussels, 1 August 1991, paragraph 12. 
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The fifth Recital then spells out the basic philosophy in the whole directive, as follows: 
 
(5) Whereas any such promotion 53 of the trans-national provision of services 
requires a climate of fair competition and measures guaranteeing respect for 
the rights of workers; 
 
This Recital needs to be read together with Recital 12 that, with the wording of Rush 
Portuguesa, paragraph 18, declared: 
 
(12) Whereas Community law does not preclude Member States from 
applying their legislation, or collective agreements entered into by employers 
and labour, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their 
territory, although his employer is established in another Member State; 
whereas Community law does not forbid Member States to guarantee the 
observance of those rules by the appropriate means; 54 
 
This Recital introduced the extension possibility in the PWD and Article 3(1) 
enshrines it as the obligation of the host states. The Recital was during the drafting of 
the Directive the flag of the case-law backing up the Directive. While the Court (in 
plenum) rendered judgment Vander Elst in 1994 referring to minimum wages 
established by law or collective agreement (as the Court did in Seco), the Commission 
kept the wording of Rush Portuguesa in its proposal. The reason was to avoid any 
debate about the PWD possibly intending to set only the lowest wage category (like a 
‘minimum of minima’) as binding erga omnes. In Arblade (paragraph 41) the Court 
referred both to Seco and Rush Portuguesa but used the Seco formula (mentioning 
‘minimum wages’). Allowing just the lowest wage category to be binding erga omnes 
by virtue of the corpus text (Article 3(1)) of the PWD was rejected at the end of the 
preparations. It is a fortiori clear that the PWD is intended to allow (in fact, it a priori 
requires!) the extension of the whole wage scale and other relevant pay provisions 
concerned, not just a lowest or otherwise reduced category. Anyway, the PWD applies 
within the framework of the Treaty. This, i.e. the Arblade-test, also has its effect on 
the extension right/obligation, highlighted in peripheral cases. 55  
                                                 
53 This ‘such’ is one example of the ‘flowers’ in a text subject to many amendments. Indeed, 
there is no previous ‘promotion’ in the text, justifying the ‘such’ here. It is easier to read the 
Recital imaginably without the wording ‘any such provision’. Essentially, the promotion 
refers to the growing number of postings, present in the third Recital. 
54 This obiter dictum in Rush Portuguesa Paul Davies has still in 2002 called ‘a basic error of 
the craft of judicial decision-making’(!). IJL Vol. 31. No. 3. September 2002, p. 300. See, 
however, even footnotes 84 and 159, infra. 
55 There might be in future cases where the Court has to assess so to say extreme pay 
provisions, like a paid leave for 50th anniversary. If it exists only in the host state law or 
collective agreement, the question arises whether a posted worker is entitled to this paid leave. 
I take the liberty to not propose any answer here. - In the doctrine Richard Giesen has paid 
attention to paragraph 29 in Portugaia where the Court in the context of the extension 
possibility required the national courts “to determine whether those rules confer a genuine 
benefit on the workers concerned, which significantly augments their social protection.” For 
this purpose, the ECJ demands a “careful assessment of the alleged benefits conferred on 
workers”. Giesen, Posting: Social Protection of Workers vs. Fundamental Freedoms? 
CMLRev. 40: 2003, p. 150-1. Unlike Giesen seems to hint, these requirements do not concern 
the extension possibility as such (the Court repeated it in paragraph 21) but need to be read in 
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However, the putting on an equal footing of fair competition and the guaranteeing of 
respect for workers’ rights is declared in Recital (5) and this is the only possibility of 
creating social justice in a market economy. The economic and social factors are 
interlinked and balanced, without any precedence being granted to either of them. 
Article 3(1) PWD puts this into practice, besides being in harmony with Article 50(3) 
EC which refers to temporary services in another Member State requiring the same 
conditions as the national service providers.  
 
 
1.3.5 Some Basic Assessments of the Directive’s Raison D’Être  
 
Granting precedence to the economic dimension would obviously mean giving service 
providers the right to carry out ‘temporary’ works in other Member States with the 
pay provisions in force in the home state, that being in line with abolishing restrictions 
on cross-border services. This line has had several advocates (after Advocate General 
in Seco) in case-law, most importantly the company Arblade in case Arblade where it 
‘anchored’ its view on the case Bond van Adverteerders and others v The Netherlands 
State. It shows how economic aims cannot constitute grounds of public policy 
(justifying restrictions on free movement of services) within the meaning of Article 46 
[ex 56] of the Treaty. 56  In Germany there has been a lot of criticism of the doctrine 
since the mid-1990’s, also about the conformity of the national law of 1996 
(Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz, hereinafter also ‘AEntG’) with the EC Treaty. Mutatis 
mutandis this criticism also addressed the PWD, and its acceptability under the Treaty. 
On the other hand, many German scholars opposed this criticism. 57 It is obvious that 
the further case-law (Arblade, Finalarte and Portugaia) left crucially less room for 
this type of criticism, and judgment Wolff & Müller v Pereira Félix 58 should normally 
put an end to it.  
 
During the preparation of the PWD there were scholars in Germany who suggested 
that, besides the national law (AEntG), the PWD would also be unconstitutional and 
would not conform to the Treaty. The criticism and questions about the 
constitutionality of the AEntG were based on the freedom of association that is 
                                                                                                                                            
the context of the case, i.e. related to the fact that the grounds of the German posting law 
AEntG reflected even open protectionism.  
56 Case 352/85 [1988] ECR 2085, para. 34. 
57 In Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 1/2002, Volker Rieble and Jan Lessner ‘rank’ in their article 
Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz, Nettolohnhaftung und EG-Vertrag, p. 37, footnote 34, as 
proponents of the criticism – more precisely said as finding the AEntG as not in conformity 
with the EC Treaty - Gerken/Löwisch/Rieble, BB 1995, 2370, 2372 ff; 
Beisiegel/Mosbacher/Lepante, JZ 1996, 668, 671; Eichenhofer ZIAS 1996, 55, 62f.; 
Strohmaier, RdA 1998, 339ff.; they refer as ‘hesitant’ (‘zweifelnd’) scholars to Hailbronner, 
EWS 1997, 401ff., and Koenigs, DB 1997, 225, 231; as accepting the AEntG being in 
conformity with the Treaty they refer to Blanke, ArbuR 1999, 417, 422ff.; Büdenbrender, 
RdA 2000, 193, 206; Däubler, EuZW 1997, 613, 614 ff.; Deinert, RdA 1996, 339; Franzen, 
DZWiR 1996, 89; Hanau, NJW 1996, 1369; Hickl, NZA 1997, 513, 515; Juncker/Wichmann, 
NZA 1996, 505, 512; Webers, DB 1996, 574, 577. As to Hailbronner’s position, in his lecture 
‚Beeinträchtigung der Dienstleistungsfreiheit durch nationale Meldevorschriften und 
Kontrollmaßnahmen’ (in Wiesehügel and Sahl (eds.), Die Sozialkassen der Bauwirtschaft und 
die Entsendung innerhalb der Europäischen Union, p. 75-93, 77) he refers to the non-
conformity of the Directive with the Treaty only as a theoretical possibility. 
58 Case C-60/03, judgment 12.10.2004, nyr. On this judgment, see section 2.2, infra. 
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guaranteed by Article 9 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, German Constitution). Thus, 
the claim was that the AEntG (and the Directive) deprived foreign undertakings of 
their right to regulate the working conditions of their workers under their domestic 
law. There was also a case questioning the constitutionality of the AEntG. The 
Constitutional Court dismissed such doubts/claims in its decision of 18 July 2000. 59 
However, the German government was a firm proponent of the PWD as such, even 
though there was a remarkable dispute relating to the contents of the EC intervention 
in the field of pay, notably in defining the minimum wage under the PWD.  
 
Within the German doctrine Volker Rieble and Jan Lessner provide us with a 
developed argumentation where they conclude that the AentG and PWD are 
incompatible with the Treaty. The basic lines of the argumentation are worth a 
detailed presentation even as a minority position because it tells something important 
about the legal nature and ‘self-understanding’ of the Community. They base their 
argumentation essentially on the free movement of workers, i.e. Article 39 EC. They 
find that in that provision we should also acknowledge a ‘freedom-related’ 
(freiheitsrechtlich) prohibition of restrictions that the worker could invoke against 
depriving him of his benefit in wage costs (Lohnkostenvorteil) and his chances of 
entering the labour market. Such an interpretation seems for them to be given already 
on the basis of ‘convergence of the fundamental freedoms’. They find that on the 
other fundamental freedoms a step from prohibition of discrimination to prohibition of 
restrictions is to great extent fulfilled. As a further argument in the same direction 
they note the fact that the Treaty does not foresee any harmonisation of substantive 
working conditions. Then comes their clue: when the approximation should result 
from the free effect or play (‘Spiel’) of market forces, there must be wage competition 
(Lohnwettbeverb) in the labour market. 60 Hence, this line of thought leads to the 
conclusion and manifests that competition with low wages would be what the Treaty 
foresees. Their motto is that competition should be completely free, and they do not 
even discuss the model of a partial restriction of competition that the PWD and 
AEntG 61 entail, let alone the reference to the same conditions for temporary service-
providers from another Member State, enshrined in Article 50(3) EC. 
 
This conclusion, i.e. the requirement of free wage competition, submitted in 2002 just 
after judgment Portugaia, is in flagrant contradiction with the extension right, as 
confirmed by settled case-law (at that time Seco, Rush Portuguesa, Vander Elst, 
Arblade and Portugaia). Accordingly, it contradicts what the Court noted already in 
                                                 
59 See case BVerfG - Kammer - 18. Juli 2000 - 1 BvR 948/00 - AP AEntG § 1 Nr. 4 = EzA 
GG Art. 9 Nr. 69. On this judgment in brief, see e.g. Koberski/Asshoff/Hold, p. 79-80. 
60 Rieble and Lessner, Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz, Netto-Lohnhaftung und EG-Vertrag. 
Zeitschrift  für Arbeitsrecht 1/2002, pp. 29-89, 46-47. While Rieble and Lessner mention 
Eichenhofer as one of those who have found the AEntG as unconstitutional (see footnote 57, 
supra), it seems fair to denote that he in his article ‘Binnenmarkt und social dumping’, 
Europäisches Unternehmensrecht 2001, p. 43-59, clearly presents the PWD (although 
referring only to a minimum wage, p. 49) as concretizing, not prohibiting, the free provision 
of services. Besides, in the same article Eichenhofer, although advocating in favour of more 
competition between national social policy regimes (p. 58), anyway at the end takes a clear 
stand against social dumping (p. 59). 
61 The AEntG does not impose on foreign employers the whole pay scale in the German 
collective agreement in construction but only two relatively low rates. See section 3.3.1, at 
footnotes 154 and 155, infra.  
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case Commission v. France in 1974: a protection under Article 39 (ex 48) EC against 
low-wage competition. Article 39 EC does not intend to allow such competition. 62 
Furthermore, the argument of Rieble and Lessner is in flagrant contradiction with the 
PWD that imposes the extension of national minimum wages (if they exist). However, 
presenting the argument about Article 39 EC in 2002 shows the in-depth opposition of 
the market-orientated part of the German doctrine. But this argument is far from all of 
their thinking. For example, they present, with their market-orientated starting point, 
what seems to be a coherent development of the whole Arblade-justification test. 63 In 
so doing they, amongst other things, unwillingly admit that minimum wages erga 
omnes would fulfil the criterion of overriding reasons of public interest (Arblade-
justification, point (ii)), 64  but only with difficulty do they, if at all, find it 
proportionate under the Arblade-justification, point (iv), 65 due to the protectionist 
grounds of the AEntG. In any case, the outcome of Rieble and Lessner is to highlight 
that neither the PWD nor the case-law requires national minimum wages.  
 
The main criticism of Rieble and Lessner is directed at their submission that the PWD, 
in expressly combining fair competition and rights of workers, would infringe 
subsidiarity in Article 5 EC and the principle of a limited specified mandate for 
secondary EC law (Einzelermächtigung). This would be due to the fact that ‘these 
majesty goals can only be achieved/realised according to procedures and requirements 
foreseen for that’. 66 It is difficult to take this submission seriously while Rieble and 
Lessner do not specify which procedures and requirements would be ‘foreseen’ and 
would respect subsidiarity and a limited mandate. It therefore has the look of 
collecting general ammunition so as to get rid of the liability of the principal 
contractor, subject to litigation in case Wolff & Müller v. Pereira since 2000 (on this 
case, see Chapter II). However, a possible ‘extension’ of this passage of Rieble and 
Lessner would lead to the assertion that only Article 96 EC is a ‘foreseen’ (and, hence, 
allowed) procedure against intra-community distortions of competition, which is 
besides an instrument in the hands of the Community. 67 However, there is nothing in 
Article 96 EC that excludes an instrument like the PWD. They can coexist, the PWD 
being lex specialis with respect to the posting of workers within the framework of the 
free provision of services. 
 
                                                 
62  See the case partially cited at footnote 12, supra. Rieble and Lessner do not mention this 
case. 
63 Rieble and Lessner, pp. 63-87.  
64 Ibid, p. 77-8. 
65 Ibid, p. 86.  For completeness’ sake I denote how they also submit that the German 
minimum wages perhaps infringe the prohibition of a double burden (Arblade-justification, 
point (iii)), because they also include a ‘construction supplement’. According to Rieble and 
Lessner, that supplement may only partly be due to circumstances that do not arise in the case 
of Portuguese workers under Portuguese law, such as bad weather. However, they admit that 
this supplement may be regarded as a part of the minimum wage if it is seen as historically 
determined – as the German government submitted in case Portugaia (see paragraph 52 et seq. 
of the Opinion of AG Mischo) - and in that way an integral part thereof. Ibid, p. 80-1. 
66 Ibid, p. 50. My translation of ‘Diese hehren Ziele können aber nur entsprechend der dafür 
vorgesehenen Verfahren und Anforderungen durchgesetzt werden.’  
67 This ‘alternative’ way to combat distortions of competition is elsewhere referred to by 
Rieble and Lessner, ibid, p. 85. Dörfler (see next footnote) discusses it as well. His conclusion 
is that Article 96 EC does not seem to be a valid legal base for national posting laws like the 
German AEntG, p. 183. 
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Thomas Dörfler’s dissertation on the liability of the principal contractor 68 follows the 
line of Rieble and Lessner, although not in all details. However, as to EC law, he does 
not take any clear stand on the conformity of the PWD with the Treaty but highlights 
that it cannot bring about any independent mandate for national laws like the AEntG. 
69 As to the Treaty, he first contends that one could derive, as Däubler and Franzen 
have done, from Article 50(3) EC a principle of equal pay for equal work (at the same 
place). A ‘direct’ counterargument he also finds in the case-law of the ECJ, by 
referring to the home state principle of free movement of goods and even by 
presenting (although in a footnote) judgments Webb, Säger and Arblade as reflections 
of this principle. In reality, it is essential that only Arblade dealt with the extension of 
national wages of the host state and that it confirmed that possibility which had 
already been established in Seco and Rush Portuguesa. Reference to free movement 
of goods is justified for him while the case-law on basic freedoms is ‘converging’. 70  
 
The non-effect of Article 50(3) EC Dörfler does not ground any further but presents, 
to pave way for his conclusion on wage competition, a striking bridge in EC law. 
Namely, he asserts that ‘making use of the existing differences in the labour law 
standards in different member States is unobjectionable (unbedenklich) insofar as the 
labour rights follow common basic principles and guarantee a minimum standard for 
the protection of workers.’ This is then followed by an unsuccessful salto mortale: 
‘the Member States have given such a minimum standard on the basis of the 
Community Charter on Fundamental Social Rights and Directives on minimum 
protection in safety and health.’ 71 The end of the bridge is to outweigh the equal 
treatment principle in the free movement of workers while the posted workers do not 
seek entrance into the labour market of the host state. Already logical, in a way, is the 
conclusion on wage comparison: viability of wages paid to posted workers should be 
decided by comparing them only to those payable in their home states. His overall 
conclusion on wage competition is that a general interest of protection against 
distortion of competition cannot justify the obligation to pay minimum wages to 
posted workers. 72 Despite these significant conclusions the prognosis of Dörfler was 
                                                 
68 Thomas Dörfler, Die Nettolohnhaftung nach dem Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz. 
Möglichkeit ihrer dogmatischen Einordnung. Prüfung ihrer Vereinbarkeit mit Europäischem 
Recht (Net Wage Liability under the AentG. Possibility of Its Dogmatic Incorporation. Test 
of Its Conformity with EC Law), Tectum Verlag 2002. 
69 Ibid., p. 153-4. 
70 Ibid., pp. 196-7. The misleading effect is rather bold in the way Dörfler (ab)uses this case-
law, namely by referring to the overall justification of restrictions on free movement of 
services: they are not justified if the interest concerned is safeguarded by the rules to which 
the provider of such a service is subject in the Member State where he is established (Webb, 
para. 17, Säger, para. 15 and Arblade, para. 34). Hence, Dörfler here – in this crucial place of 
reasoning on the contents of EC law regarding wages - completely passes the fact that the ECJ 
in Arblade (para. 41) confirmed the extension possibility of national wages. This is no wonder 
in the sense that already in presenting Arblade as a part of the pre-Directive case-law he 
makes an identical ‘silent move’ and mentions only the administrative (or bookkeeping) side 
of Arblade; ibid., p. 105. 
71 Ibid., p. 197; my translation from ‘Bei den EG-Mitgliedstaaten ist aufgrund der 
Gemeinschaftscharta über die sozialen Grundrechte und den Richtlinien über den 
Mindestschutz der Gesundheit oder Sicherheit ein solcher Mindestschutz gegeben.’  
72 Ibid., p. 197-8. The preceding analysis, discussing the possibility to exclude wage 
competition (i.e. delimiting it to output competition (‘Leistungswettbewerb’)), Dörfler ends 
up by citing the grounds at the second question in Seco of AG VerLoren van Themaat where 
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(in 2002, after Portugaia) that the ECJ one day would find the basic concept of the 
German AEntG to be compatible with the freedom to provide services. 73    
 
Steffen Görres discusses at length in his dissertation the conformity of the PWD with 
the free movement of services (Article 49 EC) and assesses it in the light of 
proportionality, ‘promotion of fair competition’, ‘promotion of free movement of 
persons[!] and services’ and ‘promotion of the social protection of workers’. 74 He 
ultimately finds that the PWD follows a recognised goal, i.e. a minimum protection of 
workers, and is ‘appropriate and suitable’ (‘erforderlich und angemessen’) for 
securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues. Furthermore, for him, the 
protection of workers ultimately outweighs the restriction on free movement of 
services. Hence, he comes to the conclusion that the PWD does not infringe the free 
movement of services. 75 There is, however, a strong reservation that Görres illustrates 
when explaining the AEntG. Hence, the minimum (i.e. the minimum of minima) 
wages under the AEntG he holds to be compatible with the Treaty but not the 
extension of the whole wage scale, i.e. the wages for different categories of workers. 
In this context he wrongly explains, based on a ‘general usage of language’ (‘nach 
allgemeines Sprachgebrauch’) that the minimum rates of wage in Article 3(1)(c) PWD 
would mean just the lowest category that due to its ‘internationally compulsory effect’ 
covers all the workers concerned. He further wrongly maintains that the European 
legislator would not have been interested in a wage regulation qualified by skills, 
concrete tasks or setting up of wage categories. 76 His conclusion is that the present 
form of AEntG, which makes it possible to extend more than the very lowest possible 
wage category, would pass the limits (mandate) of the PWD. 77 Article 3(1), second 
subparagraph, PWD shows that here Görres is simply wrong. The decision whether 
only the lowest wage category or some more categories or other pay provisions are 
extended, depends on the Member States as the unambiguous wording of the PWD 
states. Anyway, the logical conclusion must be that Görres also finds, next to the 
AEntG, the PWD to be compatible with Article 49 EC only if the minimum wage 
                                                                                                                                            
he found the use of cost benefits as a fundamental – and legitimate - feature of the Common 
Market (quoted in section 1.2.2, supra); ibid., p. 193. Dörfler passes the fact that the Court 
anyway confirmed the extension right of national wages in Seco and later in Rush Portuguesa, 
Vander Elst and Arblade. 
73 Ibid., p. 201 and the final conclusions of the dissertation, p. 237 (as a likelihood). 
74 Steffen Görres, Grenzüberschreitende Arbeitnehmerentsendung in der EU, Neuer 
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Wien 2003 pp. 174-221. He maintains that the proportionality test 
would also be in EC law threefold: suitability/appropriateness – necessity – reasonableness 
(Geeignetkeit – Erforderlichkeit – Angemessenheit). Hence, he asserts that the proportionality 
test under EC law would be in broad sense (‘weitestgehend’) identical with that under 
German law; ibid, p. 171. His reference is (in footnote 834) Schwarze-Holoubek, EU-Komm. 
Art. 49, Rn 95 m.w.N. That there is a clear difference between proportionality test in EC and 
German law, and that the test is only twofold (suitability – necessity) in EC law becomes 
clear in footnote 131, infra. 
75 Ibid, pp. 220-1 and the Resümee, p. 384.  
76 Ibid, p. 285.  
77 Ibid, p. 293-4. As shown especially in footnote 40, supra, there was a blocking minority 
against a directive allowing only the extension of a lowest wage category. See also my 
explanation on the European way to conceive the minimum wage, section 3.2 (in fine), infra. 
The PWD respects the national notions up to the extent that it does not impose the enactment 
of minimum wages. 
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means the lowest wage category. In his thinking the lowest category finally represents 
a subsistence minimum. 78  
 
However, Rieble, Lessner, Dörfler and Görres are not and have not been the whole 
doctrine in Germany, far from it. I would refer (in addition to those in footnote 57, 
supra, who find the AEntG to be compatible with the Treaty) to Richard Giesen 
whose conclusion about the case-law until Portugaia was that the ECJ by and large 
succeeded ‘in avoiding polarizing statements in weighing social protection and 
fundamental freedoms.’ 79  Von Danwitz has held, after judgment Portugaia, that the 
ECJ has powerfully blocked with its case-law a race to the bottom. For him (as for 
me) the integration-related signal of this case-law is clear: the realisation of the free 
provision of services will by no means lead to a massive dismantling of the social 
protection of workers. In his conclusions he highlights that it is possible to combine 
the free market of services and social protection of workers as principally equal 
factors that limit and set up conditions on each other. 80 Deinert clearly argues on the 
same line as von Danwitz and he succinctly finds that the opinions of the supporters 
and opponents of the AEntG and Directive ‘are based on their individual ideas in 
relation to the question whether the internal market allows one ruthlessly to exploit 
comparative cost advantages, or whether restrictions on the use of competition 
advantages are allowed for reasons of public interest, in particular to achieve social 
aims.’ I agree with him.81  
 
There seems to be no equivalent to ‘Rieble and Lessner’ in the French doctrine but 
rather the atmosphere linked to Rush Portuguesa. Thus, the starting point of Marie-
Ange Moreau in explaining the Directive is the organisation of socially loyal 
competition in the EU. She denotes the role of the French national law of 1993 as a 
point of reference in preparing the PWD and maintains that the PWD elaborates and 
puts into effect, but does not put into disorder, the mechanisms or concepts used in 
international industrial relations. It also simplifies the protection of posted workers 
and shows the importance of the regulation of competition by taking care of the social 
costs of work. 82 She also highlights that the PWD may have effects beyond the 
definition of the status of a posted worker, namely by creating a potential model for 
                                                 
78 Ibid, p. 293 where Görres finds how the AEntG (that imposes two wage categories on 
posted workers) has an impact ‘widely over guaranteeing a subsistence minimum’ (‘eine weit 
über die Sicherung eines Existenzminimums hinausgehende Wirkung’).  
79 Richard Giesen, Posting: Social Protection Vs. Fundamental Freedoms? CMLRev. 40:143-
158, 2003, p. 152. 
80 Thomas von Danwitz, Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH zum Entsenderecht. Bausteine für 
eine Wirtschaft- und Sozialverfassung der EU. EuZW 8/2002 p. 237-244, 244. On the same 
line is Gabriele Peter under heading ‘Europarechtliche Bedenken gegen das AentG’ in 
Gabriele Peter, Otto Ernst Kempen  und Ulrich Zachert, Rechtliche und rechtspolitische 
Aspekte der Sicherung von tariflichen Mindeststandards, WSI Januar 2003, pp. 34-37; 
http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/wsi_rechtsgutachten_mindeststandards.pdf. 
81 Olaf Deinert, Posting of Workers to Germany – Previous Evolutions and New Influences 
throughout EU Legislation Proposals, IJCLLIR, Autumn 2000, p. 221. Thus, Deinert de facto 
also means the argument of the Advocate General and outcome in judgment Seco, see section 
1.2.2, supra. 
82 Marie-Ange Moreau, Le détachement des travailleurs effectuant une prestation de services 
dans l’Union européenne. Journal du droit international 1996 No 4, p. 889-908, p. 907. 
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the trans-national application of collective agreements and by laying the foundations 
for a concept of a reference wage in EC law. 83 
 
The debate in the United Kingdom does not offer many views on which to comment. 
However, after an analysis of the case-law up to Portugaia, Paul Davies denotes how 
the ‘blanket permission’ given (to extend the laws and collective agreements to posted 
workers in the obiter dictum of paragraph 18) in Rush Portuguesa was overstated. His 
further conclusion is that the Directive makes the same overstatement as to host-
states’ obligations and freedoms. However, his final conclusion is to wonder whether 
some brave spirit would challenge the legal basis of the Directive because it is 
‘incapable’ of promoting freedom of cross-border services. At the same time he finds 
that it does a good job in protecting host-state employees and, much more 
controversially, the posted workers themselves. 84  I venture to assert that Davies 
himself overstates his case, at least with respect to the PWD. It is true that the obiter 
dictum in paragraph 18 of Rush Portuguesa did not refer to an extension right under 
the Treaty obligations and that it can therefore be called a ‘blanket permission’. If so, 
already in Arblade the Court in any case placed the extension right in its Treaty 
context. Furthermore, the PWD elaborated the extension right and operates under 
Treaty obligations, see especially my explanation on judgment Commission v 
Germany in section 3.3.3, infra. Besides, Member States do not have free hands in 
adding matters to the hardcore list in Article 3(1) PWD but they need to respect the 
Treaty. Catherine Barnard offered in 2000 a neutral and succinct presentation of the 
main lines of the Directive. However, she denotes how it imposes an extra burden on 
service providers. On the other hand she recognises the prevention of social dumping, 
but by setting up only minimum wage rates; being one the few scholars who have 
noted, in public, the higher wages that are actually paid in many countries. Hence, she 
sees that the competitive advantage remains, even though it is reduced by the PWD. 85  
 
In Sweden Lena Maier raised (in 2000) questions in her dissertation EU, arbetsrätten 
och normgivningsmakten (EU, labour law and lawmaking powers); first, the 
relationship between the legal basis of the PWD and the exclusion of ‘wage relations’ 
                                                 
83 Ibid. Marie-Ange Moreau refers at the indirect conceptual effect of the PWD to Antoine 
Lyon-Caen (who chaired the round table where she made her presentation).  
84 Paul Davies, The Posted Workers Directive and the EC Treaty, Industrial Law Journal Vol. 
31, No. 3, September 2002, 298-306, 306. In his earlier article ‘Single Market or Protection of 
National Labour Law Systems?’ CMLRev, Vol. 34, 1997, pp. 571-602, Davies expressed 
perhaps sharper criticism on the same line. However, he also predicted future developments, 
i.e. elaborating the ‘wholesale justification’ of the extension right in Rush Portuguesa, which 
becomes clear in footnote 159, infra. 
85 Catherine Barnard, EC Employment Law, second edition, Oxford EC Law Library 2000, 
pp. 170-180, conclusions p. 179. As to pre-Directive positions from the United Kingdom, one 
has to mention Brian Bercusson whose anti-dumping attitude characterizes his description in 
European Labour Law, Butterworths 1996, pp. 397-412, of the developments towards the 
Directive during the first half of 1990s. However, dealing with collective agreements in the 
draft directive (the Commission’s revised proposal COM(93)225, OJ C187 9.7.1993) his 
conclusion was that the draft without proper grounds distinguished CBAs from laws (as also 
did the directive later, although it left the option to cover CBAs on every sector). He also 
reminded that judgment Rush Portuguesa did not include any such distinction between laws 
and agreements; ibid., p. 412.    
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(‘löneförhållanden’ 86) in Article 137(6) (now 137(5)) EC. Second, she also raises the 
principal questions whether wage differences lead to distorted competition and 
whether this is an internal market issue that can be remedied under the free provision 
of services. Regarding the first question, she notes the problems that would have 
occurred, not the least the exclusion of the United Kingdom, if Article 2 of the 
Maastricht Social Policy Agreement had been chosen as the legal basis of the PWD. 
Regarding the second question, she highlights that posting of workers brings the wage 
differences in a specific way inside a Member State. This is a counterargument e.g. to 
the statement in the Spaak report 87 that did not see a Community intervention as 
being necessary to iron out wage differences. However, the remedy to both types of 
problems that she has raised, she finds in the indirect transfer of competence that the 
Member States have accepted by adopting the Treaty with its Articles 57(2) and 66. 
The outcome is that the Community, based on the Treaty, has the competence to 
regulate wages. That is what the PWD does, although ultimately via the national pay 
provisions. 88   
 
In the Dutch doctrine. Mijke Houwerzijl takes for granted in her recent dissertation 
the combination of fair competition and worker protection. Accordingly, and given 
the enlargement of the EU, she sees the most prominent shortcoming to lie in the area 
of enforcement and she finds a liability clause for the user company to be needed. 
However, for her, even with its shortcomings the PWD may at least prevent the most 
severe forms of social dumping. 89  
 
As to predominantly European doctrine, one has to refer to the (to my mind overstated) 
warnings of Marco Biagi about social protectionism just after the adoption of the 
Directive. He, too, took for granted the balance making between fair competition and 
social rights. 90 The same point concerns Eeva Kolehmainen who concludes that the 
PWD is more about protecting national labour law systems and guaranteeing fair 
competition than about protecting posted workers. Protection of posted workers is for 
her a by-product of the pursuit of the objective of facilitating free movement of 
services. 91 In her conclusions Ulla Liukkunen seems to adhere to the same line. 92 
                                                 
86 See that the Swedish (‘löneförhållanden’) and Danish (‘lønforhold’) versions of Article 
137(5) EC do differ structurally from the others as they use this ‘relations’ 
(förhållanden/forhold) like in the expression ‘industrial relations’. 
87 See Report of the heads of delegations to the foreign ministers at the Messina conference, 
21 April 1956 (Spaak Report), Part One, Title 1, Chapter 2. 
88 Lena Maier, EU, arbetsrätten och normgivningsmakten, Jure Ab, Stockholm 2000, p. 350-
353. 
89 See Mijke Houwerzijl, ‘De Detacheringsrichtlijn. Over de achtergrond, inhoud en 
implementatie van Richtlijn 96/71/EG’ (The Posting of Workers Directive: About the 
Background, Content and Implementation of Directive 96/71/EC; with English summary). 
Kluwer, Europeese Monografieën 2005, p. 400-1. 
90 See Marco Biagi, The ‘posted workers’ EU directive: from social dumping to social 
protectionism. Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations 1998, pp. 173-180. 
91 Eeva Kolehmainen, The Posted Workers Directive: European Reinforcement of National 
Labour Protection, IUE, 2002, p. 269.  
92 Ulla Liukkunen, the Role of Mandatory Rules in International Labour Law. Talentum 
Helsinki 2004, p. 224. In her reasoning there are, however, some points that I disagree with, 
like the statement (p. 177) that the PWD would mean ‘exhaustive harmonisation’ and that 
most of the matters in Article 3(1) PWD would belong to the ‘field of EC law, which includes 
substantive harmonisation’. The by far most important matter, i.e. pay, EC law does not 
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1.3.6 Author’s View; Summing up 
 
The author shares the general view of the PWD as it stands, i.e. it achieves a balance 
between the market freedoms and social aims, although with the remark that the PWD 
is not neutral in relation to the competition existing before its adoption. Namely, the 
Directive (rather naturally) allows essential pressure to lower actual wages that often 
and sometimes even widely exceed the compulsory provisions (mainly in collective 
agreements) in many Member States. Another issue is whether national law allows the 
defence of actual wages or the actual wage level (in piecework ordered by the 
collective agreement but not necessarily guaranteed by it) even with industrial action 
(as in Sweden and Finland). Besides, the Directive leaves the possible (and obvious, 
for the new Member States) competitive advantage in social security costs untouched. 
As to other scholars, the line is clear in the sense that the argumentation on the line of 
Rieble, Lessner, Dörfler and Görres (representing a ‘milder’ position by accepting the 
‘subsistence minimum wages’) deviates essentially from the European mainstream. 
This argumentation is market orientated to the extent that it disregards the social and 
political realities in the Member States. The EU cannot set up its goals irrespective of 
these realities. That is the bottom line reason why the ultra-market-minded 
argumentation finally does not have too many supporters in the legal doctrine, if any, 
outside Germany (and has been rejected by the ECJ since Seco in 1982). As such its 
existence as a clear-cut minority position illustrates the nature of the European 
Community, i.e. highlights that it is not a blind product and bearer of ruthless market 
thinking – that ‘labour is not a commodity’. With respect to this issue, the underlying 
market concept essentially relies on settled case-law that will remain immovable, 
unless an amendment of the Treaty itself were to be enacted in the opposite direction. 
Such a u-turn (after the Single European Act and the Treaties of Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and finally Nice in 2000, the latest thus adopted after Arblade) is surely 
outside the scope of political reality.  
 
Indeed, the gap in wages and costs between the old and new Member States in the 
enlarged EU once again highlights the crucial line drawn by the Court in Seco: 
posting of workers in the Community is not based on low-cost competition but on a 
reasonable compromise between the interests of workers and employers, the Posted 
Workers Directive being the means of enforcing this compromise. Had the 
Community not issued the PWD in 1996, enlargement would have created massive 
pressure for such an instrument, with the alternative of the Member States operating 
independently, by virtue of the case-law. I recall how the ECJ also confirmed the 
extension right in Vander Elst and Arblade, i.e. in posting workers between two 
Member States (Belgium and France) with essentially similar level of wages and other 
costs in contrast to the gap between the fifteen ‘old’ and ten new Member States since 
enlargement. 
 
Some comments are still needed about the PWD as a reflection of the fragile balance 
between market freedoms and social aims. As background I recall the extension right 
established in Seco and reconfirmed in Arblade. The latter established the key notion, 
                                                                                                                                            
regulate at all unless with the special mechanism in the PWD, and for the other matters (like 
paid annual leave and working time) minimum requirements have been set by the EC. That is 
not harmonisation. The PWD is an act of the Community but, as to material contents of 
working conditions, it is essentially labour law within the Community. 
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namely ‘protection of workers’, as capable of justifying restrictions on the free 
movement of services. It came even closer to workers’ specific interests by 
recognising the need for special protection of construction workers (paragraph 36, in 
fine). However, the reasoning in Webb (see footnote 9, supra) went even further. 
Webb – being the first great ‘labour law judgment’ within services (decided in 1981) 
and later referred to also by Arblade, paragraph 36, next to Seco and Rush Portuguesa 
– is, indeed, a graphic illustration of this fragile balance that in the end requires a 
choice. Namely, the ECJ wrote in Webb, as follows:  
 
‘19 It follows in particular that it is permissible for Member States, and 
amounts for them to a legitimate choice of policy pursued in the public 
interest, to subject the provision of manpower within their borders to a system 
of licensing in order to be able to refuse licences where there is reason to fear 
that such activities may harm good relations on the labour market or that the 
interests of the workforce affected are not adequately safeguarded’ (emphasis 
JH).  
 
Hence, the bottom line was that precedence was given to ‘the interests of the 
workforce affected’. ‘Good relations on the labour market’ may, of course, also cover 
the interests of (organised) national employers but ‘interests of the workforce 
affected’ is at the end an independent ground, and, besides, effective already in case 
of fear which is crucially different from any proven effect in future. These lessons 
from Webb are equally as valid in the debate about temporary work, the draft 
Directive on Services and overall ‘flexicurity’.  Their value is by no means diluted by 
the Court’s later statement (in paragraph 20) on the necessity to take into account the 
guarantees given in the state of establishment. 
 
Locating the PWD under the free provision of services was natural in the sense that 
the instrument is heavily competition-bound. However, that competition tie already 
has a (more or less declared) history of some 23 years (since judgment Seco) and it 
can be predicted that the present legal framework (balance and combination of the 
interests of workers and employers, finally an interpretation of the core element of the 
Community, i.e. the Internal Market) will remain in force for a corresponding time 
span in the future. On the other hand, this location under the free provision of services 
was necessary so as to come under QMV in decision-making. Besides, issuing the 
PWD after Amsterdam would have further involved a debate about Article 137 EC as 
a valid legal base for it, given its paragraph 6 (5 since Nice; I discuss Article 137(5) in 
section 4.3, infra). In any case, the PWD is a mix of economic and social (labour law) 
values. It includes in Article 3(7) as a typical labour law feature a reference to 
conditions better than those required by the PWD. Still, given the location of the 
PWD under the free provision of services, 93 a ‘mega-interpretation’ is that these 
‘better conditions’ need to comply with Article 49 (and 50) EC, i.e. with the Arblade-
test. As to the practical applications of this mega-interpretation, in the following 
Chapters I will show that, outside normal pay provisions, a formal ceiling exists for 
the host state’s conditions that can be extended to posted workers; it is, however, set 
                                                 
93 I recall that the ECJ already in Webb in 1981 (see the explanation in section 1.2.1, at 
footnotes 9 and 10, supra) stated that even pure cross-border hiring-out of manpower a priori 
falls under free provision of services and just secondarily under free movement of workers.  
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reasonably high and dominated by the concept of protection of workers instead of 
economic market values.  
 
In sum, the Posted Workers Directive is also a graphic example of the circuitous 
development of EC labour law. Neither the upward harmonisation of working 
conditions ensuing from the functioning of the common market (Article 136, third 
paragraph, EC still uses ‘common’ instead of ‘internal’), nor the approximation of 
laws under Article 94 – as for other pre-Amsterdam labour law - has worked or been 
used as presumed in the Treaty of Rome. Thus, seen from its labour law angle, the 
PWD emerged in a roundabout way, in the end based on a constitutional interpretation 
of market freedom itself by the Court in Seco. It is anyway an integral part of EC 
labour law while, as to final material contents, it essentially relies on national law.    
 
The Posted Workers Directive, especially as interpreted in the framework of the EC 
Treaty, is a focal point where the social and economic factors meet. However, these 
developments within the free provision of services rarely attract attention in 
discussions on a more general level about the relationship between economic market 
freedoms and (most often) national social rights. A graphic example is the article 
‘Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and Social Rights in the 
EU’ of Miguel Poiares Maduro, published in 1999. The article, excellent as such, 
discusses in particular Social Policy Articles of the Treaty, free movement of goods 
and persons (workers), pay equality (Article 141 EC), non-discrimination (Article 12 
EC) and worker representation in European mergers. Comprehensively it refers even 
to strikes, though just as phenomena, without any discussion on their justification. It 
comes to the conclusion that the ‘negative’ impact of the European Economic 
Constitution on social rights has been limited and is a function of market integration 
and judicial harmonization of national social and regulatory policies, not the result of 
a neo-liberal conception of the European Economic Constitution by the Court of 
Justice’ (emphasis JH). However, and this is my main point here, he deals with the 
whole impact of the free provision of services by only referring to national litigants 
wanting to ‘favour economic freedom and change social policies at the national level’. 
94  I maintain (expecting, no doubt, that Mr. Poiares Maduro agrees) that the 
developments in the field of the posting of workers crucially belong to the former 
quotation above with respect to the ECJ, while the latter is true as such (although it 
ignores the case flow in the ECJ). Namely, just consider for one moment what the 
effect would have been if the ECJ in Seco (in 1982) had decided (i.e. imposed) to 
tolerate low-wage competition as a fundamental feature of the common (internal) 
market, as was proposed by the advocate general. Reaching the extension right (or 
obligation) via a directive or directly through national posting laws would have been 
impossible because the service providers would have been entitled by virtue of the 
Treaty to use manpower with the standards of the home state, and amending the 
Treaty would require unanimity. The consequences in particular for the crisis in the 
construction industry in Germany since the early or mid- 1990’s (see section 1.3.2, 
supra) would have been disastrous. This statement relies on the fact that the very 
unsatisfactory situation still continues, despite the minimum wages (de jure) 
                                                 
94 Miguel Poiares Maduro, Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and 
Social Rights in the EU, in Alston et al. (eds.), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University 
Press 1999, pp. 449-472. The first citation is from pp. 454-5, the second from p. 455. 
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applicable there since 1997. The spill-over effect of a ‘reversed Seco’ on other areas 
of EC law would have also been obvious.  
 
However, Poiares Maduro also introduces at the end of his article a discussion about 
Social Rights and Redistribution, i.e. redistributive justice at the European level. 
While the discussion proceeds at a rather general level with an EU constitutional 
perspective (which it is not appropriate for me to comment on in this study), 
redistributive justice is also intended to reach that ‘among individuals’. I will confine 
myself here to denoting that the Posted Workers Directive (like the pre- and post-
directive case-law) is intended to prevent a redistributive trend or change (‘injustice’ 
or his ‘rough exploitation’) affecting a worker by paying him less than the minimum 
established in the host state. It is redistributive justice in this rather limited sense. Its 
main purpose is to guarantee fair competition amongst domestic and foreign 
employers. There, too, a safeguard element is evident.  
 
However, as it is intended to have concrete effects even on individual work contracts, 
the PWD requires further discussion on its implementation. That is the subject of the 




Liability of Principal Contractor 
 
2.1. General Remarks 
 
A growing feature of the area where the posting of workers is most common, i.e. in 
the construction industry, has been and remains the practice of subcontracting. It has 
in construction a threefold history. First, for decades, if not more than a century, 
specialised companies in sub-sectors, such as the plumbing trade, electrical 
installation, painting and (nowadays) scaffolding, have acted as subcontractors for 
principal contractors. Second, a more recent trend is to organise building work using 
an umbrella-model, meaning that the principal contractor employs workers, 
technicians and engineers only for the infrastructure (energy, water, maybe cranes, 
social premises and transport services) of a site whilst everything else is subcontracted. 
Third, there is a permanent trend to subcontract bulk work, such as cleaning on a site. 
95  
 
During the last few decades we have seen, especially on larger sites, chains of 
subcontracting stretching to five to eight subcontractors. Growing work-only 
subcontracting (hiring-out of manpower) is typical in these chains while it also exists 
in simple subcontracting relationships. Finally, cross-border hiring-out has been 
growing during the last let’s say 15 years, and the income gap between the old and 
new Member States guarantees its growth in future, too. However, hiring-out received 
special treatment in the PWD, which was intended to prevent any abuses. 96 
 
In sum, the prominent and still growing practice of subcontracting explains why 
several Member States have also realised in one way or another the wage liability of 
the principal contractor (or a company being the organiser of subcontracting). I will 
take the discussion of EC law via the German case Wolff & Müller v. Pereira Félix 
where the ECJ gave its preliminary ruling on 12 October 2004. 97 It merits a detailed 
discussion because the case reveals essential arguments linked to the extension right 
and, in particular, in respect of control policy and in the overall implementation of the 





                                                 
95 As a practical example I may refer to the site of the Council of Minister’s new headquarter 
(Justus Lipsius) in Brussels during the 1990s. At various times the site board included some 
30 to 50 subcontractors and not everyone was listed on the board. To illustrate the temptation 
to subcontract I refer to the renovation of Berlaymont (the Commission’s headquarter) where 
a German company that specialised in asbestos removal engaged in 1996/7, via 
subcontracting, some 110 Portuguese workers that were not trained at all for their tasks. 
Further graphic and actual examples are presented in Cremers and Donders (eds.). The free 
movement of workers in the European Union, CLR Studies 4 (2004), pp. 48-51. 
96 Articles 1(3)(c), 3(1)(d) and 3(9) PWD and the Declaration 4 of the Parliament, Council 
and Commission attached to the Directive; doc. 10048/96 SOC 264, Council meeting of 
24.9.1996. 
97 Case C-60/03, Wolff & Müller GmbH & Co. KG v José Filipe Pereira Félix, nyr. 
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2.2. Case Wolff & Müller v Pereira 
 
2.2.1 Facts and Questions 
 
Under Section 1(a) 98  of the German Arbeitnehmer-EntsendeGesetz (law on the 
posting of workers, hereinafter the ‘AEntG'), as in force since 1 January 1999, the 
‘lead contractor’ of building works is subject to the following: 
 
’An undertaking which appoints another undertaking to provide building services within 
the meaning of Paragraph 211(1) of the third book of the Sozialgesetzbuch […] is liable 
for the obligations of that undertaking, of any subcontractor and of any hirer of labour 
appointed by that undertaking or subcontractor concerning payment of the minimum 
wage to a worker or payment of contributions to a communal scheme for parties to a 
collective agreement under the [appropriate provisions of the AEntG]. The minimum 
wage for the purposes of the first sentence, means the sum payable to the worker after 
deductions in respect of tax, social security contributions, payments towards the 
promotion of employment or other such social insurance payments (net pay).' 
 
Hence, this provision established the (minimum) wage liability of the principal 
contractor. Paragraph 19 of the judgment Wolff & Müller v. Pereira Félix reveals that 
the principal contractor is in a position of a guarantor who has waived the benefit of 
execution (beneficium ordinis). Furthermore, the wage liability covers the whole 
chain of subcontracting, but only with regard to net pay.  
 
This provision was subject to a hectic debate in the Bundestag. However, it was also a 
political promise of the opposition before the elections in 1998. Given the earlier 
political and doctrinal debate in Germany, it was clear from the outset that this 
provision (as a structural factor) would also be tested in the light of European law. 
There were two possibilities as to the initiator in litigation, namely a worker 
concerned or the Holiday Fund (ULAK, nowadays called SOKA-BAU). The latter has 
an independent locus standi under the AEntG concerning holiday pay. Bricklayer José 
Filipe Pereira Félix took the initiative and brought a lawsuit about the outstanding 
minimum wage against his employer (subcontractor) and the principal contractor.  
 
The ECJ presented the facts and proceedings in the case, as follows: 
 
9. Mr Pereira Félix is a Portuguese national who, from 21 February to 15 May 2000, was 
employed in Berlin (Germany) as a bricklayer on a building site by a construction 
undertaking established in Portugal. The latter carried out concreting and reinforced-
concrete work on that building site for Wolff & Müller. 
 
10. By an application lodged on 4 September 2000 with the Arbeitsgericht (Labour Court) 
Berlin (Germany), Mr Pereira Félix sought payment jointly and severally from his 
employer and from Wolff & Müller of unpaid remuneration amounting to DEM 4,019.23. 
He claimed that Wolff & Müller, as guarantor, was liable, under Paragraph 1(a) of the 
AEntG, for sums in respect of wages not received by him. 
                                                 
98 Inserted by Article 10 of the Gesetz zu Korrekturen der Sozialversicherung und zur 
Sicherung der Arbeitnehmerrechte (Law amending social security and safeguarding workers' 
rights) BGBl. 1998 I, 18.12.1998, p. 3843. To simplify a bit, I use in the following the 
expression liability of a principal contractor, or corresponding.  
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11. Wolff & Müller opposed the claims by Mr Pereira Félix, arguing in particular that it 
was not liable on the ground that Paragraph 1(a) of the AEntG constituted an unlawful 
infringement of the constitutional right to carry on an occupation under Article 12 of the 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law) and of the freedom to provide services enshrined by the EC 
Treaty.  
 
12. The Arbeitsgericht Berlin upheld the claim by Mr Pereira Félix. The 
Landesarbeitsgericht (Higher Labour Court), before which the case was brought by Wolff 
& Müller, partially dismissed its appeal, [99] whereupon it appealed on a point of law to 
the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court). 
 
Thus, Mr. Pereira Félix sought payment of the minimum wage jointly and severally 
from his employer 100 and from Wolff & Müller. The amount claimed (some 2.000€ 
accrued in less than three months) shows essential underpayment, amounting to social 
dumping.  
 
The Federal Labour Court (BAG) found that preconditions for establishing the 
liability of Wolff & Müller as a guarantor were met. It also adjudged that the liability 
as a proportionate restriction was compatible with the German Basic Law (paragraph 
13). Furthermore, the referring court identified practical burdens in enforcing the 
liability (paragraph 14). It then questioned whether the infringement was justified. It 
first admitted that the workers got a genuine benefit contributing to their protection 
(paragraph 16) but deemed its effect limited and burdened by the practical difficulties 
on the (unlearned) workers’ side in enforcing the liability. It then referred to the 
lessening value of this protection by reduced job opportunities in Germany, due to the 
liability threat (paragraph 17). Finally, the Bundesarbeitsgericht (who should normally 
be well aware of the rationale of national (labour) law, up to the political constrains in 
the legislative process) resorted to the explanatory memorandum to AEntG. The court 
pointed to its protectionist passages which were, assessed objectively, too, primary 
considerations behind the AEntG, whereas the protection of posted workers (with a 
doubled or tripled wage for social reasons) was not (paragraph 18). This reasoning of 
the BAG had clearly benefited from the argumentation of Rieble and Lessner, as well 
as Dörfler. 101 I recall that Rieble and Lessner in their article of 2002 as its broad line 
contested the ‘general interest’ justification 102 of the AEntG in EC law with respect to 
any of its elements. Dörfler had similar severe doubts, although he supposed that the 
ECJ would find the German AEntG to be compatible with Article 49 EC. However, 
the essential difference between the BAG and Rieble/Lessner was that the BAG found 
the proportionality requirement fulfilled whereas for Rieble/Lessner (and Dörfler) the 
very opposite was the case. 103  
 
                                                 
99 The Landesarbeitsgericht accepted the appeal as to overtime bonuses 
(Überstundenvergütung); see paragraph 8 of the report for hearing. 
100 The proceedings in the ECJ reveal no trace as to the position of the employer. Sometimes 
they just vanish which is particularly taken into account at least in the Austrian law. 
101 Indeed, the BAG at the end of its substantive reasoning (at the end of point VII.3) refers to 
the conclusions of Rieble/Lessner and Dörfler that the protectionist grounds of the AEntG 
make the whole law incompatible with Article 49 EC. 
102 See the explanation in the context of judgment Arblade, section 1.2.3, supra. 
103 I discuss this argumentation in section 1.3.5, supra. Rieble and Lessner present their 
negative proportionality conclusion on p. 87. 
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However, with the abovementioned grounds the BAG referred the following question 
for a preliminary ruling: 
 
Does Article 49 EC (formerly Article 59 of the EC Treaty) preclude a national 
system whereby, when subcontracting the conduct of building work to another 
undertaking, a building contractor becomes liable, in the same way as a 
guarantor who has waived benefit of execution, for the obligation on that 
undertaking or that undertaking's subcontractors to pay the minimum wage to 
a worker or to pay contributions to a joint scheme for parties to a collective 
agreement where the minimum wage means the sum payable to the worker 
after deduction of tax, social security contributions, payments towards the 
promotion of employment or other such social insurance payments (net pay), 
if the safeguarding of workers' pay is not the primary objective of the 
legislation or is merely a subsidiary objective?' 
 
Hence, the question was whether the joint and several liability violated Article 49 EC. 
Mr. Pereira Félix, the Austrian, French and German governments plus the 
Commission saw no essential problems therein because the provision was intended to 
serve the protection of the posted workers. Wolff & Müller took a different point of 
view. It carefully enlisted EC law grounds against the liability. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Argumentation of the Principal Contractor 
 
The point in national law of Wolff & Muller was that Paragraph 1(a) of the AEntG 
constituted an unlawful infringement of the constitutional right to carry on an 
occupation under Article 12 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). The ECJ naturally did 
not discuss this claim since the liability was under the scrutiny of EC law, not of any 
national law. However, other than this point the argumentation of Wolff & Müller 104 
covered the four classical elements of the justification test: 
 
- (i) The liability restricted the free provision of services in the form of a 
measure affecting all the (i.e. both domestic and foreign) actors concerned; 
- (ii) it was not justified by overriding reasons of public interest; 
- (iii) it meant a double burden on the free movement of services; and 
- (iv) it was not proportional. 
 
(i) Under this restriction argument Wolff & Müller set forth that the liability 
threatened to cause extra costs over and above the contract price. This risk 
was smaller for domestic subcontractors whose solvency, too, was better. 
This caused the need to obtain securities, which was easier for domestic 
subcontractors, due to their ‘family bank’ relationships. Abroad this 
liability (‘Inanspruchnahme nach dem AEntG’) was unknown and the risk 
for banks was therefore not possible to assess. Anyway, Wolff & Müller 
made an argument based on financial issues. 105 Next to this, it referred to 
                                                 
104 See paragraphs 24 to 41 of the report for the hearing. 
105 As to these ‘unknown’ liability schemes abroad, see footnote 136, infra. Regarding 
securities Wolff & Müller also referred to judgment in case C-20/92 Hubbart [1993] ECR I-
3777, paragraph 15, according to which a compulsion to provide securities for public 
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the laborious, if not excessively difficult, training and control measures 
that would be required for foreign subcontractors whose activities were in 
this way further burdened.  
 
(ii) With respect to the ‘overriding reasons’ justification, Wolff & Müller 
asserted that economic reasons were decisive behind the liability and could 
never fulfil this justification criterion. Protection of workers was only a 
side purpose (Nebenzweck), and, besides, the liability diminished job 
opportunities of posted workers. Its effect would become fully realised 
when there were no foreign subcontractors. If convincing, the argument 
would quash the liability. Hence, Wolff & Müller ‘expressed a pecuniary 
view’ and this way focussed on money. 
 
(iii) The ‘equivalence’ criterion (prohibition of a double burden) was handled 
by Wolff & Müller in the middle of the fourth criterion, the proportionality 
test. However, it boldly claimed that the liability violated proportionality 
because it led to a double burden. Namely (and this is spectacular in my 
view), it explained that the principal contractor, by paying the contract 
price to the subcontractor, had already fulfilled its obligations arising from 
its contractual relationship and had in this way concluded its monetary 
obligations to the workers of the subcontractor as well. So it goes, between 
the ‘market actors’, or ‘Marktbürger’. Anyway, Wolff & Müller focussed 
once again on money. 
 
(iv) Regarding the proportionality test, Wolff & Müller found that liability was 
not suitable, necessary or acceptable. It was not suitable because the 
principal contractor had no legal or factual capacity to check all the pay 
calculations. Broader on-site controls would be better, or, as an alternative 
novelty, a regulation under which the principal contractor would be 
obliged to pay a share – at every pay day - of the contract price e.g. to the 
Holiday Pay Fund (SOKA-BAU) against whom the workers could address 
their claims. At this point Wolff & Müller do not bother with the perhaps 
excessive economic difficulties that would be caused to foreign SMEs by 
such a scheme. A further violation of proportionality was in the chain of 
liability. It was impossible to control the behaviour of any ‘third’ parties, 
meaning sub-subcontractors. Enshrining the liability in law did not change 
anything in the proportionality test. Besides, the principal contractor did 
not just have high regression costs abroad but also all the risks of the high 
number of insolvencies in this sector. Hence, Wolff & Müller spoke about 
the risk of losing money. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
authorities formed a restriction on services. In reality, in this case the Court found that 
Articles 59 and 60 must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from requiring security 
for costs to be given by a member of a profession established in another Member State who 
brings an action before one of its courts, on the sole ground that he is a national of another 
Member State. This would apply, by analogy, if Mr. Pereira Félix, or his barrister, were 
obliged to give securities in the main proceedings because he’s a foreigner! - As a non-
restriction alternative for the liability the company Wolff & Müller presented a partial 
withholding of the contract price which anyway would be financially difficult, if not 
impossible for many foreign SMEs.   
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As a general comment, one has to note that the principal contractors seem to be rather 
helpless, if we take their argumentation seriously. The only thing missing from the 
argumentation is the assertion that the subcontractor and his workers may act as a 
complot against the principal contractor and ‘cash’ the wages for a second time. Such 
a risk exists, of course, but, by analogy, it would be impossible to stop all the car 
traffic because of the risk of a certain level of drunken drivers. 
 
The overall problem with this line of argumentation is that it describes a position of a 
principal contractor that is not in accordance with the reality of the construction 
industry. Namely, the principal contractors are not at the mercy of the subcontractors, 
but the power relationship is the other way round. The supply of manpower exceeds 
the demand. Besides, as the Austrian government noted, the principal contractors have 
to check the background, with perhaps extra costs and other burdens, of any unknown 
subcontractor, irrespective of the wage liability. 106 Hence, for good reasons the ‘self-
cleaning’ (Selbstreinigung) of the sector was referred to during the legislative process. 
 
How did the court react to this argumentation? Not well. It handled the issues in 
points (ii), (iii) and (iv) in a completely different way. Regarding point (i) it let the 
national court decide whether this liability forms a restriction on free movement but 
anyway guided the justification. However, it is appropriate to present the contents of 
the judgment on their own merits, not just as a counter-position to the argumentation 
of the principal contractor.  
 
 
2.2.3 Rieble’s and Lessner’s Liability Argumentation  
 
Most of the argumentation of Wolff & Müller is also present in that of Rieble and 
Lessner. The difference is that Rieble/Lessner and partially Dörfler go even further in 
a market-orientated direction and, essentially, also discuss the Directive. Before 
discussing any further judgment Wolff & Müller v. Pereira, I will recap the essential 
points in their thinking and look at these in some more detail.  
 
I recall their wage-competition orientated paradigm: the PWD infringes the free 
movement of services (and workers), at least the proportionality requirement, by 
leading to the setting up of minimum wages, and the AEntG implementing it logically 
does the same. Furthermore, and logically for them, the liability established by the 
AEntG is not compatible with the Treaty (Articles 39 and 49 EC). At the same time, 
for Rieble/Lessner it forms an independent restriction on the free movement of 
services. 107 In the argumentation of Rieble and Lessner there is present, as ‘helpful’ 
up to expressis verbis, the drawing of parallels from the free movement of goods to 
the posting of workers in the framework of providing services.  108  Doing so is 
perhaps natural in the light of history. The EEC was founded as a predominantly 
economic community with less emphasis on the social factor. 109 However, the use in 
                                                 
106 See paragraph 69 of the report for hearing. 
107 See the basic hypothesis of Rieble and Lessner  on p. 44: liability may be shown to be 
incompatible with the market freedoms either as an accessory to minimum wage regulations 
or independently. 
108 See details in footnote 110, point (ii), infra.  
109 See e.g. Jari Hellsten, On Social and Economic Factors in the Developing European 
Labour Law. Reasoning on Collective Redundancies, Transfer of Undertakings And Converse 
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2002 of parallels, in fact rather straightforward ones, from the free movement of 
goods means boldly neglecting the convincing body of case-law since Seco in 1982, 
as well as the legislative postulate behind the Directive, that of combining the 
guarantee of fair competition and the right of workers. It is enshrined in the fifth 
recital of the Preamble to the PWD. 
 
I will take the liberty of not discussing this argumentation of Rieble/Lessner 110 in any 
greater length in my corpus text here, apart from one essential exception. Namely, in 
exploring, along their liability-targeted path of arguments, the proportionality test in 
the justification pattern (see point (iv) supra). Rieble and Lessner maintain that there 
is no general, national or European, principle of equal pay for equal work. - I imagine 
that they admit/allow gender equality and Article 13 EC. - They assert therefore, that 
it follows that it is not possible to justify the restrictions on the free movement of 
services as combating distortions of competition by invoking such equal pay 
arguments. 111  This is in paradigmatic contradiction with the pivotal argument of 
Rieble and Lessner, according to which the PWD and AEntG also infringe the free 
                                                                                                                                            
Pyramids (Hellsten 2005). Swedish National Institute of Working Life, Work Life in 
Transition 2005:11. 
110 However, the argumentation of Wolff & Müller is present in the article of Rieble and 
Lessner at least, as follows. (i) Obtaining securities with greater difficulties for foreign 
contractors is a forbidden restriction (p. 57) and also violates the double burden prohibition 
(p. 80) for Rieble and Lessner.  (ii) The purpose of AEntG Rieble and Lessner discuss 
especially on pp. 64-77. In assessing the ‘economic’ restriction Rieble and Lessner claim that 
the starting point must be the so-called ‘Campus Oil’ case-law. In Campus Oil, case 72/83 
[1984] 2727, the Court accepted a restriction in oil trade based on a certain independent 
national supply. In judgments in case 172/82 Inter-Huiles, [1983] 555; C-203/96 Düsseldorp 
[1998] I-4075 and C-209/98 FFAD [2000] I-3743, the Court, according to Rieble and 
Lessner, found that restrictions on trade were acceptable if the measure concerned directly 
served environmental protection. Measures guaranteeing a critical mass for municipal waste 
treatment undertakings were of economic nature and, thus, not acceptable. Rieble and Lessner 
highlight that even if the public interest (protection of environment) was enshrined in the 
Treaty (Article 174(2) EC, ex Article 130(r)(2) EC), it could not (or, was not enough to) 
justify the restriction concerned. From these judgments concerning free movement of goods 
Rieble and Lessner draw a parallel with the case of minimum wages. The announced purposes 
of the AentG were of an economic nature and, therefore, not of public interest. For the Court, 
labour is not a commodity which Rieble and Lessner blame, up to the assertion that the Court 
has – at least in Portugaia – by fiction(!) lent the essence of protection of workers to national 
minimum wage provisions. See Rieble and Lessner, p. 74. They also refer to the comment of 
Koenigs  (DB 2002, 431) that the question was not answered in Portugaia and half expected 
(empfielt) a new case. Well, the same issue was again in Wolff & Müller v. Pereira. – (iii) 
The equivalence criterion (prohibition of double burden) Rieble and Lessner discuss (pp. 78-
82) again with a helpful (hilfreich) reference to the origin of the prohibition in the free 
movement of goods (p. 80). However, their conclusion is that the posted workers are well 
enough protected in their country of origin (p. 82). (iv) Regarding the proportionality test 
Rieble and Lessner argue by claiming from the outset that the liability is as such a 
disproportionate measure (p. 87). Otherwise they argue here with grounds somewhat differing 
from those of Wolff & Müller while the conclusion is the same. 
111 Rieble and Lessner, p. 85: ‘Es gibt […] keinen allgemeinen Grundsatz gleichen Lohns für 
gleiche Arbeit – weder innerstaatlich noch auf europarechtlicher Ebene. Somit lässt sich mit 
der Herstellung solcher Bedingungen auch unter dem Aspekt der Bekämpfung von 
Wettbewerbsverzerrungen kaum der Eingriff in die Dienstleistungsfreiheit rechtfertigen.’ 
They further refer to MünchArb/Löwisch/Rieble § 268 Rn. 122.  
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movement of workers under Article 39 EC. 112  Namely, it is exactly equal 
remuneration that is enshrined in Article 39(2) EC, prolonged by the Regulation 
1612/68 EEC. Anyway, for Rieble and Lessner it is defendable and even natural to 
pay less for posted workers than for those who remove on their own initiative. 
Logically, for them, it is not proportionate to require equal treatment in remuneration 
and the liability as a measure of enforcement. Indeed, proportionality seems to have 
‘quite many’ dimensions. However, the equal pay aspect pushes the issue ultimately 
close to, if not inside of, constitutional values. The concept of Article 39 EC in the 
thinking of Rieble and Lessner is simply not correct. 113  
 
It is noteworthy that Rieble and Lessner also have under the proportionality test 
arguments that remain in the framework of services. Namely, they claim that the 
‘purpose and goal’ (Zweck und Ziel) of the liability are disproportionate; 114 that there 
should be just the normal responsibility of the principal contractor, requiring first 
execution against the employer; and that professional clients other than building 
companies should not be burdened. The first mentioned gets answered in exploring 
judgment Wolff & Müller v. Pereira, infra; the second (requiring just the normal 
guarantor status) remains as a possible claim, and the last mentioned requires the 
comment that it would drop even significant works from the ambit of the liability if 
undertakings outside the rank of construction companies were not covered. Private 
persons are not covered.   
  
However, while Rieble and Lessner, too, discuss the Directive in this context, it is 




Member States shall take appropriate measures in the event of failure to 
comply with this Directive. 
 
They shall in particular ensure that adequate procedures are available to 
workers and/or their representatives for the enforcement of obligations under 
this Directive.’ 
 
                                                 
112 See section ‚Freizühigkeit der “mitgebrachten” Arbeitnehmer’, Rieble and Lessner p. 44-
47. There the argumentation goes so that we should also acknowledge in Article 39 EC a 
‘freedom-related’ legal (‘freiheitsrechtlich’) prohibition of restrictions which the worker 
could invoke against depriving him from his benefit in wage costs (Lohnkostenvorteil) and 
his chances of entering the labour market; p. 46. 
113 See also the text in section 2.3.5 supra. 
114 Martin Franzen in SAE 2003, 181, 190-197, as explained by Bernd Sandmann, Die 
Entwicklung des arbeitsrechtlichen Schrifttums im Jahr 2003, ZfA 4/2004, p. 544, refers, as to 
proportionality, to judgment Mazzoleni, C-165/98 [2001] ECR I-2189, and finds that the 
posted worker does not need at all the liability of the principal contractor. The (other) 
regulations protecting him (like the PWD) would be enough. Accordingly the restriction on 
free movement of services would not be balanced but disproportionate. He has explained 
exactly the reference of BAG in the proceedings Wolff & Müller v Pereira. Anyway, the ECJ 
handled proportionality in a completely different way, see section 2.2.5, infra. – Mazzoleni 
was a sui generis decision on permanent ‘frontier posting’ that does not amount to an effect 
on ‘normal’ posting cases. 
 44
Noteworthy as a structural factor is the submission of Rieble and Lessner that the 
mandate (Ermächtigung) in the implementation of the Posted Workers Directive does 
not cover a wage liability of the principal contractor that is independent of its 
contractual obligations (verschuldensunabhängig). They also refer to the ‘fact’ that 
Article 5 PWD (Measures) deals only with a ‘threat of omissions in the 
implementation’. On the same line, as not leading to any liability, they read 
‘obligations under this Directive’ in Article 5(2). They further denote how the 
Directive does not include any third party’s liability. In this way, too, they contest the 
liability of the principal contractor covering all the subcontractors in the chain. And 
they denote Article 5(1), qualified by them with a ‘certainly’ (‘zwar’), whose 
violation may only lead to an infringement procedure against a Member State 
(impliedly, not to any liability). 115  These submissions essentially stem from the 
wording of Article 5 but only if read in isolation. Anyway, the application of Article 
5, as read and applied in its context, is the core of the case. I will return to this in 
exploring the judgment. 
 
However, Rieble and Lessner conclude their argumentation against the liability in the 
light of the Directive by referring to the so far culmination of the very acquis, i.e. the 
lack of horizontal direct effect of the directives. For them, this would prevent such a 
liability. Indeed, what could be more convincing than a kind of a European 
‘Grundnorm’ à la Kelsen… Rieble and Lessner further denote that the horizontal 
direct effect is impossible in a relationship between ‘market citizens/actors’ 
(Marktbürger). 116 Indeed, for Rieble and Lessner both Herr Maurer Pereira Félix 
(with his hopefully healthy hands) and Wolff & Müller (with a yearly project value of 
670 M€ 117 ) are just ‘Marktbürger’. In reality there is no such legal connection 
between the lack of horizontal effect and liability. It was difficult enough to gather the 
qualified majority behind the PWD even without inserting liability in its text. That is 
why it is together with other means of enforcement not expressis verbis mentioned by 
the Directive but was left to the Member States. As such, the examples in Austrian, 
Belgian and French laws were available in winter 1995/6. 118   
 
Mr. Pereira Félix did not base his lawsuit on any alleged direct effect of the Posted 
Workers Directive. Neither did the question subject to preliminary ruling include a 
reference to it. Therefore the Court did not have to decide thereupon. But it had 
sufficient in applying the Directive in the traditional context.  
 
 
2.2.4 Dörfler’s Liability Argumentation  
 
I first recall how Dörfler, despite his deep criticism of the justification of the AEntG, 
predicted that the ECJ would one day accept the AEntG as being compatible with the 
                                                 
115 Rieble and Lessner, ZfA 1/2002, p. 51 
116 ‘Hingegen sieht die Richtlinie keine unmittelbaren Ansprüche des Arbeitnehmers gegen 
den Generalunternehmer vor, da die unmittelbare Wirkung von Richtlinien nur im vertikalen 
und nicht im horizontalen Verhältnis (Marktbürger untereinander) möglich ist.’ Ibid. 
117 See http://www.wolff-mueller.de. The group has some 2.700 employees.  
118 On the other hand, Article 6 PWD was a necessary provision in the Directive so as to 
impose the establishment of a complementary forum for judicial proceedings in the host state, 
given the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and execution of judgments (replaced now by 
EC Regulation 44/2001). 
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Treaty. He, too, found that the liability forms an independent restriction on the free 
provision of services while it represents only indirect discrimination. 119 However, his 
discourse on the justification of the liability by using the concept of overriding 
requirements of general interest is in fact rather short. In essence, he states how the 
liability is ‘an extension of the legal position’ (eine Erweiterung der Rechstellung’) of 
the worker 120 but moves immediately on to discuss its possible justification as an 
instrument under the social security regulation 1408/71 (a discussion in vain) and the 
general interest in liability in insolvency situations. Regarding the latter he finds that 
the Insolvency Directive gives a comparable protection under home state law, unless 
outside its three months’ time limit. 121 
 
The main arguments of Dörfler come under the proportionality test. He finds that 
liability is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues, 
while it, however, at the same time diminishes the amount of foreign posted workers. 
122 Reasoning on the necessity argument (‘not to go beyond what is necessary’) then 
brings about the essential result. Firstly, Dörfler misleadingly refers, in particular by 
analogy to the free movement of goods, to the prohibition of double control 
established in van Wesemael 123  (and somewhat reformulated in Webb) and then 
wants to reinforce his argument by citing paragraph 51 of Arblade where the Court 
discussed the question of paying employers’ contributions to a social fund both in the 
home and host state. As in fact Dörfler himself explains, the basic situation is that 
there is no relevant liability under home state law unless based on a more than 
unlikely agreement between the principal contractor and his foreign subcontractor. 
Hence, it is not a situation of double burden in the sense of EC law. In his final 
conclusions of the whole dissertation he still finds that the posted foreign workers do 
not need any principal contractor liability. 124 Secondly, Dörfler discusses, nearing or 
partially joining the line of Wolff & Müller, less restrictive measures, such as paying 
wages of foreign workers to the authorities(!) (which he himself refutes i.a. as 
discriminatory), bank guarantee (refuted as not appropriate), enhanced state control 
(which would justify even repealing the liability), exclusion of liability in insolvency 
situations (as in Austria) and finally the use of liability but only limited to culpability, 
thus requiring culpa in eligendo/contrahendo or corresponding reprehensible conduct 
by the principal contractor. 125     
 
Dörfler’s conclusion under the necessity assessment is that less restrictive alternatives 
for liability do exist which further leads him to conclude that the existing liability 
form is disproportionate, and especially with respect to foreign subcontractors is not 
compatible with the free provision of services. 126 
 
 
                                                 
119 Discussion on open (direct) discrimination, Dörfler, pp. 132-146, with the conclusion on p. 
147 that the liability is a restriction of other type (‘eine sonstige Beschränkung’). Discussion 
of the justification of the liability is on pp. 201-217. 
120 Ibid., p. 202. 
121 Ibid., p. 207.  
122 Ibid., 209.  
123 Ibid., 209-210; joined cases 110 and 111/78 Van Wesemael [1979] ECR 35.  
124 Ibid., p. 238. 
125 Ibid., pp. 212-216. 
126 Ibid., p. 217. 
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2.2.5 Substantive Part of Judgment Wolff & Müller   
  
In the previous cases Arblade, Finalarte and Portugaia the Court did not apply the 
Posted Workers Directive because the events concerned had occurred before 16 
December 1999, that being the deadline for its implementation. In Wolff & Müller the 
works were carried out in spring 2000 and the Directive therefore applied. 127 Hence, 
in the judgment the Court noted this as well as the presence of a situation provided for 
in Article 1(3)(a) of the Directive. It then proceeded to an assessment and application 
of Article 5 PWD. 
 
As became obvious from the submissions of Rieble and Lessner, they read Article 5 
word by word but in isolation. The Court first put Article 5 into its proper context (in 
paragraph 28) by taking Article 5 as intending to implement the basic substantive 
provision in the Directive, i.e. Article 3(1)(c) that includes the obligation to pay the 
minimum wage. Or, in terms of the Directive, that is what the undertakings have to 
guarantee (as it stays in every language) to their workers.  
 
The Court further noted (paragraph 29) from Article 5 how the Member States have to 
ensure, in particular, that the workers posted have available to them adequate 
procedures in order actually to obtain minimum rates of pay. This style of writing 
might be regarded as too simple for the European legal audience, but given the way 
e.g. (or in particular) Rieble and Lessner have interpreted Article 5, it clearly has its 
place. Anyway, it seems essential to see that here the Court first distilled the 
obligation of the Member States to guarantee that something actually happens, i.e. 
that the Directive has real teeth.  
 
The Court then for its part relied (in paragraph 30) on the wording of Article 5 PWD 
but concluded, as a continuation to paragraph 29, that it was apparent that the Member 
States have a wide margin of appreciation in determining the form and detailed rules 
governing the adequate procedures under the second paragraph of Article 5. As is the 
case with all directives, Article 249 EC sets up the framework. It here means that 
Article 3(1) PWD forms the goal (i.e. that the undertakings guarantee…) whereas 
Article 5 deals with the form and methods, to use the language of Article 249, so as to 
achieve it. Hence, the outcome first is that it is up to the Member States whether they 
establish any liability of principal contractors or other clients. Contrary to what Rieble 
and Lessner maintain, the Directive clearly includes a mandate for the Member States 
to set up the wage liability, while they have no obligation to do so.  
 
Furthermore, it was self-evident (and based on settled case-law, of course) to add (in 
paragraph 30) that in ‘applying that wide margin of appreciation [the Member States] 
must however at all times observe the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty…and, thus, in regard to the main proceedings, freedom to provide services.’ 
Observing the freedom to provide services essentially means to subordinate the 
national law implementing the PWD to the four step justification test (that Rieble and 
Lessner call the ‘van Waesemael/Webb formula’). That is what the Court applied as 
                                                 
127 Paragraph 24 shows how the Court may also take into consideration rules of Community 
law which the national court has not referred to. The Court referred to the Directive as a 
forthcoming binding instrument of EC law already in judgment Arblade (paragraph 79) in 
1999. 
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settled case-law, also in Arblade, Finalarte and Portugaia. The decision on whether 
there is, by the liability, a restriction on services the ECJ left for the national court, 128 
highlighting the necessity also to take into account the position of a principal (general) 
contractor established in another Member State (paragraph 33). They are few, but they 
have the same liability as domestic principal contractors. 
 
For the case that the national court would find the liability as a restriction on services, 
the Court repeated the standard formula of the public interest justification of 
restrictions (paragraph 34), coming to the protection of workers (paragraph 35) as an 
overriding reason for that interest, this being the cornerstone of labour law within the 
free provision of services, as confirmed in paragraph 36 of Arblade (referred to here 
via judgment Portugaia). In other words, extension of minimum wages (a must under 
the PWD) pursues an objective of public interest, as also stated in paragraph 36 of 
Wolff & Müller v. Pereira. Then comes the simple move that ‘the same is true in 
principle’ with respect to ‘measures intended to reinforce the procedural arrangements 
enabling a posted worker usefully to assert his right to a minimum rate of pay.’ This 
was no surprise, since already judgment Seco in 1982 referred to appropriate measures 
in guaranteeing observance of the rules concerned (as did Rush Portuguesa, Vander 
Elst and Arblade). However, the requirement for ‘procedural arrangements to ensure 
observance’ of worker protection as corollary (‘likewise’) to this protection was again 
noted in paragraph 37. The approach is clearly different from that of Rieble and 
Lessner. Namely, while they primarily maintain that the obligation to extend 
minimum wage provisions is not compatible with the Treaty, also rendering the 
liability incompatible, they essentially, as a secondary issue, find that the liability 
would also be an independent restriction on services (and, moreover, even a case of 
direct discrimination). 129  Finally it is worth noting that the Court did not even 
mention the discrimination aspect.   
 
The question subject to preliminary ruling and the observations of the BAG included 
again the priority purpose of the AEntG, namely that of protection of the national job 
market rather than the remuneration of workers. As in Portugaia, decisive is whether 
there is a genuine benefit to the workers, which significantly augments their social 
protection, while the stated intention of the legislator may only lead to a more careful 
assessment of the benefits (paragraph 38). The BAG also referred to practical 
difficulties since the foreign workers are not fluent in German and do not know 
German law, and to the diminishing job opportunities as a consequence of the liability 
(paragraph 39). This the Court first balanced by stating how the liability ‘none the 
less’ adds a second and normally more solvent debtor which on an objective view is 
such as to ensure the protection of posted workers, also supported by the main 
proceedings themselves, with the worker as a plaintiff (paragraph 40). Thus, the Court 
stated how the host state law added another and normally more solvent debtor. This 
implied that there was no equivalent rule in the home state. This is all we find of the 
equivalence test in this judgment.  
 
                                                 
128 The Court noted in paragraph 32 how the application of host state rules is liable to 
prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of services by subcontractors from 
other Member States, 
129 See e.g. the conclusion on p. 89.  
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As a new aspect in relation to Portugaia and as a direct consequence of the 
application of the Directive the Court stated (in paragraph 41) that unfair competition, 
by paying the workers less than the minimum rate of pay, ‘may be taken into 
consideration as an overriding requirement capable of justifying a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services’ if the other provisions of the justification pattern are met. 
The other provisions mean in practice the equivalence and proportionality tests. It is 
however difficult, if not impossible, 130 to imagine an equivalent norm in the home 
state law rendering the liability superfluous. Anyway, the Court continued by stating 
(in paragraph 42) that there is not necessarily any contradiction between fair 
competition and ensuring worker protection, as demonstrated by the fifth recital of the 
PWD.  
 
The Court left the proportionality test under EC law, as often happens, for the national 
court but gave further guidance to it, given the submissions of Wolff & Müller and the 
grounds for the question referred to for preliminary ruling, that the principal yardstick 
must be ensuring the protection of workers, not the position or possibilities of the 
principal contractor as a guarantor, or the legislative grounds of the AEntG, 
(paragraphs 43-44). I recall how Wolff & Müller invoked under proportionality 
different difficulties such as those in control, guidance, chain responsibility and 
regression. All these grounds were de facto dismissed by the ECJ. The only ground of 
Wolff & Müller still prima facie ‘open’ was the proposal of paying, as an alternative 
for the whole liability, a share of wages e.g. to the Holiday Pay Fund (SOKA-BAU) 
against whom the workers could then claim the minimum wages. Such a proposal is 
purely hypothetical. Besides, it was at the same time based on difficulties in control. 
Thus, by placing the protection of the worker concerned as the yardstick, this 
alternative, too, was de facto dismissed as a ground. Besides, the BAG had already 
found that the liability passed an even broader proportionality test under German law 
(see paragraph 13 of Wolff & Müller v Pereira).  
 
In substantive terms the proportionality test in EC law requires that the measure must 
be apt to ensure attainment of the objective pursued (appropriateness) and must not go 
beyond (necessity) what is necessary in that connection (paragraph 43). Hence, it 
differs from the proportionality test under German law according to which there is 
                                                 
130 I see, of course, the theoretical situation that there is liability in the home state law but 
none in the host state law, and that the posted worker would try to get the home state liability 
applied by either the host or home state court. Article 6 PWD entitles one to institute 
proceedings in the host state but still, under private international law, it is far from clear that 
the host state court would apply the home state law. On the other hand, it is not guaranteed 
that a home state court would render a default judgment, if the principal contractor did not 
show up as a defendant, or that the host state authorities would execute a default judgment by 
a home state court. See that the Commission has published a proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 
("ROME II") COM/2003/427 final. According to that proposal (Article 9(5)) where it is clear 
from all the circumstances of the case that the non-contractual obligation is manifestly more 
closely connected with another country, the law of that other country shall apply. As such, it 
would also apply to the liability rules of another Member State. I still doubt whether any court 
would apply the liability rules of another state against a principal contractor of a state where 
there is no such liability. However, the question is merely academic while any prudent worker 
(or his lawyer) chooses forum domicilii whenever such lex fori includes the liability – as in 
Wolff & Müller v Pereira.  
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also a third element, namely a more general reasonableness test 
(Angemessenheitsprüfung). This third and at the same time rather vague element by 
definition tends to limit the rank of measures regarded as justified restrictions on the 
free movement of services. 131 However, as in case Wolff & Müller v Pereira, also in 
its judgment of 20 July 2004 the BAG found that the joint and several liability did not 
violate the German proportionality principle. 132 The liability scheme justified itself 
simply based on the responsible position of the principal contractor in the 
subcontracting decision. The BAG also took account of regression and the possibility 
of requiring guarantees. The subcontractor was from a third country (Croatia) which 
excluded according to BAG any preliminary ruling by the ECJ (paragraph 27). The 
latter decision is not justified in every case due to Article 1(4) PWD, according to 
which ‘Undertakings established in a non-member State must not be given more 
favourable treatment than undertakings established in a Member State’. However, 
there was no such claim in the case (see especially paragraph 8). 
 
It has to be emphasized that the BAG, in Wolff & Müller v. Pereira, came to be 
guided by the ECJ to make the protection of workers the very yardstick of the 
proportionality test. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the national court, in 
applying the principle of proportionality, applies a principle of Community law, not 
the German proportionality test. 133 In the case of posted workers it means that a 
                                                 
131 On this in brief, see e.g. von Danwitz, Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH zum Entsenderecht, 
EuZW 8/2002, p. 241. He highlights for good reasons the difference between the German and 
EC law proportionality test. Von Danwitz denotes that at least since early 1990s the ECJ has 
refrained from the use of reasonableness in the proportionality test. He refers to an already 
convincing set of plenum judgments: Germany v. Council [1994] ECR I-4973, paragraph 91 
et seq.; Germany v. Council [1995] ECR I-3723, paragraph 42; UK v. Council (The Working 
Time Case) [1996] ECR I-5755, paragraph 57; Germany v. Council and Parliament (Directive 
on deposit-guarantee schemes) [1997] ECR I-2405, paragraph 54; and (from a Chamber) 
Kellinghusen [1998] ECR I-6337, paragraph 33. Besides, the twofold formula was also used, 
of course, in judgments Arblade (paragraph 35) and Portugaia (paragraph 19). The former 
referred i.a. to cases Case C-76/90 Säger, [1991] ECR I-4221, paragraph 15; Case C-19/92 
Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 32; and Case C-55/94 
Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, paragraph 37. The latter referred to Case C-205/99 Analir and 
Others [2001] ECR I-1271, paragraph 25, and Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni and ISA [2001] ECR 
I-2189, paragraph 25). This overwhelming and settled case-law operates with the twofold 
formula of the proportionality test: appropriateness/suitability – necessity/‘not beyond’. Thus, 
this formula is no novelty, indeed, in paragraph 43 of Wolff & Müller v. Pereira. I recall how 
Görres has suggested that the test would be threefold even in EC law, thus also covering the 
(German type) reasonableness of the measure concerned, see footnote 74, supra. However, he 
does not refer to any EC case-law, no wonder.  
The (erroneous) application of a threefold proportionality test by Görres also has obvious 
consequences. In assessing the reasonableness of the extension of more than one (the lowest) 
wage category by the AEntG he seems to even somewhat regret (under ‘Extension of 
competition disadvantages’ – ‘Erstreckung von Wettbewerbsnachteilen’) that the foreign 
companies become deprived of their competition advantage in Germany. On the basis of the 
protectionist effect he draws the conclusion that such an extension is not reasonable (ist 
unangemessen) and is therefore not justified, ibid, pp. 288-291. The outcome does not 
correspond to the PWD. It allows the extension of the whole wage scale, see section 3.2 (in 
fine), infra.  
132 Case 9 AZR 345/03 of 20 July 2004, paragraphs 26-7. 
133 As to the role of national courts and the guidance often given by the ECJ, see e.g. a 
nutshell explanation of Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law, Oxford University 
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national court must also take into account the Posted Workers Directive, with its 
obligation to ensure that the posted workers receive the minimum pay covered by the 
Directive. A further relevant aspect is the wide margin of appreciation granted to 
Member States in implementing the directive (paragraph 30 of Wolff & Müller v 
Pereira). For its part this limits the proportionality assessment.   
 
The overall conclusion of the ECJ, on the basis of the Arblade-justification test as 
elaborated by the PWD, was that Article 5 PWD, interpreted in the light of Article 49 
EC, does not preclude the German liability scheme. As to the substance, there was 
finally no surprise in this case, unless it was the BAG first pushing the German law 
under EC law scrutiny with grounds that were partially the same (the purpose of the 
AEntG) as in Portugaia. However, in its decision of 12 January 2005 the BAG put 
into practice the justification line established by the ECJ. The BAG referred to the 
requirements of fair competition and protection of workers, and also found that the 
risk of liability costs for principal contractors is more controllable than that of losing 
the wage for the posted workers. The conclusion was that the liability is not a 
disproportionate restriction on the free provision of services. 134 
 
It is illuminating that the ECJ did not discuss ex officio the nature of the guarantee, i.e. 
applying and perhaps accepting only a benefit of execution scheme instead of a 
scheme operating with joint and several responsibility. This was one of the claims by 
Rieble and Lessner, while Dörfler foresaw a culpability scheme. However, both types 
of claim will normally not come in future, because the Court in this case already 
accepted a scheme with a joint and several responsibility. It was natural to leave 
without comments in the judgment the submission of Wolff & Müller as to the 
equivalence criterion; i.e. that by paying the contract price the principal contractor 
would already have discharged a sufficient monetary performance to the worker of the 
subcontractor.  
 
It was equally natural to require the application of the PWD within the limits set up by 
the Treaty. That is the case for any European directive. Still missing is an 
interpretation of the PWD expressly in the light of Article 50(3) EC. It refers to the 
same conditions between domestic and foreign service-providers. However, that 
aspect is in fact included in the Court’s reasoning (in paragraph 33) when it guided the 
national court in assessing the possible restriction on the freedom to provide services. 
It stated that principal contractors from another Member States are bound by the same 
liability as domestic ones.      
 
In sum, in Wolff & Müller v. Pereira the Court applied the heaviest part of the Posted 
Workers Directive, i.e. the minimum rates of pay, as reinforced by a structural 
measure in national law, i.e. the liability of the principal contractor. It did this by 
highlighting the basic philosophy behind the Directive, that of combining fair 
competition and the rights of workers, and respecting the powers of the Member 
                                                                                                                                            
Press 1999, p. 160-2.  When the validity of a Community act is challenged, the ECJ also 
decides the proportionality aspect.  In preliminary rulings the ECJ may decide the 
proportionality issue itself or leave it for the national court within specifically variable 
guidelines. In enforcement (infringement) proceedings against Member States the ECJ 
naturally always determines conclusively whether a national measure or practice infringes 
Community law in the light of proportionality. Op.cit, p. 160, footnote 196.  
134 See decision of 12 January 2005, 5 AZR 617/01, paragraphs 72-74.  
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States in implementing the Directive. The Court in a natural way extended the work of 
the European legislator. 135 On the other hand, that work (the PWD) has its roots in 
case-law since Seco where the Court decided the basic contents of the internal market 
with respect to wages in the free provision of services. 
 
 
2.2.6 Effect of Wolff & Müller on Other Liability Schemes 
 
There are relevant wage liability schemes in at least Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. 136 They sometimes operate in close connection with 
social security and/or even tax liability. The main line of analogy is clear: while the 
Court in Wolff & Müller found a wage liability scheme with joint and several 
responsibility to be compatible with the free provision of services, i.e. the broadest 
possible interpretation, the corresponding or ‘milder’ wage liability schemes, as they 
normally are, are likewise to be regarded as restrictions that are compatible with EC 
law. The opposite would normally require a striking discriminatory element to be 
inherent in a given national scheme. On the other hand, social security and tax 
schemes both involve a sui generis question on the addressee of the contributions 
concerned. In the majority of posting cases it obviously is the home state. However, 
there are no reports on any cross-border application (or even attempts of such) of 
these schemes and so they fall outside of this reasoning. 
 
Based on these national schemes the European Parliament in a resolution of 15 
January 2004 concerning the implementation of Directive 96/71 called on the 
Commission to examine i.a. a European legislative framework or other forms of 
provision governing liability in the case of subcontracting. 137 While such a scheme by 
definition must treat purely domestic and cross-border cases on an equal footing, it is 
                                                 
135 As a whole, the judgment also terminates any debate about the compatibility of the PWD 
or its legal basis with the Treaty. 
136 The Austrian scheme is in Article 7(c) of the Arbeitsvertragsrechts-Anpassungsgesetz – 
AVRAG. For wage liability in Belgium, see the Loi sur le travail temporaire, le travail 
intérimaire et la mise de travailleurs à la disposition d'utilisateurs, Wet betreffende de 
tijdelijke arbeid, de uitzendarbeid en het ter beschikking stellen van werknemers ten behoeve 
van gebruikers of 24 July 1987, Articles 31(3), 31(4) and 32(4). Liability regarding social 
security contributions in Belgium is enshrined in the Loi révisant l'arrêté-loi du 28 décembre 
1944 concernant la sécurité sociale des travailleurs, Wet tot herziening van de besluitwet van 
28 december 1944 betreffende de maatschappelijke zekerheid der arbeiders of 27 June 1969, 
Article 31bis; it also covers the payment of certain wage components via a social fund.  As to 
France, see L-124.8 in the Code du Travail (Labour Code). In Italy a Legislative Decree 
issued by the Government on 3 September 2004 stipulated a liability scheme. In the 
Netherlands wage liability is based on Article 4 of the national collective agreement for 
construction sector (COA BOU). In Spain the Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Real 
Decreto Legislativo 1/1995 of 24 March), Article 42(2) establishes joint and several liability 
of the principal contractor regarding wages and (under certain conditions) social security 
obligations. The Ley General Tributaria 58/2003, of 17 December, Article 43(1)(f) imposes 
on the principal contractor a deficiency guarantor’s liability regarding the social security 
contributions. 
137 Document P5_TA(2004)0030, Implementation of Directive 96/71/EC; European 
Parliament resolution on the implementation of Directive 96/71/EC in the Member States 
(COM(2003) 458 - 2003/2168(INI)), paragraph 6. 
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arguable that the EU could not enact such a legislative instrument within the free 
provision of services but only under approximation of laws.  
 
Amongst the national schemes, the Finnish one obviously has its own unique features. 
It contains a secondary threat of confiscating unfair profits gained by paying wages 




2.2.7 Finnish Scheme 
 
In Finland there are two possible remedies under the legislation. First, all the relevant 
sector-wide collective agreements are declared erga omnes and do cover posted 
workers. Enforcement mechanisms other than a (highly unlikely) lawsuit of the 
worker are to be found both in law and in collective agreements (supposing that the 
employer does not join a Finnish employer organisation for the posting period). 
Namely, since May 2004 the Penal Code defines the payment of too low wages as a 
criminal offence (discrimination and profiteering-like discrimination based on 
nationality; the latter with a maximum imprisonment for two years). This may also 
lead to confiscation of the illegal benefit gained by paying the illegally low wages. 
The confiscated profit/benefit belongs to the state. A crucial point is that the 
confiscation can also be directed against persons other than those committing the 
crime, hence also against the client or principal contractor on whose account the 
posted workers have worked. Confiscation cannot be applied to the extent that the 
posted workers concerned do present their wage claims. Until 2002 merely a de facto 
theoretical possibility for a wage claim prevented the confiscation. Experience so far 
is confined to one essential judgment of a district court. However, this is subject to 
appeal. The case involved 12 Chinese stoneworkers posted to Finland as hired-out 
manpower! The illegal and confiscated benefit of the user undertaking from the work 
carried out which was of seventeen months duration was estimated to be 174,000€, as 
diminished by possible further wage compensations.   
 
The confiscating system fits directly into the anti-fraud principle demonstrated by the 
ECJ in Centros: a Member State is entitled to take measures designed to prevent 
companies or individuals from improperly or fraudulently – and to the detriment of 
public or private creditors - taking advantage of provisions of Community law, at least 
by forming a posting company in another Member State. 138  
 
Second, a quasi-binding wage liability of the principal contractor in the construction 
sector is stipulated in the Outside Labour Agreement. The principal contractor is 
liable to guarantee – as a guarantor that has kept the benefit of execution - payment of 
wages, final payment for piecework included, and holiday pay, all earned on the site 
                                                 
138 Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459, paragraph 24. In the field of free provision of 
services, it referred to Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen v Bedrijfsvereniging Metaalnijverheid 
[1974] ECR 1299, paragraph 13, Case C-148/91 Veronica Omroep Organisatie v 
Commissariaat voor de Media [1993] ECR I-487, paragraph 12, and Case C-23/93 TV 10 v 
Commissariaat voor de Media [1994] ECR I-4795, paragraph 21. 
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concerned. However, such claims are precluded if they are not declared to the 
principal contractor within seven days of the due date. This obligation anyway is 
deemed to effect only inter partes, i.e. it does not extend to a lawsuit against the 
principal contractor (position of the Labour Court of Finland since 1981; it is the 
single national instance); it ultimately places an obligation on the employers’ 
organization to urge the principal contractor to pay these wages but it is only a moral 
obligation for the latter. In the model agreements for subcontracting (hiring-out 
included), the principal contractors take on this responsibility but with a 
corresponding right to set-off the cost from the remaining contract price; on this basis 
the regime works well in practice. 139 The wages paid under this regime cannot be 
covered by the state guarantee regime (directive 74/02/EC on Employer Insolvency).  
 
The merits of these two schemes must also be assessed in brief in the light of case-law 
and the PWD.  
 
Penal sanctions have been accepted by the ECJ already in Arblade (paragraph 43) 
with the prerequisite that  
 
‘those provisions must be sufficiently precise and accessible that they do not 
render it impossible or excessively difficult in practice for such an employer to 
determine the obligations with which he is required to comply’. 
 
The pay provisions in the collective agreements are available on the Internet. To get 
them is not excessively difficult. 140 As to the languages, any serious employer can 
surmount the language barrier, whenever needed in cooperation with his contract 
partner in Finland. The two of them cannot enter into an agreement without a 
language that both parties understand. The confiscation part of this penal scheme is 
justified by analogy with the liability assessed and accepted in Wolff & Müller v 
Pereira. 141 The agreement-based liability (Outside Labour Agreement) is difficult to 
imagine being challenged under EC law after Wolff & Müller v Pereira because the 
ECJ in that case accepted a stronger scheme, i.e. a law-based liability (operating de 




                                                 
139 If the principal contractor is not a member of the employers’ organisation, his collective 
agreement-based responsibility does not work as such but the Finnish trade unions may use 
different industrial actions so as to impose corresponding payments on him; they can naturally 
do the same against any non-organised subcontractor or temporary agency; 
140 The social partners additionally produce simplified brochures on the key provisions. 
141 That is why I do not see that a detailed scrutiny of the confiscation scheme under the 




On Minimum Wages under the PWD 
 
3.1 General Remarks 
 
The PWD is also a landmark in the sense that it has pay or remuneration as its object. 
It regulates pay, namely minimum pay. In so doing it first invalidates assertions that 
pay falls completely outside EC competence due to Article 137(5) EC. 142 As also the 
Convention drafting the Constitutional Treaty has noted, that provision does not 
define exhaustively the Community competence on pay. 143 Next to the PWD, there 
are several other EC law instruments that at least indirectly stipulate rules on pay. 
Posting of workers is one example of issues within the Internal Market that in the 
evolution of EC law has imposed changes on the legal thinking of labour law experts 
and the wider audience. 
 
While the modifications of the German Tarifautonomie are a flagrant example of a 
change imposed by European developments, a similar, even if less dramatic, example 
may be picked up from the Swedish debate. At the national level there is broadly a 
consensus between the social partners and state that that the public authority shall not 
interfere in proper wage setting (compulsory state mediation is another issue). 
Accordingly, there is (as in Denmark) no erga omnes system of collective agreements 
but the de facto same result is achieved based on the high degree of organisation 
among employers, as augmented by concluding (with or without industrial pressure) 
separate company level agreements (hängavtal) with non-organised employers. For 
Sweden the possibility of keeping this system within the EU legal framework was an 
important precondition in negotiations on its access. Both countries heavily supported 
the PWD, since Denmark negotiated in 1993-4 the so-called Christophersen-
compromise in Article 3(8) that was intended to safeguard the Danish (and later 
Danish-Swedish) system of a factual erga omnes effect of collective agreements. 
However, the interference of the European legislator in wage setting was no problem 
for social partners or governments in Copenhagen or Stockholm. This was 
notwithstanding the fact that the Danish and Swedish versions of Article 137(5) EC 
still are –as they were already in Article 2(6) of the Maastricht Social Policy 
Agreement - different from the others by referring to ‘pay relations’ (lønforhold, 
löneförhållanden). Here ‘relations’ has a similar meaning as in the expression 
‘industrial relations’.  144 
 
At the European level the United Kingdom opposed the Directive by invoking the 
lack of EC competence in the field of pay which Article 2(6) of the Maastricht Social 
Policy Agreement manifested. In the enlarged Community we have seen the first 
initiative to dismantle the erga omnes structure created by the PWD, in the form of a 
                                                 
142 As to different conceptions on this provision, see Jari Hellsten, Reviewing Social 
Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and 
Legal Basis of European Collective Agreements. Labour Policy Studies No. 259, Ministry of 
Labour (Finland) 2004 (Hellsten 2004); available also by 
http://www.mol.fi/mol/fi/99_pdf/fi/06_tyoministerio/06_julkaisut/06_tutkimus/tpt259.pdf 
143 See paragraphs 26-28, p. 14 of the Report of WG XI. Document CONV 516/1/03, REV. 1. 
144 See further Section 4.3, footnote 202.  
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complaint in January 2005 by Latvia against the Swedish application of the PWD. It is 
linked to the Laval case that I will explore in chapter 4. 
 
 
3.2 Pay Jungle in Construction Industry 
 
The construction industry received special treatment in the PWD since the Member 
States have to cover by the national erga omnes collective agreements also workers 
posted temporarily into their territory. This obligation the Council and the European 
Parliament described in Article 3(1) PWD in the strongest possible terms, at least such 
was the intention, by referring to Member States who shall ‘ensure…that 
undertakings … guarantee workers posted the … terms and conditions of 
employment…’. 145 
  
These conditions mean those laid down by law or collective agreements (erga omnes) 
in the construction sector, as defined by the Annex to the Directive. The Annex de 
facto repeats the definition in the safety and health directive 92/57/EC covering 
‘temporary and mobile’ construction sites. Behind this special treatment was the 
particular nature of the sector: workers move but products are stationary. On the other 
hand, the picture of the providers includes in most Member States a handful of big 
companies (or group of companies), followed by a reasonable number of ‘mid-size’ 
companies that are often active more broadly than just locally. Next to these groups, a 
myriad of small companies are active within the sector, and some of them are 
specialised in the hiring-out of manpower. Besides, self-employment exists in every 
Member State although its amount and effect varies greatly, including even bogus 
self-employment (Scheinselbständigkeit). In undertaking projects, use of 
subcontracting is widespread. In general terms, one may describe the provider side as 
diversified. One dimension is its link to the grey and even black economy. 
 
Essential variations also exist on the workers’ side regarding the stability of 
employment relationships. Within bigger companies stable employment relationships 
for a part of the workers are not unusual which on the other hand may be the case for 
certain key workers even in smaller companies. As a contrast, e.g. in the Danish 
construction industry most workers are still in fixed-term contracts covering normally 
the actual site under construction. They are used to it and want to keep it.   
 
More diversification stems from natural circumstances like weather conditions, as 
well as from economic conjunctures, resulting in repeated unemployment periods. 
Some work is seasonal, such as asphalt laying in Northern Europe. Some work 
requires highly qualified workers with considerable education and training (nowadays 
also equipped with computer skills) while bulk work exists as well, making it possible 
for nearly all healthy men and women to carry out it. Cultural diversification (in 
immigration) means differing numbers of foreign permanent workers (like the 
Portuguese in Luxembourg). 
 
                                                 
145 The PWD might spice up the debate on a horizontal direct effect of directives; I have to 
pass it here. The same concerns interpretation of national (implementation) law in conformity 
with the objectives of a directive; see e.g. joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer, 
judgment of 5.10.2004, nyr.   
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This diversification in natural and economic circumstances seems to be one 
explaining factor in the diversification of pay forms and practices. However, the pay 
provisions in the European construction industry are, as they a priori are in other 
industries as well, bound to historical developments since the Middle Ages. They 
reached their present form normally in the era following the Second World War. 
Social protection with social funds and social security, together with enhanced 
training, due to new technical developments, has emerged since WWII.  
 
Today pay diversification means linking actual pay to a multitude of factors, such as 
training, experience, age, site, sub-sectors (some ten in Finland), profession (there are 
tens), practical on-site circumstances, new production or maintenance, length of 
service, area within the state (like East-Germany or the minimum wage areas in 
France), remote location, paid public holidays and applications of shortened working 
time. Most often pay is calculated by hour but performance-related pay still forms an 
essential feature. It (i.e. a fully performance related pay) is still the main pay form in 
new production in Sweden and Finland. The final time frame for pay calculations may 
be as long as 12 to 18 months, as for nuclear powers stations or landmark projects like 
the Great-Belt tunnel-bridge combination in Denmark, which was under construction 
for some eight to ten years in all. Partial performance-related pay exists as well, 
comprising a stable and a varying part. As an ultimate example of this pay 
diversification I would mention the performance pay scheme in the collective 
agreement of the Finnish plumbing trade, the clue being that in new production the 
works and workers on a site form one single entity, within which a joint pay is 
calculated. The scheme was adopted in the 1950s in order to prevent a distribution of 
tasks that may result in greatly varying earnings between the plumbers. At the same 
time it means subordination to the fully performance-related pay form; like in 
bricklaying: by laying 1000 bricks a day, or laying just 300; the fluctuation in 
earnings is linear when the worker is paid by the brick. 
 
Due to the diversity of the terms and conditions applicable, the European social 
partners – FIEC and EFBWW – have never made any serious attempt to formulate for 
the construction sector any European minimum wage even in the form of a general 
definition. The Member States have taken the same line. Anyway, a sui generis 
proposal came from the German government at the end of the preparations of the 
PWD, which was intended to enshrine first the lowest wage category in a national 
collective agreement as generally binding (erga omnes). Later on, the proposal was in 
the form of a ‘certain’ category, as specified by the Member States. In practice this 
was intended to legitimise the lowest category as generally binding (erga omnes). 146 
The counter-proposal was the text finally adopted in Article 3(1), second 
subparagraph, which leaves the definition for the Member States. The definition 
inevitably includes first (i) a decision whether the minimum wage comprises more 
integral parts. If there are several elements both in home and host states, then (ii) a 
further stocktaking on the way to compare these wage components is necessary. 
 
                                                 
146 The first national posting-law in Germany (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz) of 26 February 
1996 realised this concept. The amendment of 1998 (the Korrekturgesetz) repealed the 
requirement to use (only) the lowest category as the generally binding minimum wage.  
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Such a flat rate (as age-related) is applicable especially in the United Kingdom from 
1999 147 while most of the other Member States include the holiday pay and other 
supplements as integral parts of the minimum wage concerned. 148 The philosophy 
behind the Directive is intended a priori to respect national concepts as such, up to the 
extent that, according to Declaration No. 5 attached to the Directive, the PWD ‘does 
not entail any obligation to make provision on such [minimum] wages’. E.g. in the 
Belgian case gross remuneration means taking into account various site-, career- etc. 
related elements that altogether form the basis for the calculation of the 13th month 
and the bad-weather payments concerned. The same principal approach, hence a 
minimum wage comprising several integral parts, also prevails, in addition to Belgium, 
at least in the Nordic countries, France, Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg and Italy. 
In these countries normally the whole pay scale and supplements are a priori 
applicable to posted workers. I will present the German intermediary system in 
explaining the infringement case Commission v. Germany. 
 
 




Case Commission v. Germany 149 involved again the debate on the contents of the 
minimum wage concerned, but this time, as the first case thereof, under the PWD that 
became compulsory on 16 December 1999. The Commission based its infringement 
claim on the fact that Germany does not recognise, with the exception of ‘construction 
supplement’, ‘all allowances and supplements’ paid in the home state as an integral 
part of the minimum wage payable for workers posted into Germany. The ECJ 
rendered its judgment on 14 April 2005. It deals with the interpretation of the second 
subparagraph of Article 3(1) PWD that reads, as follows: 
 
                                                 
147 The adult rate of the minimum wage (for workers aged 22 and over) is now (until October 
2005) £4.85 (7€) per hour, according the National Minimum Wage Regulations 1999, SI 
1999/584, as amended. As to the mostly positive experiences about these regulations, see e.g. 
Bob Simpson, The National Minimum Wage Five Years On: Reflections on Some General 
Issues, Industrial Law Journal Vol. 33 No.1, March 2004, pp. 22-46. 
148 The Belgian specialty is that the domestic employers paid contributions for the law-based 
holiday pay within the national law-based social security system. Belgium has imposed these 
contributions on foreign companies only if their workers posted exceptionally are subject to 
Belgian (i.e. host state) social security rules. 
149 See Case C-341/02, nyr. The ECJ presented the action, as follows (paragraph 1 of the 
judgment): ‘By its application, the Commission of the European Communities requests the 
Court to declare that, by not recognising as constituent elements of the minimum wage all of 
the allowances and supplements paid by employers in other Member States to their employees 
in the construction industry who are posted to Germany – with the exception of the bonus 
[construction supplement] granted to workers in that industry – and consequently by leaving 
out of account the wage elements actually paid by such employers to their employees thus 
posted, the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 
49 EC and Article 3 of Directive 96/71/EC […]’.  
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For the purposes of this Directive, the concept of minimum rates of pay […] is 
defined by the national law and/or practice of the Member State to whose 
territory the worker is posted. 
 
The judgment i.a. shows that the case developed in the course of the proceedings in 
the ECJ. However, to make it more understandable for a European audience it is 
appropriate first to explain in brief the German minimum wage system in construction.  
 
A natural feature of the German system is that the minimum wage consists of two 
separate elements, namely the hourly wage rates and holiday pay. The social partners 
fix the hourly rates that the State has declared generally binding (erga omnes). The 
holiday remuneration is paid via the holiday pay fund (now called SOKA-BAU). That 
scheme was subject to a preliminary ruling in case Finalarte. 150  
 
The German system means comparing the hourly minimum wage against that payable 
to the worker under the home state rules, and comparing respectively the holiday pay 
in Germany against that under home state rules. The home state rules may of course 
mean finally the terms and conditions in a work contract while the holiday pay rates 
are normally fixed collectively, either by law or collective agreement.  
 
A further national feature is the simplification made in setting up the minimum hourly 
rates.  There are separate minimum rates for the building sector (Baugewerbe), 
painting works (Maler- und Lackiererhandwerk), roof works (Dachdeckerhandwerk) 
and certain dismantling works (Abbruchgewerbe) but this division by sector or 
profession was not an issue in the infringement case. 151 I will therefore explain the 
system only on the basis of the collective agreement for the building sector. However, 
in all these branches the minimum rates vary between East- and West-Germany 
(including Berlin). Next to this, workers are divided according to their professional 
qualifications into two wage categories since 1 September 2003. 152 A third integral 
element of the minimum wage is the ‘construction supplement’ (Bauzuschlag), 5.9 per 
cent to its rate, as calculated for these four minimum rates (not of any total gross 
wages etc.), and subject to a brief discussion in case Portugaia. 153 The regulation 
setting up the minimum rates indicates the construction supplement separately, as well 
indicating the sum of the basic rate and supplement. 154 These sums are generally 
meant when speaking about the minimum wages concerned. 
                                                 
150 See joint cases C-49-50/98, etc.  
151 For electrical installations on building sites (Elektrohandwerk) there have been separate 
minimum wages since 1997 until 2001.  
152 Dritte Verordnung über zwingende Arbeitsbedingungen im Baugewerbe, BGBl I p. 3372, 
27 August 2002. 
153 Paragraphs 52 to 60 of the Opinion of Advocate General. The debate reveals that the 
construction supplement has historically been defined on the basis of three separate parts 
compensating the permanent change of sites and consequences of weather conditions. 
However, as the German government has noted (see paragraph 53), ‘With the evolution of the 
law of collective bargaining, the supplement has gradually lost its original function of 
compensating for specific forms of hardship and has today become, quite irrespective of its 
origins, a fixed component of the wage packet’. 
154 The rates per hour in force (slightly lowered(!) until 31.8.2007) in the building sector are, 
as follows: West-Germany (Berlin included), wage category 1 10.20€, wage category 2 
12.30€; in East-Germany the respective figures are 8.80€ and 9.80€. See Fünfte Verordnung 
 59
The (four) rates construed in this way are de facto essentially lower than those 
resulting from a strict application of the pay scale and other pay terms and conditions 
in the national framework collective agreement between the organised social partners. 
155 The holiday pay rate (a percentage, now 15.1% of the total gross wages) is the 
same for domestic and posted workers. The lower rates for posted workers are also 
applicable to German workers ipso jure outside the binding effect of collective 
agreements (either the worker or the employer is non-organised). This has the 
consequence that posted workers are not discriminated against in terms of EC law. 
 
Anyway, it is essential to see that the German minimum wages (in construction) also 
mean an essential simplification because the whole pay scale and many supplements 
(including e.g. the winter pay scheme) are not applied to posted workers. This serves 
both the control and the free provision of services by improved legal certainty. As a 
price for this simplification and lower minimum rates Germany does not accept that 
performance- or quality-related bonuses can be part of the minimum rates. 156 
 
 
3.3.2 Main Submissions 
 
In its application the Commission held that the German legislation took account only 
of the general bonus granted to construction workers (construction supplement; 
Bauzuschlag in Germany) in comparisons between the minimum pay rates payable in 
Germany and the remuneration actually paid (paragraph 17 of the judgment). 
According to the Commission this prevented service providers in other Member States 
from offering their services in Germany. Furthermore, the Member States could not 
impose, as host states, their payment structure in comparisons (paragraph 18). More 
particularly, the Commissions accused Germany for not recognising the 13th and 14th 
salary months or contributions paid to social funds as constituent elements of the 
minimum wage (paragraph 19). 
 
The German government opposed the application i.a. with the ground that it intended 
to amend its instructions (the explanatory notes; the ‘Merkblatt’) so that they would 
recognise, in principle, as constituent elements of the minimum wage allowances and 
supplements that do not ‘alter the relationship between the service provided by the 
worker and the payment which he receives’ (paragraph 20). The government further 
argued that special working hours which involve particularly high quality 
requirements or special constraints or dangers, have a greater economic value than 
                                                                                                                                            
über zwingende Arbeitsbedingungen im Baugewerbe of 29 August 2005; Bundesanzeiger Nr. 
164 vom 31. August 2005. The East-West division as well as the establishment of two 
categories according to skills etc. were not tackled in the infringement case. 
155 One may note regarding skilled workers an overall difference of 30% (or more). The 
collective agreement for employment relationships between organised management and 
labour for building works (BRTV-BHG) in West-Germany includes six general wage 
categories, the scale being (as from 1 April 2003) 10.36€ to 16.98€ per hour. In specialised 
works (here in fire protection) the scale tops 19.22€ per hour. The so-called Ecklohn (wage 
category IV without the construction supplement) was respectively 13.96€. In East-Germany 
the scale was 8.95€ to 15.14€, the top 17.14€ and the Ecklohn 12.45€. Wage category IV 
means minimum hourly wage for a worker who can carry out independently the tasks of a 
skilled worker.  
156 The explanation of the minimum wage is on the website www.zoll.de. 
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that of normal working hours and that the corresponding bonuses (supplements, 
primes) must be excluded in comparisons. If taken into account, ‘the worker would be 
deprived of the economic counter-value corresponding to those hours of work’ 
(paragraph 22). The government finally argued that the Commission incorrectly 
assumed that the German rules would require the foreign employer to pay the 
additional German bonuses in the case of work featuring special difficulties 
(paragraph 23).   
 
 
3.3.3 Reasoning of the Court with Comments 
 
The Court started its assessment (in paragraph 24) by recounting its established case-
law on the right to extend the minimum remuneration rules to service providers from 
other Member States. 157 Judgments Rush Portuguesa (with its overall extension right 
concerning provisions in law and collective agreements) and Vander Elst (with a 
reference to extension of minimum wages) were not referred to this time while Seco 
of 1982 is referred to, together with Guiot, Arblade, Mazzoleni and Portugaia.  
Hence, the Court presented this ‘catalogue’ of case-law exactly as in Portugaia in 
2002. It is anyway essential to see that in presenting the EC law in issue the Court, 
naturally as such, denoted (in paragraph 3 of the judgment) the 12th recital in the 
Preamble to the PWD that repeats the overall extension right of Rush Portuguesa. 
However, it seems that this ‘exegetical’ evolution highlights the need to set aside, in 
this post-PWD era, any further debate about the basis of the difference between Rush 
Portuguesa and Vander Elst. A special reason might be in invalidating at the same 
time the argument that the latter, and even the PWD, would mean the right to extend 
only the ‘minimum of minima’ rates of pay. 158  On the other hand, the chosen 
‘catalogue’ in paragraph 24 clearly reflects the need to avoid any (at least future) 
debate about the limits of the extension obligation on the basis of the overall 
extension right of Rush Portuguesa. 159 Its literal application would mean extending 
                                                 
157 Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81 Seco and Desquenne & Giral [1982] ECR 223, paragraph 
14; Case C-272/94 Guiot [1996] ECR I-1905, paragraph 12; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-
376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraph 33; Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni and 
ISA [2001] ECR I-2189, paragraphs 28 and 29; and Case C-164/99 Portugaia Construções 
[2002] ECR I-787, paragraph 21). There is again – as in Portugaia, paragraph 21 – the ‘beauty 
spot’ that the point of reference in Arblade should be paragraph 41 where it referred to Rush 
Portuguesa, paragraph 18.  
158 This is the leading, in fact misleading, explanation of e.g. Görres in his dissertation. See 
footnote 131, second paragraph, supra, and my explanation in section 3.2. (in fine), supra. 
159 Noteworthy as such, the Court omitted a reference to Rush Portuguesa already in judgment 
Finalarte in 2001. The question concerning the length of paid annual leave for posted workers 
the Court also answered in brief by referring to the minimum nature of the Working Time 
Directive (with a corresponding national margin of discretion) and to the statement that 
Articles 59 and 60 (now 49 and 50) EC did not in principle preclude the extension of the 
national holiday rights (paragraphs 55-59). However, Kolehmainen describes this negligence 
of Rush Portuguesa in Finalarte as ‘striking’ (Kolehmainen, p. 141). Without wanting to point 
out especially to Kolehmainen, I call this description an example of the ‘totem effect’ of Rush 
Portuguesa, common to the European posting audience. One exception is, of course, Paul 
Davies, who i.a. predicted in 1997 (judgment Arblade was rendered in 1999) that ‘the 
wholesale justification of national labour regulation, which Rush [Portuguesa] seems to 
accept, is vulnerable to attack and qualification at any time’; Davies, Posted Workers: Single 
Market or Protection of National Labour Law Systems? CMLRev. 34: 571-602, 1997, p. 596. 
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‘every point and comma’ of the pay provisions in the host state and this idea is 
certainly alien to a discussion about the German system. Instead of extending ‘every 
point and comma’ of the German pay provisions in construction, it is a simplified 
system. Further on, in Rush Portuguesa (as well as in Vander Elst) the extension right 
was noted as obiter dictum while in Arblade, Mazzoleni and Portugaia there was a 
deliberate question thereof, submitted by the national court for preliminary ruling. A 
final reason to exclude Rush Portuguesa from the ‘catalogue’ might well lie in the 
formal inconsistency of its literal application with the now confirmed, in fact rewritten 
inclusion of proportionality assessment in the use of the extension obligation. I will 
explain this below.  
 
Connecting, necessary as such, the established case-law to the PWD (in paragraph 25 
of Commission v. Germany) is, as to its wording, perhaps not the most successful 
while paragraph 25 declares that the case-law referred to ‘is enshrined in Article 
3(1)(c) of Directive 96/71’. 160 Still, more important than these ‘exegetics’ is the fact 
that the ECJ presents the PWD, more particularly the extension obligation, also as an 
extension of the case-law since Seco. That is undeniable.  
 
There is also an evolutionary step in rewriting the overall legal framework for 
assessing the extension rules in the present post-PWD era. At first glance it looks 
bigger than it finally is. However, it is in the second phrase of paragraph 24 that the 
Court qualified the extension rules, as follows: 
 
The application of such rules must be appropriate for securing the attainment 
of the objective which they pursue, that is to say, the protection of posted 
workers, and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that 
objective (see to that effect, inter alia, Arblade and Others, […] paragraph 35, 
Mazzoleni and ISA, […] paragraph 26, and Case C-60/03 Wolff & Müller […] 
paragraph 34). 161   
 
This passage means that the proportionality requirement of the Arblade-test also 
applies to the extension of minimum wages. In Arblade the passage referred to paved 
the way for the overall positioning of labour law (or protection of workers) in the 
legal framework of the free provision of services (concluded in paragraph 36 of 
                                                                                                                                            
After Portugaia, the PWD and Commission v Germany the totem definitely belongs to history 
(or, to its place in the Preamble of the PWD, only). For clarity’s sake it is appropriate to note 
that Kolehmainen also refers (loc.cit.) to the application of the general justification test in 
posting case-law since judgment Guiot (paragraph 13).  However, nowhere in her dissertation 
does she seem to refer to Davies’ quoted ‘prediction’. 
160 In reality only judgments Seco and Guiot of those referred to in paragraph 24 (see footnote 
157, supra) are pre-PWD era, the other four (Arblade, Mazzoleni, Portugaia and Wolff & 
Müller) are post-PWD and could not affect the contents of the PWD. The Council and 
Parliament had decided them already in 1996. In French the case-law referred to in paragraph 
24 was ‘consacrée’ in Article 3(1)(c) PWD.  
161 This ‘inter alia’, as to labour law cases, meant e.g. Finalarte where the proportionality 
assessment applied to payment of holiday remuneration via a social fund and the extension of 
the scheme to cover the posted workers, too (paragraph 49). In Portugaia the proportionality 
assessment was not spelled out but it referred (paragraph 23) in more general terms to a 
possible infringement of Articles 59 and 60 (now 49 and 50) EC in the use of the extension 
right. 
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Arblade). 162 Mazzoleni concerned a variably permanent and exceptional working in 
two Member States, and Wolff & Müller concerned an enforcement measure (liability 
of principal contractor; see Chapter II). How to explain this structure where every 
word (including judgments referred to) counts? My view is that labour lawyers should 
not ‘burn their sleeves’ with this use of proportionality. 163 It must be assessed on the 
basis of its wording, in its context and in the light of the practical results.  
 
As to the wording, of equal importance to declaring the use of the proportionality 
assessment to be necessary, is the declaration of ‘the protection of posted workers’ as 
its yardstick. The full Court in Arblade established the application of the 
proportionality assessment to the protection of workers in general.  In Mazzoleni a 
small chamber stated it expressis verbis in relation to the extension right, hence not 
regarding it as any radical move. 164 In Wolff & Müller the Court continued this 
proportionality path, at the same time by de facto dismissing the proportionality 
application suggested by the company Wolff & Müller. 165 Anyway, more important 
than the applicability per se of proportionality is the framing of its use by establishing 
the yardstick. At this particular point it is not ‘the promotion of free movement of 
services’, higher/lower economic burden for foreign service providers, 166 
guaranteeing fair competition between undertakings or any other interest of the 
                                                 
162 See section 1.2.3, supra. 
163 Kolehmainen defends the interpretation that only the ‘expansion clauses’ in Article 3(10) 
PWD (possibility to cover matters outside the hard core list in Article 3(1) or collective 
agreements on sectors other than construction) would fall under the Arblade-test (she calls it 
ORPI-test – from overriding requirements of public interest), including proportionality. 
Hence, matters under Article 3(1) would not be subject to the Arblade-test, and, thus, not 
subject to any proportionality assessment. I understand this as a prima vista maximal impact 
of labour law thinking in this context. She bases this on the wording of the PWD – obviously 
meaning that only Article 3(10) refers at the use of the extension right to the qualification ‘in 
compliance with the Treaty’. Her second reason is that the opposite (i.e. finding the 
proportionality test applicable also to the list in Article 3(1)) would undermine the rationale of 
the Directive. She describes the outcome (in early 2002) as being that the interpretation of the 
ECJ remains to be seen. Op.cit., p. 146-7 and 266. The wording of the PWD easily creates, 
indeed, the illusion that the list in Article 3(1) would completely fall outside the Arblade-test. 
However, the reference to the Treaty obligations in Article 3(10) was only intended to 
highlight them in applying Article 3(10), not to qualify Article 3(1) at all. The rationale 
argument is stronger, of course, and seems to endorse the PWD as a more straightforward 
labour law instrument etc. Anyway, with respect to a directive not even the rationale 
argument is, or cannot be, fully convincing – and did not convince the ECJ in Commission v. 
Germany - which becomes clearer in my explanations, infra. In general terms is Article 59 
EC, in the light of which the PWD is to be interpreted, directly effective; see e.g. case 33/74 
Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299 at 1311-2. Escaping the application of such a provision of 
the Treaty with the principles in its settled case-law requires amending the Treaty or 
modifying it with a protocol adopted in the same procedure; adopting contradictory secondary 
legislation is not enough. A classical example is case C-262/88, Barber [1990] ECR I-1889, 
paragraphs 37 and 42-3 where the Court found that the two equal treatment directives 
concerned could not free one from obligations emanating from the Treaty (Article 141, ex 
119). It only ruled out the retroactive effect of its judgment.      
164 The yardstick (protection of workers) was declared in paragraph 30 of Mazzoleni. 
165 See section 2.2.5., supra. The judgment declared the yardstick in paragraphs 42-43.  
166 See the Commission’s explanations in paragraph 18. 
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undertakings but the core of the labour law side of the PWD: the protection of 
workers. In this context the protection also covers individual work contracts. 167  
 
As to the context, the normative ‘complex’ 168  in issue simply means a practical 
application of the PWD in the light of the Treaty rules on the free provision of 
services. These Treaty rules are accompanied by the established case-law with its 
equally established proportionality assessment that naturally extends to the 
interpretation and application of the PWD’s concrete provisions. In this cross-border 
context pay is a category of EC law (acquis) whatever interpretations we may have, 
especially on Article 137(5) EC. To my mind it excludes only a self-initiated 
Community intervention on pay by virtue of that Article. However, pay is (also) a 
category of EC law even if the PWD (second subparagraph of Article 3(1)) leaves the 
primary definition of the minimum rates of pay for the Member States. Furthermore, 
had the PWD been established on another legal base (such as Article 94 EC), 
proportionality would enter into its interpretation and application simply by virtue of 
Article 5(3) EC. It is also worth mentioning that the ‘not beyond’ formula of the 
proportionality test was used in paragraph 24 to express the necessity element instead 
of the ‘same result to be achieved with less restrictive means’. The crucial point 
finally is, of course, the practical impact and results of the proportionality assessment. 
They come later in this case.   
 
However, this (‘the PWD/extension right applies in the Treaty framework’) was the 
normative structure within which operates the Member States’ right to define the 
minimum rates of pay. In practical terms the dispute in the case concerned the 
question as to ‘which allowances and supplements a Member State must take into 
account as component elements of the minimum wage, when it checks whether that 
wage has been correctly paid’ (paragraph 27). In the course of the proceedings the 
German government amended its instructions (the explanatory note) by reversing the 
‘rule-exception’ relationship. Thus, earlier the rule excluded from comparisons certain 
supplements and bonuses. It was reversed to include in comparisons certain 
supplements and bonuses. Following that amendment, account was to be taken of all 
additional payments made in so far as the ‘relationship between the service provided 
by the worker and the consideration which he receives in return is not altered in a 
manner detrimental to the worker’ (paragraph 30). This meant that e.g. quality-
bonuses or those linked to special constraints in the work could not ‘eat’ or consume 
the minimum wage. Hence, it is to be highlighted that the amendment left in dispute 
what was to be taken into account, as becomes clear below.  
 
                                                 
167 I can see that the proportionality assessment may have practical consequences e.g. cases 
concerning pay provisions in respect of the personal status of an employee (like sickness pay, 
paid anniversaries etc.). Such cases may be complicated, especially depending on their 
linkage to the law applicable without the PWD (e.g. due to variable length of service or just 
an artificially agreed law of a third country etc.). For space reasons I will set aside any 
detailed reasoning thereon. 
168 As opened with a few more words this normative complex means a Member State applying 
its minimum pay rules as part of Community law (PWD) and therefore subject to its general 
principles of law, like proportionality. Further parts of the complex are the Rome Convention 
and Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.  
 64
A further evolutionary step during the proceedings concerned the treatment of 13th 
and 14th salary months. Germany envisaged taking these into account as constituent 
elements of the minimum wage ‘on condition that they are paid regularly, 
proportionately, effectively and irrevocably during the period for which the worker is 
posted to Germany and that they are made available to the worker on the date on 
which they are supposed to fall due’ (paragraph 31). Given the in principle positive 
reply of the Commission, the Court confirmed this as being in conformity with the 
PWD (paragraph 32). The judgment does not reveal whether Germany based this 
(natural) concession on Declaration No. 9 of the Commission, Council and Parliament 
attached to the PWD. It enshrines the principle that in wage comparisons ‘account 
should be taken, when remuneration is not determined by the hour, of the relationship 
of the remuneration to the number of hours to be worked and of any other relevant 
factors’. The reference to ‘any other relevant factors’ may naturally mean the control 
aspect. One has to remember also the purpose of publishing the Declarations and to 
give them in so doing a stronger status than the Declarations usually have. This time 
the Declarations are in line with the Directive’s purpose and elaborate it.169 However, 
the outcome at this point fully conforms to Declaration No. 9. 
 
Germany urged that the same principle with respect to the 13th and 14th months be 
also applied to extra holiday bonuses paid abroad (only a pro rata temporis payment 
on the due dates during the posting period ‘eats’ the minimum wage; paragraph 34). 
The Court, however, found it unclear whether the complaint concerning contributions 
for the holiday bonus (and holiday pay) formed a separate head of complaint and 
dismissed the application for that part (paragraphs 34-37).  
 
As mentioned, Germany amended during the proceedings its general instructions 
concerning different bonuses. Following that amendment, account was to be taken of 
all additional payments made in so far as the ‘relationship between the service 
provided by the worker and the consideration which he received in return is not 
altered in a manner detrimental to the worker’ (paragraph 30). Since the amendment 
concerned only the manner of construing the rule, the principal dispute remained. The 
Commission still wanted bonuses to be taken into account on a basis broader than the 
definition used by Germany. In issue here were, in particular, quality bonuses and 
bonuses for dirty, heavy or dangerous work (paragraph 38).  
 
The decision of the Court was twofold but straightforward, as follows:  
 
’39 Contrary to what the Commission submits, allowances and supplements 
which are not defined as being constituent elements of the minimum wage by 
the legislation or national practice of the Member State to the territory of 
which the worker is posted, and which alter the relationship between the 
service provided by the worker, on the one hand, and the consideration which 
                                                 
169 On a similar line concerning such declarations, see case C-368/96 Generic et al. [1998] 
ECR I-7967, paragraphs 26-27. – It is an issue as such why the Institutions obviously have not 
taken any additional action so as to publicise the Declarations. It is impossible, or at least 
excessively difficult to find them on the Internet, notwithstanding that the purpose was to 
release them to the public. See e.g. Council document 10048/96 (for the Council meeting of 
24.9.1996) ’Statements for entry in the Council minutes’, Addendum 1 (SOC264, CODEC 
550), footnote on page 1.  
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he receives in return, on the other, cannot, under the provisions of Directive 
96/71, be treated as being elements of that kind.’(italics added) 
 
Hence, the Court first gave importance to the definition adopted by a Member State. 
This implies that, in theory, there could be elements altering the relationship between 
the employer and the worker but which nevertheless would fall under the national 
definition of the minimum wage. Anyway, allowances and supplements, if first 
defined as falling outside the minimum wage, altering the relationship between the 
employer and worker cannot be treated as part of the minimum wage under the PWD. 
I call this an alteration-clause.  
 
The Court gave the reasons for this decision in a rather succinct way, as follows: 
 
‘40     It is entirely normal that, if an employer requires a worker to carry out 
additional work or to work under particular conditions, compensation must be 
provided to the worker for that additional service without its being taken into 
account for the purpose of calculating the minimum wage.’   
 
This passage is far-reaching and interesting in many dimensions. First, the reason was 
not just ‘normal’ but ‘entirely normal’. It was something clear without any reasonable 
doubt or need of further proof. Second, it states a socio-economic ‘common ground’ 
in any market economy and, besides, is valid at least throughout the history of 
minimum wages. Third, the reason is not derived from any law books (or data banks, 
nowadays) or leading articles of the Treaty but from ‘real life’. Fourth, coming closer 
to the passage’s consequences (instead of thinking of its roots), the statement with its 
‘additional work or work under particular conditions’ clearly covers performance-
related pay more broadly than in relation to quality, hence also pay elements in 
relation to quantity or time. This is of importance even in situations, which are quite 
common in the Nordic countries, where the remuneration consists of so-called direct 
performance related pay. 170 In a nutshell: the passage operates with changes in the 
relationship between employer and worker; it is of labour law. 
 
Given the incorporation of proportionality into the ‘normative complex’ applicable in 
this case, the substantive outcome in paragraphs 39 and 40 also leads to the question 
whether there is any trace of a proportionality assessment. No, as the wording makes 
clear. The Court does not consider whether the outcome goes beyond what is 
necessary in order to attain the objective of protection of workers. This leads to the 
conclusion that in ‘entirely normal’ pay cases a real proportionality assessment does 
not take place, that it would finally be merely a safety valve for the free movement 
values or against social protectionism. What is clear, however, is the fact that the 
Court kept here, too, protection of the worker as its yardstick.  
 
The formal outcome in the case was to condemn Germany for infringement since it 
had not established the ‘alteration-clause’ – with the exception of accepting a general 
construction supplement as a constituent part of the minimum wage - in its minimum 
wage instructions before the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion of 
the Commission. However, in reality the Commission mainly lost its case, and, 
indeed, the Court dismissed the application regarding the alteration-clause. The loss is 
                                                 
170 See the explanation in section 3.2, supra. 
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just clearer in relation to the original formula in the application: an alleged inclusion 
into minimum wage of all allowances and supplements paid, even after the posting.  
 
A further direct conclusion is equally clear. In its application the Commission 
contended that a Member State cannot, as a host state, impose its remuneration 
structure in comparisons (see paragraph 18; in the application it was the method of 
comparison). The judgment means that it may do so, although not without limits,. Put 
the other way round, had the Court affirmed the Commission’s application, it would 
have either required Germany to try to impose the excessively laborious German 
bonuses (in addition to the minimum wage) or in practice it would have ruined the 
minimum wage control with respect to workers posted into Germany. This is because 
the artificial bonuses laid down by the work contracts might not actually have been 
paid at the end of the contract. The German system is not arbitrary but is de facto a 
simplified (and low-rate) solution to the German terms and conditions applicable. In 
so doing it does not result in a higher economic burden for foreign service-providers, 
on the contrary. The system equally fulfils the requirements set up in paragraph 43 of 
Arblade while it is relatively simple and easily accessible. 171 
 
One might ask whether there was an alternative way of conceiving the status of 
Member States as rule-makers on this occasion, hence an independent status outside 
the judicial control of the ECJ. This would be based, of course, on the wording of 
second subparagraph of Article 3(1) PWD. 172 The answer is simple, indeed. Namely, 
given the obligations emanating directly from the Treaty, such exclusion would be 
impossible by a directive. It would be also fully inconsistent with the fact that it is the 
PWD, hence EC law, which incorporates the obligation to extend the national 
minimum wages to posted workers. Furthermore, it would be equally justified to ask 
what would be the rule-maker status (in pay) of the Member States without the PWD. 
In that situation the Member States would still not escape the judicial control of the 
ECJ. In fact there has not been such a case and it will naturally no longer arise given 
the PWD. 173 Thus, in sum, the way in which the Court established the position of the 





                                                 
171 We may also state that the judgment respects the German system. By contrast, the 
treatment of the Belgian minimum wage system in Arblade, paragraphs 46-47, without 
explanation provisionally excluded from the minimum wage the 13th salary month (timbres-
fidélité) and bad-weather payments for construction workers. Thus, the ECJ applied a flat-rate 
minimum wage. The exclusion was provisional while the Court, wisely enough, left the final 
contents of the Belgian minimum wage for the national court to confirm. Judgment 
Commission v Germany, together with PWD, means that the provisional exclusion in Arblade 
belongs now entirely to legal history. 
172 Basing the Member States’ exclusion from the judicial control of the ECJ by virtue of 
Article 137(5) EC is not worth any real consideration. As is natural, there is nothing e.g. in 
the judgment Commission v Germany indicating that such an issue need be raised, let it be 
considered by the Court. If true, it would have been an issue to be noted ex officio. 
173 The Commission also invoked Article 49 EC. The Court, having established the failure to 
fulfil the obligations on the basis of PWD, found it unnecessary to examine the action in 
respect of Article 49 EC (paragraph 42). 
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3.4 From Seco to Alteration Clause - Entirely Normal? 
 
In sports the forthcoming match is always the most important, but in legal reasoning 
history normally weighs more. Judgment Commission v. Germany in a way closes the 
circle started by Seco in 1982 and succeeded by Rush Portuguesa (1990), Vander Elst 
(1994), Guiot (1996), Arblade (1999), Finalarte 174 (2001), Portugaia (2002) and 
Wolff & Müller (2004). None of these successors includes a passage expressis verbis 
amending the line of a predecessor, although the Court has shown its capacity to make 
relevant moves even by omitting references to previous case-law. All this leads to the 
conclusion that in general terms the Court has developed its line with natural steps: 
from obiter dicta via questions and answers in preliminary rulings to the application 
and interpretation of the PWD, in the light of the Treaty. However, various 
assessments exist by scholars as to distinguishing turning points or deviating 
passages. 175 From today’s perspective it seems justified to conclude that while Seco 
(including the basic concept on the contents of the common/internal market, i.e. 
legitimating state measures – the extension right of minimum wages - against low-
wage competition within temporary provision of services) and Rush Portuguesa 
clearly were important for social Europe, Arblade was and still is the landmark in 
case-law, not just in confirming the extension right but particularly in establishing the 
status of das Sozial (i.e. protection of workers, construction workers in particular) in 
more general terms in the field of the free provision of services, hence in the core of 
regulating the Internal Market. One can condense the outcome by stating that the 
protection of workers justifies proportionate restrictions on the free provision of 
services.  
 
Arblade was, however, a pre-PWD case. In this sense Commission v Germany is, if 
not a landmark, a long-standing statue anyway. It interprets, as does Wolff & Müller, 
the Directive. It is natural to think that the Directive and its appropriate application by 
the Member States is the source for the formal rewriting (I do not submit it is a 
substantive change) of the normative complex in which fixing the definition of the 
minimum wage operates. The rewriting meant declaring the status of the 
proportionality assessment therein but with protection of workers as its yardstick. 
Finally the proportionality assessment remains as a safety valve for free market values 
and against social protectionism. As is ‘entirely normal’ in the internal market 
business, not everybody is happy.  
 
This outcome (protection of workers justifies proportionate restrictions) is, of course, 
also a specification of the contents in Article 50(3) EC: temporary provision of 
services in another Member State under the same conditions as those applicable to 
                                                 
174 It dealt with the realisation of a part of the extension right, namely holiday pay, and merits 
to be counted in this continuum. Judgment Mazzoleni I comment briefly in footnote 177, 
infra.  
175 Some examples on highlights: both Kolehmainen (op.cit, p. 125-135) and Davies (IJL Vol. 
31, No. 3, September 2002, p. 301 et seq.) present Arblade as a landmark decision while only 
Davies really analyses the consequences of the four-fold Arblade-test (while he doesn’t use 
this name). Kolehmainen concentrates on the practical application of the justification 
principles (Arblade-test) in that particular case. Giesen, who in general terms accepts the 
balancing of social protection and fundamental freedoms in case-law (see section 1.3.5, at 
footnote 79, supra), regrets that the extension right in Portugaia was left up to the national 
authorities and courts (see footnote 55, supra).  
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domestic service providers. That proviso, too, must be read in the light of the Arblade-
test.   
 
 
3.5 On Pay Comparisons in General 
 
As mentioned, Commission v. Germany de facto decided that the host state is entitled 
to establish the method of comparison of working conditions, albeit within the limits 
set by the Treaty. This line drawing still necessitates some further remarks on these 
comparisons. 
 
However, comparing the national schemes and pay provisions is not an easy task if 
one takes just time-related wages with their many components. Furthermore, the 
decision on the practical use of performance-related pay might be simple in a clear 
majority of cases as in the new construction of buildings (or civil engineering 
projects) that do not include e.g. new materials, production methods or safety and 
health aspects requiring time-related remuneration. Normally the collective 
agreements concerned include the necessary and detailed rules on the use of 
performance-related pay. 176  Anyway, e.g. comparing a time-related pay scheme to a 
performance-related one is something that the EC should not impose but should 
respect the a priori right of the host state concerned to use such a method in 
remuneration and to set up the rules if a comparison is to be made between a time-
related and performance-related scheme.  
 
Putting fine-tuning aside right now we may distinguish two basic methods of 
comparison: a benefit-by-benefit model and a package model. 177 The German case is 
a graphic example of the former: hourly wages and holiday remunerations are 
compared respectively and separately. On the other hand, the agreement between the 
Dutch and Belgian social partners in construction in 1997 established that there is a 
sufficient equivalence between the benefit packages in those countries. The agreement 
at the same time also meant that the social partners and the authorities do not require 
payments of the separate benefits (in practice: the holiday pay) concerned via the 
respective social fund in the host country (hence when Belgians work in the 
Netherlands and vice versa). Instead, in posting situations the companies continue 
paying via the home state fund. The agreement is equipped with a safety valve 
including a possibility for individual workers to require a comparison of benefit-by-
benefit. This is due to the fact that legislation in both countries is based upon the 
                                                 
176 It seems that e.g. in negotiations of the on-going Laval case in Sweden the Construction 
Workers’ Union would have accepted that the Latvian workers would carry out the works for 
an hourly wage, the amount of which is the crucial point. The Swedish collective agreement 
concerned takes the performance-related remuneration as the principal object of local 
negotiations in wage setting. 
177 As a third alternative I may mention comparing the annual earnings that Advocate General 
proposed in the case C-369/96 Arblade [1999] ECR I-8453. The Court in judgment Arblade 
left it without any reference. Such a comparison includes a lot of vagueness and unsure 
factors, such as partial unemployment, whose effect makes it finally desktop wisdom. Such 
comparisons have only a theoretical and extra-judicial knowledge value. – The comparison 
present in case C-165/98 Mazzoleni [2001] ECR I-2189, including even the impact of 
taxation and welfare services, deviates from the comparison of gross wages intended by the 
PWD. However, it was also a sui generis case in the field of frontier work. 
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comparisons benefit-by-benefit. The package comparison between these two countries 
is thus an exception in formal terms. The social partners anyway find that the package 
method in this Belgian-Dutch case gives a feasible and sufficiently reliable 
application. Individual requests for benefit-by-benefit comparisons have obviously 
been rare, if they so far exist at all. The Belgian-Dutch agreement is declared binding 
erga omnes at least in the Netherlands. 178 
 
As mentioned, the ratio of the Directive is more in favour of the benefit-by-benefit 
model. Namely, Article 3(7) refers to more favourable conditions applicable. 
Furthermore, the Directive in Article 3(1) treats minimum rates 179 of pay (including 
overtime rates) and paid annual holidays separately. Furthermore, the Declaration No. 
9 attached to the PWD refers to comparisons on the basis of remuneration per hours 
worked. The EFBWW study of 2004 reveals that the comparison of benefit packages 
strictly speaking applies only between Belgium and the Netherlands. Another issue is 
that the German social partners (i.e. their holiday pay fund, now called SOKA-BAU) 
have joined this agreement in the sense that Germany does not require Dutch and 
Belgian companies, who pay contributions for the holiday pay fund in their respective 
countries, to pay the contributions in Germany. Accordingly, German companies 
continue paying contributions in Germany when carrying out works in Belgium or the 
Netherlands.   
 
The European social partners in the construction industry, EFBWW and FIEC, have 
noted, after discussions lasting some seven years, the impossibility of imposing a 
more elaborate European model for the comparisons. Under the heading ‘Bilateral 
actions in favour of a Europe-wide approach’ they took in their joint statement of 
2004 the favourability principle as the starting point, clearly having Article 3(7) PWD 
and the benefit-by-benefit approach in mind. They further noted that ‘the comparison 
of labour conditions is complicated because in practice it is comparing apples and 
oranges.’ They therefore note as a positive development that ‘social partners of 
several Member States with similar socio-economic developments and structures 
conclude bilateral agreements to recognize each others’ collective agreements, 
minimum wages and/or paid holiday schemes.’ 180 
 
                                                 
178 On this agreement, see e.g. the summarised country report on the Netherlands by Mijke 
Houwerzijl, in Cremers and Donders (eds.), The free movement of workers in the European 
Union. CLR Studies 4 (2004), p. 101. Technically the bilateral agreement has been transferred 
to a provision of the Dutch collective agreement in construction, subject to the erga omnes 
declaration; statement of Mijke Houwerzijl on 18 February 2005. As to Belgian law, see the 
summarised country report by Prof. Dr. Yves Jorens and Filip Van Overmeiren. They refer to 
the national law of 5 March 2002 implementing the PWD. It de facto repeats the text of 
Article 3(7) PWD and means a benefit-by-benefit comparison. Ibid, p. 71. 
179 The plural form ‘minimum rates’ (les taux de salaire minimal, Mindestlohnsätze) was 
meant to be an intentional choice in every language while the Swedish and Danish versions 
anyway are in the singular (minimilön, mindsteløn). 
180 The joint statement is included in Cremers and Donders (eds.), The free movement of 
workers in the European Union. CLR Studies 4 (2004), pp. 138-141; see p. 140, paragraph 7. 
The social partners also note how ‘between Member States with unequal socio-economic 
conditions the application of the favourability principle is not so difficult as the best 
provisions will apply.’ 
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One has to highlight that the comparison is essentially easier in cases where there is a 
clear difference between benefits applicable in the home and host states, as is the case 
between the old 15 and the 10 new Member States. Whereas the overall difference 
between the benefit levels is one to three or four, a discussion like that on the benefit-
by-benefit or the package comparison does not really emerge. The best provisions 
apply. Where it does, the Community, ultimately the Court, would best serve the 
promotion of free movement of services by guaranteeing that such a comparison is 
based on objective grounds, as well as taking account of the diverse forms of national 
practices, in particular in the field of contractual relations (Article 136 EC).  
 
There remains the formal question about overlapping or double payments of 
employer’s contributions to social funds running, above all, holiday pay schemes in 
several countries. In Arblade (paragraph 51 and the second ruling) the Court 
confirmed that the host state cannot require payments to its fund ‘where the 
undertaking in question is already subject, in the Member State in which it is 
established, to obligations which are essentially comparable, as regards their objective 
of safeguarding the interests of workers, and which relate to the same workers and the 
same periods of activity.’ At the same time, the Court left the backdoor open for such 
an imposition by the host state (paragraph 54) if it confers on workers ‘an advantage 
capable of providing them with real additional protection which they would not 
otherwise enjoy.’ As the Declaration No. 7 attached to the PWD shows, the PWD 
intended to cover the contributions to the social funds in the host state. 181 However, 
an interpretation based on the Treaty obligations leads to the application of this 
Declaration in the light of the requirement set up in paragraph 54 of Arblade. Real 
additional protection must exist for justification. 
  
                                                 
181 The Declarations are e.g. the Council document 10048/96 (for the Council meeting of 









As a relevant conceptual remark I denote that, like many other labour law scholars, I 
use the phrase ‘right to strike’ in its broad sense, hence, as a synonym for ‘industrial 
action’ and ‘collective action to defend the workers’ interests’. Unless otherwise 
indicated, therefore the phrase ‘right to strike’ also covers forms of action other than 
those within a valid contract of employment, such as blockades and secondary 
boycotts. Thus, sympathy actions are covered, but with the reservation that in this 
study I pass over the delicate question of cross-border sympathy action. ‘Industrial 
action’ usually means any form of action threatened or taken by a party in order to 
protect or promote its interests, which may lead to the disruption of production or 
economic activities more generally.   
 
The issue of the right to strike in EC law is deeply connected with the topic in my 
three previous Chapters, i.e. the Posted Workers Directive (PWD). The PWD operates 
in its Article 3(8) on three types of collective agreements: (i) those declared to be of 
universal application (erga omnes); (ii) those generally applicable to all similar 
undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned, and 
(iii) those concluded by the most representative employers' and labour organizations 
at national level which are applied throughout the national territory. Agreements type 
(ii) and (iii) are secondary and subject to additional provisions on equal treatment 
between domestic and foreign undertakings. It is no secret that type (ii) (national) 
agreements was intended to cover the Danish-Swedish situation of a de facto erga 
omnes of the collective agreements concerned, due to the high degree of organisation 
in those countries. The national agreements are in Denmark and Sweden normally 
complemented with separate company level agreements (substitute agreement; 
‘hängavtal’) concluded by the national trade unions or their local constituents with the 
non-organised employer, whether domestic or posting workers from another Member 
States. 182 The substitute agreement practice is well established in Finland, too. In the 
Nordic labour law tradition the substitute agreements also incorporate a peace clause 
with the same effect as that in the principal national agreement. 
 
However, each of these three types of agreement (hence, company level agreements 
as well) may raise the question about the right to strike in the context of a posting 
situation, either when striving to reach such an agreement during collective bargaining 
or in applying it. The inevitable question arises about the protection of the right to 
strike in relation to the fundamental freedom to provide services in the EU/EEA. I will 
simplify this reasoning by setting aside the issue of strikes carried out to reach a 
national collective agreement. One may state in brief that by virtue of the equal 
treatment principle (Articles 12 and 50(3) EC) a national trade union obviously may 
                                                 
182 On the Nordic Collective agreements see e.g. Jonas Malmberg, The Collective Agreement 
as an Instrument for Regulation of Wages and Employment Conditions, in Peter Wahlgren 
(ed.): Stability and Change in Nordic Labour Law. Scandinavian Studies in Law, Vol. 43, 
Stockholm 2002, pp. 189-213; on substitute (accession) agreements pp. 196-7. 
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also direct its industrial action against a foreign employer posting workers. This leads 
us to concentrate on industrial action in support of claims on a substitute agreement.  
 
Even if the right to strike were to be silently inherent in the context of the PWD, its 
Preamble makes the position clear by stating explicitly in Recital 22 that ‘this 
Directive is without prejudice to the law of the Member States concerning collective 
action to defend the interests of trades and professions.’ It expresses the principle and 
conviction of the Council and Parliament to not interfere in that a priori national law 
on collective action. It can be seen that this is in line with Article 2(6) of the 
Maastricht Agreement on Social Policy, now enshrined in Article 137(5) EC, 
according to which ‘(t)he provisions of this article shall not apply to pay, the right of 
association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs.’ I will come back to 
this provision later in my reasoning. Anyway, the PWD applies as an elaborating 
instrument in the legal framework of the Treaty, particularly in the framework of 
Articles 49 and 50 EC. Hence, in trying to answer the question about the relationship 
between the right to strike and the freedom to provide services a preliminary issue that 
needs to be discussed is whether Articles 49 and 50 EC do have a horizontal direct 
effect; whether they can be relied on in industrial action disputes between private 
parties. Indirectly this question does also cover the question about the compatibility of 
national strike rules with the EC Treaty. Both questions have become subject to a 
preliminary ruling of the ECJ in the case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri (hereinafter 
‘Laval’), where the Arbetsdomstolen (Labour Court of Sweden; a single national 
instance for collective labour disputes, collective agreements included) has decided to 
request it. In shaping this legal complex under EC law one has to distinguish carefully 
between the rules on priority of collective agreements (see the reference question B 
below) that at the same time also regulate the applicability of the statutory peace 
clause (the Swedish lex Britannia) and their application in concrete cases. 183 
 
                                                 
183 (Interim) Decision 49/05 of the Arbetsdomstolen (Labour Court of Sweden) on 29 April 
2005 (www.arbetsdomstolen.se) in the case Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetare-förbundet (Swedish Building Workers’ Union), Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, avdelning 1 (the union’s local department No 1), and Svenska 
Elektrikerförbundet (Swedish Electricians’ Union). The Latvian company claims with its suit 
that the Building Workers’ Union, its local department No. 1 and Electricians’ Union have 
resorted to industrial action incompatible with Article 49 EC and are liable for damages. The 
company had posted workers from Latvia to Sweden and paid some 30-50% of the viable 
Swedish wages. The Building Workers’ Union urged the company to sign a substitute 
collective agreement, with the Swedish level of wages and benefits. The company refused and 
the union resorted – after many negotiations - to industrial action (boycott and blockade) 
concerning the construction site in Vaxholm, supported by the Electricians’ Union. The 
outcome was that the company withdrew from the works concerned but continues the legal 
proceedings. A sympathy action is allowed under Swedish law if the principal action is legal. 
The case also involves variable details in the Swedish benefits a priori or allegedly applicable 
to the workers posted. I leave them aside now and look at the case purely from the perspective 
of proper wages. I use the expression ‘right to strike’ in describing the events there, although 
in practice it was industrial action that was more in the form of a blockade that affected 
electrical installations and various works outside the activities of the company Laval. - The 
second interim decision that includes the reference questions with their (summarized) grounds 
the Labour Court of Sweden published (in Swedish, only) on 15 September 2005; see 
<http://www.arbetsdomstolen.se/pdf/ab133.pdf>. 
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4.1.1 First Reference Question in Laval; Recital (22) of the Preamble to the 
Posted Workers Directive 
 
Hence, in its first question the Labour Court of Sweden asks, as follows: 
 
Is it compatible with rules of the EC Treaty on the freedom to provide services 
and the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality and with 
the provisions of Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services for trade unions to attempt, by means 
of industrial action in the form of a blockade, to force a foreign temporary 
provider of services in the host country to sign a collective agreement in 
respect of terms and conditions of employment such as that set out in the 
above-mentioned decision of the Arbetsdomstolen, if the situation in the host 
country is such that the legislation intended to implement Directive 96/71 has 
no express provisions concerning the application of terms and conditions of 
employment in collective agreements?  
 
The working conditions subject to a targeted substitute agreement were a practical 
solution based on those prescribed by the national sector-wide collective agreement in 
the construction industry. The first question requires general argumentation on the 
contents of the right to strike (industrial action) in EC law. However, I do not present 
in detail the argumentation of the parties in the Laval case in the national court. In 
general terms, the employer side maintains that the industrial actions concerned are 
unlawful as violating Articles 12 and 49 EC, as well as the PWD. The first mentioned 
(Article 12 EC) I take as a corollary argument under Article 49 EC (which I also 
discuss juncto Article 50 EC). The main argument in EC law of the union side has 
been that the EC is not competent at all to regulate the right to industrial action. I will 
discuss this issue as a further preliminary question to the right to strike in EC law (see 
section 4.3).The last mentioned argument (that the action violates the PWD) merits 
only a brief discussion here, given the recital No. 22 of the Preamble to the PWD, 
according to which the Directive does not prejudice the national right to ‘collective 
action to defend the interests of trades and professions’.   
 
This recital was not based on a last minute thought, but resulted from careful 
consideration during the preparation of the PWD. It was generated especially by the 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. As to Sweden, it was also directly 
linked to the labour market Declaration attached to the Accession Act. It was intended 
to safeguard – in the form of assurances given by the Commission – ‘the Swedish 
practice in labour market matters and notably the system of determining conditions of 
work in collective agreements between the social partners’; see footnote 286, infra. 
This was fundamental in gaining the general public’s support for the accession.  
 
Recapping the recital textually, it is notable that it is not limited to the right to strike 
sensu stricto. It is also intended to cover different lawful sympathy actions that are 
typical especially in Sweden and Finland. It was also fully in line with the right to 
strike/industrial action as defined within the ILO (see section 4.4.2, especially at 
footnote 217, infra). Textually the recital leaves no uncertainty about the fate of the 
‘PWD argument’ of the company Laval; it fails. Contextually the recital’s impact is 
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clear in principle. When read as a part of the preamble of the PWD, it is essential to 
see that recitals 1, 2, 3 and 5 link the PWD directly to the completion and functioning 
of the Internal Market. The principles of the Internal Market are governed by the 
Treaty. Hence, whereas no secondary EC legislation can overrule the Treaty, the 
logical conclusion in this broader context is that recital 22 of the PWD does not 
guarantee any full immunity for national rules on strikes or industrial actions in 
general. 184 It is also, of course, of value in interpreting the Treaty itself because the 
reasonable assumption is that secondary legislation is intended to elaborate and in a 
way to extend the Treaty, but not to contradict it. In conclusion, it is the interpretation 
of Articles 49 and 50 EC that decides, and not Recital 22) of the PWD.        
  
 
4.1.2 Second Reference Question: Lex Britannia 
 
The second question of the Labour Court of Sweden deals with the specific structure 
in Swedish labour law, as follows (my translation): 
 
The Swedish Medbestämmandelagen (Law on workers' participation in decisions) 
prohibits industrial action taken with the intention of circumventing a collective 
agreement concluded by other parties. That prohibition applies, however, pursuant to 
a special provision contained in part of the law known as the 'lex Britannia', only 
where a trade union takes measures in respect of industrial relations to which the 
Medbestämmandelagen is directly applicable, which means in practice that the 
prohibition is not applicable to industrial action against a foreign undertaking which 
is temporarily active in Sweden and which brings its own workforce. Do the rules of 
the EC Treaty on the freedom to provide services and the prohibition on 
discrimination on grounds of nationality and the provisions of Directive 96/71 
constitute an obstacle to an application of the latter rule - which, together with other 
parts of the lex Britannia also mean in practice that Swedish collective agreements 
become applicable and take precedence over foreign collective agreements already 
concluded - to industrial action in the form of a blockade taken by Swedish trade 
unions against a foreign temporary provider of services in Sweden?  
 
Hence, lex Britannia means that the prior agreement rule does not cover a foreign 
company bound by a prior collective agreement abroad, and which therefore is not 
subject to the Swedish Co-determination Act (that is at the same time the Swedish 
‘Collective Agreement Act’). In general terms this ‘gaining of precedence’ is nothing 
more than the host state law ‘gaining precedence’ by virtue of the PWD in Member 
States where minimum wages apply to posted workers directly by virtue of law or an 
erga omnes declaration of a state authority. However, lex Britannia now becomes 
subject to preliminary ruling on the basis of both discrimination and the Arblade-test – 
in case that discussion on the horizontal direct effect of Articles 49 and 50 EC first 





                                                 
184 Sigeman, professor emeritus in labour law, also notes this; see Tore Sigeman, Fri rörlighet 
för tjänster och nationell arbetsrätt, Europarättslig Tidskrift 3/2005, p. 481.   
 75
4.2 Horizontal Direct Effect of Articles 49 and 50 EC 
 
A natural source in addressing the direct effect issue is the case-law of the ECJ. It 
started in 1974 with case Van Binsbergen 185 where the Court confirmed the vertical 
direct effect of Article 59 EC. Soon after, in case Walrave 186 the Court also extended 
the direct effect to cover rules of a private law nature. It stated the basics, as follows: 
 
‘16 Articles 7, 48, 59 [now 12, 39 and 49] have in common the prohibition in their 
respective spheres of application, of any discrimination on grounds of nationality.  
 
17 Prohibition of such discrimination does not only apply to the action of public 
authorities but extends likewise to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating in a 
collective manner gainful employment and the provision of services.  
 
18 The abolition as between Member States of obstacles to freedom of movement for 
persons and to freedom to provide services, which are fundamental objectives of the 
Community contained in Article 3(c) of the Treaty, would be compromised if the 
abolition of barriers of national origin could be neutralized by obstacles resulting 
from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associations of organizations which do 
not come under public law. 
  
19 Since, moreover, working conditions in the various Member States are governed 
sometimes by means of provisions laid down by law or regulation and sometimes by 
agreements and other acts concluded or adopted by private persons, to limit the 
prohibitions in question to acts of a public authority would risk creating inequality in 
their application.’ 
 
Hence, Article 49 EC also covers rules of a private law nature. Anyway, the Court, 
whilst it referred to the risk of inequality, did not discuss inequality stemming from 
material differences in the rules concerned, whether public or private. However, the 
conclusion of the Court (paragraph 34 and the ruling) was that the first paragraph of 
Article 49 EC, 187  ‘in any event in so far as it refers to the abolition of any 
discrimination based on nationality, creates individual rights which national courts 
must protect.’  
 
In Donà v. Mantero 188 the Court in 1976 confirmed that non-discrimination covered 
the rules of a private sporting association. It equally confirmed that also Article 60(3) 
                                                 
185 Case 33/74 Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging 
voor de Metaalnijverheid.[1974] ECR 1299. 
186 Case 36/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405. 
187 Article 49, first paragraph reads: ‘Within the framework of the provisions set out below, 
restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the Community shall be prohibited in 
respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the Community other 
than that of the person for whom the services are intended.’ – As to legal consequences of 
Walrave, e.g. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1996 (a revised and updated version of his doctoral thesis of 1991), pp. 249-252, 
equated them with those of Defrenne II in gender equality at pay (case 43/75 [1976] ECR 
455), thus proving within the free provision of services the horizontal direct effect of non-
discrimination based on nationality (conclusion on p. 252).  
188 Case 13/76 Gaetano Donà v Mario Mantero [1976] ECR 1333. 
 76
EC - at least in so far as it seeks to abolish any discrimination against a person 
providing a service by reason of his nationality or of the fact that he resides in a 
member State other than that in which the service is to be provided - has a horizontal 
direct effect and creates individual rights that national courts must protect (paragraph 
20). According to Article 60(3) (now 50(3)) EC 
 
[…] ‘the person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue 
his activity in the State where the service is provided, under the same 
conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.’ (emphasis 
added)  
 
In delimiting the reach of the free provision of services the Court used the economic 
nature of the activities as the very yardstick. Sports activities fell under the prohibition 
in so far as they were of economic nature while purely sporting interests fell outside 
(paragraph 19). 
 
In 1977 in case van Ameyde 189 the Court further confirmed that ‘for discrimination to 
fall under the prohibitions contained in […] articles [52 and 59] it suffices that such 
discrimination results from rules of whatever kind which seeks to govern collectively 
the carrying on of the business in question.’ The case concerned the operation of the 
so-called green card system in vehicle insurance.  
 
In case Bosman 190  the questions for preliminary ruling concerned only the 
interpretation of Article 39 (ex 48) EC, more particularly the transfer rules of 
professional football players. However, the Court (in 1995) in its reasoning 
(paragraphs 83 and 84) repeated the essential points in paragraphs 18 and 19 of 
Walrave, quoted above. 
 
In judgment Deliège 191 the Court again and with main proceedings in the field of the 
free provision of services confirmed the principles in Walrave (paragraphs 17 and 18) 
and Bosman (paragraphs 82 and 83). Most recently the Court (in 2002) in Wouters 192 
did the same and stated, also this time within the framework of the free provision of 
services, as follows:  
                                                 
189 Case 90/76 S.r.l. Ufficio Henry van Ameyde v S.r.l. Ufficio centrale italiano di assistenza 
assicurativa automobilisti in circolazione internazionale (UCI) [1977] ECR 1091, paragraph 
28. 
190 Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc 
Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations 
européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. Referring to 
judgments Walrave and Bosman, Bruno de Witte notes that the fundamental freedoms in the 
common market exceptionally have the horizontal direct effect, thus regarding the collective 
regulation by private organizations, such as a sports federation. Bruno de Witte, The Past and 
Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights, in Philip 
Alston et al. (eds.), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University Press 1999, p. 874. 
191 Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et 
disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo (C-51/96) 
and François Pacquée (C-191/97) [2000] ECR I-2549, paragraph 47. 
192 Case C-309/99 J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse 
Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 
intervener: Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap ECR [2002] I-1577. 
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120. It should be observed at the outset that compliance with Articles 52 and 
59 [now Articles 43 and 49] of the Treaty is also required in the case of rules 
which are not public in nature but which are designed to regulate, collectively, 
self-employment and the provision of services. The abolition, as between 
Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons [and to free 
provision of services 193] would be compromised if the abolition of State 
barriers could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their 
legal autonomy by associations or organisations not governed by public law 
(Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405, paragraphs 17, 23 and 24 
                                                 
193 As a lapsus the English version does not refer in this sentence to the free provision of 
services. The French version does (as the Dutch, Swedish etc.). Taken substantively, the 
wording of the first sentence – while it refers only to collective regulation of self-employment 
and the provision services but not to paid labour – may provoke a misleading interpretation. 
Namely, that the horizontal direct effect of Article 49 (and that of Article 43) would a priori 
not cover the collective regulation of terms and conditions of employment. Such an 
interpretation falls, first, due to the simple fact that the Court referred to paragraph 17 of 
Walrave (that also includes ‘regulating in a collective manner gainful employment’). Second, 
the context in Wouters proves the fully unconvincing nature of such an interpretation. 
Namely, the case dealt with the possibility of prohibiting a lawyer-accountant partnership in 
national law - without the prohibition being i.a. in breach of Articles 43 and 49 EC. While 
lawyers of course may act both as independent economic actors (respectively as members of 
such a coalition of lawyers) and as salaried employees (‘workers’ in terms of the Treaty), any 
formal decision on such a partnership certainly falls under the business powers of the 
employer. In their respective last answers both the Advocate General Léger (Opinion of 10 
July 2001, relying on ‘lawyers’ independence and professional secrecy’ in the work of 
‘lawyers practising’) and the Court (relying on the ‘proper practice of the legal profession’ 
BUT defining the lawyers as ‘Members of the Bar’) allowed such a national prohibition. 
However, and this is my third point, AG ‘for the sake of completeness’ discussed (in 
paragraphs 48 to 55) in brief the nature of lawyers’ activities and also distinguished (in 
paragraph 52) a third category: ‘Second, it may happen that lawyers do not really work under 
their employer's direction and that their remuneration is directly linked to the latter's profits 
and losses. In that case, lawyers belong to the borderline categories mentioned by Advocate 
General Jacobs in his Opinion in Pavlov’. However, lacking a precise question and sufficient 
information on the status of salaried lawyers in the Netherlands, he reasoned further – as did 
the Court – only on the basis that lawyers are undertakings in the sense of Article 81(1) EC. 
Anyway, in reasoning for his last answer, he characterised (in paragraph 234 which 
corresponds to para. 120 of the judgment) Articles 43 and 49, as follows: ‘Let me make the 
preliminary observation that the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement for persons and 
the free movement of services are not applicable only to measures taken by the public 
authorities. They also extend to measures of another kind which seek to regulate, collectively, 
the employment of workers and the provision of services. Articles 52 and 59 of the Treaty 
may therefore apply to rules adopted by associations or bodies such as professional 
associations.’ (my emphasis). The AG referred to Walrave, Donà, Deliège and Angonese 
(while the Court replaced Deliège by Bosman, obviously by reasons not relevant in this 
reasoning). The inevitable conclusion is that the Court – while it accepted the national ban of 
partnership between members of the Bar (not ‘lawyers practising’!) and accountants – by 
omitting a reference to paid labour in its paragraph 120 of Wouters did not grant any general 
exception for paid labour from the horizontal direct effect of Article 49 (or from that of 
Article 43). In Wouters it took no position in that respect. -  As to the interpretative value of 
the AG’s opinion in this particular question, see the qualification by Ole Due in footnote 14, 
supra.   
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[194]; Case 13/76 Donà [1976] ECR 1333, paragraphs 17 and 18; Case C-
415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraphs 83 and 84, and Case C-281/98 
Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139, paragraph 32 [195]).  
 
This case-law is settled and conclusive in the sense that Article 49 (ex 59) EC has the 
horizontal direct effect on collective regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment. It may thus be invoked, within these limits, in judicial proceedings 
between private parties. It would be artificial to maintain that an industrial action 
striving to achieve collective regulation would escape the direct effect because the 
action itself is not a regulatory measure. Such a plea would artificially detach the 
action from its purpose and is therefore not convincing as a justification. Another 
issue is that there might be actions without any regulatory purpose, such as political 
ones or those directed against (or for) a purely business decision that formally belongs 
to the employer’s discretion. Their justification I leave aside now. As to Article 50(3) 
EC, there is only one judgment (Donà) showing its direct horizontal effect concerning 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality but it was, however, delivered in 1976 by 
the Court sitting with seven judges. There is no reason that Article 50(3) EC should 
have lost its character as having the horizontal direct effect, at least concerning 
discrimination. I therefore conclude that Article 50(3) EC also has the horizontal 
direct effect, nowadays obviously at least within the scope of Article 13 EC.  
 
 
4.2.1 Reach of Horizontal Direct Effect of Articles 49 and 50 EC 
 
The scope of EC law is not unlimited. The Community is based on conferred powers. 
I will first try to illustrate in brief the limits of Articles 49 and 50 EC as it appears 
from case-law so far. 
 
The Court most recently discussed these limits in the sports case Deliège and 
concluded that sporting is subject to ‘Community law only in so far as it constitutes 
an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty’. 196 Furthermore, 
the concept of economic activities may not be interpreted restrictively 197  and, 
according to settled case-law, the pursuit of an activity as an employed person or the 
provision of services for remuneration must be regarded as an economic activity 
within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty. 198 Hence, everything included under 
                                                 
194 This time the Court also referred to paragraphs 23 and 24 of Walrave where it had linked 
the scope of Article 59 (now 49) EC to that of Article 48 (now 39) EC.   
195 Judgment Angonese concerned the free movement of persons. 
196 Paragraph 41. The ECJ referred to Walrave, paragraph 4, and Bosman, paragraph 73.  
197 Deliège, cited above, paragraph 52, with the reference to Case 53/81 Levin v 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035, paragraph 13. 
198 Deliège, paragraph 53, where the Court referred to judgment Donà, cited above, paragraph 
12, and Case 196/87 Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1988] ECR 6159, paragraph 10. 
Further in this sense, e.g. in Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] I-1039, paragraph 19, where the 
ECJ, referring to Donà and Steymann, confirmed that lotteries are “economic activities”. 
Similarly, thus indicating the broad meaning of ‘economic activities’, judgment Jany stated 
how (self-employed) prostitution is a provision of services for remuneration which falls 
within the concept of economic activities; Case C-268/99 Jany et al. [2001] ECR I-8615, 
paragraph 48. In the same judgment the ECJ stated that it is not for the Court to substitute its 
own assessment for that of the legislatures of the Member States where an allegedly immoral 
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the heading of economic activity is subject to EC law and may at the same time be a 
prima facie forbidden restriction on free provision of services. It is self-evident that 
strikes will not fall outside EC law on the supposed grounds that they are not 
economic activities and are at most just social activities or something similarly ‘non-
economic’, since they are aimed at stopping or hindering such activities. Otherwise 
we know on the basis of e.g. Steymann that, to fall under economic activity, it is 
sufficient for something to be of genuine and effective work and not such as to be 
regarded as purely marginal and ancillary. 199 However, we may conclude that a strike 
may fall outside EC law due to its marginal or ancillary nature. It is a kind of a natural 
de minimis principle and obviously applicable under both EC and national law.  
 
In Deliège the Court concluded that a certain sporting rule does not in itself, as long as 
it derives from a need inherent in the organisation of a competition, constitute a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services under Article 59 (now 49) of the EC 
Treaty. In this way the Court set up an essential limit. In Society for the Protection of 
Unborn Children v Grogan the Court found that the prohibition of abortion, enshrined 
in the Irish constitution, fell outside the scope of EC law and did not assess it the light 
of Articles 49 and 50 EC. It also protected information on legal abortion abroad only 
in so far as the clinics concerned were involved in the distribution of information. 200 
The Court did not discuss at all the effect of freedom of expression, enshrined in 
Article 10 of the European Human Rights Convention.  The doctrine has widely 
criticized this.  
 
However, as these two examples show, in assessing the status of a strike in EC law a 
further preliminary question is whether it falls within the ambit of EC law at all, more 
particularly under Articles 49 and 50 EC. Only if it does, can the legal question arise 
about restricting the free provision of services and about its possible justification.  
 
 
4.3 Right to Strike in the Ambit of EC Law? 
What does the Treaty say about the right to strike? Are there relevant delimitations of 
EC competence regarding other matters?  
First, the Treaty of Rome said nothing directly about the right to strike, but it did 
oblige the Commission in Article 118 to encourage cooperation between the Member 
States particularly in the fields of labour law and working conditions, as well as in 
matters relating to the right of association and collective bargaining. However, the 
inherent assumption was that the Council was not expected to act in these fields. 
Besides, the Treaty of Rome in Article 2 stated that the leading task of the 
Community was to promote ‘harmonious development’ of economic activities and 
also ‘accelerated raising of the standard of living’; the Treaty of Maastricht qualified 
economic activities with their ‘harmonious and balanced’ developments (which is 
now ‘harmonious, balanced and sustainable’). Article 118b EEC, inserted by the 
Single European Act, referred to ‘relations based on agreement’ between management 
                                                                                                                                            
activity is practised legally (paragraph 56). However, in ordre public (public policy) issues a 
national margin of discretion exists. 
199 Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (see the previous footnote), paragraph 13. 
200 Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen 
Grogan and others [1991] ECR I-4685. 
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and labour at the European level (which is now situated in Article 139 EC). Then, 
outside the Treaty of Maastricht, the 11 Member States in their Social Policy 
Agreement (Article 2(6)) stipulated that the provisions of that Article ‘shall not apply 
to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs’. 
This provision was later incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam as Article 137(6) 
EC and the Treaty of Nice just changed the number to 137(5). It is the only place 
where the Treaty mentions expressly the right to strike. Second, according to Article 
137(2) and 137(1)(f) EC, the Community may issue unanimous directives on 
‘representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, 
including co-determination, subject to paragraph 5’. This provision is accordingly 
copied from Article 2(3) of the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement. Third, a 
particularly relevant peg in the Treaty is Article 95(2) EC, enshrined by the Single 
European Act, which excludes ‘provisions relating to the rights and interests of 
employed persons’ from qualified majority voting. Fourth, there is no clause in the EC 
Treaty excluding any European harmonisation of strike laws as there is, with slightly 
variable material contents, in the case of education (Article 149 EC), vocational 
training (Article 150 EC), culture (Article 151 EC) and public health (Article 152 
EC). The Treaty of Maastricht added these provisions. Fifth, regarding the right to 
strike there is no exclusion as there is, since the Treaty of Rome, for national systems 
of property ownership (Article 295 EC), national security and trade in arms, 
munitions and war materials (Article 296 EC) and for exceptional security 
circumstances (Article 297 EC). 
There are two main avenues to interpret the Treaty at this point and, more particularly, 
Article 137(5) EC. 201 A ‘constitutional’ interpretation line goes that Article 137(5) is 
intended to exclude all the matters referred to there from the competence of the EC, or 
to demonstrate such exclusion. 202  Article 2 of the so-called Monti-Regulation 
                                                 
201 As to the different interpretations on Article 137(5) EC especially regarding pay, see 
Hellsten 2004 (footnote 142, supra), passim.  
Lord Wedderburn has held – immediately after Maastricht - that a Community instrument on 
freedom of association would be possible on the basis of Article 94 (ex 100) EC. It implies 
that the right to strike is not ‘constitutionally’ excluded from the Community competence by 
Article 137(5) EC. Lord Wedderburn, Freedom of Association and Community Protection: A 
Comparative Enquiry into Trade Union Rights of the European Community and into the Need 
for Intervention at the Community Level, May 1992, paragraph 35.1; a stencil for the 
European Commission – never published that I know of.  I also refer to Lenaerts and van 
Nuffel who have written how regarding pay, freedom of association and rights to strike and 
lock-out ‘no reliance may be made on Article 137 (paragraph 6)’. Lenaerts and van Nuffel 
(ed. Bray), Constitutional Law of the European Union, 1999, p. 229.  
202 There is, of course, a close tie between pay and the right to strike. I recall how the Danish 
and Swedish versions of Article 137(5) EC refer to ‘pay relations’ (lønforhold, 
löneförhållanden) which in the Danish and Swedish labour market context – with an 
emphasized status of collective agreements - feeds the interpretation that Article 137(5) EC 
defines and excludes the overall EC competence in these relations, strikes included. Textual 
support this argument finds in the wording of Article 137(1)(f) (ex 137(3)) that refers to 
issuing directives on representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and 
employers, including co-determination, subject to paragraph 5.  
On this ‘constitutional’ interpretation regarding pay, also see Lena Maier (footnote 88, supra) 
pp. 275-285. Her own conclusion anyway is that it is unclear whether Article 137(5) EC 
excludes community competence under other Treaty provisions; p. 422 (p. 461 in the English 
summary). In ‘Utstationering av arbetstagare och det svenska kollektivavtalssystemet. En 
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2679/98 and Recital 22 in the Preamble to the PWD, both with references to national 
law regarding strikes or fundamental rights, are also explained then as reflections of 
this constitutional exclusion. Continuing this line, the legality of a strike is subject 
only to national law (or international obligations of the Member States). Hence, an 
extreme constitutional interpretation of Article 137(5) would mean holding that the 
right to strike falls entirely outside the legislative competence of the EU. It would on 
this basis be consistent to hold that a strike (like national strike rules), due to Article 
137(5) EC, falls equally outside the scope of Articles 49 and 50 EC. No further 
discussion about the limits or application of these provisions in this context would be 
needed. However, such an interpretation (i.e. the entire lack of legislative competence 
                                                                                                                                            
rättslig analys’ (SACO 2005) she concludes that Article 137(5) EC does not guarantee a full 
immunity for strikes and national strike law in relation to EC law; pp. 53-54.  Further in the 
Swedish discussion, noteworthy is that Jonas Malmberg has denoted the lack of strike cases in 
the ECJ without any reference to Article 137(5) EC: Malmberg, Metoder att motverka 
låglönekonkurrens i Sverige (Methods in opposing low wage competition in Sweden; exists 
only in Swedish) in Malmberg (red.) Låglönekonkurrens och arbetstagares integritet, 
Arbetslivsinstitutet 2000:2, p. 19. Tore Sigeman has denoted that Article 137(2) and (5) EC 
do not, as a logical consequence, rule out Community competence in matters covered by 
Article 137(5) EC under Article 94 EC. He states that, whatever is the regulatory competence 
of the Council of Ministers regarding industrial action, the ECJ does not seem to be prevented 
from judging various private (industrial) actions in relation to the four market freedoms and 
nationality-based discrimination. As grounds he refers to cases C-265/95, Commission v. 
France, and C-112/00, Schmidberger; see Sigeman, footnote 184, supra, pp. 481-2.   
In German literature Birk has firmly expressed the argument that Article 137(5) EC cannot be 
assumed to be a guarantee of the national right to strike in relation to fundamental economic 
freedoms in the EC Treaty just because it does not exclude the right to strike from the Treaty; 
see Rolf Birk, Arbeitskampf und Europarecht, Oetker et al. (Hrsg.), 50 Jahre 
Bundesarbeitsgericht, Münchner Beck 2004, pp. 1165-1178, especially pp. 1166-8. I take the 
liberty to denote Birk’s basic position – let it be an initial one, concerning “a widely unwritten 
page” (ibid., p. 1165) - on the right to strike in EC law. Thus, he finds that, when we take into 
account the several concrete references to that right in the relevant European documents (the 
1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, reference to European 
Social Charter in Article 136 EC and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000), the 
starting point must be that there exists “already today” (i.e. in 2004) a right guaranteed 
(‚verbürgt’) in EC law. In the next phrase he refers to the use of that right within the limits of 
proportionality and in a legal field where the fundamental freedoms in the Internal Market are 
not unlimited (ibid., p. 1177).  Proportionality and limiting the fundamental market freedom 
will be discussed especially in sections 4.9 and 4.10., infra. The European Social Charter is 
presented in section 4.4.4, infra, and it is dealt with more fully in footnote 294, infra.   
Novitz has reiterated the position that Article 137(5) EC excludes the matters concerned from 
the Community’s regulatory competence and, as a ground, refers to the principle that a 
specialized treaty base should prevail; as a conclusion she predicts that there is ‘little to 
protect this entitlement from progressive erosion’ by the market freedoms. See Tonia Novitz, 
The Dialogue between the EU and ILO, in Alston (ed.), Labour Rights as Human Rights, 
Oxford University Press 2005 (Novitz 2005), p. 218-9. To be fair, one has to remember that 
Novitz regards EC regulation in principle as possible (although unlikely) under Articles 94 or 
308 EC; ibid.  The essential point is that Novitz does not discuss the situations where the ECJ 
has to strike a balance between market freedoms and the right to strike. If nothing else that at 
least reveals how Article 137(5) EC does not conceal a solid escape and/or delimitation of the 
Community competence. The lessons from cases 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415, 
paragraph 20, and Albany, paragraph 60, show us that Article 137(5) EC must be interpreted 
finally in the light of an effective and consistent interpretation of the EC Treaty as a whole.  
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with respect to strikes on the part of the EU) would not solve all the essential 
problems. Accordingly, it would not be consistent. Even a strike which is perfectly 
and undoubtedly legal under national law (as when the collective agreement 
concerned has expired) may certainly be in conflict with EC market freedoms 
(including the free movement of workers) that have a horizontal direct effect, or with 
equally effective non-discrimination provisions in Articles 12 and 13 EC. It is evident, 
finally by virtue of effet utile and primacy of EC law, that the supposed prerequisite of 
a lacking legislative competence, based on Article 137(5), would not a priori and as 
such exempt all the nationally legal strikes from the possible effect of the EC law 
concerned. Such strikes are within the scope of the Treaty. It then also means de facto 
a debate (or, judgment!) about the (basic) contents of the right to strike under this EC 
law (I will discuss it later in this chapter). Hence, even the constitutional interpretation 
of Article 137(5) does not free us from discussing the contents of the right to strike 
under EC law with the horizontal direct effect.   
 
The other interpretation line takes as its basis the whole Treaty and reads Article 
137(5) EC literally which leads to the conclusion that an EC intervention in strike law 
would be possible with another legal base, such as Article 94 or 308 EC, or based on 
the agreement of the European Social Partners. 203 This interpretation line explains 
Article 137(5) EC merely as a demonstration of the reluctance of the Member States 
to enact any EC strike directive without in any way excluding the issue as a whole 
from the formal competence of the Community. On this interpretation line as well, the 
material contents of the right to strike remain essentially national or subject to 
international treaties (see section 4.4 et seq., infra) while EC law implies mainly a 
principal protection of the right to strike in relation to the market freedoms and proper 
competition rules. Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is also a 
demonstration of this basic protection under EC law, with an expressed reference to it 
(see further section 4.4.6, infra). 
 
That the right to strike falls under EC competence has particularly the following 
additional grounds at the Treaty level. First, the location of labour law and working 
conditions in Article 118 EEC did not prevent the Community from enacting the 
labour law directives on Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings in the 
1970s. Second, Article 95(2) (ex 100a(2)) EC excludes ‘provisions relating to the 
rights and interests of employed persons’ expressly from qualified majority voting, 
not from the Treaty. Use of Article 94 (ex 100) in the 1970s as a basis for labour law 
directives naturally was behind this delimitation of qualified majority voting. Third, 
Article 2(6) of the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement essentially was a late attempt 
to get the United Kingdom to accede to that agreement. Fourth, essential is that while 
Maastricht’s Article 2(6) was enacted outside the Treaty, it would be even illogical to 
argue that it would somehow restrict the scope of the original Treaty or that reflected 
by Article 95(2) (ex 100a). Its incorporation into the Treaty of Amsterdam was rather 
a political compromise than a legal exclusion. Fifth, the PWD regulates pay and 
collective agreements in a cross-border context and for its part shows the 
                                                 
203 On the same line (a directive on the right to strike is conceivable under Articles 94 or 308 
EC; the author shares this view) writes Tonia Nowitz, too, in her dissertation International and 
European Protection of the Right to Strike, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 162. Anyway, 
her previous conclusion is that ‘the members of the EU seem to have denied that organization 
the competence to adopt directives relating specifically to ‘the right of association, the right to 
strike or the right to impose lockouts’’; p. 33.   
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unconvincing nature of the constitutional interpretation of Article 137(5) EC. Sixth, 
Article 136 EC refers to the European Social Charter and the 1989 Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, and both of them include the right 
to strike. Seventh, Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000, 
including the right to strike, would be meaningless for EC law if the constitutional 
exclusion by Article 137(5) EC were valid. Finally, nothing in or around Article 
137(5) EC shows that it would invalidate the effect of international law, either under 
Article 307 EC or by virtue of general international law. I will discuss these below in 
sections 4.5 and 4.6. 
 
The forthcoming Laval case in Sweden obviously means that the ECJ has also to take 
stock on Article 137(5) EC. It seems likely, however, that the ECJ will not embrace 
the constitutional interpretation thereof, probably with some additional grounds linked 
to its own position. First, the constitutional interpretation would drop essential 
internal market ‘interferences’ from the control of the ECJ which militates against its 
mission as the guardian of the Treaty, including the principles of primacy of 
Community law and uniform application of the acquis. Second, as the judgment 
Schmidberger shows, the ECJ has without any doubt determined itself competent to 
judge, in an internal market context, on fundamental rights (freedom of expression 
and freedom of assembly) guaranteed in the ECHR. 204 Another issue is how the ECJ 
will express its grounds in judicial language, case-law included. The experience of the 
sports judgments (Walrave, Donà and Deliège) shows that the Court may confine 
itself to a laconic statement based on the concept of economic activities in the sense of 
Article 2 EC: a strike within the sphere of economic activities is subject to EC law. 
This kind of line drawing would mean that not all aspects of the right to strike would 
fall under EC law. As in the case of pure sporting interests, 205 there is certainly at 
least the policy and internal decision-making of trade unions that fall outside the 
judicial control of EC law and courts. 206  Anyway, it seems necessary to reason 
further on the basis that the ECJ, despite Article 137(5) EC, will deem itself 
competent and compelled to judge on the right to strike in the framework of the free 
provision of services.  
 
                                                 
204 Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik 
Österreich [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraphs 71-94. - I use the abbreviation ‘ECHR’ for the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
‘EHRC’ for its Court (like ‘European Human Rights Court’). 
205 In this sense, see case T-313/02 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of 
the European Communities, judgment of 30.9.2004, nyr, paragraphs 53 and 63 et seq. The 
keywords were Competition - Freedom to provide services - Anti-doping legislation adopted 
by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) - Purely sporting legislation. The Court of 
First Instance concluded that anti-doping rules are of pure sporting interest and fall outside 
Community law. The basis of its assessment it defined, as follows (paragraph 42): 
‘Conversely, legislation which, although adopted in the field of sport, is not purely sporting 
but concerns the economic activity which sport may represent falls within the scope of the 
provisions both of Articles 39 EC and 49 EC and of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC and is capable, 
in an appropriate case, of constituting an infringement of the liberties guaranteed by those 
provisions (see, in that regard, the Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Bosman at I-4930, 
paragraphs 253 to 286, and particularly paragraphs 262, 277 and 278 EC […])’; my emphasis. 
The judgment is subject to appeal (see case C-519/04 P) - obviously in vain. 
206 See Article I-48, too, of the Constitutional Treaty. The context also involves a question 
about political strikes, which is not explored here.  
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4.4 On Protection of the Right to Strike in the Context of EC Law 
 
4.4.1 General Remarks 
 
I first denote the right to strike as presumably a fundamental right in EC law. Such 
rights enjoy a special status in the legal order of the Community 207 that the Court e.g. 
in the recent judgment Omega Spielhallen expressed as follows: 
 
33 […] according to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral part 
of the general principles of law the observance of which the Court ensures, 
and that, for that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by 
international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member 
States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has special 
significance in that respect […].208  
 
Hence, fundamental rights are protected as an integral part of general principles of 
law and in protecting them the Court draws on common constitutional tradition and 
relevant international treaties. It is also plausible that the Charters adopted within the 
Community, next to national constitutions, reflect the common constitutional 
tradition. On the other hand, international treaties giving (only) guidelines do not bind 
the Court which i.a. means that the Court with respect to strikes is not bound by the 
weak (and old) letter of the ECHR that recognizes only the freedom of association. 
The Court naturally takes into account the supervisory practice and jurisprudence of 
the international treaties. I will return to this below. 
 
However, under this heading I will give only a necessary overview, with some 
subject-related comments concerning the ILO instruments and the EU Charter of 2000, 
on the international and EC law instruments governing either the freedom of 
association or directly the right to strike. Regarding international instruments, I would 
generally refer to the presentation by Tonia Novitz in her dissertation. 209 At an EC 
                                                 
207 On the development and status of fundamental rights in the legal order of the Community 
see e.g. Tuomas Ojanen, The European Way. The Structure of National Court Obligation 
under EC Law, Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, Saarijärvi 1998, pp. 97-136 and 291-324. As to a 
conceptualizing overview, see e.g. Allan Rosas, The Legal Sources of EU Fundamental 
Rights: A Systemic Overview, in Colneric et al. (eds.), Une communauté de droit. Festschrift 
für Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag Berlin 2003, pp. 85-102.   
208 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v  
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, judgment 14.10.2004, nyr. The following case-
law was this time cited in paragraph 33: Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 
41; Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR I-1611, paragraph 37; Case C-
94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, paragraph 25; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] 
ECR I-5659, paragraph 71.  
209 Tonia Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike, Oxford 
University Press 2003. My presentation also draws generally on Olavi (Olli) Sulkunen, 
Kansainväliset ammattiyhdistysoikeudet (International Trade Union Rights), Helsinki 2000, 
XXXIX + 674, with an English summary. I also refer to Olavi Sulkunen,  
Ammattiyhdistysoikeudet Euroopan yhteisön oikeudessa (Trade Union Rights in EC Law), 
Työoikeudellisen yhdistyksen vuosikirja 1999-2000, pp. 55-195 (exists only in Finnish). In 
the latter Sulkunen does not, however, discuss trade union rights in the specific context of the 
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level the issue (right to strike/industrial action v. fundamental freedoms in the internal 
market) is naturally particularly complicated due to the diversity of strike laws in the 
Member States. 210 Therefore, and for space reasons, I have to confine myself to 
presenting only the basics, followed by shaping a likely or possible application line in 





                                                                                                                                            
free provision of services. The same concerns Novitz (and Germanotta, see infra). More 
generally, Sulkunen has not dealt with the status of ILO provisions in EC law by virtue of 
Article 307 EC or general international law in doctrine while he well mentioned Article 307 
in spring 2005. He died on 13 May 2005. Novitz refers to pre-existing obligations of the 
Member States in a couple of sentences, p. 31 and 152 (the latter also referring to 
denunciation of these obligations when incompatible with the Treaty); Paul Germanotta and 
Tonia Novitz, Globalisation and the Right to Strike: The Case for European-Level Protection 
of Secondary Action, IJCLLIR Vol. 18/1, 67-82, 2002, p. 79, do refer to transposition of ILO 
norms into the EU as consistent with EU external relations policies (see footnote 220, infra) 
but, graphically, without any reference to Article 307 EC or general international law.  
As one of the rare references made to the fundamental right to strike in EC law I may mention 
Giovanni Orlandini, The Free Movement of Goods as a Possible ‘Community’ Limitation on 
Industrial Conflict, ELJ, Vol. 6, No. 4, December 2000, pp. 341-362. His starting point (p. 
341) is that Article 137(5) EC excludes the right to strike from EC competence but it doesn’t 
prevent him – without further normative grounds - from referring to its protection under EC 
law as a fundamental right. This he also does, however, by presenting the ‘reasonableness’ of 
appeal to it as one of its criteria (which Novitz, p. 254-5, accepts without comments). I denote 
an overriding difficulty in deriving such an overall criterion from both the formula in Omega 
Spielhallen, para. 33, and the legal framework in accepting restrictions on fundamental rights, 
applied e.g. in case Schmiedberger (which I explore below in section 4.10.1), let alone under 
Article 307 EC or general international law (which I explore in sections 4.5 and 4.6). There is, 
of course, less space for criticism in case that this ‘reasonableness’ in fact means the principle 
of proportionality. That is relevant, indeed, regarding the specification of restrictions on 
fundamental rights and market freedoms as case Schmiedberger shows.  
210 It is common ground that, among the old EU Member States, in Southern and Central 
Europe the right to strike is primarily an individual right (with the exception of Greece); in 
Northern Europe it is organic, hence belonging to the organisations. An outlining description 
is e.g. in Brian Bercusson, Trade Union Rights in the 15 EU Member States of the European 
Union (by the European Parliament, EU’s Publications Office 1998). As to sympathy 
(solidarity) strikes the picture is more varied; see e.g. Niklas Bruun and Bruno Veneziani, The 
Right or Freedom to Transnational Industrial Action in the European Union, in A Legal 
Framework for European Industrial Relations, ETUI, Brussels 1999, pp.  77-88. A broader 
presentation is given by Juri Aaltonen, International Secondary Action in the EU Member 
States, Finnish Metalworkers’ Union, Espoo 1999. An international overview is also e.g. in 
A.T.J.M. Jacobs, The Law of Strikes and Lockouts, in Blanpain and Engels (eds.), 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies, 
Kluwer Law Int. 2001, pp. 585-628.  The need for a principal regulatory measure on the right 
to strike he identified already in 1978; he referred as an example to the Hersant Group case. 
This publisher transferred the printing of three newspapers to Belgium, following a strike in 
France; see Antoine Jacobs, Towards Community Action on Strike Law?, CMLRev. 1978 
Vol. 15, pp. 133-155, especially at 142 and 155. He also presents the answer of the 
Commission to a parliamentary question: ‘the principle of freedom of establishment neither 
affects nor is affected by the right to strike’; p. 142. 
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4.4.2 ILO Provisions  
 
As a first step it is essential to note that the international treaties concerned include the 
ILO Constitution, the ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise 1948 and the ILO Convention No. 98 on the Right 
to Organise and Collective Bargaining 1949. The ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, 211 adopted in 1998, is an expression of commitment 
by governments, employers' and workers' organizations to uphold basic human values 
- values that are vital to our social and economic lives.  It stated the commitment of 
the ILO Member States to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in 
accordance with the ILO Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental 
rights, such as freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining (paragraph 2(a)). The former is also enshrined in the Preamble 
to the ILO Constitution, the latter in the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944, annexed to 
the Constitution.   
 
The letter of Article 3(1) of Convention No. 87 does not spell out the right to strike 
but the freedom of association, as complemented by the right of the trade union 
organizations ‘to organize their activities’ and ‘to formulate their programmes’. 
However, derived from these formulas in the supervisory practice the right to strike 
has been recognized for decades. 212  As developed, this right is regarded as ‘an 
intrinsic corollary of the right of association protected by Convention No. 87’ 213 and 
as ‘one of the essential means through which workers and their organizations may 
promote and defend their economic and social interests’. 214 Hence, the ‘ILO right to 
strike’ means a civil, political and socio-economic entitlement. 215 It is also clearly 
free from restrictions set up by the existing working relationship which would impose 
limits on the protection of the right concerned. It is the right of the workers’ 
organizations 216 and, as also linked to the right to establish and join federations and 
                                                 
211 The Declaration is available <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/index.htm>. 
212 Further support for the right to strike is in Articles 8 (organisations have to respect the law 
of the land which shall not impair the guarantees provided for by the Convention) and 10 of 
the Convention (‘organisation’ means any organisation of workers or of employers for 
furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers). On the evolution of the 
ILO practice in general, see e.g. Novitz, p. 185-206; similarly: Lee Swepston, Human rights 
law and freedom of association: Development through ILO supervision; ILRev. Vol. 137 
(1998), No. 2, pp. 169-192, at 186-7. Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero and Horacio Guido 
(officials of the International Labour Office) also give an overview on the application of the 
ILO Convention 87: ILO principles concerning the right to strike, International Labour 
Review, Vol. 137 (1998), No. 4, pp. 441-481. 
213 ILO Committee of Experts, General Survey 1994, paragraph 179. 
214 ILO Committee on Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the 
Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association (Digest), 4th edition, Geneva, ILO 
1996, paragraph 475. 
215 In terms of Novitz, see e.g. her outlook, p. 368, in fine.  
216 See International Labour Conference 81st Session 1994, Report of Committee of Experts, 
General Survey, paragraph 149, p. 66. The Committee also found that protection of strikers 
under the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 1957 (No. 105) extends to individuals, as 
does the protection under the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(presented later in this article) and the European Social Charter of 1961 (presented later in this 
article); loc cit., footnote 23. The Committee further noted that while the right to strike is an 
intrinsic corollary of the right to organize protected by Convention No. 87, it cannot be 
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confederations in Article 5 of the Convention No. 87, also covers sympathy actions, 
217 secondary boycotts included. 218 
                                                                                                                                            
considered as an absolute right. It may be ‘subject to a general prohibition in exceptional 
circumstances’ and ‘governed by provisions laying down conditions for, or restrictions on, the 
exercise of this fundamental right;’ loc.cit., paragraph 151.  
217 Ibid., paragraph 168, p. 74.  The Committee noted that sympathy strikes are recognized as 
lawful in some countries. It further noted the need for distinction (such as an exact definition 
of the concept of a sympathy strike; a relationship justifying recourse to this type of strike, 
etc.) but concluded that ‘a general prohibition on sympathy strikes could lead to abuse and 
that workers should be able to take such action, provided the initial strike they are supporting 
is itself lawful.’  The 1996 Digest (footnote 214, supra), paragraph 489, confirmed that a ban 
on strike action not linked to a collective dispute to which the employee or union is a party is 
contrary to the principles of freedom of association. It further referred to 284th Report, Case 
No. 1575, paragraph 911. This essentially repeated the position of the 1994 General Survey 
(paragraph 168) but also referred to the General Survey of 1983, paragraph 217. Gernigon et 
al. also report a case in 1987 where a Decree did not ban sympathy strikes but merely 
regulated them by limiting the possibilities of recourse to this type of action. The Committee 
on Freedom of Association found that various procedural provisions might be justified (as 
well as security provisions) but e.g. geographical or sectoral restrictions placed on sympathy 
strikes – which therefore exclude general strikes of this nature - it found as constituting a 
serious obstacle to the calling of such strikes; Gernigon et al. (footnote 212), p. 447; Reports 
of the Committee on Freedom of Association, in Official Bulletin (Geneva), Vol. LXX, Series 
B, No. 1, 248th Report, Case No. 1381, paragraphs 417-8.  As to more recent practice, one 
may refer e.g. to the complaint of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) et al. v. Australia, report No. 320, case No. 1963 (Doc. Vol. LXXXIII, 2000, Series 
B, No. 1) where the Committee on Freedom of Association requested ‘the Government to take 
necessary measures, including amending the Trade Practices Act, to ensure that workers are 
able to take sympathy action provided the initial strike they are supporting is lawful’ 
(conclusion (d)). 
218 The 1989 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, p. 238, stated that ‘(t)he Committee has never expressed any decided view 
on the use of boycotts as an exercise of the right to strike. However, it appears to the 
Committee that where a boycott relates to the social and economic interests of the workers 
involved in either or both of the original dispute and the secondary action, and where the 
original dispute and the secondary action are not unlawful in themselves, then that boycott 
should be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the right to strike. This is clearly consistent 
with the approach the Committee has adopted in relation to ‘sympathy strikes’’. In its Report 
2001 the Committee of Experts noted with regret that amendments in Australia’s Trade 
Practices Act 1974 maintained its boycott prohibitions (p. 206). More recently, and 
concerning the same law, the 2003 Report of the Committee of Experts, p. 220, expressed 
again its position on secondary boycotts as a corollary to its position on sympathy action. It 
‘once again’ recalled that workers should be able to take such action, provided the initial 
strike is lawful. In response to the complaint against Australia, referred to in the previous 
footnote, the Committee on Freedom of Association also protected an international secondary 
boycott, as follows: ‘The Committee recalls that the right to affiliate with international 
organizations of workers implies the right, for the representatives of national trade unions, to 
maintain contact with the international trade union organizations with which they are 
affiliated, to participate in the activities of these organizations and to benefit from the services 
and advantages which their membership offers (see Digest of 1996, para. 635). The granting 
of advantages resulting from international affiliation must, however, not conflict with the law, 
it being understood that the law should not be such as to render any such affiliation 
meaningless (see Digest of 1996, para. 631). The Committee, therefore, requested the 
Government ‘to take the necessary measures to ensure that in future trade unions are entitled 
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The ILO Convention No. 98 concerns the application of the principles of the right to 
organise and to bargain collectively. It complements the protection of the right to 
organize (Article 11 of Convention No. 87) by its Articles 1 and 2, in particular by 
protecting strikers. Article 4 of Convention No. 98, establishes the obligation of the 
Member States to ‘encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of 
machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organisations 
and workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment by means of collective agreements’. Hence, autonomous collective 
bargaining is not just something legitimised but also subject to encouragement and 
promotion by states. Taken together, the guarantee of freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining at work is ‘of particular 
significance in that it enables the persons concerned, to claim freely and on the basis 
of equality of opportunity, their fair share of the wealth which they have helped to 
generate, and to achieve fully their human potential.’ 219 
 
All EU Member States are also ILO Member States and have ratified ILO 
Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. The Community itself promotes and rewards compliance 
with them in its external relations, notably in development aid and external trade. 220 
 
 
4.4.3 European Human Rights Convention 
 
A further relevant provision is in the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1951, Article 11(1) of which declared: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
to maintain contact with international trade union organizations, to participate in their 
legitimate activities and to benefit from the services and advantages of such membership’ 
(paragraph 236). In a complaint against Canada (British Columbia) in 1988 the Committee on 
Freedom of Association found that a law restricting clauses on secondary boycotts in 
collective agreements – prohibiting trade unionists from thus giving effective assistance to 
their fellow workers - was not in accordance with free and voluntary collective bargaining and 
requested the government to review the law; report 256, case no. 1430, Official Bulletin, Vol. 
LXXI, 1988, Series B, No. 2, paragraph 193. 
219 Applying the terms of the fifth preambular paragraph of the 1998 ILO Declaration. 
Principal discussion on the role of collective bargaining is e.g. in the 2004 Global Report 
(under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work) 
of the ILO Director General, Organising for Social Justice; International Labour Conference, 
92nd Session 2004, Report I (B), especially in paragraphs 27-30; 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration. 
220 I here note only the trade aspect. Since 1995, the EU's Generalized System of (tariff) 
Preferences has acquired an additional development orientated dimension by providing 
special incentives rewarding compliance with international social (and environmental) 
standards. To qualify under the social policy incentive clause, countries must be able to 
provide proof of compliance with standards included in the ILO Declaration of 1998, hence 
i.a. with ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. See Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 
December 2001 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 
January 2002 to 31 December 2004. It was extended to last until 31 December 2005 by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2211/2003. Substantively, see Recitals 18-19 and Article 14(2) 
of Regulation 2501/2001.  
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Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests. 
Article 11(2) ECHR sets up the limits for restricting the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under Article 11(1). It is disputable whether the EHRC has recognized 
that freedom of association and joining a trade union also includes the right to 
collective action. 221 However, while the letter of the ECHR does not spell out the 
right to strike, although the other fundamental rights instruments referred to below 
do, it is appropriate to remind oneself of the need to read Article 11 ECHR in the 
light of Article 53 ECHR. 222 It denotes, under the heading of ‘Safeguard for existing 
human rights’ how ‘(n)othing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or 
derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be 
ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement 
to which it is a Party’. 223 Hence, the ECHR does not restrict the right to strike as 









                                                 
221 See case Schmidt and Dahlström v Sweden, 1 EHRR 632 (1979), paragraph 36. On this 
judgment, see Novitz p. 229-30, 320-1. Advocate General Jacobs in case C-67/96 Albany 
[1999] ECR I-5751 (paragraph 145 of the opinion of 28.1.1999) asserted that ‘nor does 
Article 11 necessarily imply a right to strike, since the interests of the members can be 
furthered by other means’. He referred to paragraph 36 of judgment Schmidt and Dahlström 
v. Sweden. While it is true that paragraph 36 of Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden also refers 
to ‘other means’, it nevertheless presents – in paragraph 36 - the right to strike as one of the 
most important means of protecting occupational interests and required, based on the ECHR, 
that the members should have in national law the possibility of promoting their occupational 
interests by means of their organisations.  On this basis the Presidium of European 
Convention of 2000 anchored its interpretation on Article 11 ECHR (as recognizing the right 
to strike) to judgment Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden, see Charte 4192/00 Convent 18, 27 
March 2000, p. 7. This debate received a further nuance from judgment Unison v. UK in 2002 
in which a Chamber of the EHRC asserted that the proposed strike must be regarded as 
concerning the occupational interests of the applicant’s members in the sense covered by 
Article 11 of the Convention; application No. 53574/99, Decision of 10 January 2002, ECHR 
2002-I, available via the HUDOC portal. On this judgment and about the (only) 
‘occupational’ right to strike presented there, see Novitz, p. 231-2. 
222 It is to be denoted how e.g. in case Gustafsson v. Sweden the EHRC referred (in paragraph 
53) as arguments to the other international treaties, including Article 6 of the European Social 
Charter, Article 8 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and Conventions nos. 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organisation. See further 
footnote 314, infra. 
223 Novitz concludes that the EHRC has not applied Article 11 consistently with Article 53 
(that she still counts as Article 60; the articles of section III of the Convention were 
renumbered by Protocol No. 11 (ETS No. 155)) especially by leaving aside the relevant ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98. See Novitz, p. 239-240.  
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4.4.4 European Social Charter 
 
The European Social Charter of 1961 declares in its Article 6(4), as follows:  
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the 
Parties undertake:  
and recognize:  
4. the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of 
interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of 
collective agreements previously entered into. 224 
Article H of the Charter, as revised in 1996 (Article 32 of the 1961 Charter), 
stipulates that ‘the provisions of this Charter shall not prejudice the provisions of 
domestic law or of any bilateral or multilateral treaties, conventions or agreements 
which are already in force, or may come into force, under which more favourable 
treatment would be accorded to the persons protected’. 
The Appendix to Article 6(4) declares that ‘It is understood that each Contracting 
Party may, insofar as it is concerned, regulate the exercise of the right to strike by 
law, provided that any further restriction that this might place on the right can be 
justified under the terms of Article 31’. However, Article 31 (Article G in the revised 
Charter of 1996) qualified these possible restrictions, as follows 
1. The rights and principles set forth in Part I when effectively realised, and their 
effective exercise as provided for in Part II, shall not be subject to any 
restrictions or limitations not specified in those parts, except such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others or for the protection of public interest, national 
security, public health, or morals.  
2. The restrictions permitted under this Charter to the rights and obligations set 
forth herein shall not be applied for any purpose other than that for which they 
have been prescribed. 
Noteworthy is that the ESC defines the scope of the right to strike/collective action 
being ‘cases of conflicts of interest’ and derives it, similarly to that in the ILO 
nowadays, from the ‘effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively’. The ESC 
is the only international treaty that expressly deals with the question of restrictions 
arising out of previous collective agreements. 
                                                 
224 It is worth denoting that the provision refers to obligations that might arise out of a 
previous agreement. Such obligations can be excluded. That is what the Swedish lex Britannia 
does; see section 4.9.4, and footnote 294, infra. The European Social Charter is inherently 
subject to reservations (also by its Article G). Greece has not accepted its Articles 5 and 6 
whereas Austria, Luxembourg, Poland and Turkey have not accepted Article 6(4); 
www.coe.int. Novitz further points out that Germany, the Netherlands and Spain have 
excluded the application of the ESC to certain officials in the public sector, p. 132, footnote 
40. On the other hand, Sulkunen (in International Trade Union Rights) concludes that the 
supervisory practice of the Charter is rather uniform with that of the ILO Conventions 87 and 
98; p. 651-2 in the English summary. 
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4.4.5 United Nations’ Covenants 
The UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 22, 
recognizes freedom of association. Furthermore, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Article 8(1)(d), recognizes ‘the right to 
strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular 
country’. Article 8(3) stipulates that nothing in Article 8 shall authorize state 
measures prejudicing ILO Convention No. 87. The EU has incorporated these 
covenants into its external human rights policy, even as parts of the acquis. 225 
 
 
4.4.6 Community Law and Charters 
 
Following the case-law of the ECJ since Stauder 226 in 1969, the Preamble of the 
Single European Act was the first piece of written EC law sensu lato that referred to 
fundamental rights, recognized in national law, the ECHR and the European Social 
Charter.  
 
The 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, as a solemn 
declaration of the 11 Member States, stated as follows: 
 
13. The right to resort to collective action in the event of a conflict of interests 
shall include the right to strike, subject to the obligations arising under 
national regulations and collective agreements. 
 
The last Recital of the Preamble to the 1989 Charter (naturally) declared its non-
regressive nature as to national rights. 
 
Article 6(1) TEU states that ‘the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States’. In Article F.2 (now 6(2) TEU) 
the Union in 1992 committed itself to respect the fundamental rights, enshrined in the 
ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, as general principles of EC law. According to Article 6(3) TEU the Union 
shall respect the national identities of its member States. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
acknowledged in Article 136 EC, first paragraph, to ‘have in mind’ the European 
Social Charter of 1961 and the Community Charter on Fundamental Social Rights of 
                                                 
225 See Council Regulation (EC) No 975/1999of 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements 
for the implementation of development cooperation operations which contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of 
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms; see Recital 6 in the Preamble and Article 
2(1). See further Council Regulation (EC) No 976/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the 
requirements for the implementation of Community operations, other than those of 
development cooperation, which, within the framework of Community cooperation policy, 
contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of 
law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries; see 
Recital 6 and Article 3. 
226 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419. 
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Workers of 1989. Article 136 EC, second paragraph, further envisages in the social 
field Community measures ‘which take account of the diverse forms of national 
practices, in particular in the field of contractual relations’. (I have discussed Article 
137(5) above, in section 4.3) Social dialogue between management and labour, 
contractual relations included, has been recognised in EC law since the Single 
European Act and is now enshrined in Article 139 EC.  
 
With respect to this ‘normative catalogue’, the references in Article 136 of the EC 
Treaty to the 1989 Community Charter and the European Social Charter merit special 
attention because they are in the very EC Treaty. Although the referential ‘bridge’ is 
only the expression ‘having [these Charters] in mind’, it still makes both of these 
Charters part of EC law. A bottom line interpretation is that the reference to the 
European Social Charter by this ‘having in mind’ does not and cannot nullify its 
nature as an international treaty that binds within the limits that I have referred to in 
footnote 224, supra. Therefore, if one takes the Treaty references seriously (in terms 
of Birk; see footnote 202, supra), it means that one must conclude that the right to 
strike/industrial action has in principle a binding guarantee in EC law. This conclusion 
obviously also has more practical consequences in the justification of the Swedish lex 
Britannia; see footnote 294, infra. 
  
Furthermore, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000 (the 
EU Charter) 227 as a solemn declaration of the Council, Parliament and Commission 
declared in its Article 28 that  
 
Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with 
Community law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts 
of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action. 
 
The explanations prepared under the responsibility of the Praesidium of the 
Convention preparing the Charter noted that this Article was based on Article 6 of the 
European Social Charter and on the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers (points 12 to 14). The explanations further denoted how the 
collective action was recognized by the European Court of Human Rights as one of 
the elements of trade union rights laid down by Article 11 of the ECHR. Moreover, 
according to the explanations, collective action, including strike action, comes under 
national laws and practices, including the question of whether it may be carried out in 
parallel in several Member States. 228 Still in the text of the Charter is also the explicit 
                                                 
227 On the Charter in general, see e.g. Koen Lenaerts and Eddy De Smijter, A ‘Bill of Rights’ 
for the European Union, 38 Common Market Law Review (2001), 273-300. 
228 A footnote attached to the published Charter denotes how the explanations ‘have no legal 
value and are simply intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter.’ However, Article II-
112(7) of the Constitutional Treaty states that ‘The explanations drawn up as a way of 
providing guidance in the interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights shall be given 
due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States.‘ This ‘provision of guidance’ 
and ‘due regard’ however cannot overthrow the unambiguous level of protection clause in 
Article 53 of the Charter (II-113 of the Constitutional Treaty). Besides, next to Article 53, the 
Preamble to the Charter also reaffirms the international obligations common to the Member 
States. Hence, the reference to ‘the modalities and limits for the exercise of collective action’ 
in the explanations to Article 28 of the Charter by the Praesidium of the Convention on the 
Future for Europe cannot be validly interpreted as meaning that the Member States would 
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reference to a fundamental right to collective action to defend their interests, including 
strike action, ‘in accordance with Community law’.  
 
Article 52(3), second sentence, of the Charter declares the possibility of a protection 
by Community law stricter than that guaranteed by the ECHR. Furthermore, 
according to Article 53 (Article II-113 of the Constitutional Treaty), nothing in the 
Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognised i.a. by international agreements to which all the 
Member States are party. The ILO Constitution and Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 are 
such agreements. 
 
Several Advocate Generals have referred to the EU Charter in support of an argument 
229 as well as the Court of First Instance in many cases. 230 The Court of Justice has 
obviously not yet been compelled to make such a reference and may, on the other 
hand, so far feel more comfortable in refraining from such a reference while the 
Charter is still to become formally binding through the entry into force of the 
Constitutional Treaty (in this case Article II-88). However, the EU Charter represents 
a kind of a resumé of the fundamental rights developments within the E(E)C and EU. 
Lenaerts and de Smijter conclude that it is also an emanation of the common 
constitutional traditions, in the substantive sense of the term ‘constitutional traditions’. 
They therefore argue that it is a part of the acquis communautaire, even if it is not yet 
a part of the Treaties. 231  
 
The European Commission, upon the request of the European Parliament, has set up 
an EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights. It monitors the 
situation of fundamental rights in the Member States and in the Union, on the basis of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It issues reports on the situation of fundamental 
rights in the Member States and in the Union, as well as opinions on specific issues 
related to the protection of fundamental rights in the Union. In its ‘Synthesis Report: 
Conclusions and Recommendations on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union and Its Member States in 2004’ of 15 April 2005 it qualified the 
                                                                                                                                            
have a free hand in restricting the right to collective action via these modalities and limits for 
exercise.  
229 The first reference obviously was in the Opinion of Advocate General Alber (1.2.2001) in 
case C-340/99 TNT Traco [2001] ECR I-4019, paragraph 94. 
230 See e.g. judgment in case T-54/99 max.mobil Telecommunications [2002] ECR II-313, 
paragraphs 47 and 57. 
231 Lenaerts and De Smijter, footnote 227, supra, p. 299. As grounds they refer to the holistic 
interpretation given by the Court to the term ‘common constitutional tradition’, the 
composition and functioning of the Convention drafting the Charter as well as to the 
unanimous acceptance of the text by the three EU institutions with legislative powers. As a 
reflection of the holistic interpretation they refer to case 44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727, 
paragraphs 20 to 22, and note how the Court does not undertake an exhaustive study of the 
constitutional provisions of all the Member States. They further refer to the Opinion of AG 
Tizzano of 8 Feb. 2001 in case C-173/99 BECTU [2001] ECR I-4881 where (paragraph 28) 
he asserted that ‘the Charter provides us with the most reliable and definitive confirmation of 
the fact that the right to paid annual leave constitutes a fundamental right’. The Court passed 
the EU Charter but relied expressly (in paragraph 39) on the 1989 Charter that is referred to 
by the Preamble to the Working Time Directive. - The refusal by a number of Member States 
to insert the EU Charter into the Treaties already in 2000 is seen by Lenaerts and De Smijter 
as more a political than a legal issue.  
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Charter, as follows: ‘However, the Charter also constitutes a catalogue of common 
values of the Member States of the Union. In that respect, the Charter may be taken 
into account in the understanding of Article 6(1) EU, to which Article 7 EU refers. […] 
the Network considers the Charter as the most authoritative embodiment of these 
common values, on which its evaluation therefore may be based.’ 232 This statement 
shows that it is appropriate to consider and assess the right to strike in the light of the 
very founding principles of the Union, as enshrined in Article 6(1) TEU: liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. 
A further necessary conclusion is also that the restrictions on the right to strike must 
qualify under the parameters enshrined in Article 6(1) TEU, as strictly elaborated by 
the Court of Justice in judgment Schmidberger, paragraphs 79 and 80 (see section 
4.10.1, infra).    
 
The normative complex in EC law is completed by the so-called Monti-Regulation 
(2679/98/EC). 233 According to its declaratory Article 2  
 
‘This Regulation may not be interpreted as affecting in any way the exercise of 
fundamental rights as recognized in Member States, including the right or freedom 
to strike. These rights may also include the right or freedom to take other actions 
covered by the specific industrial relations systems in Member States.’ 
 
It is natural to reason that this principle of Article 2 in the Monti-Regulation also 
applies within the field of the free provision of services, although in assessing 
restrictions on the free movement of goods and services the test patterns are not 
entirely parallel. 234 However, a natural connecting factor is the fact that goods move 
by means of transport services or stop moving following a strike in that service sector.  
 
 
4.4.7 Member States’ Constitutions 
 
As to the common constitutional tradition of the Member States regarding the right to 
strike, it suffices for the purposes of this reasoning to denote that among the old 
Member States in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden the right to strike is 
enshrined in the constitution; in Belgium, Denmark, France and Germany it is 
                                                 
232 The report is available via http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/index_en.htm or with 
reference ‘CFR-CDF.Conclusions.2004.en’. The Network also took into account the fact that 
there are provisions of the Charter other than Article 52(3) that ‘have to be read in accordance 
with the rights guaranteed in instruments adopted in the field of human rights in the 
framework of the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation or the Council of 
Europe’; p. 10 of the Report. This is fully in line with what I assert on the applicability of the 
‘ILO right to strike’ even by the EU; see sections 4.5 to 4.7, infra.  
233 Officially it is Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 of 7 December 1998 on the 
functioning of the internal market in relation to the free movement of goods among the 
Member States.  
234 I recall how e.g. in Bosman (footnote 190, supra) the Court relied on case-law on the free 
provision of services. The difference is, of course, that in the free provision of services the 
Court has not accepted the Keck and Mithouard (Cases C-267 and 268/91 [1993] ECR I-
6097) formula, according to which – in a nutshell – equal selling arrangements are not 
regarded as forbidden restrictions to the free movement of goods. In services the Court 
applies the Arblade-test.  
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proclaimed there as a freedom. In Austria and Finland the right derives from the 
constitution. In the new Member States the right to collective action is enshrined in 
the constitution with the exceptions of the Czech Republic and Malta. One may 
therefore justly conclude that the common constitutional tradition is sufficient so as to 




4.4.8 Summing up; Comparing International Treaties 
 
In summing up I recall that the ECHR (via its jurisprudence), the ILO Conventions 
Nos. 87 and 98 (via the supervisory practice and as anchored in the ILO Constitution), 
the UN Covenant and the three Charters (expressis verbis) – two of them besides 
issued within the Community - do recognize the right to strike as a fundamental right, 
complemented by the Monti-Regulation in secondary EC law. Hence, the national 
constitutional tradition together with the international treaties justifies concluding that 
the right to strike is a fundamental right in EC law.  
 
Within these international instruments, the protection of the right to strike is obviously 
the broadest and strongest under the ILO Conventions No. 87 and 98, as anchored in 
the ILO Constitution. 235 It is notable that the EU Charter of 2000 comes close to them 
at least in the sense that it recognizes the right to strike for organizations, too, more 
particularly ‘in cases of conflict of interests’. Even that formula anyway fully covers 
cases like that in Laval.  
 
To illustrate the difference between the approach (and interpretation) of the ECHR 
and that of the ILO, I would mention the freedom of association. I would further point 
out that for analytical purposes it is common to make, in describing the basic trade 
union rights, a distinction between three facets: the right to organise (or, freedom of 
association), the right to collective action and the right to collective bargaining. 236 In 
the judicial practice under Article 11 of the ECHR this distinction has generated some 
discussion as to whether the right to strike can be derived from the freedom of 
association. 237 Obviously, that discussion still continues. In the ILO practice, hence 
under Convention No. 87, both the right to strike and the right to collective bargaining 
have been unequivocally derived from the freedom of association. 238 239 Furthermore, 
                                                 
235 On this, concerning particularly the permissible objectives of a strike, see Novitz pp. 285-
294 (also with more references to ILO practice on sympathy actions, pp. 290-292), and as a 
summary and on theoretical, structural and contextual differences, pp. 329-339.   
236 This is what e.g. AG Jacobs did in case C-67/96 Albany (footnote 221, supra); see 
paragraph 134 of the Opinion of 28 January 1999.  
237 See footnote 221, supra, concerning the debate as to case Schmidt and Dahlström v. 
Sweden and especially the position of AG Jacobs thereon. 
238 As to the right to strike, see e.g. footnote 213, supra. As to the right to collective 
bargaining, the 1996 Digest (footnote 214, supra), referring to the travaux préparatoires of 
Convention No. 87, characterized it, as follows: ‘The right to bargain freely with employers 
with respect to conditions of work constitutes an essential element in freedom of association, 
and trade unions should have the right, through collective bargaining or other lawful means, 
to seek to improve the living and working conditions of those whom the trade unions 
represent. The public authorities should refrain from any interference which would restrict 
this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof. Any such interference would appear to 
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and illustratively, in the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work the ILO defines as core labour rights: the freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. The report, drawn up under 
the responsibility of the ILO Director-General, following up the 1998 Declaration, 
sets forth that ‘the right to strike is the logical corollary of the effective realization of 
the right to collective bargaining. If it does not exist, then bargaining risks being 
inconsequential – a dead letter.’ 240 This way the 1998 Declaration is the modern – 
and additional - source of the universal right to strike, expressly anchored in the ILO 
Constitution. But coming back to the question about arguably different contents of 
freedom of association within the ILO and the EHRC, crucial is to see that the ILO 
practice is by no means imprisoned by any constraints in the analytical distinction in 
three facets. On the other hand, there is nothing in the 1998 Declaration showing any 
aim to restrict or dilute the value of the earlier positions in the supervisory practice by 
this certain shift of emphasis, i.e. definition of the right to collective bargaining, too, 
as the source of the right to strike. Defending economic and social interests remains as 
its scope. This shift of emphasis reflects more adequately the common ground that 
justified strikes have a justified goal, i.e. normally an agreement with the employer 
side. - Finally, noteworthy is also that the EU Charter presents the right to strike as an 
extension (or, guarantee) of the right to collective bargaining. 
 
However, the special status granted in the fundamental rights doctrine to the ECHR 
(Omega Spielhallen, paragraph 33) would lead one to conclude that the ECJ would 
find it possible to decide the lot of the right to strike in EC law, as well as the Laval 
(Vaxholm) case, by using the ‘occupational’ right to strike, recognized i.a. in Unison v. 
UK by the EHRC. In this sense it is to be noted that already Articles 53 of the ECHR 
and the EU Charter directly lead to the application of the fundamental rights doctrine 
in drawing even exclusive inspiration from the ILO right to strike, taking into account 
that the ILO Constitution and Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 bind every EC Member 
State. Another issue is that a strong requirement of coherence – and, in fact, a moral 
argument - militates for the same result: what the EU promotes and rewards in its 
external relations as a part of the acquis communautaire (i.e. application of ILO 
Conventions – i.a. - Nos. 87 and 98 in the Generalized System of Preferences), it must 
also respect internally.   
 
Still, the special status of the ECHR in the fundamental rights doctrine, together with 
the certain margin of discretion inherent in ‘drawing inspiration’ from international 
treaties, leads to a discussion of two additional legal sources in this context:  the effect 
of Article 307 EC and general international law. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
infringe the principle that workers' and employers' organizations should have the right to 
organize their activities and to formulate their programmes’; Digest, paragraph 782. See that 
e.g. AG Jacobs in Albany (footnote 221, supra) at this point, concerning the right to collective 
bargaining, refers only to (the wording in Article 4 of) Convention No. 98; he concluded that 
‘no right is granted’; paragraph 147 of the opinion of 28.1.1999. 
239 Sulkunen states that the right to collective bargaining has been derived from Convention 
No. 98 as well; Sulkunen, Kansainväliset ammattiyhdistysoikeudet (International Trade 
Union Rights), p. 647 (in the English summary).   
240 ILO, Your Voice at Work (2000), paragraph 101; www.ilo.org. 
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4.5 Article 307 EC 
 
Article 307 EC, first paragraph, stipulates that ‘(t)he rights and obligations arising 
from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the 
date of their accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one 
or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this 
Treaty.’ Article 307 EC is of general scope and applies to any international agreement, 
irrespective of subject-matter, which is capable of affecting the application of the 
Treaty. 241 Furthermore, the purpose of Article 307, first paragraph, is defined ‘in 
accordance with the principles of international law’, i.e. the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. 242 243 Furthermore, crucial in an ILO context, the leitmotiv for 
                                                 
241 Case 812/79 Attorney General v Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, paragraph 6, and Case C-
158/91 Levy [1993] ECR I-4287, paragraph 11. On Levy Macleod, Hendry and Hyett, The 
External Relations of the European Communities, Clarendon Press Oxford 1996, p. 230, have 
written laconically that the duty of the Community to respect pre-existing agreements of the 
Member States ‘extends to permitting the Member State to fulfil its obligations, if necessary 
by allowing it to maintain in place legislation which would otherwise be contrary to its 
Community obligations’. Piet Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union. Legal and 
Constitutional Foundations. Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 338-9, denotes a contrast 
between the outcome in Levy and the opinion of Lenz AG in joined cases 209 to 213/84 
Ministère public v. Asjes [1986] ECR 1425, 1453. The latter conditioned the effect of Article 
307 EC, first paragraph, by compliance with the second paragraph. Eeckhout’s conclusion is 
that deviating from judgment Levy (or from the opinion of Tesauro AG in Levy) would mean 
to let the EC law impose a breach of international law. 
242 See e.g. Case C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal [2000] ECR 5215, paragraph 53.  The 
Vienna Convention is available e.g. via http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm. 
243 The ECJ has applied the Vienna Convention, next to case Levy (see footnote 241), 
paragraphs 19 and 20, e.g. in its Opinion 1/91 European Economic Area [1991] ECR I-6079, 
paragraph 14 (interpretation of an international treaty in accordance with Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention) and in cases Case C-312/91 Metalsa Srl. [1993] ECR I-3751, paragraph 
12 (Article 31 of the Vienna Convention); C-432/92 Anastasiou [1994] ECR I-3116, 
paragraph 43 (on the rules on the interpretation of treaties; see Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention); C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I-3655 paragraphs 18 et al., especially 58 and 59 
(on rebus sic stantibus clause); and C-416/96 Nour Eddline El-Yassini v Secretary of State for 
Home Department [ 1999] ECR I-1209, paragraph 47 (interpretation rules on international 
agreements, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention; it seems that the ECJ resorted to the Vienna 
Convention by its own motion); the CFI did it in case T-115/94 Opel Austria [1997] ECR II-
39, paragraph 90 and 91 (principle of good faith as a rule of customary international law; 
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention). In case C-286/90 Poulsen [1992] ECR I-6048, 
paragraph 9, the ECJ not only referred explicitly to rules of international law but also 
accepted their binding nature (on this case, see further section 4.6, infra, in the context of case 
Racke).  
On this case-law, e.g. see Christiaan Timmermans, The EU and Public International Law, 4 
European Foreign Affairs Review (1999), pp.  185-188; Koen Lenaerts & Eddy De Smijter, 
The European Union as an Actor under International Law, 19 Yearbook of European Law 
(1999-2000), pp. 95-138, at 115-126.  For the purposes of this reasoning it suffices to note the 
title of Timmermans in explaining the case-law of 1990s: ‘A More Open Attitude of the Court 
vis-à-vis International Law’. Piet Eeckhout (footnote 241, supra, p. 343) reminds one of the 
simple but important source of developments. Namely, distinguishing EC law clearly from 
international law and restricting the latter’s effects once was rather natural for a new legal 
order. However, ‘it seemed incongruous for a legal order which owed its very birth and 
existence to international law to become unreceptive to the latter’. He further reminds how 
this receptive attitude towards international law has an important political dimension. The EU 
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the application of Article 307 EC is no longer limited to guaranteeing the rights of 
third countries. 244  This became clear in judgment Levy 245  where the full Court 
resorted to the obligations of the Member States as the leitmotiv. In so doing it also 
recognised the binding nature – in EC law - of the ILO Convention No. 89 prohibiting 
night work for women. France was allowed to apply penal sanctions against an 
employer who breached the Convention while he invoked compliance with the 
Directive 76/207/EEC on equal treatment. Furthermore, Levy extended the application 
of prevailing prior international agreements to the benefit of individuals. 246  
 
It is essential to note that under Article 307 EC the ILO Constitution qualifies with 
respect to every EU Member State as an earlier international agreement. This implies 
that the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining have in EC law, too, their effect as principles embodied in or, respectively, 
annexed to the ILO Constitution.  
 
It is essential further to determine whether the ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 also 
qualify as earlier international treaties. Among the six founding states of the EEC 
Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands ratified the ILO Convention No. 87 
prior to the entry into force (1 January 1958) of the Treaty of Rome while 
Luxembourg did it on 3 March 1958 and Italy on 13 May 1958. Accordingly, 
Luxembourg and Italy ratified Convention No. 98 on the same dates while the 
Netherlands did it just on 22 December 1993. All the succeeding Member States have 
joined the Community after having ratified them. This also concerns the newest 
Member States that joined on 1 May 2004. In any case, a literal reading of Article 307 
EC leads to the conclusion that ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 have remained in 
force as earlier agreements with the abovementioned exceptions. Such a legal split 
would lead to undesirable or unacceptable imbalances between the Member States. 
However, between e.g. Latvia (home state of Laval un Partneri Ltd, the plaintiff in the 
Laval case) and Sweden there would not be any imbalance.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
is deeply involved in international relations where it is also faced with the hegemonic 
approach of the United States. He finally recalls the Constitutional Treaty that (in Article I-3) 
provides that the EU ‘shall contribute…to strict observance and development of international 
law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’.  - The latest example 
of the application of the Vienna Convention (by 3 June 2005) by the ECJ obviously is case C-
347/03, ERSA, judgment of 12 May 2005, nyr. 
As to other examples of the overall value of international law in interpreting the basic 
concepts of the EU’s legal order, see joined cases C-46/93 and 48/93 Brasserie de Pêcheur 
and Factortame, [1996] ECR I-1029, paragraph 34; and case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-
10239, paragraph 32; both judgments concerned state liability under EC law.  
244 Like e.g. in cases 10/61 Commission v. Italy [1962] ECR 1, 812/79 Burgoa [1980] ECR 
2787, paragraph 8, and 121/85 Conegate [1986] 1007, paragraph 25.  
245 Case Levy (footnote 241, supra), paragraph 22.  
246 This is also the conclusion of Lenarts and De Smijter, footnote 243, supra, p. 119. Based 
on judgment Levy, Krüger, Nielsen and Bruun have referred to Article 307 (ex 234) in the 
contradiction between Article 3(2) (eight days’ installation works), 3(3) and 3(4) PWD, and 
Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention (No. 94) 1949 of the ILO; Kai Krüger, Ruth 
Nielsen & Niklas Bruun, European Public Contracts in a Labour Law Perspective, DJØF 
Publishing, Copenhagen 1997, p. 232. However, while Sweden has not ratified this 
Convention and it does not deal directly with the right to strike, I do not explore it further.  
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Hence, the finding above is the ‘delayed’ – in the case of Article 307 EC - ratification 
of ILO Convention No. 87 by Luxembourg and Italy, as well as that of ILO 
Convention No. 98 by Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands. While this, taken 
literally,  means with respect to these Conventions the non-applicability of Article 307 
EC in trade involving these Member States, there is still one relevant legal source that 
presumably leads to adoption of the ILO right to strike as a coherent EC standard, 
namely general international law.   
 
 
4.6 General International Law 
 
The EU as a subject of international law is bound by general (customary) international 
law. 247 In Racke (see footnote 243, supra) the Court expressed this, as follows:  
 
‘45. It should be noted in that respect that, as is demonstrated by the Court's 
judgment in Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019, 
paragraph 9, the European Community must respect international law in the 
exercise of its powers. It is therefore required to comply with the rules of 
customary international law when adopting a regulation suspending the trade 
concessions granted by, or by virtue of, an agreement which it has concluded 
with a non-member country.’ 
 
The rules of customary international law in this case mean those codified in the 
Vienna Convention. On the other hand, there is no real reason why this respect for 
international law should not cover cases where the Community is not a formal party to 
an international treaty but only the Member States, as in the case of the ILO 
provisions. In that sense I recall the fact that the ILO Constitution and Conventions 
Nos. 87 and 98 bind every Member State. Furthermore, Article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention stipulates, under the heading Pacta sunt servanda, that ‘Every treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.’ 
248 Therefore, it is impossible, indeed, to avoid the conclusion that the Member States 
have a mutual commitment to respect the ILO Constitution and Conventions Nos. 87 
and 98, too, in trade between them by virtue of customary international law (as 
codified in the Vienna Convention).  
                                                 
247 As to EU and general international law, see e.g. Timmermans, footnote 243, supra, pp. 
181-194 (also including a heading ‘Community Law as a Factor of Strengthening 
International Law’); Lenaerts and De Smijter, footnote 243, supra, pp. 95-138, especially at 
pp. 122-126 (under the heading ‘The Status of Customary International Law in the European 
Legal Order’).  
248 In Racke (footnote 243, supra) the Court highlighted the value of the pacta sunt servanda 
principle and stated, as follows: ’49. The rules invoked by Racke form an exception to the 
pacta sunt servanda principle, which constitutes a fundamental principle of any legal order 
and, in particular, the international legal order. Applied to international law, that principle 
requires that every treaty be binding upon the parties to it and be performed by them in good 
faith (see Article 26 of the Vienna Convention).’ The Court further relied (paragraph 50 of 
Racke) on the qualification by the International Court of Justice, which has held that 'the 
stability of treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental change of circumstances be 
applied only in exceptional cases (judgment of 25 September 1997, Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary v Slovakia), at paragraph 104…)’. The judgment is available on the website 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/>. 
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The theoretical possibility that the Member States would have certain rules for 
themselves as ILO Member States and different rules for themselves within the EU 
surmounts the limits of any genuine legal reasoning. This is a fortiori the case 
whereas, as noted above, the EU in its external policy promotes and rewards as a part 
of the acquis compliance with these ILO Conventions. In the light of the effect of 
Article 307 EC and general international law one might ask why it was necessary to 
present the overall contents of the three Charters and the UN Covenant. It was 
appropriate, first, simply to describe the legal landscape, and, second, also to show 
that this contains more than just the position of AG Jacobs in Albany (explained 
below under EC case-law) and the ILO provisions as alternative legal sources. Third, 
it was necessary to show that the application of the ILO provisions, or the adoption of 
the right to strike according to them as the EU’s basic standard, is finally not just an 
inevitable outcome but also in harmony with the other international treaties.  
There is one principal aspect to be added concerning the relationship between 
Community law and the obligations of the Member States under international treaties. 
Namely, as the Court stated in its AETR judgment, 249 where Community rules have 
been promulgated for the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, the Member 
States cannot, outside the framework of the Community institutions, assume 
obligations that might affect those rules or alter their scope. There are no substantive 
Community rules sensu stricto 250 on strike (but only Article 2 of the so-called Monti-
Regulation 2679/98). Hence, concerning the right to strike, there cannot be any 
substantive contradiction between the Member States obligations under the ILO 
provisions and those under Community law.  On the other hand, e.g. the Court’s 
Opinion 2/91 concerning the ILO’s Chemicals Convention 1990 shows that the ECJ 
takes seriously the obligations of the Member States under the ILO Conventions; see 
e.g. paragraphs 23 and 26 of the Opinion where the Court found that the Member 
States could not assume certain ILO obligations adversely affecting i.a. protection of 
workers in the field of chemicals. 251   
 
4.7 Intermediate Concluding Remarks  
The result of this international discourse shows the necessity of considering the 
application – obviously for the first time - of Article 307 EC to a situation where the 
relevant international treaties (the ILO Constitution and the Conventions 87 and 98) 
are ratified by and bind every Member State. A literal reading of Article 307 EC first 
                                                 
249 Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263, paragraph 22. 
250 The European Social Charter and the 1989 Community Charter are referred to in Article 
136 EC as something to be had in mind. As to a contradiction between EU and ILO norms, 
also see case C-203/03, Commission v Austria, judgment of 1.2.2005, nyr. It dealt with an 
ILO based national (basic) prohibition of female work in mines. Austria invoked Article 307 
EC, linked to ILO Convention No. 45 of 1935. The ECJ (Grand Chamber) a priori, let it be 
that with certain conditions, accepted the defence (paragraphs 57 to 64). However, an 
elementary difference from case Laval (right to strike) is that in Commission v Austria the EC 
law applicable included clear substantive provisions in Directive 76/207 on gender equality as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions.   
251 Opinion 2/91 Convention Nº 170 of the International Labour Organization concerning 
safety in the use of chemicals at work [1993] ECR I-1061. 
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leads one to conclude ipso jure that freedom of association (as embodied in the ILO 
Constitution) and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining (as 
annexed to the ILO Constitution) have also remained in force in EC law. Accordingly, 
ILO Convention No. 87 has remained in force as an earlier agreement with the 
exception of Luxembourg and Italy. ILO Convention No. 98 is also an earlier 
agreement, with the exception of Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands. General 
international law anyway leads to the application of these Conventions (‘the ILO right 
to strike’), also including in the case of the exceptions, and, thus, as the coherent EU 
standard, without the possibility of resorting to the standard drawing of inspiration 
(only) from international treaties. This finally also excludes any (diluting) influence of 
the other international treaties or charters - which is not, I would remind the reader, 
against the expressed purpose and spirit of each of them - as well as any difficulty in 
the national constitutional tradition. This outcome essentially also means the 
recognition of the right to strike as a right of the organisations to defend their 
economic and social interests, covering the right to sympathy (solidarity) action. If the 
wording of the EU Charter is used to define the EU right to strike, the contents must 
anyway fulfil the ILO criteria. 
A terminological remark is that in the following I take the ILO right to 
strike/industrial action as applicable – by virtue of Article 307 EC and general 
international law - within the fundamental rights doctrine (Omega Spielhallen, 
paragraph 33). Discussing e.g. the convergence of that doctrine with the principles of 
justifying restrictions on the free provision of services then implies this connotation. 
This is my way of retaining the protection aspect in the fundamental rights doctrine 
without having to repeat it all the time. 
Still, any detailed substantive definition of the right to strike/industrial action at a 
Community level (let alone at the international level) has not yet been feasible nor 
will it be feasible in the foreseeable future, given the existing diversity in national 
strike laws and practices. However, the basic recognition of the right to 
strike/industrial action in its ILO form is a commitment of all the Member States, and 
one which the Community respects. A direct consequence thereof must be that 
interpretations of Community law (here Articles 49 and 50 EC) cannot generally 
overrule or preempt the right to strike, as further elaborated in national regulations. 
This is my preliminary conclusion. It has legal support in Article 136 EC where the 
EU Member States have drawn into the sphere of the acquis the fundamental social 
rights enshrined in the European Social Charter and in the 1989 Community Charter 
of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. Furthermore, Article 28 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is a politico-constitutional 
enshrinement of the right to strike/industrial action, which can be read together with 
the ILO right to strike and can be interpreted ultimately in harmony with the founding 
principles of the Union: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law (Article 6(1) TEU). 
 
It is finally noteworthy that even the Commission has stated that ‘with regard […] to 
international core labour standards, the fundamental principles and rights at work 
identified by the International Labour Organization of course apply in their entirety to 
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the countries of the EU’. 252 Self-evidently, the right to strike is one of the rights 
meant in that statement. 
 
 
4.7.1 ILO Supervision v. EU Proceedings    
 
The above conclusion, that the ILO right to strike is also binding on the EU, naturally 
raises the question about the relationship between the interpretations and application 
of the ILO’s constitution and conventions within the ILO and those to be adopted by 
the ECJ. A preliminary remark is that the two international organisations (the ILO and 
the EU) have been close for quite some time. Their cooperation dates back to 1958 
and is now based on the exchange of letters between the EU Commissioner for 
Employment and Social Affairs, Anna Diamantopoulou, and the ILO Director-
General, Juan Somavia, in 2001. 253  The cooperation is reinforced by the EU 
promoting and rewarding compliance of the core ILO Conventions (Conventions 87 
and 98 included; see section 4.4.2, especially footnote 220, supra), covered by the 
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.  
 
The ILO standards have often served as a model for E(E)C law, even such as Article 
141 (ex 119) EC on equal remuneration which has its international legal roots in the 
ILO’s Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100). 254 A further example is the 
                                                 
252 See the Commission Communication, Promoting Core Labour Standards and 
Improving Social Governance in the Context of Globalisation, COM(2001) 416 final, p. 11.  
253 The exchange of letters is available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2001/ jun/letter1_en.html and 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2001/jun/letter2_en.html. In the latter 
Mr. Somavia stated, as follows: ‘Against this background, the Commission and the ILO agree 
that it would be of benefit to both organisations to develop their co-operation by focussing 
[inter alia] on the following priority areas: The promotion of labour standards, notably with 
regard to the principles and rights set out in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work;’. 
254 Arrigo and Casale denote that Article 141 (ex 119) EC was ’clearly inspired’ by this ILO 
Convention; see Gianni Arrigo and Giuseppe Casale, Glossary of labour law and industrial 
relations (with special reference to the European Union). International Labour Office, Geneva, 
2005, p. 23. Idem Novitz 2005, footnote 202 supra, p. 221. The ECJ referred to this ILO 
Convention in case 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] 455, paragraph 20. Besides, e.g. in the Preamble 
to the Working Time Directive 93/104/EC, Recital (4) (Recital (6) in codifying Directive 
03/88/EC), the Community legislator has referred to corresponding ILO principles.  
As an expression of the confidence that the ILO has enjoyed in the eyes of the Commission 
one may mention the draft parallel Community ship register; see Commission 
Communications COM(89) 266 final and COM(91) 483 final. Namely, the Commission 
proposed that wages, working hours and further labour conditions of seafarers, who were not 
nationals of a Member State, on board vessels registered in that EC register (EUROS) ‘shall 
be in accordance with the ILO Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Recommendation 
(No 109)’; see Article 8 of the first Communication and Article 14 of the second. Deviations 
by collective agreements were possible; see Articles 9 and 15, respectively. Thus, the 
Commission wanted to raise the ILO Recommendation into a position of a principal norm in 
the EC legal order. The Commission did not see it as being necessary to justify this legal 
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Posted Workers Directive that was also inspired by the Labour Clauses (Public 
Contracts) Convention, 1949 (No. 94). Still, a discussion about the two distinct 
supervisory and jurisdictional structures seems rather self-evident. However, time and 
space do not allow any in depth discussion of this topic here. 
 
Thus, the supervisory machinery in the ILO, concerning Convention Nos. 87 and 98, 
includes the Committee of Experts (which gives a yearly report to the International 
Labour Conference) and the Committee on Freedom of Association that works under 
the Governing Body of the ILO and deals with individual complaints. At the top of 
the interpretation of the ILO Constitution or its single conventions is the International 
Court of Justice; see Articles 29, 31 to 34 and 37 of the ILO Constitution. Under the 
last mentioned article the ILO Governing Body may also appoint an ad hoc tribunal. 
Since its creation in 1951 the Committee on Freedom of Association has examined 
over 1800 cases. On the other hand, the ICJ practice seems to include no substantive 
case concerning the ILO Constitution or Conventions. Therefore, a contradiction 
between the ECJ and the ICJ is rather theoretical. On the other hand, the ECJ has 
sometimes resorted to the authority of the ICJ as e.g. judgment Racke shows. 255 
The question of possibly overlapping and even contradictory supervisory and court 
practice is still worth some further principal remarks. In so doing I will mainly set 
aside for the present the status of the Commission in supervising the functioning of 
the Internal Market.  
A source of certain tension is the fact that the EU is not - and cannot be, due to Article 
1(2) of the ILO Constitution - a member of the ILO. It is a member e.g., and in 
particular, in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that has its own dispute settlement 
and court system. In the ILO the EU has an observer’s status while officially it is 
represented by the EU Member States. But viewed the other way round, my crucial 
thesis is that the ILO right to strike/industrial action ’penetrates’ the EU’s legal order 
even de jure (under Article 307 EC) and ultimately by virtue of general international 
law. 
However, there are several factors which alleviate a potential problem concerning 
overlapping supervision and/or jurisdiction. The first factor is that the supervisory 
practice of the ILO, while it deals with concrete cases, does not require any EC-
modelled balance to be struck at a detailed level between work rights and the 
economic market freedoms. Wide and detailed case-law of the ECJ does cover these 
freedoms. In that sense, my further crucial thesis is that recognising the binding effect 
                                                                                                                                            
structure (see paragraph 61 of the 1989 Communication) but found that ‘legally speaking the 
setting up of a parallel register is not a major problem’ (ibid., paragraph 65). 
 
255 For Racke, see footnote 248, supra. As to an ICJ reference by the ECJ within employment 
law, I refer as an example to judgment in case C-37/00 Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden 
Services Ltd [2002] ECR I-2013, paragraphs 34 to 36. The case concerned a contract of 
employment, more precisely the definition of the place where the employee habitually carried 
out his work. The work was performed partly at an installation positioned over the continental 
shelf adjacent to a Contracting State (to the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction) and partly in 
the territory of another Contracting State. One can imagine ‘inserting’ a total strike, or even a 
sympathy action into such a legal framework. However, the ILO right to strike would clearly 
streamline it. I will take the liberty to postpone any in depth discussion thereof. 
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of the ILO right to strike within the EU does not deprive the ECJ of its status as a 
guardian of the Treaty in general, let alone its rules on the Internal Market. A further 
alleviating factor is that in Articles 227 and 292 EC 256 the EU Member States have 
committed themselves not to bring their ‘internal’ EC law disputes, i.e. in this context 
those regarding the interpretation of EC law, before the courts outside the Union, and 
thus elsewhere than the ECJ. Hence, the EU Member States are also committed to 
leave any dispute involving a balance-striking between the right to strike/industrial 
action and the fundamental market freedoms (i.e. any such interpretation of the EC 
Treaty) for the ECJ to decide; its decision meaning here a principal line drawing while 
the ECJ ‘internally’ may leave e.g. a concrete application of the proportionality 
principle for a national court to decide. I will comment the status of national courts in 
the end of this section. 
Coming back to the issue of possibly conflicting judicial supervision, it is useful to 
remember the Opinion 1/00 257 of the ECJ concerning judicial supervision within the 
then draft European Common Aviation Area (ECAA). There the ECJ first reasoned, 
as follows: 
20. The Court has already recognised that an international agreement entered 
into by the Community with non-Member States may affect the powers of the 
Community institutions, without, however, being regarded as incompatible 
with the Treaty. As it found in its Opinions on the draft agreements relating to 
the creation of the EEA, such an agreement is regarded as compatible with the 
Treaty provided it does not alter the essential character of the powers 
conferred on the Community institutions by the Treaty (see, in particular, 
Opinion 1/92, paragraphs 32 and 41). (italics added) 
 
The ECJ continued (in paragraph 23) by noting that the ‘indispensable conditions for 
safeguarding the essential character’ of its own powers were satisfied. It presented as 
grounds, first (in paragraph 24), the fact that the Court remained responsible for ruling 
on all questions ‘concerning the legality of decisions taken by Community institutions 
under this Agreement.’ Consequently, the Court’s powers under inter alia Articles 230 
EC and 234 EC were not called in question. The ECJ’s second ground highlighted (in 
paragraph 25) how the proposed ECAA Agreement safeguarded the binding effect of 
the preliminary rulings of the ECJ.  
 
The ECAA Agreement also included a dispute settlement procedure that is indirectly 
relevant in the ILO context. The background was that the ECAA Agreement 
replicated a whole number of Community rules such as those relating to market access, 
freedom of establishment, equal conditions of competition, safety and environment. 
The agreement also established a Joint Committee to resolve disputes and to ensure 
                                                 
256 Article 227 EC, first subparagraph, reads, as follows: ‘A Member State which considers 
that another Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty may bring the 
matter before the Court of Justice.’ Article 292 EC for its part stipulates that the ‘Member 
States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.’ 
257 See Opinion pursuant to Article 300(6) EC: Proposed agreement between the European 
Community and non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common Aviation 
Area; Opinion 1/00 [2002] ECR I-3493. For this opinion, see the case annotation of Fernando 
Castillo de la Torre, CMLRev. 39: 1373-1393, 2002. 
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the uniform implementation of the provisions concerned. This created a potential 
threat to the autonomy of the Community legal order, which the Court addressed 
separately (paragraphs 27 to 45). The solution to this threat was that the dispute 
resolution and interpretation mechanisms ultimately did not bind the Community and 
its institutions (notably the Commission) to a particular interpretation of EC law. In 
the ILO context it is essential to note that the ILO right to strike/industrial action does 
not replicate any Community rules and, therefore, a similar threat to the autonomy of 
the Community’s legal order should normally not arise.       
 
A comparison of the grounds expressed by the ECJ in their Opinion 1/00 suggests that 
the same outcome would also be reached in the context of the ILO right to 
strike/industrial action: while it binds within the EU, it does not alter the essential 
character of the powers of the ECJ. Mutatis mutandis this also applies to the 
Commission.    
 
The status of national courts still requires some important comments. As mentioned, it 
is natural that what binds the EU and the ECJ, also binds the national courts when 
interpreting EC law. The obligation of the Member States to respect the fundamental 
rights – when they are implementing EU law - is also enshrined in Article 51(1) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In Booker Aquaculture Ltd the 
ECJ confirmed as settled case-law ‘…that the requirements flowing from the 
protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order are also binding on 
Member States when they implement Community rules. Consequently, Member 
States must, as far as possible, apply those rules in accordance with those 
requirements’. 258  Some elementary additional remarks will suffice here to amplify 
the point. Thus, according to the Simmenthal-doctrine a national court is under a duty 
to set aside the national rules not only when they conflict with express Community 
rules but also if they are ‘otherwise incompatible with the provisions of Community 
law’. 259 On the other hand, there is also the question to what extent the ILO right to 
strike/industrial action, via the EU, ‘penetrates’ purely national situations (and strike 
rules). I take the liberty to pass over this issue here. However, within the ambit of EC 
law, as for example in the cross-border provision of services, a consistent treatment of 
the fundamental rights requires that the national courts protect those rights to the same 
extent as the ECJ does. Primacy and the uniform application of EC law are also strong 
grounds in support of this conclusion. Hence, what binds the Member States, also 
binds their courts. 260 The logical conclusion is that the national courts also must 
                                                 
258 See joined cases Booker Aquaculture Ltd, trading as Marine Harvest McConnell (C-
20/00), Hydro Seafood GSP Ltd (C-64/00) v The Scottish Ministers [2003] ECR I-7411, 
paragraph 88.    
259 See case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] 
ECR 629, paragraphs 18 to 24. 
260 The fact that the rules regarding the EU right to strike/industrial action derive essentially 
from an outside source, i.e. the ILO, does not alter the criteria applicable when a national 
court considers a request for a preliminary ruling of the ECJ. For these criteria, see e.g. 
Ojanen, footnote 207 supra, pp. 188-203, where he gives i.a. an explanation of the acte clair 
doctrine (p. 196 et seq.) under which a national court can refrain from making a reference to 
the ECJ. The first condition of that doctrine requires that the national court be ‘convinced that 
the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of 
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protect the fundamental ILO right to strike/industrial action and balance it with the 
market freedoms, just as the ECJ does. I discuss it further, mainly in my section 
4.10.4, infra.  
 
 
4.8 EC Case-law 
 
It is notable that EC case-law recognizes the right to strike, although originally in staff 
cases. In Union Syndicale 261 the Court arguably recognized, first, the individual right 
to form and join an association and, secondly, the collective right to take action. The 
fundamental nature of those two rights was confirmed in Bosman 262 with respect to 
freedom of association in general and in Maurissen 263 more specifically with regard 
to trade unions.  
 
In Albany 264 Advocate General Jacobs recognized, on the basis of this case-law, that 
‘the right to take collective action in order to protect occupational interests in so far as 
it is indispensable for the enjoyment of freedom of association is also protected by 
Community law’. 265 Hence, he did not recognize the right to strike as a fundamental 
right in EC law but as something to be protected. It is to be underlined that he 
presented his analysis in 1999 and relied only on a disputable interpretation of Article 
11 ECHR, thus passing the European Social Charter concerning the right to strike 266 
and, especially, the ILO Convention No. 87 with its supervisory practice. The Court 
was able to pass the right to strike while it had to take stock – in relation to 
competition rules 267 - only on collective bargaining and on its results, i.e. a collective 
labour agreement. It decided that these agreements outweighed fundamental 
competition rules, hence, they must themselves result from a fundamental right, 
namely a right to collective bargaining. Such a right without the right to strike would 
                                                                                                                                            
Justice’; paragraph 16 of case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415. Regarding the right to 
strike/industrial action, especially apposite is Ojanen’s general statement that ‘[t]hus, when 
the point is new and invites construction of Community legal system as a whole and the 
objectives thereof, the Court of Justice alone is in the position to ponder such broad and 
significant questions’; ibid., p. 201.      
261 Case 175/73 Union Syndicale, Massa and Kortner [1974] ECR 917, paragraph 14. 
262 See paragraphs 79 and 80 of Bosman (footnote 190, supra).  
263 Joined Cases C-193/87 and C-194/87 Maurissen and European Public Service Union v 
Court of Auditors [1990] ECR I-95, paragraphs 11 to 16 and 21.  
264 Case Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie is case 
C-67/96 [1999] ECR I-5751. Its joined cases were Brentjens, C-115-117/97, and Drijvende 
Bokken, C-218/97. As to Albany in defining the demarcation line between collective 
agreements and competition rules, see Bruun Niklas & Hellsten Jari (eds.), Collective 
Agreement and Competition Law in the EU, DJØF, Copenhagen 2001. As to Albany as a 
more general landmark showing the relationship between the economic and social dimensions 
in EC law, see Hellsten 2005 (footnote 107, supra), pp. 67-71. 
265 Paragraph 159 of the Opinion of 28 January 1999.  
266 He mentions only the right to collective bargaining in the European Social Charter, 
paragraph 146 of the Opinion. 
267 I rhetorically recall the fundamental nature of the competition law regime (Article 81 EC) 
in the acquis; it ‘constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the 
accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the 
functioning of the internal market.’  See i.a. case C-126/97 Eco Swiss [1999] ECR I-3055, 
paragraph 36. 
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be anomalous, like collective begging. I will come back to this in the context of the 
free provision of services.  
 
One ‘internal’ ground for accepting the entitlement to secondary (solidarity) action in 
EC law can be seen in the fact that in defining – in Albany - the scope of the immunity 
of collective agreements vis-à-vis competition rules the Court did not accept the third 
condition suggested by Advocate General Jacobs, namely that the relevant collective 
agreement should not 'directly affect [...] relations between employers and third 
parties, such as clients, suppliers, competing employers or consumers’. 268 
 
The ECJ (sitting in plenum) also tackled in 1991 the right to strike in case Dansk 
Slagterier where it indirectly deduced the right to strike (and its indirect protection)  
from the concepts of a prudent businessman and (an in casu dismissed) force majeure. 
269 It was also essential that the likelihood and probable effects of a declared strike 
threat were assessed in their real national context where the Court took into account 
the Danish system of collective bargaining and the negotiation and strike practice of 
the Danish trade unions. The reasoning justifies concluding that this principle – a 
strike is to be assessed in its real national context – has general significance in EC law. 
270  
 
In conclusion, the case-law of the ECJ also recognizes the right to strike and takes it 
in its real context. 271 
                                                 
268 See paragraph 193 of the Opinion of AG Jacobs. In case C-222/98 van der Woude [2000] 
ECR I-7111 AG Fennelly found this proposed restriction as undermining ‘the solidarity 
inherent in collective bargaining’ (paragraph 32 of the Opinion of 11 May 2000). The Court 
did not endorse this but confined itself to assessing the resulting collective agreement on the 
basis of judgment Albany. Germanotta and Novitz have found the solidarity statement of 
Fennelly to be brave and ‘most promising for advocates of an entitlement to take secondary 
action’ (footnote 209, supra, p. 77). The context (a collective sickness insurance) in van der 
Woude seems, however, to refer more to solidarity between those within the scope of a 
collective agreement than with those outside. Anyway, Fennelly’s statement was not just 
brave but also true. 
269 Case C-338/89 Organisationen Danske Slagterier agissant pour Jydske Andelsslagteriers 
Konservesfabrik AmbA (Jaka) v Landbrugsministeriet [1991] ECR I-2315; the key words 
were ’Force majeure’ and ‘Interruption of supplies owing to a strike’. In paragraph 21 the 
Court wrote, as follows: ‘Similarly, the possibility mentioned by the national court that the 
strike would have no effects on the undertaking concerned, because, for example, negotiations 
might be resumed, the strike postponed or an exception made for the transport of animals or 
foodstuffs, is not decisive. As the Court ruled in its judgment in Case 4/68 Firma 
Schwarzwaldmilch GmbH v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Fette [1968] ECR 377, an event is 
abnormal when it would have been considered improbable by a prudent businessman 
exercising due care. Such is not the case when the elimination of the effects of a strike, which 
is foreseeable in itself, depends on the occurrence of other events which are beyond the 
control of the trader concerned and incalculable in nature, as is shown by the Danish trade 
union practice described in these proceedings’. The Danish system of collective agreements 
and the way it operates in practice was accordingly referred to by AG Mischo in his Opinion 
of 22.1.1991, paragraph 16. 
270 Also see paragraphs 18 to 21 in comparison to paragraph 24 that is no longer bound – as to 
its wording – to the Danish circumstances. 
271 The history of EC social law reveals some traces of a similar national context, in fact of a 
margin of discretion within social and economic policy. In Case 155/80 Oebel [1981] ECR 
1993 the Court discussed working hours in relation to the free movement of goods. It 
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As mentioned, the issue (the right to strike in relation to internal market freedoms) is 
made more complicated due to the diversity of substantive national strike laws and 
practices. However, that situation is, regarding fundamental rights, not unique to 
strikes. In Omega Spielhallen the Court had to assess fundamental values, i.e. human 
dignity, enshrined in the German Constitution (Basic Law), in relation to the free 
provision of services. By its question, the referring court asked i.a. whether the ability 
which Member States have, to restrict fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, 
namely the freedom to provide services and the free movement of goods, is subject to 
the condition that that restriction be based on a legal conception that is common to all 
Member States (paragraph 23). The answer of the Court, following the standard 
formula of the observance of fundamental rights both in EC and national law (cited 
above), was rather straightforward: 
 
‘37 It is not indispensable in that respect for the restrictive measure issued by 
the authorities of a Member State to correspond to a conception shared by all 
Member States as regards the precise way in which the fundamental right or 
legitimate interest in question is to be protected. ‘ 
 
Hence, despite the diversity, EC law may protect fundamental rights. There seems to 
be no grounds for concluding that this diversity aspect would receive in principle a 
different treatment with respect to strikes, on the contrary.  
 
 
4.9 Right to Strike in the Framework of Free Provision of Services 
 
4.9.1 General Aspects 
 
Before entering into a detailed reasoning on the convergence of the doctrines on the 
free movement of services (Arblade-test) and fundamental rights, so as to shape the 
justification for a strike within services, it is appropriate to comment in one section on 
the basis, a legal source or principle, of such justification. Are there relevant 
competing justifications?  
 
As alternative hypotheses one can distinguish six such justifications, which are to 
claim: (i) a ‘Social Policy exclusion’ or ‘Title XI (of the EC Treaty) exclusion’ from 
the ambit of services (Articles 49 and 50); (ii) a ‘strike exclusion’ or ‘industrial action 
exclusion’, respectively; (iii) an ‘Albany-immunity’; (iv) a ‘fundamental rights’ 
exclusion, respectively; (v) a public policy defence; and (vi) a justification by 
convergence of the doctrines on restrictions on services (Arblade-test) and 
                                                                                                                                            
concluded that ‘national rules governing the hours of work, delivery and sale in the bread and 
confectionery industry constitute a legitimate part of economic and social policy, consistent 
with the objectives of public interest pursued by the Treaty’.  A further indication was the 
wave of cases on Sunday trading in the late 1980s. Shop owners claimed that compulsory 
closing on Sundays was in breach of Article 30 (now 28) EC. In Case C-145/88 Torfaen 
Borough Council v B & Q plc [1989] ECR 3851 the Court, referring to Oebel as cited above, 
held that ‘(t)he same consideration must apply as regards national rules governing the opening 
hours of retail premises. Such rules reflect certain political and economic choices in so far as 
their purpose is to ensure that working and non-working hours are so arranged as to accord 
with national or regional socio-cultural characteristics, and that, in the present state of 
Community law, is a matter for the Member States’ (paragraph 14). 
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fundamental rights. Each of them is both defensible and subject to more or less critical 
comments. I will comment on them briefly. 
 
A ‘Social Policy exclusion’ or ‘Title XI exclusion’ (i) would mean that matters falling 
under EU Social Policy do not fall at all under Articles 49 and 50 EC. By definition 
this prima facie looks attractive for any labour lawyer, highlighting an independent 
development and status of EC labour law.  
 
However, the ‘Social Policy exclusion’ faces considerable problems, both in number 
and contents, I am sorry to say. First, an elementary point is that the text of the EC 
Treaty does not include any such exclusion. Furthermore, finding Title XI and the 
Services Chapter of the Treaty as mutually exclusive would for the sake of 
consistency obviously also require one to apply the same principle to the free 
movement of workers. Do we e.g. want to deny e.g. the effect of the 1989 Community 
Charter, referred to by Article 136 EC, on the free movement of workers? A further 
fundamental comment is that if mutual exclusivity were to be the case, it would have 
been impossible to write already in Walrave (see section 4.2) that ‘regulating in a 
collective manner gainful employment’ falls under Article 49 EC. Namely, as is 
common ground, ‘gainful employment’ as such falls under Title XI. Next to this, 
against ‘mutual exclusivity’ speaks, or, demonstrates, also the presence of ‘the 
functioning of the common market’ in Article 136 EC, although as a (de facto quite 
unsuccessful) source of upwards harmonisation. 272 It is there, anyway. Furthermore, 
adopting the labour law directives on collective redundancies, transfer of undertakings 
and employer’s insolvency during the 1970s under Article 94 EC shows that Title XI 
is not any exclusive base for EC labour law, far from that. Article 136 EC also refers 
to the approximation of laws etc. On the other hand, the Posted Workers Directive 
shows how the Services Chapter may also produce labour law (see chapter 1). Finally 
(supposing a ‘Social Policy exclusion’), the Arblade-test or doctrine, with ‘protection 
of workers’ as one of its elementary components, would not exist in its present form 
because the ECJ would have applied this ‘Social Policy exclusion’ instead. Judgment 
Seco would obviously have declared that the extension right of national minimum 
wages would flow from Title XI, instead of ‘Community law’ (see section 1.2.2).  Not 
just the expressed ‘face’ but also the ‘heart’ (legal source in the Treaty), i.e. Title XI, 
of justifying labour law matters (not ‘restrictions on a fundamental freedom’ in this 
thinking) would differ from the established practice. The effect of labour law issues 
on the freedom to provide services would be assessed and justified in a completely 
different way from what the European legal audience has had under its own eyes for 
decades. These comments are not exhaustive. Summing up one may state that the 
economic and social factors in EC law are also legally deeply and mutually 
interlinked. They are not exclusive. 
 
I have discussed the ‘strike/industrial action exclusion’ (ii) in section 4.3, with the 
conclusion that a strike in an internal market context falls under the Treaty, ultimately 
                                                 
272 In case-law the negation of the mutual exclusivity is graphic e.g. in Joined cases C-72/91 
and C-73/91 Sloman Neptun [1993] ECR I-887. The ECJ first repeated the programmatic 
nature of Article 117 (now 136) EC (paragraph 25) but added (in paragraph 26): ‘26 
Admittedly, the fact that the social policy objectives laid down in Article 117 are in the nature 
of a programme does not mean that they are devoid of any legal effect. They constitute an 
important aid, in particular for the interpretation of other provisions of the Treaty and of 
secondary Community legislation in social matters […].’ 
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under Article 2 EC. On the other hand, Article 137(5) EC shows that we cannot 
expect any EU strike directive that, in theory, could – like reflecting ‘the purpose of 
the fondateurs of the Community’ – elaborate the Treaty by excluding strikes from the 
legal ambit of the fundamental freedoms. Neither has the Monti-regulation 2679/98 
such an effect as judgment Schmidberger (see section 4.10.1) indirectly shows: there 
is no reference to the Regulation although the case concerned the free movement of 
goods. The Regulation clearly reflects a high protection of the fundamental right to 
strike (within the free movement goods, and, by analogy, within services), as finally 
guaranteed in its details by national law. As secondary legislation it, however, cannot 
and does not exclude the right to strike from the fundamental freedoms (in the event 
that the ECJ decides that a strike falls under a freedom).   
 
In Albany (see further especially footnote 312 and the references in footnote 264, 
supra) the ECJ set up a conditioned immunity of (sectoral) collective agreements 
from competition rules. The hypothetic assertion is that by analogy a similar quasi-
exclusion (‘Albany-immunity’ (iii)) would/should also be established with respect to 
strikes in relation to Article 49 EC. In Albany the judgment was constitutional for EC 
social policy and labour law, being anchored to the particular task of the 
Community ’to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced 
development of economic activities’ and 'a high level of employment and of social 
protection’ (Article 2 EC). However, while Albany’s final normative target was the 
relationship between collective agreements and competition rules, the ECJ will not 
literally repeat itself by assessing or justifying strikes within services. If the question 
were the setting up of a demarcation line between strike rules/a strike and competition 
rules, Albany (with its conditions) would be, by definition, ‘directly applicable’. Still, 
as a landmark in striking the balance between the social and economic factors it is 
self-evidently of high value in any corresponding constitutional interpretation of the 
Treaty. Accordingly, I, too, will resort by analogy to Albany in considering the final 
justification criteria of a concrete strike (see section 4.10.4).     
  
An overall ‘fundamental rights’ exclusion (iv) is with respect to strikes a natural 
submission in the sense that Article 136 EC requires us to ‘have in mind’ the 
European Social Charter of 1961 and the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers. Both expressly enshrine the right to strike. While their 
interpretative value is clear, 273 they do not offer any comprehensive defence against 
services rules of the Treaty.  The leading precedent Schmidberger shows that the 
relative ones amongst fundamental rights/human rights may be balanced against 
fundamental market freedoms (see section 4.10.1). While the contents of the ILO right 
to strike a priori exclude its restriction unless strictly profession-related (for example 
the army and police force) or on societal grounds (under exceptional circumstances), 
it is nowhere an absolute right. It therefore falls to be balanced.  
 
A public policy (ordre public) defence or exclusion (v) is of specific value but does 
not a priori free strike rules or a concrete strike from the fundamental freedoms, as the 
ECJ confirmed e.g. in Arblade. I discuss this further in section 4.9.3. Another aspect 
is that case-law under the EC Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters shows how 
                                                 
273 On the 1989 Charter, see e.g. joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer, nyr, paragraph 
91. On the 1961 Charter, see e.g. case 24/86 Blaizot [1988] ECR 379, paragraph 17. 
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fundamental rights are a necessary element in assessing the contents of the public 
policy, and that the Member States are in principle free to define the contents of their 
public policy while the limits of that concept are a matter for interpretation of the 
Brussels Convention (nowadays the regulation 44/2001/EC), finally by the ECJ 
(judgment Krombach 274). 
 
What is then the profile of the Arblade-test, as complemented by the fundamental 
rights doctrine (Schmidberger) (vi). Given the text in previous chapters, it is not 
necessary to present the Arblade-test generally, its position in case-law, etc. Within 
the social part of the restrictions on the free provision of services, justified by general 
good or interest it embodies the case-law since 1979 in judgment van Wesemael. 275 It 
is to be expected that the ECJ would follow that line when assessing the status of 
strikes within services. Schmidberger is a fresh landmark of the ECJ but there, too, no 
serious reason leads to the conclusion that its principal line, weighing between 
fundamental rights and a market freedom, would not be followed with respect to the 
fundamental right to strike/industrial action. 
 
However, one additional aspect is worth particular attention within the Arblade-test 
before considering its application to strikes. It must be highlighted at the outset that 
concerning (minimum) wage-setting by law or collective agreements within the PWD, 
or as a modification of the Arblade-test, the ECJ as a principal position (as a ‘well-
established’ interpretation of ‘Community law’, not just of ‘common market’) in Seco 
legitimised state measures (the extension right; see section 1.2.2, supra) against low-
wage competition from other Member States. I maintain that this test must a fortiori 
allow measures (industrial action) by workers (the ‘affected workforce’; Webb, 
paragraph 19) themselves, as well as by their organisations.     
 
 
4.9.2 Elaborating Remarks; Relation to Earlier Case-law 
 
I first resume in brief the normative structure to be used in assessing a national strike 
regarding posting workers in the framework of the free provision of services. With 
this I mean a situation where a national trade union resorts to industrial action in order 
to reach a (substitute) collective agreement implementing the Posted Workers 
Directive 96/71 (PWD). 
 
As argued above, the right to strike is a fundamental right, essentially protected by the 
relevant international treaties (of which the ILO right to strike also sets up the EU 
standard) and the common constitutional tradition of the Member States. Furthermore, 
Article 136(2) EC (taking account of the diverse forms of national practices, in 
particular in the field of contractual relations) must also be observed in interpreting 
Articles 49 and 50 EC which also have the horizontal direct effect. I see the effect of 
Article 137(5) EC in the principle that whereas it reflects the reluctance of the 
European legislator to interfere in the right to strike, it is a legitimate expectation that 
the Court will find itself equally bound – although mutatis mutandis – to respect the 
inherent national margin of appreciation.  
 
                                                 
274 See Case C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1935, paragraphs 22. 
275 See footnote 32, supra. 
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As to the Treaty, it would be no surprise to see that the Court would rely even on the 
leading Articles 2 and 3 EC, defining the objectives and tasks of the Community, and 
on an ‘effective and consistent interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a 
whole’ as the Court declared in Albany, paragraph 60.  
 
The Posted Workers Directive (PWD) furthermore fills the normative ‘space’ 
concerned. While its Recital 22 states that the PWD ‘is without prejudice to the law of 
the Member States concerning collective action to defend the interests of trades and 
professions’, the PWD is not without significance here; far from it. Recital 22 must be 
read as meaning that the PWD, being secondary legislation, does not weaken or dilute 
the status of the (national) right to strike from what it would be without the PWD. 
Otherwise it is highly important to note that the Directive itself means a convergence 
of the consolidated market freedom (i.e. fair competition) and protection of the rights 
of workers as its Recital 5 demonstrates. That was also counted of weight in judgment 
Wolff & Müller, in paragraphs 41 and 42, as follows: 276 
 
41 Inasmuch as one of the objectives pursued by the national legislature is to 
prevent unfair competition on the part of undertakings paying their workers at 
a rate less than the minimum rate of pay, [277] a matter which it is for the 
referring court to determine, such an objective may be taken into consideration 
as an overriding requirement capable of justifying a restriction on freedom to 
provide services provided that the conditions mentioned in paragraph 34 
hereof are met. [278] 
 
42 Moreover, as the Austrian Government has rightly pointed out in its 
observations, there is not necessarily any contradiction between the objective 
of upholding fair competition [279] on the one hand and ensuring worker 
protection, on the other. The fifth recital in the preamble to Directive 96/71 
demonstrates that those two objectives can be pursued concomitantly. 
 
These passages present, when read together, indeed, one and the very first post-PWD 
application of the Arblade-test that the Court uses in the interpretation of Article 49 
                                                 
276 On that decision, see section 2.2.5, supra. 
277 It is, however worth mentioning here, too, the early decision in 1974 where the Court, 
although in the field of free movement of workers, confirmed the right to protection for 
domestic workers against low wage competition: case Commission v France, 167/73 ECR 
[1974] 359, paragraph 45 (quoted in connection to footnote 12, supra). One may clearly 
conclude that this protection is recognized outside an employment relationship. By analogy 
this supports the submission that national trade unions are not prohibited from industrial 
action against a foreign service provider by virtue of the fact that they have no members in the 
companies concerned.  
278 The referred paragraph 34 of Wolff & Müller conditioned the restriction with the standard 
formula in the Arblade-test, as follows: 
‘…justified where it meets overriding requirements relating to the public interest in so far as 
that interest is not safeguarded by the rules to which the provider of such a service is subject 
in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing 
the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain it […].’ 
279 Already judgment Vander Elst, paragraph 25, in 1994 used this competition argument, by 
referring to the Belgian system of industrial relations that prevented workers from being 
exploited and competition distorted. See section 1.2.2, supra. 
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and 50 EC. It is essential to note the incorporated twofold proportionality assessment 
(appropriateness – necessity) with respect to restrictions on the free provision of 
services. As shown earlier in this reasoning (Chapter III), in Commission v Germany 
(paragraph 24) 280  the ECJ in April 2005 somewhat rewrote, while keeping the 
contents, the formula concerned in the Arblade-test regarding the definition of the 
minimum rates of pay. It was essential, in line with earlier case-law, to establish the 
protection of workers – instead of any interest of the posting employer - as the very 
yardstick of the proportionality assessment. There the analysis shows that finally the 
proportionality test remained as a safety valve against social protectionism or 
unnecessary restrictions on free movement. 281 However, it is more than likely that in 
assessing the right to strike in this context the ECJ will base itself, next to protecting 
the right to strike as a fundamental right and in its ILO form, on its own case-law, 
especially Commission v. France (quoted at footnote 12, supra), Seco, Dansk 
Slagterier, Arblade, Wolff & Müller and Commission v. Germany. I will come back to 
this after having discussed first the Swedish lex Britannia in the light of the Arblade-
test. That is what we obviously can do even without adding the fundamental rights 
aspect to that test. Experience has shown that lex Britannia is no industrial action 
automat. In 2004 the Swedish Building Workers’ Union concluded 98 substitute 
collective agreements with foreign employers posting workers into Sweden and in 





4.9.3 Public Policy (ordre public) Provisions    
   
A further important - but now still preliminary - question in EC law is whether 
national strike laws are of ordre public (public policy) nature in the context of the free 
provision of services. I will have to pass over any deeper reasoning thereon. 283 
However, the so-called lex Britannia (i.e. the set of certain provisions in the Swedish 
Codetermination Act) elaborates the Swedish constitution by stipulating that the 
Swedish trade unions may resort to industrial action so as to reach a collective 
                                                 
280 Case C-341/02, judgment 14.4.2005, nyr. On that judgment see sections 3.3.3 and 3.4, 
supra. 
281 For clarity’s sake it is to be underlined that this proportionality test is no novelty in posting 
case-law, for example Rush Portuguesa (and the 12th recital of the Preamble to the PWD) in 
its obiter dictum of paragraph 18 noted it (in 1990) by referring to enforcement (‘guarantee of 
observance’ in the PWD) of national pay rules by appropriate means. So also did judgment 
Vander Elst in 1994 in an obiter dictum in paragraph 23. 
282 See press release ‘Kommentar med anledning av TT-uppgifter: 98 avtal med utländska 
företag 2004’ of 29 April 2005, available via www.byggnads.se. 
283 As to the concept of ordre public provisions, the ECJ defined it in Arblade, as follows 
(paragraph 30): ‘…concerning the classification of the provisions at issue as public-order 
legislation under Belgian law, that term must be understood as applying to national provisions 
compliance with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, 
social or economic order in the Member State concerned as to require compliance therewith 
by all persons present on the national territory of that Member State and all legal relationships 
within that State.’ (emphasis added) In ‘fundamental rights language’ one may state that the 
Swedish right to strike/industrial action – like the Finnish one, included in case Viking; see 
section 4.10.5, infra – is an expression of the common constitutional tradition that has its 
special status under Article 6(2) EU.  
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agreement under Swedish law, like the abovementioned substitute agreement, even if 
the foreign employer posting workers into Sweden is bound by a collective agreement 
abroad. Hence, lex Britannia seems to belong to the Swedish ordre public (public 
policy) and to be a (set of) mandatory provision(s) falling under Article 7(2) of the 
Rome Convention on Law Applicable to Contractual Relationships. 284 Besides, being 
the cornerstone of the Swedish labour law and labour market system 285 in a cross-
border context, the value of lex Britannia, too, was highlighted by a declaration 
attached to the Accession Act of Sweden. 286  
 
It is necessary to observe that public policy (ordre public) provisions do not escape 
from the sphere of the fundamental freedoms in the Treaty. The Court stated this e.g. 
in Arblade (paragraph 31) by referring simply to the need to avoid undermining the 
primacy and uniform application of Community law. It continued by stating how 
‘(t)he considerations underlying such national legislation can be taken into account by 
Community law only in terms of the exceptions to Community freedoms expressly 
provided for by the Treaty and, where appropriate, on the ground that they constitute 
overriding reasons relating to the public interest.’ 287  Hence, even ordre public 
provisions are subordinate to the Arblade-test. 288  This brings me to discuss the 
justification of lex Britannia. 
                                                 
284 Being inherently linked to the core of the Swedish labour market model, lex Britannia 
seems to clearly reflect, indeed, the political, social and economic order of the state. Ulla 
Liukkunen points out in her dissertation The Role of Mandatory Rules in International Labour 
Law, Talentum, Helsinki 2004, p. 139, that one part of the lex Britannia (section 25a of the 
Swedish Co-determination Act) is ‘clearly’ internationally mandatory; according to that 
provision, a collective agreement invalid under foreign law due to its emergence from an 
industrial action is anyway valid in Sweden if the industrial action is valid under the Swedish 
Co-determination Act. She further refers to Swedish travaux préparatoires  (SOU 1998:52, p. 
69) according to which ‘provisions in the Act on the freedom of association, the right to 
negotiate as well as provisions on the peace obligation when a collective agreement has been 
concluded have been regarded as internationally mandatory.’ In this context lex Britannia 
(Sections 25a, 31a and 42, subparagraph 3, of the Co-determination Act) seems to form one 
entity that as a whole amounts to public policy (ordre public) provisions. 
285 I recall how the EHRC emphasized the status of collective agreements in the Swedish 
labour market model in case Gustafsson v. Sweden; see footnote 314, infra. 
286 See the Declaration No. 46 by the Kingdom of Sweden on social policy, annexed to the 
Accession Act of Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, OJ C241, 29.8.1994: ‘In an 
exchange of letters between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Commission, the Kingdom of 
Sweden received assurances with regard to Swedish practice in labour market matters and 
notably the system of determining conditions of work in collective agreements between the 
social partners’. 
287 On similar lines the Court reasoned in Omega Spielhallen, as follows: ‘30 However, the 
possibility of a Member State relying on a derogation laid down by the Treaty does not 
prevent judicial review of measures applying that derogation (Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] 
ECR 1337, paragraph 7). In addition, the concept of ‘public policy’ in the Community context, 
particularly as justification for a derogation from the fundamental principle of the freedom to 
provide services, must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined 
unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the Community institutions (see, by 
analogy with the free movement of workers, Van Duyn, paragraph 18; Case 30/77 
Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, paragraph 33). Thus, public policy may be relied on only if 
there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society (Case C-
54/99 Église de Scientologie [2000] ECR I-1335, paragraph 17)’. 
288 As to Arblade-test in general, see section 1.2.3, supra. 
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4.9.4 Justification of Lex Britannia 
 
Before applying the above-mentioned principles of EC law into a concrete industrial 
action it is appropriate to discuss in brief the status of the Swedish lex Britannia in the 
light of the Arblade test. That is the reference question (B) of the Labour Court of 
Sweden (see section 4.1). I recall in summary its components: (i) abolition of any 
discrimination and even tenuous restrictions on the free provision of services; (ii) 
existence of justifying overriding requirements of public interest (iii) that have not 
been met by rules of the home state (equivalence or mutual recognition) and (iv) 
proportionality with an objective justification (appropriateness and necessity – ‘not 
going beyond’ – of the national measures concerned).  
 
A preliminary remark is that the lack of any reference to wages in the Swedish law 
implementing the Posted Workers Directive is not a decisive factor in the justification 
of lex Britannia. This simply leads to the conclusion that the obligations deriving from 
the EC Treaty (i.e. the Arblade-test) apply, and the Directive is of (only) interpretative 
value.   
 
By giving precedence to a subsequent collective agreement under Swedish law (Co-
determination Act, Section 31(a)) the national law incorporates unequal treatment and 
indirect discrimination of foreign employers posting workers into Sweden. 289  A 
Swedish employer enjoys the legal protection granted to the previous agreement, the 
inherent peace clause included. That unequal treatment is, however, an inherent 
consequence of the basic purpose of the Act, namely to guarantee the realisation (i.e. 
implementation(!)) of the national benefits covered by the PWD by means of 
collective agreements. Hence, the purpose is to guarantee equal treatment (or to block 
low wage competition or social dumping 290) and fair competition within that sphere 
of benefits. It is in fact an obligation established by the PWD for the Member States 
with erga omnes minimum wages and such an obligation is by definition more than 
that required by the Arblade-test, namely a public interest recognized by the 
Community. In this sense, the collective agreements in Sweden, the substitute 
agreements in particular, do have the same function as minimum wage laws or 
collective agreements of the formal erga omnes effect in many other Member States. 
In other words, collective agreements based on lex Britannia put into practice the 
equal treatment principle enshrined in Article 50(3) EC. This is besides in line with 
Article 137(3) EC which refers to the implementation of directives (like the PWD) by 
means of collective agreements. Furthermore, this corresponds with the second 
subparagraph of Article 3(1) PWD that leaves the definition of the minimum wage 
concerned to the national law and labour market practice. For all these reasons the 
formally inherent, indirect discrimination via lex Britannia must be regarded as 
fulfilling the requirement of overriding reasons of public interest (see judgment Wolff 
& Müller, paragraph 41, quoted above). Here I especially recall how the Court in Seco 
                                                 
289 An a priori forbidden discrimination established; criterion (i) in Arblade-test. That lex 
Britannia involves indirect discrimination is also the position of e.g. Jonas Malmberg, 
Metoder att motverka låglönekonkurrens i Sverige, in Malmberg (ed.) Låglönekonkurrens och 
arbetstagares integritet. Arbetslivsinstitutet, Arbetsliv i Omvandling, 2000:2, p. 19-20. 
Sigeman, footnote 202, supra, pp 492-3, also finds that lex Britannia in practice means 
treating the visiting service providers different from domestic ones and foresees ’good 
grounds (’goda skäl’) for its justification (which he does not rule out). 
290 See in the Swedish travaux préparatoires Ds 1994:13, p. 333.  
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legitimised state measures against low-wage competition. It a fortiori means that 
measures by the affected workers themselves or by their organisations must be 
regarded as legitimised. 291  
 
Fulfilling the equivalence criterion of the Arblade-test is manifest unless the law of 
the home state would exceptionally oblige the employer to comply with the pay rules 
of Sweden as the host state. That could create a relevant debate whether it would be 
justified to require a collective agreement under Swedish law as a means of 
implementing the extension right of national minimum wages that the ECJ established 
in Seco, with a reference to enforcement with appropriate means (see section 1.2.2, 
supra). It is in fact an exception to the equivalence criterion; more money does not 
violate equivalence. 292  
 
As a whole, the Swedish system (lex Britannia), due to its status as realising a 
fundamental Community principle (i.e. equal treatment, as enshrined in Article 50(3) 
EC) must be regarded as appropriate for its purpose and proportionate as to the 
yardstick, protection of workers. It does not result in automatically and manifestly 
disproportionate pay benefits to workers as individual strikes or other industrial action 
in theory may do. 293   
 
In sum, in the light of settled case-law, lex Britannia as such passes the Arblade-test 
and is compatible with Articles 49 and 50 EC. This conclusion becomes endorsed if 
one adds, regarding the ‘overriding reasons’ and proportionality criteria of the 
Arblade-test, the legal consequences adhering to right to strike/industrial action as a 
fundamental right in EC law. 294  
                                                 
291 Concluding: criterion (ii) in Arblade-test fulfilled. 
292 Concluding: criterion (iii) in Arblade-test fulfilled. As far as the author knows, the only 
national implementation law of the PWD that includes such an obligation (of the home state), 
clearly justified as such, be exactly the Swedish law. Also see – by analogy - the philosophy 
in Wolff & Müller where the liability rule of the host state added at least one more solvent 
debtor (paragraph 40). A detailed analysis reveals other aspects in the Swedish system with 
such an added value, like the independent status (locus standi) of the trade union to institute 
judicial proceedings so as to execute a collective agreement under Swedish law. If the posted 
workers do not act, the union may institute proceedings so as to reinforce the union’s 
compensation interest even against the workers’ will (arg. Litigation in Labour Disputes Act - 
lagen om rättegången i arbetstvister (1974:371)). Further on, as a standard procedure, a 
substitute agreement also subordinates the employer to the wage control mechanism in the 
sector-wide national collective agreement in construction. The employer has to declare to the 
trade union each month the wages paid.  
293 Concluding: criterion (iv) in Arblade-test fulfilled.  The opposite position would mean to 
regard as inappropriate and disproportionate ultimately the whole Swedish labour market 
model with its emphasized role of collective agreements. The fact that Sweden has not 
officially indicated implementing the PWD via collective agreements cannot be decisive as 
this is at the end of interpretation of Articles 49 and 50 (ex 59 and 60) EC. 
294 This study has reached the conclusion that the fundamental ‘ILO right to strike/industrial 
action’ also binds the EU. ‘The ILO right to strike’ is ‘one of the essential means through 
which workers and their organizations may promote and defend their economic and social 
interests’ and it is therefore ‘a civil, political and socio-economic entitlement’ (see section 
4.4.2 at footnotes 212 and 213, supra). It a priori legitimises trade union action in the Internal 
Market, certainly against low-wage competition, within the concept of the protection of 
workers; see further section 4.10, infra.  
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4.10 Converging the Doctrines on Services and Fundamental Rights 
 
4.10.1 Proportionality and Acceptability Aspects  
 
In Schmidberger the Court ruled in the field of free movement of goods. In that sense 
I recall that while the restriction rules regarding the four fundamental freedoms are 
not entirely parallel, they too can be used by analogy unless there are obvious reasons 
not to. Seen from the point of view of the fundamental rights, the interpretations 
should be even more parallel, irrespective of against which of the four freedoms a 
fundamental right is to be balanced. Anyway, as to the fundamental rights of workers, 
there should be no essential difference, whether the question is one of the free 
provision of services or the free movement of goods. However, in Schmidberger the 
Court reasoned, as follows: 
 
78. First, whilst the free movement of goods constitutes one of the fundamental 
principles in the scheme of the Treaty, it may, in certain circumstances, be subject to 
restrictions for the reasons laid down in Article 36 of that Treaty or for overriding 
requirements relating to the public interest, in accordance with the Court's consistent 
case-law since the judgment in Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral ('Cassis de Dijon') [1979] 
ECR 649. 
                                                                                                                                            
However, regarding the particular justification of lex Britannia, it is also appropriate to 
consider an additional argument: the European Social Charter (ESC), which is also referred to 
by Article 136 EC.  
Article 6(4) ESC refers to restrictions (obligations) ‘that might arise out of collective 
agreements previously entered into’ (see section 4.4.4; italics by JH). It is the only 
international treaty dealing expressly with the question of previous agreements. By virtue of 
Article 307 EC the Swedish trade unions and government may invoke it, due to the 
ratification of the ESC by Sweden on 17 December 1962 with no reservation with respect to 
Article 6(4). 
As to substance in the ESC, the Digest of the Case-law of the European Committee for Social 
Rights (ECSR) in March 2005 describes generally the permitted objectives of collective 
action, as follows:  
‘Article 6§4 applies to conflicts of interests, i.e. generally conflicts which concern the 
conclusion of a collective agreement. It does not concern conflicts of rights, i.e. related to the 
existence, validity or interpretation of a collective agreement.  
Within those limits, the right to strike should be guaranteed in the context of any negotiation 
between employers and employees in order to settle an industrial dispute.’ (emphasis JH; see 
the Digest, p. 36; available via http://coe.int). Furthermore, the question of previous 
agreements is not a dead letter in the ECSR practice. Concerning a breach of a currently valid 
collective agreement (in Malta) the ECSR wrote ”Admittedly, the Committee has always 
accepted the fact that collective action could not be taken with regard to matters governed by 
collective agreements if legal disputes, rather than conflict of interests, were at stake (see 
Conclusions I [1970], p. 38). However, this did not apply to matters subject to bargaining 
during the negotiations but not covered by the agreement, which could not be considered an 
obstacle to such action” (Conclusions XIII-2 [1995], p. 283; italics by JH). The case is 
reported by Lenia Samuel, Fundamental social rights. Case-law of the European Social 
Charter. Second edition, Council of Europe Publishing 2002, p. 155.  
Hence, the Article 6(4) ESC clause on possible restrictions on industrial action by previous 
agreements may have an impact on contractual relations even between parties that have 
concluded an agreement. The right to action exists regarding matters ‘negotiated but not 
covered’ by a previous agreement. A fortiori Article 6(4) ESC legitimises the abolition of the 
peace obligation between parties that have not concluded any previous agreement. This is 
exactly the case in the Swedish lex Britannia. 
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79. Second, whilst the fundamental rights at issue in the main proceedings are 
expressly recognized by the ECHR and constitute the fundamental pillars of a 
democratic society, it nevertheless follows from the express wording of paragraph 2 
of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly are also subject to certain limitations justified by objectives in the public 
interest, in so far as those derogations are in accordance with the law, motivated by 
one or more of the legitimate aims under those provisions and necessary in a 
democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued […].  
 
80. Thus, unlike other fundamental rights enshrined in that Convention, such as the 
right to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, which admit of no restriction, neither the freedom of expression nor the 
freedom of assembly guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but must be 
viewed in relation to its social purpose. Consequently, the exercise of those rights 
may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of 
general interest and do not, taking account of the aim of the restrictions, constitute 
disproportionate and unacceptable interference, impairing the very substance of the 
rights guaranteed […]. 
 
A linguistic remark is that, as justifying restrictions on fundamental rights, the 
expression ‘pressing social need’ (paragraph 79) self-evidently means a need seen 
from the whole society’s point of view. Accordingly, viewing each of the freedoms 
concerned ‘in relation to its social purpose’ (paragraph 80, emphasis added) means 
the purpose for the whole society, hence not just an issue ‘more or less’ protecting the 
poor or powerless people; the French wording manifests this with the expression ‘leur 
fonction dans la société’. On the other hand, the freedoms concerned were qualified 
as constituting ‘the fundamental pillars of a democratic society’ (see paragraph 79). 
Substantively I submit that the fundamental right to strike/industrial action amounts to 
the same qualification as freedom of expression and assembly: a fundamental pillar of 
a democratic society. However, to make this argumentation more operational, I resort, 
in discussing possible interferences with the right to strike/industrial action, to the 
developed concept present in paragraph 80 of Schmidberger: outlawing interferences 
that impair the very substance of the right guaranteed. This does not mean that the 
other paramount ‘restriction threshold’ in paragraph 80, the objective of general 
interest, would not be important. It certainly is, but case Laval (with its Swedish 
context) does not require any detailed discussion on the application of such 
restrictions. 
 
However, some further general comments are appropriate regarding the ‘general 
interest’ criterion. First, the right to strike/industrial action finally has its ‘EU base’ 
(hence, next to the applicability of the ‘ILO right to strike’) in the founding principles 
of the Union, enshrined in Article 6(1) TEU: liberty, democracy, respect of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Consequently, the restrictions 
of that right ultimately must also qualify even on that level. Second, in a cross-border 
context it is a Community concept, but it might be of some significance that paragraph 
80 of Schmidberger does not refer to it. 295 Still, in posting of workers a natural 
                                                 
295 In Case C-62/90 Commission v. Germany [1992] ECR I-2575, paragraph 23 (whereto 
Schmidberger, paragraph 80, refers), this is clearly spelled out by referring to general interest 
pursued by the Community. That case concerned free movement of medicinal products.  
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association anyway exists with the settled case-law that ‘protection of workers’ 
represents (overriding reasons of) general interest that may restrict the free provision 
of services. 296 Furthermore, because Seco (see section 1.2.2, supra) legitimised state 
measures against low-wage competition, measures by the workers affected and their 
organisations must a fortiori be regarded as legitimate under EC law. This (finally 
‘protection of workers’) in fact excludes even considering restrictions on the right to 
strike, as far as its use remains genuine, under any ‘general interest’ of the 
Community. At the same time proportionality and acceptability of restrictions on the 
right to strike (‘that may not impair the very substance of that right’) obviously leads 
to concrete conclusions. I will turn my attention to them now.  
 
The Schmidberger formula proportionality – acceptability (‘disproportionate and 
unacceptable interference’ in paragraph 80 of Schmidberger) finally for its part also 
highlights the question about the two types of restrictions present in the Laval case: 
restrictions on the free provision of services and restrictions on a fundamental right. I 
will discuss them together since they both qualify the one and same phenomenon, the 
interference that may ultimately impair the very substance of the right to strike.  
 
Hence, the Laval case for the first time in the field of EC labour law 297 incorporates 
in the one and same case the proportionality assessment as a part of two a priori 
separate toolkits of reasoning in EC law: (i) justification of restrictions to the 
fundamental freedom to provide services (fourth part of the Arblade-test) and (ii) 
proportionality test in restricting a fundamental right of workers. The fundamental 
rights doctrine adds the acceptability assessment (of a restriction) to this already 
complicated structure. Both the proportionality and acceptability assessments must be 
first put into their context and outlined. Here I take it for granted that the Court will 
keep the protection of workers as its legal yardstick for proportionality, as in the 
relevant, and also in the recent case-law.  
 
In distinguishing between acceptability and proportionality, it should be noted that the 
acceptability assessment is highly sensitive. While it has at one level a very concrete 
dimension (with the exploitation of the Latvian workers as the core), it is at the same 
time abstract and linked to social values. It comes close to, or even within, purely 
political decision-making in relation to which any constitutional court is extremely 
careful and grasps only manifest cases of excess of the limits of discretion (by the 
Member States in this case). 298 Another sensitive dimension simply is: who decides 
                                                 
296 Judgment Arblade, paragraph 36. 
297 I see it as being justified to place the posting of workers in the framework of services (and 
the Posted Workers Directive) here with this qualification ‘EC labour law’ having in mind the 
other side of the context: guaranteeing fair competition between undertakings.   
298 I may refer to a framework applied by the Court, although it was in exploring 
proportionality of a Community act, in the case C-84/94 United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union [1996] ECR I-5755; the keywords were: 
Council Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time - 
Action for annulment. There the Court reasoned, as follows: 
’58 As to judicial review of those conditions, however, the Council must be allowed a wide 
discretion in an area which, as here, involves the legislature in making social policy choices 
and requires it to carry out complex assessments. Judicial review of the exercise of that 
discretion must therefore be limited to examining whether it has been vitiated by manifest 
error or misuse of powers, or whether the institution concerned has manifestly exceeded the 
 120
what an acceptable restriction is? Is it the Labour Court of Sweden or the European 
Court of Justice. The prerequisite is that it is the European Court of Justice that 
answers that question. Furthermore, the legal concepts present are either its own 
creatures or otherwise fall under its ultimate jurisdiction. On this basis, I think, the 
ECJ will deem itself competent, if not the solely competent body, to decide the 
acceptability of a restriction to a fundamental right. That is what it also did in 
Schmidberger, besides also deciding there the proportionality assessment (paragraphs 
90-94). It is, of course, conceivable that the ECJ confines itself to establishing the 
parameters or otherwise guiding the acceptability assessment and leaves its final 
application to the Labour Court of Sweden. In any case, in applying the final formula 
(‘interference impairing the very substance of the right[s] guaranteed’, Schmidberger, 
paragraph 80), the ECJ will rely on the right to strike as it is elaborated in the Swedish 
context.  
There remains the question about which court will make the proportionality 
assessment concerned. The examples of e.g. the recent posting judgments Wolff & 
Müller v. Pereira and Commission v. Germany would justify concluding that the ECJ 
would confine itself to establish the criterion (or criteria), the yardstick, but otherwise 
leave the application for the national court. 299 However, while there are now two 
types of proportionality, and one of them is inherently linked to acceptability (under 
the umbrella of substance-impairing interference), a reasonable guess is that the ECJ 
will decide, if not the whole ‘package’, at least anything having essential significance 
in Community law. One has to bear in mind that on this occasion the industrial action 
concerned one school site in one country. Another time the same action may concern 
e.g. even large parts of transport (services) in several countries and reach the desk of 
the ECJ. Judgments Bostock and ERT v DEP provide clear guidance by explaining 
how 300 the ECJ - where the national rules fall within the scope of Community law - 
must provide in a preliminary ruling all the criteria of interpretation needed by the 
national court to determine whether those rules are compatible with the fundamental 
rights whose observance the Court ensures. This already implies the obligation of a 
national court to protect the fundamental rights recognised by the Community and the 
ECJ.   
 
4.10.2 Lot of Danish-Swedish Model 
 
A further relevant but case-related feature is that the relevant posting law precedents 
(notably Webb, 301 Seco, Rush Portuguesa, Vander Elst, Arblade, Finalarte, Portugaia, 
Wolff & Müller and Commission v. Germany) in one way or another dealt with 
restrictions imposed by the state (and on the broad line justified by the Court 
whenever subject to the very ruling on a concrete question). In Arblade and Portugaia 
                                                                                                                                            
limits of its discretion.’ By replacing ‘the Council’ by ‘a Member State’ one might also bring 
a viable formula to the acceptability assessment. 
299 On this aspect, see sections 3.3.3 and 3.4, supra, in the context of judgment Commission v. 
Germany, case C-341/02.  
300 See Case C-2/92 The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte 
Dennis Clifford Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, paragraph 16, and Case C-260/89 ERT v DEP 
[1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 42, 
301 I take the liberty to insist on the connection between judgments Webb, Seco and Arblade, 
see especially sections 1.2.2 and 1.3.6, supra, but also the end of footnote 318, infra. 
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the questions subject to preliminary ruling involved, of course, national collective 
agreements but such as were declared of universal applicability (erga omnes) by the 
state. Mutatis mutandis, in Omega Spielhallen the restriction (ban on ‘play killing’ 
games) concerned one type of entertainment game and e.g. in Läärä 302 certain types 
of gambling (slot) machines, both in any case rather limited as to their overall societal 
significance. Differently (although not in contrast), the particular feature of the Laval 
case is that it concerns restrictions caused by a national labour market system that 
relies on the acts of private legal actors, namely collective labour agreements. The 
final means of reaching them is the right to strike/industrial action. This way it is also 
the anchor of the whole labour market model of Sweden (and Denmark). Linked to 
this, in terms of Schmidberger, paragraph 80, what might be impaired is finally that 
labour market model. Therefore that model – having its legal formulation in the lex 
Britannia - is finally subject to judgment in the Laval case, with the possibility of 
keeping that model in a Member State of the Community. And what is elementary for 
a Member State (or two Member States) is also deeply tied to the essence of the 
Community itself. The Swedish and Danish model, in realising social justice and 
order (fair competition and prevention of social dumping), certainly deserves its place 
in the Community. 
 
With the remarks above I want to highlight the challenge ahead in the case. It is not 
just combining the Arblade-test and the doctrine of accepting restrictions for a 
fundamental right in a way that is coherent and sustainable from the point of view of 
the Community law; it also has to serve the Member States concerned. That is also the 
message that stems – next to Article 3(1) and 3(8) PWD - from Omega Spielhallen: 303 




4.10.3 Convergence of the Two Doctrines in Practice 
 
However, while we live in the European legal Community, I see it as being natural 
that the ECJ in making this convergence will take as its basis the free provision of 
services, one of the fundamental elements of the internal market that is a constituent 
element of the whole Community, and thereby the Arblade-test as an equally heavy 
doctrinal category resulting from a relevant number of cases since judgment van 
Wesemael in 1979 (see footnote 32, supra). Hence, the Court will incorporate the 
application and protection of the right to strike into that legal framework and not the 
other way round. Putting it other way round would mean taking the right to strike as 
the basis; the Arblade-test would then be incorporated into that framework. Hence, the 
basis would be the right to strike as a fully new concept of EC law (although a 
fundamental right; it would still be a kind of a Deus ex machina). It is besides 
nationally variable as to final material contents. Given the overall strength of the 
settled case-law, such a way of converging these two doctrines seems very unlikely, 
indeed. If the convergence line were still unclear, it would stem - in the form stated 
above - from an ‘effective and consistent interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty 
                                                 
302 See Case C-124/97 Läärä [1999] ECR I-6067. 
303 And from the case-law referred to by Omega Spielhallen, paragraph 38: Case C-124/97 
Läärä [1999] ECR I-6067, paragraph 36; Case C-67/98 Zenatti [1999] ECR I-7289, paragraph 
34; Case C-6/01 Anomar and Others [2003] ECR I-8621, paragraph 80). 
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as a whole’ (Albany, paragraph 60). 304  I would emphasize that regarding the 
proportionality assessment the difference in approach does not necessarily lead to a 
different result, given that the yardstick in the Arblade-test proportionality here is the 
protection of workers; it covers the right to strike. Regarding the acceptability 
assessment in the fundamental rights doctrine, the situation at least prima facie looks 
different and at the same time inevitable. Hence, the historical evidence leads one to 
assume that the prima facie leading question will be to what extent the fundamental 
right to strike may restrict the freedom to provide services.  
 
However, this does not free us from the remaining challenge, application of the 
‘protection facet’ of the fundamental rights doctrine, i.e. the proportionality and 
acceptability test therein. I would emphasize that when the ECJ takes – 
understandably as such - the fundamental freedom (with its inherent Arblade-test) as 
the basis for the necessary convergence with the fundamental right, it does not free the 
Court from answering the question to what extent that freedom may restrict the 
fundamental right to strike without it impairing its very substance. 305 In that sense I 
dare to present a model below. Obviously the old adage that a freedom is weaker than 
a right is not sufficient for a sustainable answer in the Community context. 
 
Still, the convergence of the Arblade-test and the fundamental rights doctrine is 
complicated. Such a convergence, or balance-making, is in any case necessary in 
order to answer the concrete question on the lot of the Laval industrial action and 
boycott under Articles 49 and 50 EC. It remains to be seen to what extent all this can 
be condensed to a more straightforward balancing of the interests involved, having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case  (as in Schmidberger, paragraph 81 et seq.). 
 
 
4.10.4 Applying the Line of Argumentation 
 
I first recall that I have considered only one aspect of the Laval case, namely the 
question of proper wages (with holiday pay as a natural corollary). Other collective 
agreement based restrictions on the free provision of services in Sweden, such as 
certain insurances or payments to a training fund, deserve a separate in casu 
assessment. Such an exercise is better suited to native (or correspondent) scholars and 
is finally an obligation of the courts concerned. However, regarding proper wages, I 
would make the further preliminary remark that the industrial actions in Laval seem to 
fulfil the ILO criteria: the trade unions defended the economic and social interests of 
their members. On the other hand, the actions also strived to increase considerably the 
wages of the Latvian workers concerned, thus affecting their economic and social 
interests. Both angles achieve the same result of fair competition between employers. 
However, falling under the economic and social interests does not in itself make any 
                                                 
304 This is what paragraph 60 of Albany means. The interpretation is (or, must be) effective 
and consistent, and not the Treaty as the English version of Albany suggests. This is clear on 
the basis of the French and other linguistic versions of Albany. – This aspect in a way also 
reveals one additional reason why the Court in Laval will not build up the essential of its 
argumentation on the basis of Article 137(5) EC but will interpret – effectively and 
consistently – the Treaty as a whole, taking Article 137(5) EC as one element within this 
holistic approach.  
305 I am well aware that this question implies recognition by the ECJ of the right to strike as a 
fundamental right. 
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strike legitimate. The question of legitimacy is subject to a combined application of 
the protection of the fundamental right to strike and the criteria in the Arblade-test.  
  
Thus, what needs to be considered next is the proportionality and acceptability 
assessment – as resulting from the convergence of the Arblade-test and the 
fundamental rights doctrine - of industrial action based on a fundamental right; with 
the protection of workers and impairment of the substance of the right to strike as the 
relevant yardsticks. I recall that here, too, the proportionality and acceptability 
assessments are concepts of EC law. 306 However, an essential and inherent factor is 
that, due to the lack of detailed substantive strike law in international treaties and EC 
law, and in line with the lessons of case-law, especially from Dansk Slagterier and 
Omega Spielhallen, the proportionality and acceptability assessment takes place in a 
real, i.e. in a national context.  
 
Hence, the predictable broad line of interpretation of Articles 49 and 50 EC on the one 
hand, and the right to strike on the other, would be as follows: in so far as an 
industrial action of the host state workers or trade unions strives, assessed objectively 
307  and as to its nature and expressed purpose, to protect the posted workers by 
improving their working conditions, it passes successfully the proportionality test. 308 
It is even the more so if the protection is intended to guarantee the posted workers the 
same level of benefits as that applicable – for example by virtue of a national 
collective agreement – to domestic workers. The situation is just easier to assess this 
way in cases of social dumping (Schmutzkonkurrenz).  
 
In case Laval the Swedish trade unions have demanded that the wages Laval pays its 
Latvian posted workers should be at the standard Swedish level. According to the 
judgment of the Labour Court of Sweden, this first meant an hourly wage at a market 
level for the Great Stockholm region (some 2530 €/month). Before the Labour Court 
of Sweden the union announced that it required the signing of a standard substitute 
collective agreement which, according to the pay and negotiation rules of the national 
CBA, would result in an hourly wage – standard for the Great Stockholm region - of 
14.70 €/h (some 2430 €/month, if applied for that period of time). However, the 
company, Laval, was only ready to agree to 1430 €/month. 309 Coming back to the 
level of principles, as a theoretical possibility the unions could demand a wholly 
unrealistic level (such as double the normal level in the host state). In this situation, 
the pay provisions that are claimed, ostensibly for the protection of the posted workers 
(raising their wages etc.), might be viewed – ultimately in the eyes of the ECJ - as de 
facto a means of discrimination against the foreign employer and his workers. Again, 
the broad line of interpretation clearly is that as long as a foreign employer is treated 
                                                 
306 I recall the difference between German and EC law proportionality; see footnote 131, 
supra. 
307 The opinions of the often exploited and misled posted workers are not relevant. 
308 I recall how in Commission v. Germany something assessed as ‘normal’ within the field of 
wages passed the proportionality test finally without being separately and expressly tested 
with the formula ‘does not go beyond what is necessary’. See section 3.3.3, supra. 
309 The Building Workers’ Union has contested this amount as paid in reality; during the 
hearing before the Labour Court of Sweden the Union asserted that, according to the Latvian 
collective agreement concerned, the wages were 2.10 to 3.68 €/hour, i.e. some 336 to 590 
€/month; see e.g. the krönika (column) 5/2005 of the Union’s Chairman, Hans Tilly; 
http://www.byggnads.se/byggnads/38871,38869.cs.    
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equally with domestic employers, the industrial action serves – next to protecting 
workers - fair competition in the sense of the PWD and cannot be prohibited 
discrimination. 310  
It is notable that the first reference question does not pose the question of claiming a 
so-called market wage in the circumstances concerned. By market wage I mean a 
wage that, depending on historical, sociological and political factors, availability of 
manpower, economic trends, geographic circumstances etc., is higher than that in the 
law or national collective agreement concerned. In Sweden this may also include a 
substitute agreement with the non-organized foreign or domestic employer. However, 
in this study I confine myself to some initial remarks – with a commitment to discuss 
the issue profoundly in the synthesis book of this research project. Thus, in any case, 
the basically minimum nature of the PWD, which is here a relevant interpretative 
factor, does not outlaw such a claim (i.e. a claim for a market wage). Furthermore, the 
EC Treaty provisions other than those on discrimination (Article 12 EC), i.e. at least 
Articles 2 (including ‘a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of 
economic activities’ and ‘the raising of the standard of living’; italics added), 3 (‘a 
policy in the social sphere’; this is the obvious key in this particular reasoning), 4 (the 
principle of open market economy; italics added), 50(3) (principle of same conditions 
imposed on domestic and foreign service providers, thus employers) and 136 EC 
(‘…improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their 
harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained…’, as also resulting from 
the functioning of the common market…’) heavily suggest, I maintain, the conclusion 
that the EC Treaty does not outlaw a claim based on market wage. Besides, the issue – 
being also a question of restricting a fundamental right - is finally tied to the founding 
principles of the Union, enshrined in Article 6.1 TEU. 
The nature of the action requires an assessment whether the action is peaceful and is 
the normal behaviour of trade unions. In this case the assessment can be kept short. 
                                                 
310 Sigeman (footnote 184, p. 486-7) denotes that that the Labour Court of Sweden considered 
the question of market wages and expressed some doubt as to the compatibility with the 
Treaty of the claim concerned. However, Sigeman himself refers primarily to the protection 
of the host state workers: Finalarte (footnote 13, supra), Mazzoleni (footnote 114, supra), 
Portugaia (footnote 20, supra), Wolff&Müller, paragraph 40 (footnote 7, supra) and 
Commission v. Germany, paragraph 24 (footnote 149, supra). This protection falls within the 
overriding reasons justifying restrictions of the free provision of services. This aspect he 
reiterates on p. 490 but this time developed in the form of a question whether the protection of 
the host state workers justifies restrictions (like the wage claims in Laval) on the free 
provision of services even in a case where the wages of the posted workers are not so low that 
they as such would require restrictive measures in the general interest. He finds that Articles 
12 and 49 EC allow this and denotes that the wage claims concerned were not discriminating 
but merely equalled those claimed against Swedish employers. Indirect discrimination he 
found possible in transaction costs (like interpretation and translation), possibly balanced by 
lower costs in the home state’s social security costs (the last aspect being in Sigeman’s 
footnote 45). Sigeman’s position regarding the posting case-law corresponds to that of the 
author. He does not present an argumentation regarding the right to strike/industrial action as 
a protected fundamental right in the EU, but essentially a reference (ibid., p. 489) to the 
growing role of the social partners since the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers.  Accordingly, he does not discuss the combined application of the 
Arblade-test and the doctrine in allowing restrictions on the fundamental rights à la 
Schmidberger.  
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According to the judgment of the Labour Court of Sweden, some incidents of 
peaceful picketing have taken place around the site but nothing so serious as e.g. 
during the tumults in case Commission v. France 311.  
 
It is no secret that this interpretation line on the effect of the proportionality and 
acceptability assessment (taken now as abstract legal categories) is – mutatis mutandis 
- pretty much the same as the approach of the ECJ in Albany. 312 There the ECJ 
protected collective agreements from EC competition rules in so far as they serve by 
their nature 313 and purpose the social objectives of the Treaty or at least in so far as 
they contribute directly to improving one of the working conditions, namely 
remuneration; paragraph 63 of Albany. Anyway, the ‘purpose’ and ‘nature’ of the 
collective agreement served as a safety valve against misuse of collective agreements. 
My final argument on this line is hypothetic in a formal sense but worth presenting in 
any case. Namely, had the case Albany also involved a strike, then just as in the case 
of an allegation of a collective agreement being incompatible with EC law due to its 
emergence from an illegal or disproportionate strike, that strike would probably have 
received the same treatment as the collective agreement resulting from such a strike.   
 
This interpretation line would obviously be also in harmony with the outcome in case 
Gustafsson v. Sweden of the European Court of Human Rights 314 in the sense of 
                                                 
311 See Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959. 
312 An intermediate conclusion, applying mutatis mutandis the structure in paragraph 59 of 
Albany, would be: ‘It is beyond question that restrictions of the free movement of services are 
inherent in collective actions taken by workers and their organisations. However, the social 
policy objectives pursued by such action would be seriously undermined if workers and their 
organisations were subject to Articles 49 and 50 of the Treaty when seeking to improve 
conditions of work and employment.’ A further corresponding exercise with paragraph 60 of 
Albany would result in stating that ‘It therefore follows from an effective and consistent 
interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole and the fundamental right to take 
collective action in accordance with the ILO Constitution and Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 
that the action in pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue of its nature and purpose, be 
regarded as falling outside the scope of Articles 49 and 50 of the Treaty.’ This kind of 
reasoning includes no real proportionality test as in the Arblade-test and Schmidberger 
doctrine. The purpose test may, however, serve a similar function. Hence, a genuine purpose 
of improving working conditions would equate to regarding something as a proportionate 
means.    
313 ‘Nature’ of the agreement in Albany meant that it was made in the form of a collective 
agreement and was the outcome of collective negotiations between representative 
organisations of employers and workers (according to the French version; the English one 
used ‘representing’ instead of ‘representative’); see paragraph 62 of Albany.    
314 See Case Gustafsson v. Sweden (1996) 22 EHRR 409. In assessing the boycott and related 
activities of the national trade union, striving to a substitute agreement, the EHRC reasoned 
(in paragraph 53), as follows: ‘Bearing in mind the special role and importance of collective 
agreements in the regulation of labour relations in Sweden, the Court sees no reason to doubt 
that the union action pursued legitimate interests consistent with Article 11 (art. 11) of the 
Convention (see, for instance, the above-mentioned Swedish Engine Drivers' Union 
judgment, pp. 15-16, para. 40; and the Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden judgment of 6 
February 1976, Series A no. 21, p. 16, para. 36).  It should also be recalled in this context that 
the legitimate character of collective bargaining is recognised by a number of international 
instruments, in particular Article 6 of the European Social Charter, Article 8 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Conventions nos. 87 and 
98 of the International Labour Organisation (the first concerning freedom of association and 
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respecting the national margin of appreciation regarding the right to collective action. 
The difference is, by definition, that there is no fundamental freedom to provide 
services in the ECHR, with the necessary balancing between the fundamental freedom 
and right. The interpretation line above would also be in harmony with the overall line 
of developments in the history of the Community: the emergence of a real social 
dimension, particularly in the context of fundamental or human rights. In gender 
equality the Court in Deutsche Post and in Deutsche Telekom in 2000 found it 
inevitable to conclude that ‘the economic aim pursued by Article 119 [now 141] of 
the Treaty, namely the elimination of distortions of competition between undertakings 
established in different Member States, is secondary to the social aim pursued by the 
same provision, which constitutes the expression of a fundamental human right.’ 315 
According to Judge Rosas, ‘[t]his quotation from the Court’s case law shows that the 
social dimension of the EU has come to be considered as a value in itself, not 
necessarily subordinate to the economic freedoms inherent in the EC Treaty.’ 316 The 
right to strike/industrial action is also, as to its core, a fundamental human right, 
deserving equal treatment.  
 
What would finally be the effect of the proportionality and acceptability assessment, 
as shaped above, under Articles 49 and 50 EC? It is – nothing more, nothing less than 
- a safety valve, as also indicated in judgment Commission v. Germany (explored in 
section 3.3, supra). I am, of course, well aware that this interpretation line is in 
discordance with the old trade union slogan that the ECJ may assess and judge the 
results of a strike, notably a collective agreement, but not the strike itself. The 
counterargument is that an advanced trade union doctrine should orientate itself by 
taking into account probable developments (based on history) and not solely 
according to its own dogma. Similarly, a complete ‘hands off’ solution by the ECJ 
would doubtless require the right to strike to be an absolute fundamental right, but it is 
proportional or subject to possible restrictions in all the international treaties. 
 
To sum up: in assessing the industrial action in the Laval (Vaxholm) case the ECJ will 
judge (in more or less detail), in this era of globalisation, the first direct case in EC 
strike law. This is connected – not just by the case itself questioning the Danish-
Swedish labour market model but also by the ILO context (ultimately with its 
                                                                                                                                            
the right to organise and the second the application of the principles of the right to organise 
and to bargain collectively).’ In paragraph 54 the Court, based on the margin of appreciation 
accorded to the States, drew its conclusion that Sweden did not fail to secure the applicant's 
rights under Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention.  
315 Joined cases C-270/97 and C-271/97 Deutsche Post [2000] ECR I-929, paragraph 57. The 
ECJ first (in paragraph 55) referred to Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455 
('Defrenne II’), where the fundamental right aspect was not yet present; shoving the change in 
the approach it then (in paragraph 56) referred to cases 149/77 Defrenne III [1978] ECR 1365, 
paragraphs 26 and 27; joined cases 75/82 and 117/82 Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission 
[1984] ECR 1509, paragraph 16; and case C-13/94 P. v S. and Cornwall County Council 
[1996] ECR I-2143, paragraph 19, where the Court had found that the right not to be 
discriminated against on grounds of sex is one of the fundamental human rights whose 
observance the Court has a duty to ensure. The precedence of the social aim was stated ‘in 
view of that case law’. Case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekom [2000] ECR I-743 includes the 
passages identical to those in Deutsche Post.  
316 See Allan Rosas, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Application and 
Interpretation of Social Values and Rights, in Palola Elina and Savio Annikki (eds.), Refining 
the Social Dimension in an Enlarged EU, Stakes, Helsinki 2005, p. 199.  
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coherence argument) within the fundamental rights doctrine - to the Social Self of the 
Community. A legitimate and reasonable expectation is that the forthcoming 
judgment will strongly resemble Albany. This background note may be further turned 
to a sustainable outcome by resorting to one of the fundamental principles in EC law: 
non-discrimination. Such a decision line would guarantee the protection of the 




4.10.5 Reach of Case Laval; Case Viking v. ITF and FSU  
 
In Laval the ECJ prima facie will have to lay down the essential principles concerning 
the right to strike in EC law. The situation resembles that in Albany in the sense of 
filling a decades’ gap in case-law, as a heavy spill-over phenomenon. The internal 
market sometimes produces after a long delay, but anyway it eventually produces, 
new legal clashes between the economic market freedoms and (fundamental) social 
rights. The decision in Laval will be of constitutional value, shaping the overall 
balance between economic and social factors in the EU in its very core, i.e. the 
Internal Market.  
 
Besides, a first successor case to Laval in the form of another reference for a 
preliminary ruling is already before the Court of Justice. Namely, on 16 June 2005 the 
High Court (of London), Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court in case Viking 
Line Abp v. The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and the Finnish 
Seamen’s Union (FSU) granted an injunction against any industrial action, even 
against these defendants causing such an action by other trade unions, related to 
wages applicable to seamen after the re-flagging of MS Rosella in Estonia (at present 
it flies the Finnish flag). 317  The aim was to replace the existing, predominantly 
Finnish crew by an Estonian one, however, retaining some Finnish (key) workers 
onboard. With respect to the actions of the FSU, the court naturally applied the 
Finnish law on industrial action (on the assumption that it would allow such an 
injunction; see infra). The court de facto ignored the application of the maritime 
services rules in EC law 318  and its judgment was based on Article 43 EC and 
                                                 
317 Decision [2005] EWHC 1222 (Comm) of the High Court. 
318 Judgment (of the Court in plenum) in case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia [1994] ECR I-
1783, paras. 20 to 31, shows the overall status of service rules of the EC Treaty in the field of 
maritime transport. They apply. On that line in case C-381/93 Commission v. France [1994] 
ECR I-5145, paragraph 13, the ECJ then declared that Maritime Transport Services 
Regulation No 4055/86/EEC (the English version as a lapsus refers to ‘Paragraph 13’ of 
Regulation 4055/86; there are 12 Articles in the Regulation) thus renders applicable to the 
sphere of maritime transport between Member States the ‘totality of the Treaty rules 
governing the freedom to provide services.’ This a priori means that the Arblade-test (see 
section 1.2.3) applies there while it is not for this reasoning to discuss its possible minor 
modifications or specifications due to specific circumstances in maritime transport. To denote 
in brief, vulnerable seamen need special protection like construction workers (see Arblade, 
paragraph 36, in fine; section 1.2.3, supra). Furthermore, much of my reasoning above, 
especially in Chapter IV, is also mutatis mutandis valid in case Viking v ITF and FSU. 
Furthermore, my examples on the application of the proportionality principle in sections 2.2.5 
and 3.3.3, in fine, are also relevant in the context of the case Viking v ITF and FSU. Finally, 
as to case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia, the Advocate General, who reasoned fully on the 
line of the Court, also relied (paragraph 23 of the opinion of 9 February 1994) (although via 
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equipped with a penal notice against possible contempt of Court. It was further 
strengthened by a threatened sequestration of the defendants’ assets. The judgment 
became subject to appeal, not just in the United Kingdom, but also in Finland where it 
was to be enforced against the FSU. 319  
 
The appeal in the United Kingdom led on 3 November 2005 to the judgement of the 
Court of Appeal (Civil Division). 320 In this instance Viking’s Estonian subsidiary, 
Viking Line Eesti OÜ, joined the proceedings and claimed to reconfirm the injunction 
by invoking its freedom to engage in liner traffic (provision of maritime transport 
services) between Estonia and Finland under Regulation 4055/86/EEC. 321  In its 
judgement the Court of Appeal lifted the permanent injunction issued by the High 
Court and (also refusing any interim injunction) referred to the ECJ ten questions 
(with some of them elaborated by further alternatives). The first one asks whether the 
industrial action falls ‘outside the scope of Article 43 of the EC Treaty and/or 
Regulation 4055/86 by virtue of the EC’s social policy including, inter alia, Title XI 
of the EC Treaty and, in particular, by analogy with the Court’s reasoning in […] 
Albany, paras 52-64?’ This is what I have discussed in sections 4.9.1 and 4.10.4, 
supra. – In the ECJ the case has the following coordinates: C-438/05 The 
International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s Union. 
 
The other questions deal with the horizontal direct effect of establishment and 
services rules in EC law, existence of restrictions on free movement, relationship of 
establishment and services rules 322  and justification of restrictions. The last 
                                                                                                                                            
case 13/83, European Parliament v Council [1985] ECR 1513, paragraph 64) on the first 
‘great’ labour law judgment within the free provision of services, namely Case 279/80 Webb 
[1981] ECR 3305 that also started the case-law cited in the present cornerstone of social or 
labour law restrictions on the free provision of services: Arblade, paragraph 36. 
319 According to Article 34 in the Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, the Member States may refuse to recognise a foreign judgment if such recognition is 
manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member State in which recognition 
is sought. In its appeal of 30 August 2005 against the recognition by a district court the FSU 
invoked ordre public, based in particular on the constitutional protection of the right to strike 
(and i.a. that of industrial peace and dispute settlement system, and of freedom of association 
and freedom of expression) in national law, but it also referred to Finland’s obligations in the 
ILO and, consequently, to Article 307 EC.  
320 The judgment is available on the internet:  
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/1299.html. 
321 The original lawsuit was based – exactly in this order – on the envisaged industrial action 
violating EC rules on 1. free provision of services, 2. free movement of workers and 3. 
freedom of establishment. During the proceedings in the High Court services and 
establishment exchanged their ‘benches’.   
322 Case-law shows a sufficiently settled line of reasoning by the ECJ in assessing rivalling or 
overlapping internal market freedoms in a particular case. In Omega Spielhallen (footnote 
208, supra) the ECJ stated this, as follows (paragraph 26): ‘…where a national measure 
affects both the freedom to provide services and the free movement of goods, the Court will, 
in principle, examine it in relation to just one of those two fundamental freedoms if it is clear 
that, in the circumstances of the case, one of those freedoms is entirely secondary in relation 
to the other and may be attached to it...’ The Court referred i.a. to the lottery case C-275/92 
Schlindler [1994] ECR I-1039 where the full Court found that cross-border sending of 
advertisements and application forms, and possible ticket selling, thus importation and 
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mentioned facet includes i.a. the assertion that ‘the taking of collective action 
(including strike action) is a fundamental right protected by Community law’ and the 
concept of the protection of workers as a justification ground; question No. 7. A 
separate question (No. 8) deals with the justification of the flag of convenience policy 
of the International Transport Workers’ Federation. Thus, via the link to the ILO right 
to strike/industrial action even the possibility of striving after global social justice will 
be indirectly addressed in this case. Regarding the justification of the FSU’s action, 
the Court of Appeal finally asks whether the collective action that has been taken 
strikes ‘a fair balance between the fundamental social right to take collective action 
and the freedom to establish and provide services and is it objectively justified, 
appropriate, proportionate and in conformity with the principle of mutual recognition’; 
question 9. This is what I have discussed under the Arblade-test passim in this study 
when considering strikes/industrial action, in particular in section 4.10.   
    
Time and space do not allow any in depth reasoning on the legal and economic details 
in Viking. 323  As Laval, it deals with the fundamental and constitutional balance 
                                                                                                                                            
distribution of such objects, were, in the context of lottery activities, not ends in themselves. 
The case was decided only by applying the rules on free movement of services; paragraphs 22 
to 25. On the line of this ‘dominating freedom principle’ in the particular circumstances of the 
case Viking the re-flagging in a certain Member State is not an end in itself. The core is the 
pay conditions (and the way to establish them – with or without the right to strike - before or 
after re-flagging) which falls under the free provision of services; see further footnote 318, 
supra. It is essential to note that under the Maritime Services Regulation 4055/86/EEC the 
right to liner traffic is not bound to flagging in one of the two states; flagging within the 
Community suffices; see Articles 1(1) and 1(2). Besides, ‘triangle traffic’ (e.g. Tallinn-
Stockholm-Helsinki) might also emerge.   
323 However, some aspects concerning free movement in judgments under EC Regulation 
44/2001 are noteworthy already here. The background is that in Viking the courts in United 
Kingdom applied Finnish law to the action of the FSU. On the other hand, the High Court 
(like the Court of Appeal in United Kingdom, naturally) was undoubtedly a competent court 
under Article 6(1) of the Regulation because the other defendant, ITF, has its base in London. 
In its public policy (ordre public) appeal (see footnote 319, supra) in Finland the FSU, 
although in a footnote, also referred as a ground to case C-38/98 Renault v. Maxicar and 
Formento [2000] ECR I-2973.  
Case Renault concerned intellectual property rights granted in France. The defendants 
opposed in Italy the recognition of the judgment of the French Cour de Cassation (Court of 
Cassation) which then led to this preliminary ruling of the ECJ. The defendants attacked the 
French intellectual property rights (which were not recognised in Italian law) and wished the 
ECJ to define the concept of public policy in economic matters (ordre public économique); 
paragraph 24 of the judgment. Thus, the defendants invoked free movement of goods and 
spiced their attack with the allegation that the French courts would have committed an error in 
applying free movement rules. The clue in the ECJ’s reasoning then came in paragraph 32, 
second sentence, where it wrote, as follows: ‘The fact that the alleged error concerns rules of 
Community law does not alter the conditions for being able to rely on the clause on public 
policy. It is for the national court to ensure with equal diligence the protection of rights 
established in national law and rights conferred by Community law.’ The second sentence 
was in line (but broader) with what the Advocate General had stated (paragraph 67 of the 
opinion); i.e. that ‘Nevertheless, it cannot be completely ruled out that because of such an 
erroneous interpretation the enforcement of the judgment could breach fundamental 
principles, including those of Community law. This is however, in the situation described, 
only conceivable in the most exceptional of cases. There would have to be a clear violation of 
fundamental principles.’  
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between the economic and social factors within the now enlarged Internal Market. 
Therefore, the issue is of great political importance for the development of the 
European Union. It also encourages new thinking on ways and means of trying to 
accelerate, if possible, the necessary bridging of the (in general terms) drastic gap in 
wages, costs and overall standard of living between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member 
States. I will leave aside this macro-level consideration in this study and only pick up 
two legal aspects that it is worth reminding the European legal audience of (even in 
brief). The first concerns the contents of the Finnish strike/industrial action law 
regarding its relationship to the fundamental market freedoms. The second is the link 
that the Posted Workers Directive forms between the cases Laval and Viking.  
 
Thus, first, in Viking it is important, also in the context of EC law, that the Court of 
Appeal first confirmed the envisaged industrial action of the FSU as lawful under 
national law, ‘by virtue of the right to freedom of association protected by Article 13 
of the Finnish constitution’; paragraph 26 i) of the judgement. 324 Moving on then, the 
relationship between national and EC law reveals a serious misunderstanding 
(wherever its final roots are) regarding this relationship as seen from the viewpoint of 
the Finnish Supreme Court (KKO). Namely, a crucial point in the whole reasoning of 
the judge of the High Court was the assertion that the constitutionally protected right 
to strike in Finland could not be invoked ‘where the strike is in breach of EC law 
                                                                                                                                            
A further essential aspect is that the judgment (according to a combined reading of especially 
its paragraphs 24, 30, 32 and 34) de facto includes a recognition of the French intellectual 
property rights as capable of restricting the free movement of goods (in this case vehicle body 
parts).  Thus, the ECJ rejected the idea of a European public policy (ordre public) based on 
unlimited free movement of goods (and fully free competition). In addition to the author, at 
least Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon has explained the judgment on this line in her case annotation: 
Revue critique de droit international privé, No 3, juillet-septembre 2000 p. 504-513. She 
refers to violation of primacy of EC law as an example of a situation where EC law would 
undoubtedly form the contents of the public policy under regulation 44/2001 (p. 512). It is 
difficult to describe this with terms other than European public policy (within the limits and 
general conditions of the Regulation 44/2001, of course).  
Following the judgment of the British Court of Appeal in Viking the appeal of the FSU in 
Finland became superfluous. I therefore pass over here any further reasoning on judgment 
Renault.  
In the application of Regulation 44/2001 there is – due to Article 68(1) EC - the anomaly that 
only a national last (or single) instance can refer questions for a preliminary ruling of the ECJ. 
See the orders in cases C-24/02 Marseille Fret, paragraphs 14 and 15, and C-555/03 Warbecq, 
paragraphs 13 to 15. 
 
324 The courts in the United Kingdom were able to avail themselves of the Expert Opinion of 
Professor Niklas Bruun of 24 November 2004, also including a discussion of the 
constitutional protection of the right to strike in Finland (paragraphs 32 to 47) and the relevant 
references to the Supreme Court’s case-law. The Opinion answered the questions posed by 
the High Court. The Opinion was complemented (Exhibit 1) by Niklas Bruun’s annotation 
and analysis of the judgment in the Case Estonian Shipping Company v. Finnish Seamen’s 
Union and Finnish Transport Workers’ Union, Korkein oikeus (the Supreme Court of 
Finland) 2000:94 concerning MV Rakvere; see Finland, in International Labour Law Reports, 
Vol. 20, Kluwer Law International 2001, pp. 325-336. - The highest official authority in 
interpreting the Finnish Constitution, the Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament, 
stated in its Opinion (mietintö) 12/2003 that the right to industrial action derives from the 
freedom of association, enshrined in Section 13(2) of the Constitution. Limitations of that 
right must reflect the overall limitation grounds of the fundamental rights. 
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directly applicable between the parties’ (paragraph 67 of the judgment; emphasis 
added here). The Court of Appeal reiterated the same position in its paragraph 26 iv) c) 
but did not follow thereafter the line of reasoning of the High Court. The High Court’s 
assertion was based on the judgement of the KKO in the Rakvere case 325 where it 
dealt with – and rejected - an in principle similar injunction claimed against the FSU. 
The union had claimed to raise (up to a viable Baltic Sea level) the wages of the 
Estonian crew onboard the Estonian vessel. In its judgment the KKO in reality 
confirmed, leaving aside now an action exceptionally being contra bonos mores 326 in 
the sense of its relevant case-law, that  
 
“it would be possible to forbid the industrial action measures taken by the 
Seamen’s Union primarily in a case where the use of such measures has been 
specifically restricted through national legislation or in European Community 
law in such a way as to allow reference to it when dealing with relations 
between private parties.” (italics added) 327 
To prove the difference between an interpretation-based ‘being in breach’ and an 
express norm empowering a judge to restrict the use of a constitutionally protected 
right does not require any lengthy reasoning. By analogy one may state that exceeding 
in a car a speed limit (of let’s say 40 kilometres/h) by a (more or less reliably) 
measured one kilometre per hour means ‘being in breach’ of that limit. However, 
every layman knows that in each Member State there are other statutes so as to 
empower a provisional withdrawal (like an interim injunction) or even cancellation 
(like a permanent injunction) of the driving licence. It is crucial here, of course, that 
there is no such restricting statute regarding any industrial action, neither in national 
nor in EC law, neither express/specific nor reachable via any meaningful/fair 
interpretation of law. 
 
Secondly, the link between Viking and Laval brings us back, first, to the contents of 
the Posted Workers Directive, in particular to its Article 1(2) according to which   
 
‘This Directive shall not apply to merchant navy undertakings as regards 
seagoing personnel.’ 
 
Textually this clause is clear. The PWD does not apply to merchant navy undertakings 
as regards seagoing personnel. Contextually this clause may lead to diametrically 
opposite conclusions as to the protection granted to seagoing personnel by EC law. 
Namely, at least in the Court of Appeal the company Viking maintained that this 
clause would be the very clause where 
 
                                                 
325 The judgment referred to in the previous footnote.  
326 For the actions contra bonos mores (fair practices), see Bruun’s Expert Opinion, footnote 
324, supra, paragraphs 60 to 74. The opinion shows that contra bonos mores is not relevant in 
Viking; there is, besides, no such allegation while the company Viking recognises that the 
envisaged action of the FSU would be lawful under national law. 
327 This formula is quoted from the High Court’s judgment, paragraph 66. The translation 
substantively corresponds in full to that e.g. in Bruun’s article in the Fordham reports, 
footnote 324, supra, p. 331; a purely semantic difference is that the latter uses the expression 
‘use of such action has been expressly restricted’ (italics added) instead of ‘use of such 
measures has been specifically restricted’.     
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‘…the Community legislature expressly recognised that the principles set 
down in [the relevant posting] case-law were not appropriate for seafarers,…’. 
328 
 
Concerning the principal position of seagoing personnel, it is elementary, as to 
relevant case-law, first, to see that it also includes the ‘early’ judgments van 
Waesemael, Webb and, in particular, Seco where the Court confirmed that the 
Member States are not required to tolerate low-wage or dumping competition within 
the field of the free provision of services. Furthermore, in addition to Rush 
Portuguesa and Vander Elst, Arblade is especially relevant here, too. 329 Second, the 
relevant case-law interprets the EC Treaty. Nothing in the Treaty even hints that it 
would allow lower protection standards for seagoing personnel (i.e. finally the right to 
industrial action/strike in this particular case) than those for other professions. 330 
Third, as I have shown in my Chapter I, the PWD, as a political confirmation by the 
European legislature of the interpretation of Community law (established in Seco), 
applies, as does any secondary EC legislation, in the framework of the EC Treaty. 
Secondary legislation cannot overrule the leading principles of the EC Treaty. Hence, 
the PWD could not have validly excluded the seagoing personnel from the protection 
granted by the EC Treaty, as interpreted by the Court. Another issue is that the wide 
use of secondary ship registers made it politically impossible to cover seagoing 
personnel by the PWD because that would have been in contradiction with the 
specific obligation established by the PWD: if there are binding national minimum 
wages, they must apply to posted foreign workers, as well.  
 
The conclusion is that the PWD was not intended to cancel and cannot cancel the 
protection of seafarers under the EC Treaty. The relevant case-law since Seco must 
apply to them, too. Logically, indeed, in assessing the justification of seafarers’ or 
their organisations’ industrial action and of the flag of convenience policy of the ITF, 
the relevant conclusion is that the fundamental rights doctrine (Schmidberger, 
paragraphs 78 to 81 et seq.) and the protection of workers doctrine (Arblade, 
paragraph 36) form the basic legal framework for such action and policy. Finally, not 
even the company Viking Line has maintained that seafarers are not covered by the 
ILO right to strike/industrial action. Leaving aside the army and police force (like 
judges and high officers in the administration, representing the public employer or the 
so-called essential services sensu stricto), it is a universal right, indeed. 
                                                 
328 Skeleton Argument of the Respondent of 26 August 2005, paragraph 76(b); it referred to 
para. 138(iv) of the High Court that, always assessing the case under the freedom of 
establishment, mentioned judgments Guiot, Rush Portuguesa and C-288/89Gouda [1991] 
ECR I-6836 concerning the principle of mutual recognition. I recall that its real context in this 
case is a claim for more money within the free provision of services; see footnote 322, supra. 
A pecuniary claim viz-à-viz mutual recognition is quite straightforward to shape: claiming 
higher wages (i.e. more money) does not violate the principle of mutual recognition.  
329 For Seco, see section 1.2.2, and for Arblade section 1.2.3, supra. 
330 See that judgment in joined cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Sloman Neptun 
[1993] ECR Page I-887 did not mean any such recognition. The judgment concerned the 
application of state aid rules and Article 117 EEC (now Articles 136 and 137 EC). It 
recognised that the Member States were (are) free (from the viewpoint of the Community) to 
set up in their national law a secondary (or ‘international’) shipping register that includes 
wages varying based on nationality (paragraph 28). The Community does not have a 
second/double shipping register.  
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Finally, a relevant procedural remark is that, because Viking is an injunction case, the 
ECJ will entertain a request that the case be given priority (pursuant to Article 55 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ). Thus, judgment in Viking may come first or 
judgments in Viking and Laval may come on the same day. An educated guess is that 
the Court will not join the cases although they both fall under the free provision of 
services. Namely, some different items also exist, such as lex Britannia only in Laval 
and the ITF’s FOG-policy in Viking. 
 
The current position is that the company Viking Line and the FSU have reached, after 
the interim decision of the Court of Appeal in United Kingdom, a manning agreement 
until 2008, the vessel as a consequence continuing to fly the Finnish flag but with 
slightly reduced wage supplements for new crew members. The principal legal 
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Tämän tutkimuksen ensimmäinen luku käsittelee työehtosopimusten ja EU:n 
kilpailusääntöjen suhdetta Albany-tuomiossa vahvistetun työehtosopimusten 
immuniteetin valossa. Käsittelen siinä myös oikeustieteellistä kirjallisuutta. Evju, De 
Vos, Ichino ja Kiikeri ovat kaikki käsitelleet tuomiota artikkeleissaan. Kirjoittaja 
käsittelee kriittisesti näitä artikkeleita ensimmäisessä luvussa.  
 
Amsterdamin sopimuksen jälkeinen, Albanyyn liittyvä kysymys on, olisiko EYT 
vastaavanlaisessa tapauksessa pakotettu ottamaan kantaa oikeuteen 
työehtosopimusneuvotteluihin perusoikeutena, ottaen erityisesti huomioon EY 136 
artiklan viittaukset Euroopan sosiaaliseen peruskirjaan ja työntekijöiden sosiaalisia 
oikeuksia koskevaan yhteisön peruskirjaan. Artikkelissa päädytään siihen, että 
Euroopan sosiaalisen peruskirjan 5 artiklaan ja ILOn peruskirjaan sekä 
yleissopimukseen nro 87 sisältyvä oikeus työehtosopimusneuvotteluihin on 
yhteisöoikeuden suojaama perusoikeus, lopulta EY 307.1 artiklan ja yleisen 
kansainvälisen oikeuden sitovuuden nojalla. Myös itse Albany-tuomio johtaa 
pitämään oikeutta työehtosopimusneuvotteluihin tosiasiallisena perusoikeutena.  
 
Tutkimuksen toinen luku käsittelee Albanyn perusteluja hollantilaisen eläkerahaston 
julkista palvelutehtävää koskevalta osalta. Perustelujen yksityiskohdat oikeuttavat 
päättelemään, että EYT vahvisti erityisen, yleisen sosiaalisen palvelutehtävän niiden 
joukossa, jotka katsotaan mahdolliseksi oikeuttaa EY 86.2 artiklan alla. Samalla EYT 
totesi, että jäsenvaltioiden sosiaalipolitiikan välineet voivat tulla hyväksytyiksi 86.2 
artiklan alla kyseisten erityisten sosiaalisten palvelutehtävien suorittamiseksi. 
Sosiaalipolitiikan välineen käsitteen alkuperä on julkisasiamiehen 
ratkaisuehdotuksessa Albanyssa yhdessä Saksan tieteisopista löytyvän jäljen kanssa. 
Käsite ylittää 86.2 artiklan kielellisen ja poikkeussäännökseen liittyvän ahtaan 
tulkinnan rajat. Taloudellisten toimintojen perinteisesti laaja tulkinta tasapainottuu 
sisällytettäessä ’sosiaalinen’ palvelutehtävä nimenomaisesti artiklan 86.2 piiriin. Näin 
tämä käsite myös selventää erilaisten sosiaaliturvajärjestelmien asemaa artiklan 86.2 
alla. 
 
Toinen luku käsittelee myös Suomen TEL-järjestelmää artiklan 86.2 valossa. Vain 
työmarkkinaosapuolten rahoittama, kuitenkin lakisääteinen järjestelmä perustuu 
osittaiseen rahastointiin ja muuten ns. jakojärjestelmään. Yksityiset vakuutusyhtiöt 
pääosin hallinnoivat järjestelmää, joskin laajan julkisen kontrollin alaisina. 
Järjestelmä sisältää kilpailuelementtejä (eläkemaksujen asiakashyvitykset) mutta 
myös sen välttämättömiä rajoituksia eläkemaksuissa ja yhtenäisessä 
laskuperustekorossa. Näissä sopimuksissa on varteenotettavia työmarkkinasopimusten 
piirteitä. Näillä perusteilla, ja osittain nojautuen tuomion AOK Bundesverband 
perusteluihin (tietty kilpailuelementti ei välttämättä muuta sosiaaliturvajärjestelmää 
luonteeltaan ei-sosiaaliseksi) tekijä vetää johtopäätöksen, että eläkemaksuja ja 
laskuperustekorkoa koskevat sopimukset TEL-järjestelmässä katsotaan oikeutetuiksi 




Första kapitlet i denna studie behandlar förhållandet mellan kollektivavtal och EG:s 
konkurrensregler i ljuset av den i domen Albany bekräftade immuniteten av 
kollektivavtal. Också rättsvetenskaplig litteratur behandlas. Evju, De Vos och Ichino, 
har alla behandlat domen i skilda artiklar. Författaren gör i detta kapitel en kritisk 
granskning av dessa artiklar.  
 
En Albany-relaterad fråga efter Amsterdamfördragets tillkomst är om EGD skulle i ett 
motsvarande fall skulle ta ställning till rätten till kollektiva förhandlingar som en 
grundläggande rättighet skyddad av EG-rätten, speciellt när man beaktar 
hänvisningarna i artikel 136 EG till den europeiska sociala stadgan och 
gemenskapsstadgan om arbetstagares grundläggande sociala rättigheter. Författaren 
svarar på det här så att rätten till kollektiva förhandlingar, inkluderad i artikel 5 i den 
europeiska sociala stadgan samt i ILOs stadga och konvention nr 87, är en 
grundläggande rättighet i EG-rätten, sist och slutligen på grund av artikel 307.1 EG 
och den generella internationella rätten. Också själva domen Albany ger anledning till 
att hävda att rätten till kollektiva förhandlingar är en grundläggande rättighet.  
 
Andra kapitlet i studien utnyttjar resonemanget i Albany vad gäller den holländska 
pensionsfondens generella service uppgift. En tolkning av domen motiverar att 
konkludera att domstolen etablerade en speciell social uppgift av allmänt intresse 
under artikel 86.2 EG. Samtidigt skrev domstolen ut att medlemstaternas 
socialpolitiska instrument i tillhandahållandet av sådana offentliga tjänster kan 
rättfärdigas under artikel 86.2. Begreppet ’socialpolitiska instrument’ är hämtat från 
generaladvokatens förslag till avgörandet i Albany samt den tyska doktrinen. 
Begreppet går utanför ordalydelsen och den traditionella snäva tolkningen av artikel 
86.2. Den breda tolkningen av ’ekonomiska aktiviteter’ balanseras av det här 
uttryckliga inlemmandet av den sociala uppgiften inom artikel 86.2. Detta klargör 
vidare positionen av olika sociala skyddssystem under artikel 86.2. 
 
Andra kapitlet diskuterar också det finländska arbetspensionssystemet APL under 
artikel 86.2. Systemet fungerar som partiellt fonderat och i övrigt enligt 
fördelningsprincipen. Det finansieras av arbetsmarknadsparterna. Förmånerna är helt 
lagbaserade. De privata försäkringsbolagen sköter systemet till största delen men 
under omfattande statlig kontroll. Systemet innehåller konkurrenselement 
(premieåterbäringarna), men också nödvändiga restriktioner via avtal om 
pensionsavgifter och beräkningsgrundsräntan som tillämpas i hela systemet. Dessa 
avtal ikläder sig relevanta drag som kännetecknar kollektivavtal. Med dessa grunder, 
och delvis baserat på resonemanget i domen AOK Bundesverband (en viss andel 
konkurrens förändrar inte nödvändigtvis ett socialt trygghetssystem som icke-socialt) 
drar författaren slutsatsen att avtalen om pensionsavgifter och beräkningsgrundsräntan 
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In the first Chapter of this study I discuss the relationship between collective 
agreements and EC competition rules, in the light of the immunity of collective 
agreements established in Albany. I further discuss the academic commentary on 
Albany. Evju, De Vos, Ichino and Kiikeri have all discussed the judgment in their 
articles. The author discusses these articles with a critical approach.   
 
A post-Amsterdam question, which is linked to Albany, is whether the Court would be 
required in a corresponding case to take stock on the fundamental right to collective 
bargaining, given especially the references in Article 136 EC to the European Social 
Charter (ESC) and the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights. Unlike the 
Advocate General in Albany, the author answers that the right to collective bargaining, 
included in Article 5 ESC and in the ILO’s Constitution and Convention No 87, is a 
fundamental right protected by EC law, finally by virtue of Article 307(1) EC and 
general international law. Judgment Albany itself also leads one to the conclusion that 
the right to collective bargaining is a factual fundamental right in EC law. 
 
In the second chapter of the study I explore that part of the reasoning in Albany which 
concerned the Dutch pension scheme as a public service task. Careful reading of the 
judgment justifies one in concluding that the Court established a particular social task 
of general interest among those possible to justify under Article 86(2) EC. At the 
same time the Court spelled out that social policy instruments used by the Member 
States in performing such particular social tasks may qualify as justified under Article 
86(2). The origin of the notion of social policy instrument under Article 86(2) 
appeared to be in the opinion of Advocate General in case Albany, together with a 
trace in the German doctrine. The notion surmounts the linguistic ambit and narrow 
reading of Article 86(2) as an exception that besides refers only to tasks of general 
economic interest. The traditionally broad reading of the concept of economic 
activities becomes balanced by this express insertion of a particular ‘social’ task of 
general interest in the ambit of Article 86(2). This notion further clarifies the status of 
various social security schemes under Article 86(2).  
 
I also discuss in the second chapter the Finnish Earnings-Related Pension Scheme 
(“TEL”) under Article 86(2). The scheme operates as partially funded and partially as 
pay-as-you-go. It is financed by the social partners, only. The benefits are fixed by 
law. The scheme is mainly run by mutual insurance companies under private law with 
extensive public control. The scheme includes elements of competition but also its 
necessary restrictions by agreements on the contributions and the single technical 
interest rate used throughout the scheme. These agreements display to a considerable 
degree features of collective labour agreements. Therefore, and partially based on the 
reasoning of judgment AOK Bundesverband (a certain degree of competition does not 
render a social security scheme non-social), the author comes to the conclusion that 
the agreements on contributions and the technical interest rate in the TEL scheme are 




This Article is the third in a wider research project ‘From Internal Market Regulation 
to European Labour Law’. The two earlier articles (“On Social and Economic Factors 
in the Developing European Labour Law” and “On the Social Dimension in Posting 
of Workers”) have been published in 2005 and 2006. This article shapes the Social 
Dimension in the context of competition rules. A synthesis article will be published 
later. 
 
The first chapter of the article deals with the relationship between collective labour 
agreements and competition rules. As a preliminary issue it touches briefly on the 
question whether there is a general exception for the social field, let it be that we may 
presume a negative answer. As to the relationship between collective agreements and 
competition rules, Albany is the leading case.  I had the opportunity of contributing to 
the book “Collective Agreements and Competition Law in the EU” which I co-edited 
with Professor Niklas Bruun and in which I wrote together with Professor Niklas 
Bruun the analysis of European law, i.e. including that of judgment Albany. It is 
telling how little has happened since then regarding the issue of collective agreements 
v. competition law. In fact there is no case-law since judgment van der Woude in 2000 
(and the Norwegian EFTA-Court judgment Landsorganisasjonen i Norge (Norwegian 
Federation of Trade Unions) v. Kommunenes Sentralforbund (Norwegian Association 
of Local and Regional Authorities) in 2002), and no new case is in the pipeline that I 
know of. The issue has, however, not lost its relevance. I therefore continue the 
Albany-debate in this article. I do not repeat, more than is necessary, anything already 
covered in the writings of 2001. I also take the liberty not to present any point and 
comment about the Albany-debate, but confine myself to pick up in corpus text four 
presentations (by Evju, De Vos, Ichino and Kiikeri; in footnotes one also finds 
references to Sciarra and Giubboni) that, each in its own way, represent a more or less 
compact description of the Albany-immunity. Accordingly, I do not repeat the 
discussion included in the first publication of this project that concerned the 
discussion about a priority given either to social or economic factor in Albany (It was 
given to the social factor). As an important precedent that defines the constitutional 
line between social and economic rights, Albany gives rise to interpretations by 
analogy, as in the pending case The International Transport Workers’ Federation and 
the Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line and OÜ Viking Line Eesti on the right to 
strike. However, in this article I leave these analogical interpretations aside with the 
exception of considering in brief a possible ‘labour law exception’. In sum, the first 
chapter of this article tries to update the Albany debate and comes in the end to the 
question of a possible fundamental right to collective bargaining in EC law.  
 
The second Chapter focuses on social services of general interest and their position 
under Article 86(2) EC. There are three main issues.  
 
The first issue is whether the Court in Albany also launched conceptual novelties 
under Article 86(2) EC, namely that of ‘a particular social task of general interest’ and 
an ‘instrument of social policy’ in fulfilling such public service tasks. That part of 
Albany has been subject to considerably less commentary, especially in English. In 
French I have found only one doctrinal source which deals with the general 
relationship between collective agreements and competition rules. On the other hand, 
the author is convinced that this piece of EC law merits exploration in full, especially 
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in English, although there is also a linguistic problem clearly hampering the 
understanding of this part of Albany in English. As a prerequisite for the Albany 
reasoning the basic notions of ‘economic activities’ and ‘undertaking’ are considered 
in brief, especially in the light of judgment AOK Bundesverband, which concerned the 
national sickness insurance scheme in Germany.  
 
The second issue is the presentation of the Finnish Statutory Earnings-Related pension 
Scheme (TEL) which includes elements of solidarity while as a pension scheme it 
operates based on a partial funding and is predominantly run by mutual insurance 
companies under private law. The system further includes competition elements but 
also restrictive agreements by the pension insurance companies on the contributions 
and a single technical interest rate (TIR) applied throughout the scheme. In the 
national debate the TEL scheme is therefore often presented as if it would be a glaring 
and possibly unjustified exemption from competition rules. In reality, the scheme is 
one of the rare pension schemes (if not the single one) under the so-called first pillar 
of social security that includes elements of competition between the actors involved. 
A further source of hopefully interesting reasoning lies in the fact that there are 
relevant features of labour market agreements involved in fixing the amounts of 
contributions and technical interest rate (TIR) in this scheme.  
 
A third and natural issue in the end is the question of the justification of the TEL 
scheme under Article 86(2) EC, naturally in the light of the obstruction criterion 
applicable. It might also be unorthodoxy to resort in this justification to judgment 
AOK Bundesverband that did not come under Article 86(2) EC because the German 
sickness insurance funds concerned were not deemed to be undertakings in the sense 
of Article 81 EC. The reason for resorting to AOK Bundesverband by analogy is the 
certain dose of competition accepted in that judgment without it changing the basic 
social nature of the scheme concerned. Thus, a close reading of this judgment reveals 
that it represents a careful assessment of a social security system that, so as to 
guarantee the general interest, may also include less attractive details (like a system of 
determining maximum amounts reimbursed in respect of medicinal products). It might 
be considered unwise by some for me to expose voluntarily the TEL scheme to a 
public EC competition law scrutiny. My answer is there are actors inside and outside 
the TEL scheme who are ready to subject it to such a scrutiny irrespective of any 
doctrinal writings on the subject. ∗  
                                                 
∗ The manuscript was substantially closed by 30 September 2006. 
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Chapter I 
Labour Law vis-à-vis EC Competition Rules 
 
1.1 General Remarks 
 
In discussing the relationship between EC (and national) labour law and EC 
competition rules, one must first deal with questions about the limits of labour law. A 
preliminary point is that gender equality is a part of labour law even though in this 
study it receives only a marginal treatment - a mention of the principal status of 
gender equality in relation to competition rules. Safety and health is a typical part of 
labour law which has a direct link to competition. In that field a principal statement is 
enough: compromising safety and health shall not be used as an indirect means of 
competition, given that the safety and health acquis (Articles 2, 95(4), 136 and 
137(1)(a) EC with the corresponding secondary legislation) requires a high level of 
protection. More generally, we may understand with labour law the body of acquis 
that takes its effect either at the individual level between an employer and his workers 
1 or in the collective labour relations.  
 
As to competition rules, I will not enter into any in-depth reasoning about their 
contents but will mention that their main purpose is to prohibit price and other cartels 
(Article 81 EC) and abuse of dominant position (Article 82 EC) as well as to limit 
state aid. The last mentioned includes a social dimension of its own. However, it is 
not developed in this article. Merger control forms a separate dimension in which a 
tiny social element exists in the form of two cases.  
 
The role and status of competition rules is central for the whole Community. In 
judgment ECO Swiss the Court described them, as follows: 
 
[A]ccording to Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, 
Article 3(1)(g) EC), Article [81] of the Treaty constitutes a fundamental 
provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks 
entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of the 
internal market. The importance of such a provision led the framers of 
the Treaty to provide expressly, in Article [81(2)] of the Treaty, that any 
agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to that article are to be 
automatically void. 2 
 
Competition rules have developed since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and form today a 
legal culture of its own. They are, together with the free movement rules, fundamental 
to the functioning of the Internal Market.  
 
The ‘fondateurs’ of the Community were more than just in principle aware of the 
competition effects of labour law. A classical example is Article 141 EC (ex 119) on 
equal pay that France insisted be included in the EEC Treaty. The Spaak report 
mentioned unequal pay as well as working time, overtime and paid annual holidays as 
                                                 
1 Reference to workers includes both blue and white collar workers and employees. 
2 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss [1999] ECR I-3055, paragraph 36. 
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a source for distortion of competition. 3 The outcome was, certainly also based on the 
ILO’s Equal Remuneration Convention 1951, to insert Article 119 EEC on equal pay 
and Article 120 EEC (now 142 EC) on maintaining ‘the existing equivalence between 
paid holiday schemes.’ 4 However, the direct legal relationship between labour law 
and competition rules remained a tabula rasa as to express norms when establishing 
the Community. 5 One incident around this relationship was when the Commission 
proposed certain minimum requirements for fixed-term contracts in 1990 with 
accentuated competition balancing grounds. The proposal remained ineffective and 
was withdrawn when dealing with the 2002 proposal for a directive on temporary 




1.2 Is There a General Exception for the Social Field? 
 
1.2.1 Cases Höfner and Job Centre II 
 
A remarkable direct conflict between labour law and competition rules arose in 1991 
in the Höfner case. 7 It concerned the German employment procurement monopoly 
(exclusive rights under Article 86(1)) 8  under Arbeitsförderungsgesetz. The Court 
stated i.a. that the monopoly was not sheltered by virtue of Articles 86(1) and 82 when  
 
- the exclusive right extends to executive recruitment activities; 
  
-    the public employment agency is manifestly incapable of satisfying demand 
prevailing on the market for such activities;  
 
-  the actual pursuit of those activities by private recruitment consultants is 
rendered impossible by the maintenance in force of a statutory provision under 
                                                 
3 Spaak report: Comité Intergouvernemental Créé par la Conférence de Messine. Rapport des 
Chefs de Délégations aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, 21avril  1956,  p. 63.  
4 As to the insertion of the social factor (I do not use the more challenging term ‘dimension’) 
in the EEC Treaty, also see the condensed explanation in Jari Hellsten 2005, On Social and 
Economic Factors in the Developing European Labour Law, Swedish Institute for Working 
Life, Work Life in Transition 2005:11 (Hellsten 2005), section 1.1, pp. 4-10. 
5 That labour law remained for a long time as a tabula rasa in relation to competition rules 
also became clear in the parliamentary question No 777/89, OJ C328/3, 31.12.1990. It 
concerned industrial accidents within the FIAT group. The question alleged in Italy poorer 
safety and health conditions than in other countries and invoked EC competition rules. The 
answer of the Commissioner, Mrs. Papandreou, terminated the treatment of the question by 
denoting how Article 81 and 82 in principle did not concern matters of labour law.  
6 See the documents COM (90) 228 final (OJ C228/8) and COM (2002) 149 final. 
7 Case C-41/90 Höfner [1991] ECR I-1979. Already case C-179/90 Merci [1991] ECR I-5889 
launched a debate about the demarcation between competition and labour law. However, it 
concerned dock-work companies whose workers were also members of these companies. The 
case was often seen as showing the penetration of competition law into labour law. I will 
leave it aside now.   
8 Article 86(1) reads, as follows: ‘In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to 
which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor 
maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to 
those rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89.’ 
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which such activities are prohibited and non-observance of that prohibition 
renders the contracts concerned void;  
 
-  the activities in question may extend to the nationals or to the territory of 
other Member States. 
 
This judgment has been interpreted as showing in general the applicability of 
competition rules to the social field, also by AG Jacobs in Albany. 9 I would be 
cautious with such a general conclusion. Namely, the case concerned executive 
recruitment services and the judgment is effective only when the public employment 
agency (the state monopoly) is manifestly incapable of satisfying demand. Such 
recruitment often happens behind closed doors. Thus, it is not justified to maintain 
that the judgment reflects any overall priority given to market values over social ones 
(which was not the position of AG Jacobs either).  
 
Case Job Centre II 10 was a further milestone with a more direct link to general 
conditions in administrative labour law. It concerned the Italian employment agency 
monopoly. The Court found that a Member State which prohibits any activity as an 
intermediary between supply and demand in the employment market, whether as an 
employment agency or as an employment business, unless carried on by state offices, 
is in breach of Article 86(1) of the Treaty where it creates a situation in which those 
offices cannot avoid infringing Article 82 of the Treaty. That is the case, in particular, 
in the following circumstances:  
 
-   the public placement offices are manifestly unable to satisfy demand on the 
market for all types of activity; and 
  
- the actual placement of employees by private companies is rendered 
impossible by the maintenance in force of statutory provisions under which 
such activities are prohibited and non-observance of that prohibition gives rise 
to penal and administrative sanctions; and  
 
- the placement activities in question could extend to the nationals or to the 
territory of other Member States. 
 
This was in practice a much more radical penetration of EC competition rules into the 
national labour law field than that in Höfner, although this case also applied in a 
situation of being ‘manifestly unable to satisfy demand’ on the market. The state 
monopoly de facto fell. No wonder that this case was included in the reasoning of AG 
Jacobs in Albany showing that there is no general exception for the social field from 







                                                 
9 See e.g. the opinion of AG Jacobs in case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, paragraph 
127. 
10 Case C-55/96 Job Centre II [1997] ECR I-7119.  
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1.2.2 Case Sodemare 
 
Case Sodemare 11 dealt especially with the possibility of establishing the conditions 
for running an old people’s home, notably that only non-profit-making companies or 
other bodies were entitled to do this. The Court found that 
 
‘…as Community law stands at present, a Member State may, in the exercise 
of the powers it retains to organize its social security system, consider that a 
social welfare system of the kind at issue in this case necessarily implies, with 
a view to attaining its objectives, that the admission of private operators to that 
system as providers of social welfare services is to be made subject to the 
condition that they are non-profit-making’ (paragraph 32). 
 
The Court further concluded (in the fourth ruling) that Articles 81 and 82, read in 
conjunction with Articles 3(g), 10 and 86 of the EC Treaty, do not apply to national 
rules which allow only non-profit-making private operators to participate in the 
running of a social welfare system by concluding contracts which entitle them to be 
reimbursed by the public authorities for the costs of providing social welfare services 
of a health-care nature. 
 
As to the application of competition rules to the welfare scheme concerned, the Court 
- without even examining whether private non-profit-making bodies engaged in 
health-care activities were to be classified as undertakings - simply applied the 
competition rules and found that there was no agreement within the meaning of 
Article 81(1). 12 However, Sodemare in its specific way shows the applicability in 
principle of competition rules to the social field while it on the other hand it proves 
that non-profit-making is of importance in applying those rules.  
 
 
1.2.3 Case Becu 
 
In Becu non-recognised dockers were used in the port of Ghent with salaries far below 
those applicable according to a collective agreement that was binding erga omnes. 
The Court found that Article 86(1) EC, read in conjunction with the first paragraph of 
Article 12 EC and Articles 81 EC and 82 EC, must be interpreted as meaning that it 
does not confer on individuals the right to oppose the application of legislation of a 
Member State which requires them to have recourse, for the performance of dock 
work, exclusively to recognised dockers such as those referred to in the Belgian Law 
of 8 June 1972 organising dock work, and to pay those dockers ‘remuneration far in 
excess of the wages of their own employees or the wages which they pay to other 
workers’. It is notable that the Court in its ruling attributed to the wages payable to 
dockers not the neutral term ‘binding rates’ as in the reference question but the 
connotation ‘far in excess’ etc.  
 
Again, the judgment does not show any general non-applicability of competition rules 
(Article 86(1)) to working conditions but convincingly shows how in this particular 
juxtaposition a non-conditioned precedence was given to rules fixing those working 
                                                 
11 Case C-70/95 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395. 
12 This is stated in terms of AG Jacobs, opinion in Albany, paragraph 127. 
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conditions. In fact, the case concerned rather an extreme example of the dumping of 
labour in that the wages paid for the temporary workers were about a half of those 
fixed by the collective agreement concerned. This explains the elaboration of the 
wage rates in the ruling. It is also notable that the Court saw no need to resort to 
Article 86(2) EC as a justification of the national rules concerned.   
 
 
1.2.4 Equal Pay 
 
There is no possibility in this study of an extensive discussion on equal pay between 
men and women. However, some principal remarks clarify the relationship between 
competition values and equal pay. As the Court held in Defrenne II 13 the principle of 
equal pay forms part of the foundations of the Community. As kicked-off by Defrenne 
II, it has been subject to considerable developments and also gained more weight at 
the level of the Treaty by the amendments introduced by the Treaties of Amsterdam 
(inserting equal treatment in Article 2 EC, mainstreaming principle in Article 3(2) EC, 
inserting Article 13 EC and affirmative action in paragraph 141(4) EC) and Nice 
(insertion of paragraph 2 into Article 13 EC on qualified majority voting regarding 
community incentives). These amendments anyway have not brought about any 
demarcation between equal pay and competition rules, which remains based on case-
law and is so far limited to an appreciation of equal pay in the light of competition 
values. Thus, in Deutsche Telekom v. Schröder the Court in 2000 first noted the 
traditional double aim of Article 141 EC: economic and social; economic in aiming at 
preventing distortion of competition between employers in different Member States 
and social in promoting a fundamental human right. The Court then concluded, after 
having noted the developments in the human rights case-law since Defrenne II, that  
 
‘the economic aim pursued by Article [141] of the Treaty, namely the 
elimination of distortions of competition between undertakings 
established in different Member States, is secondary to the social aim 
pursued by the same provision, which constitutes the expression of a 
fundamental human right’. 14  
 
Thus, equal treatment (being based finally on Article 2 EC) is in principle superior to 
competition values. This explains the relationship, i.e. a hierarchy within this specific 
social and legal facet, between the social and economic factors on an EC 
constitutional level. 15 Evelyn Ellis has described the quoted hierarchy passage as a 
                                                 
13 Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455 (`Defrenne II'), paragraph 12. 
14 See case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekom v Schröder [2000] ECR I-743, paragraph 57. Its sister 
cases with identical reasoning were joined cases C-270/97 and C-271/97 Deutsche Post v 
Sievers [2000] ECR I-929. As to human rights case-law reflecting the developments since 
Defrenne II the Court noted in Deutsche Telekom v Schröder (in paragraph 56) cases 149/77 
Defrenne III [1978] ECR 1365, paragraphs 26 and 27, Joined Cases 75/82 and 117/82 
Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission [1984] ECR 1509, paragraph 16, and Case C-13/94 P. v 
S. and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143, paragraph 19).    
15 Besselink has explained the judgment with a similar tuning. See case annotation in 
CMLRev. 38: 437-454, 2001, p. 444-5 and 454 while the author cannot sign his comment on 
an alleged general precedence of economic rights; p. 454. Szyszczak has found the cited 
passage of the Court as a ‘dramatic statement’; see Erika Szyszczak, The New Paradigm for 
Social Policy: a Virtuous Circle, CMLRev. 38: 1125-1170, 2001, p. 1155. Kenner has seen in 
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radical one (however I would call it unproblematic; see below) which could be of 
considerable utility, for example, in refuting economic arguments for the justification 
of indirect discrimination. 16 Judge Rosas has stated how ‘[t]his quotation from the 
Court’s case-law shows that the social dimension of the EU has to be considered as a 
value in itself, not necessarily subordinate to the economic freedoms inherent in the 
EC Treaty.’ 17  
 
The human rights approach and superiority of social values over competition values in 
equal pay is of course akin to the Albany-immunity (that I discuss below), i.e. akin to 
an exception from competition rules, while the outcome in Deutsche Telekom v 
Schröder is as such only an ‘equal pay precedence’. That the judgement, which spelt 
out the precedence of social, was in any case a non-problematic step in the 
developments of EC law is endorsed by the fact that the judgment was rendered by a 
chamber of three judges. Finally, it is very clear that if or when a question on the 
relationship between equal pay and competition rules arises in a concrete case, 
Deutsche Telekom v Schröder will be the natural point of reference.   
 
 
1.2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
In Albany AG Jacobs discussed the demarcation between the social field and 
competition rules. He referred as support for the a priori applicability of competition 
rules to the social field also to the fact that there is no provision in the Treaty, as there 
is in the case of Article 36 regarding agriculture, that expressly excludes the 
application of the competition rules or makes this subject to a decision by the Council 
(paragraph 124). He further referred to Article 296(1)(b) with respect to trade in 
military equipment and to the exception of ‘limited extent’ in Article 86(2); paragraph 
123. He also invoked case Asjes according to which 'where the Treaty intended to 
remove certain activities from the ambit of the competition rules, it made an express 
derogation to that effect’. 18 Thus, the approach in this air-transport case was sectoral 
or economic activity-based whereas social factors are present in every sector or 
activity. I therefore still maintain that it is more accurate to conclude that the 
‘fondateurs’ of the Treaty did not really discuss and define the legal relationship 
between the social field and competition rules. The stipulations in the EC Treaty on 
equal pay and paid annual holidays were of course also grounded with competition 
                                                                                                                                            
Deutsche Post v. Schröder the Court’s preparedness to re-evaluate the economic and social 
aims as a ‘part of a wider recognition of the equivalence of the social and economic objectives 
of the Treaty as a whole’, as well as – by shifting the paradigm from economic to social – ‘a 
basis for a more fundamental reappraisal of the economic bias in the Court’s sex equality 
jurisprudence’. Jeff Kenner, EU Employment Law. Hart Publishing 2003, p. 461-2. The 
author dares to denote that Deutsche Post declares, indeed, a precedence of the social factor in 
explaining the law on equal pay in general, not as an equivalence of the social and economic 
objectives.   
16 Evelyn Ellis, The supremacy of Community pensions equality law: a two-edged sword? 
European Law Review 2000, vol. 25, p. 568.  
17 Allan Rosas, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the application and interpretation 
of social values and rights, in Elina Palola and Annikki Savio (eds.), Refining the Social 
Dimension in an Enlarged EU, Stakes 2005, p. 199. 
18 Joined Cases 209/84 to 213/84 Ministère Public v Asjes [1986] ECR 1425, paragraph 40. 
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values but they were not statutory in the sense of defining exactly the reach of 
competition rules.  
 
What can be inferred from the case-law discussed above? Cases Höfner, Job Centre II 
and Sodemare show the applicability of competition rules to social field issues while 
the practical effect of competition rules is not to be generalised either. In Höfner and 
Job Centre II the effect was fettered by the concept of the public monopolies being 
‘manifestly unable to satisfy demand’. In Sodemare the public contract arrangement 
and privilege of non-profit-making organisations in running an old people’s home was 
nonetheless accepted. Becu also shows the in casu inapplicability of competition rules. 
Namely, the exclusive rights of recognised dockers to perform dock work with 
agreement-based (erga omnes) wages were sheltered from the wrath of competition 
rules. Deutsche Telekom v. Schröder with its sister cases shows, by definition, the 
most radical non-applicability of Community competition rules although their hard 
core was at stake: the possible distortion of competition between undertakings 
established in different Member States.  
 
Becu and Deutsche Telekom v Schröder clearly show a precedence given to the social 
factors over the economic values of the companies concerned, the latter case besides 
showing even paradigmatic evolution of the social dimension. The same precedence 
de facto can be seen in Sodemare. Höfner and Job Centre II represent the precedence 
of the economic factor although only in the limits of the manifest incapacity to satisfy 
demand in a given market. 
 
In sum, the case-law discussed above does not as such show any general exception for 
the social field from EC competition rules. The ‘social field’ is as a concept too 
diffuse for any such definition. On the other hand, Becu and Deutsche Telekom v 
Schröder, as clear labour law cases, suggest immunity from rather than exposure to 
the full force of competition rules. However, it would be going too far to suggest, in 
the light of the still limited case-law discussed so far, more than a tailor-made 
approach in casu. This becomes once again clear in discussing the pivotal issue of the 
relationship between collective agreements and competition rules, subject to case 




1.3 Immunity of Collective Labour Agreements vis-à-vis Competition Rules 
 
The judgment in the joined cases Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken 19 on 21 
September 1999 filled in a gap of more than forty years by defining the relationship 
between collective agreements and competition rules, notably Article 81 EC. All three 
cases dealt with a single sectoral pension fund – each running a supplementary 
occupational pension scheme established by a sectoral collective agreement that had 
been declared binding erga omnes. This meant that every worker in the three sectors 
concerned had to be affiliated to the sector’s fund unless the fund itself granted an 
exemption. The companies concerned wanted to dispense with the compulsory 
                                                 
19 See cases C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751; C-115 to 117/97 Brentjens [1999] ECR I-
6025; and C-219/97 Drijvende Bokken [1999] ECR I-6121. 
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affiliation by arranging similar or better pension benefits for a lower price outside the 
fund. They invoked the EC competition rules.  
 
The judgment confirmed, on the basis of an effective and consistent interpretation of 
the EC Treaty as a whole, that collective agreements by virtue of their nature and 
purpose did not fall within the ambit of Article 81 EC. 20 “Nature” in this case meant 
the agreement resulting from negotiations of representative social partners and 
“purpose” meant its essence as a part of remuneration (pension rights). 
 
On the basis of this judgment the author had the opportunity to edit and partially write 
the book Bruun Niklas and Hellsten Jari, Collective Agreement and Competition Law 
in the EU (Bruun & Hellsten 2001). It is not appropriate to repeat the analysis here. 
The same comment applies to the first publication of this research project: ‘On Social 
and Economic Factors in the Developing European Labour Law’ (Hellsten 2005) 
where I discussed the issue whether precedence in that judgment was given to 
competition or social values. 21 I concluded that the judgment de facto meant that 
precedence was given to social values (factors). I claimed (and repeat) that dominance 
of economic values would have meant the subordination first of the collective 
agreements to competition rules and then the construing of a safety valve for them. 
The Court did the opposite by establishing with nature and purpose a safety valve for 
competition values. 22 With the notions of nature and purpose of an agreement, the 
Court built up a safety valve for competition values, i.e. a method of dealing with 
concealed distortions of competition. Following this preliminary explanation I may 
now state the impact of the Albany-immunity: 
 
- the negotiating social partners are not subject to competition rules 
(paragraph 59), and  
                                                 
20 Paragraph 60 of Albany declared the basic immunity as follows:’ It therefore follows from 
an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole which is both effective and 
consistent that agreements concluded in the context of collective negotiations between 
management and labour in pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and 
purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.’ The French 
and other linguistic versions prove that ‘effective and consistent’ refers to the interpretation, 
not the Treaty. Thus, the English version is at least ambiguous and one cannot therefore 
adhere to Kenner’s statement that the language of the judgment was ‘strikingly clear’; Jeff 
Kenner, EU Employment Law, Hart Publishing 2003, p. 21. In paragraph 60 of Albany the 
versions other than the English one are strikingly clear. – For clarity’s sake I denote that 
Kenner clearly welcomes the outcome in Albany. For him it shows awareness of national 
sensitivities, autonomy of social partners and the ‘fine balance’ between the Community’s 
economic and social aims. For him, too, ‘it was to rectify the formal imbalance in the methods 
available to fulfil its economic and social objectives arising from the strictly limited social 
provisions in the Treaty of Rome…’. Ibid. 
As such the promulgation of the interpretation method (effective and consistent) is obviously 
unique in case-law. Similar inferences are e.g. in Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415 that 
operated with the interpretation ‘of the provisions of the Community law as a whole’ 
(paragraph 20), besides ‘regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution 
at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied’. 
21 See Hellsten 2005, section 2.6, pp. 67-71. 
22 Loc.cit., p. 70. 
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- sectoral collective agreements are a priori excluded from competition 
rules. 23 
 
In Bruun & Hellsten 2001 we further qualified the judgment Albany, as follows:  
 
‘While the basic immunity of collective agreements is: 
 
- established by balancing the Treaty provisions on social policy and 
collective agreements with an EC competition regime qualified as 
fundamental, 
- expressly anchored in the basic objectives of the Community, such 
as harmonious and balanced development of economic activities 
and a high level of employment and social protection (Article 2 
EC), 
- based on an effective and consistent interpretation of the provisions 
of the Treaty as a whole, 
- a bridge over a gap of 40 years in the Treaty itself, and 
- a permit in this framework for the Member States to have recourse 
to the erga omnes effect of collective agreements enjoying basic 
immunity, 
 
it is appropriate to call it a fundamental decision on the interpretation of 
the Treaty.’ 24 
                                                 
23 Bruun & Hellsten 2001, p. 53. I recall that in Bruun & Hellsten 2001 (pp. 45-46 and 55-56) 
we left open the interpretation of the scope of the immunity, i.e. whether ‘social policy 
objectives’ (paragraph 59 of Albany) or ‘working conditions’ (paragraph 63) define the limits 
of the immunity. Further case-law, thus cases C-180-184/98 Pavlov [2000] ECR I-6451 and 
C-222/98 van der Woude [2000] ECR I-7111, have not decided this issue. A decision thereon 
would obviously require a case that falls inside ‘social policy objectives’ but outside ‘working 
conditions’.  
24 Ibid., p. 54. According to Silvana Sciarra matters of symbolic or technical relevance are 
indicative to our book (see the previous note); Silvana Sciarra, Market Freedom and 
Fundamental Social Rights, in Hepple (ed.), Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context, 
Cambridge University Press 2002, p. 110. It certainly did more, i.e. presented the Albany-
immunity as it stands, supplemented by the presentation of the relevant national situations. 
However, Silvana Sciarra clearly supports  the Albany-immunity (‘…labour lawyers reading 
Albany gain reassurance from the Court’s decision exempting collective agreements from 
antitrust law’; ibid, p. 109). She does not discuss its conditions or the Treaty interpretation 
leading to it (effective and consistent interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole; 
paragraph 60 of Albany), whereas she does see one notable problem in the Court’s reasoning. 
Namely, she finds that the reference to European agreements in Article 4(2) of the Maastricht 
Social Policy Agreement  and the extension possibility by a Council decision of agreements at 
European level (now Article 139 EC) ‘is almost unexpectedly made’ (ibid., p. 107; paragraph 
58 of Albany). She notes it is difficult to understand ‘why such different species of collective 
agreements, each based on its own legal order – one national, one supranational – should be 
offered as examples to be interpreted along similar lines of thinking.’ National collective 
agreements naturally are deeply rooted in the rich national legal-societal culture and 
framework (even a lack of a law on collective agreements as in Denmark) whereas European 
agreements, their extension included, depend on a reference to promotion of social dialogue 
in Articles 136 and 138, and two general clauses in Article 139 EC. Still, certain restrictions 
of competition as well as the social policy objectives sought or working conditions agreed are 
 13
The debate around the judgment has not revealed serious reasons to amend the above 
characterisation. Albany is a landmark decision in the developments in the EC social 
and labour law. However, I admit that our expression that sectoral collective 
agreements are a priori excluded from competition rules may lead to extreme further 
interpretations, ignoring the fact that the agreements must qualify under the nature and 
purpose test. To avoid this risk Fahlbeck has described the Albany-immunity as 
meaning that collective agreements are prima facie excluded from competition rules. 
25 I find that the difference between a priori and prima facie is here just a matter of 
taste issue, given that we in Bruun & Hellsten 2001 always emphasised the nature and 
purpose test. However, due to the time factor Bruun & Hellsten 2001 and Hellsten 
2005 did not include all the relevant debate. I therefore discuss some further 
presentations before concluding with some remarks mainly concerning a post-
Amsterdam fundamental rights aspect in the Albany context. 
 
 
1.3.1 Evju’s Assessment On Albany 
 
Evju’s analysis of Albany, ‘Collective Agreements and Competition Law. The Albany 
Puzzle, and van der Woude’, 26 is generally rather neutral and analytical, on a first 
appraisal. I will comment only on its main positions.  
 
As to Albany, Evju first notes that the Court did not embark on any comparative 
analysis as the Advocate General did. Second, Evju is right in presenting the 
compound structure behind the first real answer given by the ECJ (in paragraph 64 of 
Albany). For that purpose the ECJ in its paragraph 52 of Albany fixed the three 
compound parameters: (1) setting up a single pension fund for a whole sector (2) by a 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and (3) asking by a joint request of the social 
partners the public authorities to make affiliation to that fund compulsory. 27  In 
Albany this three-fold composition and/or question was in fact made by the ECJ itself 
because the national (district) court in Albany (unlike in Brentjens and Drijvende 
Bokken) did not pose a question in this form but its first question concerned directly 
the third component, i.e. the request to make the affiliation compulsory (erga omnes).  
However, Evju notes and quotes the pivotal paragraph 60 of Albany but it seems that 
Evju nowhere notes how the interpretative path (or, a normative pyramid 28) of the 
ECJ started from Article 2 EC. Thereof the ECJ quoted (in paragraph 54 of Albany) 
the tasks of the Community ‘to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and 
                                                                                                                                            
inherent in both ‘species’ of agreements and the extension of agreements exists in a clear 
majority of (the ‘old’) Member States.  It is natural that the Court resorted to European 
agreements (and their extension) as an argument. Finally, when Silvana Sciarra presents as a 
subsumed justification the Court’s attempt to reinforce its own arguments ‘by letting such 
collective roots penetrate as deeply as possible in Community law’, it is appropriate to 
observe that according to the Court ‘these collective roots’ also penetrated or took effect in 
Community law by virtue of the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement. 
25 Reinhold Fahlbeck, book annotation: Niklas Bruun og Jari Hellsten (red.), Collective 
Agreement and Competition Law in the EU. The Report of the COLCOM-project, Tidsskrift 
for Rettsvitenskap No. 4-5 2001, p. 919. Otherwise Fahlbeck seems to accept the analysis of 
the Albany-immunity in Bruun & Hellsten 2001. 
26 IJCLLIR vol. 17/2, 165-184, 2001. 
27 Evju, p. 172. 
28 As to the ‘pyramidal’ interpretation of Albany, see Hellsten 2005, section 2.6, pp. 68-71.  
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balanced development of economic activities’ and ‘a high level of employment and of 
social protection’. He in fact notices only that the collective agreements concerned are 
‘similar’ to those deriving from the ‘social dialogue’ (quotation marks by Evju) and 
presents this as a condensed ground for the pivotal demarcation between the two areas 
of law (concluding in the immunity) in paragraph 60 of Albany. 29 
 
A third difference as to the analysis of Advocate General for Evju is that in defining 
the material scope of the immunity the ECJ did not adopt Advocate General’s notion 
of ‘core subjects’ that do not ‘directly affect third parties or markets’. 30 This position 
I share.  
 
What Evju then qualifies as his ‘first analysis’ seems to reveal some positions subject 
to my critical comments. His starting point is that the ECJ in Albany did not adopt, at 
least not explicitly, as he points it out, a notion that “any and all collective agreements 
between management and labour fall within the scope of Article [81] by virtue of 
an ’implied agreement’ on the employer side”. 31 Some comments are necessary. First, 
Evju clearly spells out how the ECJ dismissed the idea of an implied agreement of 
employers falling under the ambit of Article 81. Second, the quoted statement is too 
cautious. Namely, I maintain that the ECJ set up the immunity the other way round: 
collective agreements fall under Article 81 only if their nature and purpose justify it.  
 
A clear source of disagreement arises in Evju’s subsequent position; i.e. that the Court 
would have ‘in effect bypassed the whole issue of the scope of Article [81(1)] ratione 
personae’. 32 Evju seems to bypass, indeed, the fact that the ECJ in paragraph 59 of 
Albany discusses agreements of the social partners (management and labour) and in 
paragraph 62 further qualifies them as representative organizations of employers and 
workers. Awaiting anything more would surpass the limits of the case; it concerned a 
certain sectoral collective agreement. Reading paragraphs 59 and 62 together clearly 
shows that ‘management and labour’ in paragraph 59 is a general definition while 
paragraph 62 expresses an outcome in casu; i.e. it implies that to enjoy the immunity 
the organizations concluding the agreement concerned must be representative ones. 
One might wonder what this is doing if it is not discussing the scope of Article 81 and 
the immunity ratione personae. I dare to suggest that Evju’s conclusion might result 
from the English version of paragraph 62. I recall that one must read paragraph 62 in 
the French etc. versions instead of the English one which refers to organizations 
(vaguely) ‘representing’ employers and workers; e.g. in French the text clearly reads 
‘représentatives’ instead of ‘représentants’. 33 
 
                                                 
29 Leaving nearby aside, i.e. on the level of reminding only of the similitude to social 
dialogue, the constitutional interpretation of the Treaty as a whole seems to be the opposite of 
Prétot’s assertion. He regretted how the immunity was based on a quasi-ideological 
interpretation of Articles 2 and 3 EC while the case should have been decided on the basis of 
Article 81 (ex 85) alone. See Xavier Prétot, La cour de justice des Communautés Européennes 
et les fonds de pension néerlandais. Droit social 1/2000, p. 107. 
30 Evju, p. 173. 
31 Ibid., p. 174. 
32 Loc.cit; italics by Evju. 
33 See my explanation on the same issue in section 1.3.2.2 The Principal Albany-Criticism of 
De Vos, in fine. 
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A further example of Evju’s positions requiring comments is the position maintaining 
that the ECJ (in its compound approach) did not answer ‘the crucial question of 
whether a collective agreement in itself is an agreement that may be caught by Article 
[81]’. 34 We learn below that the answer to this prima facie peculiar question is linked 
to the above discussion of ratione personae. Anyway, Evju seems to propose that in 
addition to the general immunity of collective agreements set up in paragraph 59 and 
60 of Albany there would be a question of the status of a collective agreement in itself. 
I admit that I cannot follow this ‘in itself’ path because there is, indeed, the general 
answer in paragraphs 59 and 60 of Albany, although it is in the form of a certain 
conceptual apparatus where the agreement must – to enjoy the immunity – qualify as 
to both its nature and purpose. However, while Evju’s question seems to be 
superfluous, he first firmly asserts that one cannot deduce from Albany a position that 
trade unions would generally be ‘undertakings’ in the sense of Article 81 (I agree). He, 
however, continues by stating  that the ECJ ‘was in no need of taking a stand on 
whether a trade union generally must be regarded as an “undertaking”, nor on whether 
collective agreements in general fall within the scope of Article [81]’. This he found 
as a sufficient reason for the lack of a position being taken by the ECJ on the status of 
trade union and on the scope ratione personae of Article 81. 35 I have to insist – again 
– that in reality the ECJ took a stand on a general level as to the position of collective 
agreements and, in paragraph 59, it also took a stand regarding ratione personae – a 
priori freeing the negotiating social partners from the ambit of Article 81.  
 
Evju’s conclusion on the scope of the Albany-immunity also invites some comments. 
Namely, he finds that ratione materiae the ECJ’s position “leaves the impression of 
an approach similar to that of  ‘core subjects’, whereby a distinction still could be 
drawn between issues ‘directly’ relating to the improvement of the ‘conditions of 
work and employment’… He further finds that the Court’s considerations offer 
limited guidance on how to ‘draw the borderline between collective agreements 
provisions that are exempted from Article [81] and those that are not – if and when a 
collective agreement is caught by Article [81] ratione personae.’ 36 Thus, Evju seems 
to foresee that the ECJ should in one case not just fill in a gap of decades by laying 
down the immunity of collective agreements in relation to competition rules but that it 
should also be able to give simultaneously clear borderlines for all related issues in 
this field. I find such a requirement as unfair, given especially how cautious Evju is in 
reading Albany, although probably as hampered by the English, Danish and Swedish 
versions 37 of paragraph 62 which obviously influenced him not to see the definition 
ratione personae in a combined reading of paragraphs 59 and 62. Both ratione 
materiae and personae it is interesting that Evju himself – who criticises the outcome 
as rather vague in both senses – does not even mention the ‘ultima ratio’ for the 
exclusion of management and labour (or, their representative organizations) from the 
ambit of Article 81: the serious undermining of the social policy objectives if the 
negotiating management and labour were a priori caught by Article 81. Worth noting 
is also that Evju does not see the function of ‘nature’ and ‘purpose’ of the agreements 
as safety valves against masked distortions of competition. As to the alleged 
vagueness of the scope ratione materiae, Evju is right to the extent that good reasons 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. 176. 
36 Ibid., p. 177. 
37 See my explanation on this linguistic problem in section 1.3.2.2, infra, in fine.  
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can be found for both ‘social policy objectives’ and ‘working conditions’ to determine 
the boundaries of the immunity.  
 
 
1.3.2 De Vos’ Criticism  
 
1.3.2.1 The Pre-Albany Analysis of De Vos 
 
Marc De Vos, a Professor of Labour and Private Law from Ghent, Belgium, gives 
already in his introduction 38 a hint on the direction of his analysis concerning the 
possible immunity of collective labour agreements vis-à-vis competition rules by 
stating that the background is ideological or economic. Thus, it does not reflect any 
per se background of the social rights of the workers concerned.  
 
In describing the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ economic effects, De Vos denotes the 
‘public good’ nature of collective bargaining: many people benefit or no one does. 
Furthermore, ‘[u]nions and the collective bargaining process can…serve as an 
informed and informative communication channel, allowing management to introduce 
timely improvements in production or working conditions.’ 39  The impression 
‘…management to introduce timely improvements…in working conditions’ is telling, 
indeed. For De Vos, there seems to be no way for such improvements to be introduced 
as stemming from demands, let alone from an industrial action, of workers and/or 
their organisations. However, De Vos denotes how the positive assessments of the 
benefits of collective bargaining have reached, next to law academia, even the World 
Bank; while his positive assessment approach does not pose the question whether the 
unions in their present legal form are ‘the only and most effective answer to the 
efficiency problems they are claimed to have solved’. 40   
 
De Vos further describes – neutrally - the classic Austrian-school economic mantra or 
neo-liberal doctrine which does not want to leave any place for any collective 
regulation of working conditions. Via the roots of any modern labour law in the early 
20th century he denotes certain fresher signs of new individualism but concludes how 
‘the existing legal architecture of labour relations remains largely inspired by the 
classic labour law model, where individual liberty is subordinated to collective 
representation and to societal interests of labour relations’. 41 Its kernel he sees in 
correcting or avoiding the expected excesses of laissez faire liberty. This anti neo-
liberal approach has ‘its most emblematic legal expression in the ILO Constitution’s 
credo that “labour is not a commodity”’ which De Vos eloquently describes as ‘a 
clear Marxist phraseology that diametrically opposes the neo-liberal approach of 
labour relations.’  42 This distinction between labour and genuine commodities he 
finds ‘of course’ superficial and artificial even though the labour’s organization 
                                                 
38 Marc De Vos, Collective Labour Agreements and European Competition Law. An Inherent 
Contradiction? In De Vos (ed.), A Decade Beyond Maastricht: The European Social Dialogue 
Revisited, , Kluwer Law International pp. 53-86 at 53. 
39 Ibid., p. 54.  
40 Ibid., p. 54-5. 
41 Ibid., p. 59. 
42 Ibid. The Philadelphia Declaration was, by definition, imposed by the victory side of the 
WWII. However, to my mind, stating ‘labour is not a commodity’ did not make Franklin D. 
Roosevelt a Marxist.   
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indirectly but necessarily affects its market. We then face a first core element in the 
‘pre-Albany analysis’ of De Vos that necessitates really critical comments. Namely, as 
a perhaps combined effect of the limited legal force of the ILO Constitution and the 
market reality (i.e. a de facto effect on the market of ‘genuine’ commodities) he finds 
it is possible to explain why the EC Member States typically do not have any blanket 
labour exclusion in their competition law. ‘If there is any rule to be drawn from the 
EC Member States, it is one of careful balancing that amounts to a partial immunity 
from antitrust law. In any event, Member State solutions to the labour v. competition 
conundrum at the national level are wholly separate from the EC level where no 
dogmatic statement on the nature of labour obscures the debate.’ 43 44 
 
It is not surprising that De Vos in this particular place refers to the comparative 
analysis of Advocate General Jacobs in Albany (paragraphs 80-112 of the opinion) 
and to its summarized overview presented by Van den Bergh and Camesasca. 45  
 
The author had the opportunity to edit and partially write the book Bruun & Hellsten, 
Collective Agreement and Competition Law in the EU (Bruun & Hellsten 2001) 
where the national solutions in deciding the contents and scope of the immunity were 
also discussed. The picture appeared rather different from the description offered by 
Advocate General. Namely, as to the EC Member States concerned, the AG referred 
to France, Finland, Denmark, Germany and United Kingdom. More elaborately the 
AG also discussed the legal distinctions in the United States. As to EU Member States, 
the description presented by the AG was not accurate in the case of France, Germany 
and Finland but it gave a too competition-minded picture of the national situation. 46 
As such, the conclusion of the AG was backed up by only the experience of two 
Member States. His conclusion was that in the form of questions for national courts, 
the targeting to core issues of bargaining, effects on markets of goods and services, 
and third parties, tends to limit the scope of the immunity. 47 In Bruun & Hellsten 
2001 we came to the conclusion that there are in fact three answers to the relationship 
between collective agreements and competition law in the EC Member States: 
 
- the Nordic model: a law-based immunity explicitly recognised in 
competition law; 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 60.  
44 On the other hand, on p. 61 De Vos describes the situation in the Member States as one 
where ‘freedom of collective bargaining and free competition coexist without explicit 
hierarchy and with no statutory framework to resolve their apparent contradiction, see De 
Vos, p. 61; this assertion seems to be closer to the reality in the continental group of 
countries; see below footnote 48. 
45 See Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camesasca, Irreconcilable Principles? The Court of 
Justice exempts collective labour agreements from the wrath of antitrust. European Law 
Review Vol. 25, 2000, pp. 495-9. As to a critical approach vis-à-vis the comparative analysis 
of AG Jacobs, also see Markku Kiikeri, Comparative Legal Reasoning and European Law, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001, pp. 224-227 and 242. He even questions whether the 
interpretation of national systems is really transferable to the Community law, where the 
interpretation by the Community Court must be somewhat more extensive and the nature of 
‘social rules’ is very different. The ‘social rules’ in Community law are still in the 
developmental stage; ibid, p. 225-6.   
46 As to details in this criticism, see Bruun & Hellsten 2001, pp. 71-72. 
47 See paragraph 112 of the opinion. 
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- a Continental European group where no immunity is fixed by national law 
but it is derived from constitutional rights or freedoms; this is the 
prevailing picture; 
- the Anglo-Saxon tradition where competition law in principle applies to 
collective bargaining agreements; however, the present law in UK clearly 
corresponds to the contents of EU rules. 48       
 
I recall how De Vos, referring to the comparative overview of AG Jacobs came to the 
conclusion that a partial immunity would be a justified conclusion drawn from the 
practice in the Member States. I am afraid that such a conclusion is simply wrong. 
The comparative overview of AG Jacobs was not coherently comparative since it 
covered only a few countries, nor was it even a reliable overview of the countries 
covered.  
 
Through discussing in brief the right to collective bargaining as a potentially 
fundamental right 49 - which is for him no indication of an antitrust immunity, not 
even as enshrined in Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 50 – De Vos 
comes to his pre-Albany conclusion: while the right to collective bargaining obviously 
is a fundamental right, it cannot be left as a meaningless qualification. Therefore, and 
while collective bargaining on the other hand cannot be left as ‘untouchable’, ‘a 
middle ground will have to be found.’ 51 This pre-Albany analysis is then completed 
by an overview of the case-law that De Vos finds relevant: state aid in employment 
support issues, employment agencies and the provision of manpower, prohibition of 
                                                 
48 On the analysis of the national situation, see Bruun & Hellsten 2001, pp. 66-71 
49 De Vos denotes both Deinert’s positive position (Olaf Deinert, Der europäische 
Kollektivvertrag, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1999, pp. 254-435), and some ECHR practice that 
has not recognised the right to collective bargaining a fundamental right: Svenska 
Lokmannaförbundet (1976) Eur.Court H.R. Rep. Series A, no. 20; Schmidt and Dahlström, 
(1976) Series A, no. 21, Gustafsson (1996) R.J.D., II, no. 9; Wilson & National Union of 
Journalists, 2 July 2002, nos. 30668/96, 30671/96 and 30678/96. He then equals to this case-
law the case UEAPME, T-135/96, [1998] ECR II-2335, with the implication that the 
UEAPME judgment would support his conclusion that a fundamental right does not imply a 
duty to enter into negotiations with a given organisation; see the footnote 28 of De Vos on p. 
61. In reality the case UEAPME did not encapsulate any argumentation with the fundamental 
right to collective bargaining. It was a suit of the European SME employer organisation 
(UEAPME) against the Directive 96/34 on Parental leave with the pretext that the inter-
professional agreement behind the Directive was not appropriately representative. The CFI de 
facto rejected (in formal terms declared as inadmissible under Article 230 (ex 173) EC) the 
lawsuit of the UEAPME. It withdrew its appeal after having concluded a co-operation 
agreement with the UNICE that guaranteed the presence of the UEAPME in later negotiations 
on the European level. 
50 De Vos denotes how the EU Charter also includes ‘the right to conduct a business (art. 16)’ 
and how the Charter ‘therefore maintains the tension between free competition and free 
collective bargaining’; De Vos p. 62. De Vos passes over the fact that while the Charter 
includes a principal recognition of the right to conduct a business, it does not mention outside 
the Preamble their specific EU level emblems: the market freedoms or, in other words, the 
free movement rules (more or less) guaranteed by the Treaty. Besides, the right to conduct a 
business is mainly a general recognition of that right. Labour legislation notoriously includes 
a myriad of restrictive elements.  
51 Ibid., p. 62. The only reference of De Vos here is S. Graf von Wallwitz, Tarifverträge und 
die Wettbewerbsordnung des EG-Vertrages, Peter Lang,  Frankfurt am Main 1997, p. 106.  
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Sunday work and tourist guide cases. 52  The last mentioned requires a couple of 
specific comments. 
 
In the tourist guide case SETTG the ECJ, maintains De Vos, confirmed that 
‘maintaining industrial peace and settling collective labour disputes are plain 
economic aims, not a reason of general interest justifying restrictions on the free 
provision of services.’ And he concluded: ‘A clearer inclusion of collective labour 
relations in the spectrum of the common economic market can hardly be imagined.’  
53 In reality the reasoning in SETTG was not that straightforward. The reasoning of the 
Greek government showed that a compulsory form of employment contract for any 
paid tourist guides in the free provision of services ended a collective labour dispute 
that was important for tourism and thereby for the economy of that State. That way 
the ECJ found that the aim concerned (not the industrial peace as such) was economic 
(paragraph 23) and unable to justify restrictions on the free provision of services. The 
case did not concern competition rules. In fact, of the cases De Vos presents only 
Höfner and Job Centre II fall under competition rules, namely abuse of a dominant 
position as state monopolies.  
 
However, the conclusion of De Vos, based on his interpretation of the case-law he 
found as of a pre-Albany nature, was that “the ‘no commodity’ slogan finds no 
adherents at the ECJ”; and that ‘the Court’s refusal to separate labour from the 
Treaty’s competition rules confirms and testifies to the latter’s general material 
scope.’ 54 In fact, De Vos admits that the cases he presents do not tangle directly the 
relationship between collective agreements and competition rules but he insists that 
‘they tellingly contain no special consideration where collective labour relations are 
indeed involved.’  
 
The case-law discussed by De Vos shows that he has tried to gather, indeed, any case 
supporting any critical conclusion related to Albany. I am afraid that in so doing he is 
not too convincing. However, after all it is also important to denote the main 
submissions of De Vos regarding judgment Albany and its ‘progeny’ – to use an 
expression of De Vos.  
 
 
1.3.2.2 The Principal Albany-Criticism of De Vos 
 
Already the main heading of De Vos is telling: ‘The Surprising Labour Exemption: 
Albany and Its Progeny.’ The second sub-heading confirms the rest of the melancholy 
melody: ‘A Fundamental Critique of Albany’ with sub-sub-headings ‘Incorrect 
Premises’ and ‘Unnecessary and Unjustified Labour Supremacy’.  
 
Under the first sub-sub-heading ‘A Partial Labour Exemption’ the criticism of De Vos 
describes the Albany-immunity as a Hegelian style and ‘quick’ creature (whereas the 
                                                 
52 As to employment aid cases, De Vos refers especially to case C-251/97 Commission v. 
France [1999] ECR I-6639; at employment agencies De Vos refers i.a. to case C-41/90 
Höfner [1991] ECR I-1979 and C-111/94 Job Centre [1997] ECR I-7119; at Sunday work De 
Vos refers i.a. to case C-145/88 Torfaen [1989] ECR I-3851; and at tourist guides i.a. case C-
398/95 SETTG v. Ergasias [1997] ECR I-3091. 
53 De Vos, p. 66. 
54 Ibid. 
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immunity proposed by AG Jacobs was a balanced and mitigated escape from 
competition law intrusion) where counting – by the Court – Articles 3(1)(g), 2 and 
118b (now Article 139) EC is a thesis. The antithesis is the inherent restriction of 
competition by collective agreements. The immunity, declared in paragraph 60 of 
Albany, marks a synthesis. I will pass over whether we may fully agree with that 
description. In any case, one can agree (although with an opposite ideological premise) 
with what seems to be the culminating general criticism of De Vos: 
 
‘In the perceived field of tension between the EC’s economic aims, for which 
free competition is instrumental, and the EC’s social policy which supports the 
negotiations of collective labour agreement, the ECJ therefore gives 
precedence to the social over the economic. Albany and its progeny 
symbolically contradict the traditionally assumed primacy of economic in the 
European integration process. They are moreover the first, and so far only 
cases, where the ECJ has self-imposed a categorical limitation to the material 
scope of EC competition law.’ 55  
 
Under ‘Incorrect Premises’ De Vos criticises the ECJ because it justified an immunity 
for national, i.e. Dutch, collective agreements with European collective agreements 
(now Articles 138 and 139 EC). The submission implies that their status could be per 
se different. I cannot see how this could be the case (omitting the dichotomy national-
European), although De Vos finds that one can see the difference even in a superficial 
reading. He also maintains that the ECJ forgot the market integration function of 
competition rules that may sometimes, given their supposed efficiency effects, 
overrule ‘postulating any inherent contradiction’ between collective agreements and 
competition rules. 56  
 
Under ‘Unnecessary and Unjustified Labour Supremacy’ De Vos once again flags the 
US Supreme Court’s ‘accommodating’ immunity policy and submits how AG Jacobs 
proposed a similar model in Albany. 57  De Vos welcomes the Commission’s policy 
that is by analogy anchored to sports cases: it does not apply Article 81 to inherent 
and organisationally necessary sports rules. He also finds that a sort of proportionality 
test ‘exempts’ those sporting restrictions. My comment is that there is no sports case-
law involving a collective labour agreement. The proportionality aspect I comment on 
in section 2.7.1, infra. However, under ‘Unnecessary and unjustified Labour 
Supremacy’ De Vos makes as his strongest normative effort a reference to text of the 
Treaty (Articles 138, 139, 81, 136 (with its reference to the common market), 2 
(economic policy based on the Internal Market), and finally Article 4: the principle of 
                                                 
55 Ibid., p. 68. On the preceding page De Vos had called the status of collective agreements 
vis-à-vis competition rules – in the eyes of the ECJ - as a ‘per se preferential’. After the first 
sentence cited De Vos referred to his own article in Dutch. 
56 Ibid., pp. 69-70 
57 Marie Malaurie-Vignal has presented how we should also read the Albany-immunity in an 
inverted way: issues outside the essence of collective bargaining or those meaning to affect 
directly the relationships between employers and third parties, like the clients, deliverers or 
competing employers, would be without immunity. Marie Malaurie-Vignal, Droit de la 
concurrence interne et communautaire, 3e éd. 2005, p. 74. This inverted reading – akin to the 
immunity of core subjects by AG Jacobs that do not affect third parties and markets – simply 
does not find support in the text of Albany that operates with the agreements’ nature and 
purpose. 
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an open market economy with free competition. His reading ‘clearly presents the 
common market and its free competition as overarching goals from which no EC 
policy can be exempted.’ ‘If any hierarchy is to be wrung from the TEC, precedence 
should rather go to competition policy over social policy rather than vice versa.’ He 
then maintains, no less, that ‘the naked truth…is that social policy and competition 
policy coexist as common EC objectives without a formal internal hierarchy and that 
the authors of the TEC, especially when developing the EC’s social policy in 
Maastricht and Amsterdam, were apparently unaware of any potential conflict 
between the policies.’ For De Vos, this ‘reality’ again called for a modus vivendi, not 
a partial priority of one policy over the other. 58  
 
It is easy to see that De Vos would like to see the ECJ confirm the priority of 
competition rules over social policy. In this line he is more consistent than in claiming 
that no priority can be set up but only an accommodation between the two policies. In 
this claim he in a way goes even further than AG Jacobs who clearly saw that EC 
competition rules were not drafted with a view to their application to collective 
bargaining agreements, see paragraph 179 of the opinion. Under ‘Contentious 
Relationship with the Previous Case-law’ De Vos asks the reason for the immunity of 
collective agreements and maintains that it remains a mystery. 59 I have two essential 
comments. First, the ECJ answered this question by referring to the serious 
undermining of the social policy objectives of the Treaty if the competition rules were 
applied to them. Second, even AG Jacobs saw many aspects of general good in 
collective agreements, saw how the application of competition rules would reverse the 
national practice and also proposed an automatic anti-trust immunity, although limited 
to core subjects such as wages and working conditions; see in particular paragraphs 
178 and 179 of the opinion. In this sense the criticism of De Vos de facto also 
addresses the proposal of AG Jacobs.  
 
Furthering the ‘mystery’ argument, De Vos asks whether Albany and its progeny (van 
der Woude and Pavlov) herald ‘a dramatic shift that will in due course be extended to 
other ‘special’ sectors such as environment, public health, education or consumer 
protection?’ 60 In this question De Vos, first, forgets that there are express Treaty rules 
on each of these ‘special’ sectors, shaping accordingly their relationship with 
competition rules. Second, for collective agreements there was no precedent, an issue 
also highlighted by AG Jacobs (who otherwise outlawed a general labour exemption; 
see paragraphs 120-130 of the opinion). This therefore undermines the conclusion of 
De Vos that ‘Albany’s labour exemption rests upon false premises and is technically 
both unnecessary and unwarranted, especially considering the line of cases that 
preceded it.’  
 
All in all, the criticism of De Vos is fundamental, indeed. According to him, ‘time 
will tell whether Albany and its immediate progeny are but an accident de parcours, 
or the dawning of a new age in the development of the EC, away from the pensée 
unique of free competition.’ 61 I think that time has already shown clearly that Albany 
was neither an accident, nor something provisional. No national court has challenged 
                                                 
58 Ibid., p. 72.  
59 Ibid., pp. 73-4. 
60 Ibid., 74. 
61 Ibid. 
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it with questions subject to a preliminary ruling. No Commission practice shows an 
attempt to challenge it even though its high officer Mr. Gyselen in 2000 came up with 
sharp criticism that was partially directed to the basic immunity of collective 
agreements and to the first ruling in Albany on the erga omnes declaration of the 
agreement concerned. 62 No corresponding Treaty amendment was proposed in the 
preparations of the Treaty of Nice, signed in 2000, or of the Constitutional Treaty. 
Really narrow but simultaneously authoritative criticism came from AG Jacobs in 
Pavlov where he asked if the Albany reasoning would stand (only) regarding the ways 
of safeguarding an appropriate judicial review of the decisions of a pension fund 
based on a collective agreement and enjoying exclusive rights under Article 86 EC. 63 
Otherwise he did not contest the Albany-immunity in Pavlov: see e.g. paragraphs 97-
98 of the AG’s opinion. 
 
The detailed description of the detailed ‘contours’ of the Albany-immunity by De Vos 
does not bring any great surprises, except perhaps that he finds how collective 
agreements at all levels are covered by the immunity. 64  
 
A second, perhaps surprising outcome is that De Vos does not find the 
representativeness of the social partners a necessary condition for the immunity under 
Albany although he himself finds that it should be so. 65  This further reveals a 
difference between the French and Dutch versions of Albany. Namely, the French 
version of paragraph 62 of Albany refers to collective negotiations between 
representative social partners (‘négociation collective entre les organisations 
représentatives des employeurs et des travailleurs’). The Dutch version, language of 
the case, speaks about collective negotiations between employers’ and workers’ 
organisations (‘collectieve onderhandelingen tussen werkgevers- en 
werknemersorganisaties’). The English (with the ‘organisations representing’ instead 
of representative organisations), Danish, German and Swedish versions are on the line 
of the Dutch, but the Italian and Spanish on the line of the French version. While the 
French version is what the judges have jointly agreed upon (or confirmed by a 
majority), the Dutch one is the only official one. It is, of course, regrettable that the 
judgment leaves good grounds for two diametrically opposite interpretations in this 
kind of essential issue. Not just De Vos but also Evju has taken the judgment as 
setting up no criteria for the representativeness of the social partners concerned. 
                                                 
62 See Luc Gyselen, case annotation (Cases Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken), 
CMLRev. 37:425-448, April 2000. 
63 See the opinion in joined cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov et al. [2000] ECR I-6451, 
paragraphs 199-200. 
64 De Vos, p. 74. It is clear, however, that while Albany dealt with sectoral collective 
agreements it could not define exhaustively especially the lot of company-level agreements. 
One has to keep in mind at least the possibility of yellow agreements. However, obviously the 
‘nature and purpose’ test also applies at the company level and it is also clearly arguable that 
genuine company-level agreements may enjoy the Albany-immunity. In van der Woude (see 
footnote 23, supra) AG Fennelly expressed the same (although provisional) position as a 
response to a clarification request submitted by the government of the United Kingdom; see 
footnote 14 of the Opinion of 11.5.2000. 
65 Ibid. 
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However, the French version as the authoritative one (as used by the judges in camera) 
is the reliable source for the understanding of the judgment (also) at this point. 66 
 
 
1.3.3 Ichino’s Assessment on Albany 
 
Pietro Ichino offers one of the law and economics critics of Albany. 67 While he, 
professor of labour law in Italy, refers to the history up to the French Le Chapelier Act 
of 1792 and the British Combination Act of 1799, his analysis is not ‘too precise’ in 
highlighting how neither the EC Treaty nor the derived law acknowledges the right to 
union freedom and collective bargaining. In a footnote he recognises Articles 139, 
137(4) and 137(1) representing a more relevant role for collective bargaining but does 
not recognise at all Article 136 EC with its reference to the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights 1989 and European Social Charter 1961, both of which 
include the freedom to join a trade union and the right to collective bargaining. 68  
 
Ichino’s approach is also purely competition-minded in that he attacks the 
“Commission’s thesis, according to which collective agreements could not fall within 
the notion of ‘agreement among enterprises’”. This position must mean the written 
observations of the Commission since the judgment does not contain any such 
statement of the Commission. Instead, from paragraph 47 of Albany we learn that the 
company Albany submitted the opposite view, clearly also supported by Ichino: that a 
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) implies inside the employer side an 
agreement in the sense of Article 81 EC. That is also the cornerstone of the analysis of 
Advocate General in Albany (not signed by the Court). 69 Furthermore, as shown 
earlier the Court did not share this view while it acknowledged the restrictions on 
competition inherent in sectoral CBAs. For the Court the essential feature of a CBA 
was the link between the parties, not any possible express or implied agreements 
inside the negotiating management and labour. It is finally rather easy to distinguish 
the labour law rationale in this ‘agreement connotation’; that it is between the 
collectively negotiating parties. I also recall how this ‘inside approach’ is a typical 
example of viewing the issue from the competition law angle: its grasp a priori covers 
any agreement that then must legitimise its exceptional immunity.  
 
                                                 
66 Fahlbeck has also found the difference between the linguistic versions. For him it is, 
however, unclear whether the English, Dutch, German, Danish and Swedish versions are 
erroneous, as looks obvious. See Fahlbeck, footnote 25, supra, p. 917 (footnote 7). Fahlbeck 
also denotes that it would have been appropriate to remind the reader in Bruun & Hellsten 
2001 of these two language ‘interpretations’ instead of noting only the difference between the 
French and English versions. Fahlbeck’s comment is in principle justified while it cannot 
challenge the position of French as the authoritative version. 
67 Pietro Ichino, Collective Bargaining and Antitrust Laws: an Open Issue. IJCLLIR Vol. 
17/2, 185-198, 2001. 
68 Ibid., p. 188. 
69 Ibid, p. 190. See the opinion of AG Jacobs, paragraphs 237-244. The Albany-immunity in 
paragraphs 59 and 60 of the judgment impliedly rejected this position. The AG also refers to 
the relevant decision of the Commission, i.e. that concerning the opening hours of Irish Banks 
in which the Commission took the same view as the AG, paragraph 243 of the Opinion: the 
Irish Banks’ Standing Committee, OJ 1986 L 295, p. 28, paragraph 16. 
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Ichino sees a point of attack in the Court’s reasoning in the ‘fact’ that the line of 
argumentation in Albany would free any related collective agreement from anti-trust 
scrutiny (because such agreements are intended to improve ‘working conditions’). For 
him, however, an objective assessment of a CBA is no more convincing. I do not 
share this criticism, nor where Ichino disregards a distinction between the (unlawful) 
restriction of competition in goods and services, and the (lawful) restrictions in a 
labour market. His grounds are that minimum standards in a CBA may easily become 
maximum norms (as stipulations on business hours prove, according to him), that 
wage increases mostly turn into a price increase and that in labour intensive services 
restricting competition among workers immediately translates into restricting 
competition among enterprises. 70 In his examples Ichino ignores the fact that CBAs 
in general terms are beneficial for workers, even for white collar workers nowadays. 
Historically CBAs result in every country from a tension, if not sometimes also from a 
social struggle, between management and labour. In stating this it is not my intention 
to disregard a paternalistic employer view that for a couple of centuries has taken a 
fairly regulated relationship with labour as the only socially meaningful one and even 
morally acceptable way of treating ‘the social issue’. It has its firm place in the history 
of labour law. Anyway, I maintain that the grounds expressed by Ichino disregard the 
difference between competition law and collective agreements by presenting their 
relationship as one between two technically very similar legal structures. The 
rationale behind each of these legal features is by definition different. While Ichino – 
via his examples - sees that Albany raises the broader question about the reasons of a 
‘labour market exemption’ from competition rules, he – pushed by the ‘power’ of his 
examples – disregards the Court’s simple reason (social policy objectives seriously 
undermined) for it and moves on to seek a solution in economists’ thinking.  
 
However, Ichino’s main criticism against the judgment is that the Court’s answer to 
the question why CBAs should have an immunity vis-à-vis competition rules was too 
generic. He asserts that ‘the difficulty in precisely identifying the reasons for such 
immunity prevented its limits being defined in the judgment in a clear and persuasive 
way’. 71  This position is true in the sense that the judgment left us with some 
uncertainty as to the limits of the immunity: whether it is defined via ‘working 
conditions’ (as Ichino takes it; paragraph 63 of Albany) or ‘social policy objectives’ 
(paragraph 59). 72 So far Ichino is right. However, his own solution is something a 
labour lawyer cannot truly sign on to: namely, that a labour law approach could give 
such limits only with the aid of an economist. He goes on to assert that ‘the 
connection between law and economics was exactly what was totally missing from 
the judgment justification’. 73   
 
Where does Ichino’s law and economics approach bring us? With an 
‘insiders/outsiders model’ he asserts that only collective bargaining which also 
represents outsiders would justify it as subject to antitrust immunity. This is akin to 
Ichino’s statement that he shares the Advocate General’s view according to which 
only CBAs not directly affecting third parties may enjoy the antitrust immunity. 74 
                                                 
70 Ichino, p. 191. 
71 Ibid., p. 194. 
72 See footnote 23, supra. 
73 Ichino, p. 194.  
74 See Ichino’s footnote 10 on p. 194 where he also announces that he shares the AG’s 
conclusion that EC law does not ‘make an exception to the general competition discipline in 
 25
Under ‘job security as rational allocation of risk of unexpected occurrences’ he 
would let the national legislator (lawmaker) decide, within his large discretion, which 
job security clauses would be justified, subject to EC law scrutiny. 75  Under 
‘Collective agreement as instrument of transaction costs reduction’ he would allow 
the continuous role of the CBAs, but possibly adding a ‘default regulation’ clause, 
thus allowing derogations negotiated by individual agreements. A brief comment on 
these proposals is this: they ignore the fact that Albany was a constitutional decision 
anchored even in Articles 2 and 3 EC. It is not to be expected that the ECJ would 
change its line of reasoning on the basic antitrust immunity without the Treaty first 
being amended, and that does not seem at all likely. A more general comment is that 
the law and economics approach simply shares the strongly competition-minded 
viewpoint of AG Jacobs in Albany.  
 
 
1.3.4 Kiikeri’s Analysis on Collective Agreements and Competition Law 
 
Markku Kiikeri offers a rather distinctive and original analysis of collective 
bargaining and competition rules. 76  His analysis following the presentation of 
judgment Albany starts by denoting (as if judgment Albany did not exist – Kiikeri 
reasons on the level of legal principles) how it seems ‘fairly strange to apply a set of 
norms designed to protect the consumer, and the functioning of the selling and 
retailing market, by activity, which is designed, on the other hand, to protect the 
interests of the individual as worker, especially where the individual interests are 
agreed in an agreement between the collective parties (employees and employers) 
having, in this respect, rather different aims.’77 I do agree. 
 
However, Kiikeri raises the question whether the relationship between ‘collective 
agreeing’ and competition law is ultimately a ‘basic right’ issue. ‘Could there be a 
right to collective bargaining?’ 78 Kiikeri does not refer to any potential source of such 
a right but refers to Sulkunen who held on the basis of the judgment that the Court did 
not accept (de facto rejected, I would say, with a constitutional reasoning reaching 
even Article 2 EC) the idea of AG Jacobs that collective agreements have sufficient 
protection under the general principle of freedom of contract. For Sulkunen, this 
further justified the conclusion that the right to bargain collectively enjoys protection 
                                                                                                                                            
favour of labour collective bargaining’, and referred to AG’s para. 160; to be precise, in that 
paragraph the AG stated that there is no EC fundamental right to bargain collectively.  
However, Ichino also shares the view that the ‘Community legal system shows a generic 
favourable attitude towards collective bargaining as a method for ruling labour relations’ 
(paragraphs 181-183 of the AG) but adheres then to the ‘reasonable’ balance-making of the 
AG, thus with the general protection of competition freedom; paragraphs 190-194 of the AG’s 
opinion. A part of this balance-making was the immunity condition that a collective 
agreement (besides concluded in good faith on core subjects such as wages and working 
conditions) does not directly affect third markets and third parties (paragraph 194). 
75 I admit that some of the Italian examples Ichino presents are rather peculiar in a 
comparative view, especially a ’preferential hiring criteria for relatives of workers already 
employed in the same company’ in the airport personnel and motorways and tunnels 
concessionary companies; see Ichino, p. 195, footnote 13.  
76 Markku Kiikeri, Comparative Legal Reasoning and European Law, pp. 224-242. 
77 Op.cit., p. 236.  
78 Ibid. 
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also in EC law on the basis of a specific right established in case-law. 79 He later 
concluded that Albany rendered the right to collective negotiations a fundamental 
right in the EC. 80  Kiikeri however finds that ‘the point of departure to the 
interpretation of this question…appears to be in the conflict between collective 
agreements and competition law and not so much in the realm of basic [i.e. 
fundamental] rights’. ‘[N]o really “hard” basic right conflict does really exist.’ 81 
 
Kiikeri’s position needs to be elaborated in light of the fact that already paragraph 
III(e) in the Declaration of Philadelphia 1944, annexed to the ILO Constitution, 
enshrined a ‘solemn obligation of the International Labour Organization to further 
among the nations of the world programmes which will achieve…(e) the effective 
recognition of the right of collective bargaining’. Furthermore, Article 136 EC refers 
to the European Social Charter 1961 and the Community Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers of 1989 which both, 82  as well as the Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of the EU (in Article 28), recognize the right to collective 
bargaining. This said, I leave it open here whether the legal sources referred to really 
mean – 62 years after the Philadelphia Declaration – a fundamental right achieved. If 
we take the Article 136 EC references seriously, the answer should be positive.  
 
Kiikeri finds the status of collective bargaining to be a priori distinctive in the legal 
system, because ‘the agreements made in this sphere are designed to achieve social 
objectives and to actualize the social rights also guaranteed by the state to an 
individual (rights recognized in one form or another in most of the legal systems in 
the western world)’. 83  However, the conflict between collective agreements and 
competition law he resolves simply by denoting how competition law provisions seem 
to be in the end a lower rank set of norms, and the right to free competition lower than 
the right to collective bargaining. 84 It is easy to agree with this. 
 
Kiikeri also finds the methods of interpretation between collective and commercial 
agreements different and important for their status and hierarchy. He highlights how 
agreements pursuing social policy objectives must be observed from the point of view 
of the general social policy –maker (whether it is a Member State or the Community). 
Genuinely and in a transparent process accomplished terms pursuing social policy 
objectives make therefore “their status in comparison to ‘normal’ market contracts 
(belonging to the scope of competition law) very strong”. 85 A disturbing element in 
this always hypothetical reasoning is that it assumes that collective agreements were 
anyway subject to competition rules, although Kiikeri clearly does not mean this. 
However, he finds, already somewhat deviating from the nature and purpose of the 
agreements (the tools of the Court established in paragraph 60 of Albany), that 
                                                 
79 Olavi Sulkunen, Ammattiyhdistysoikeudet Euroopan yhteisön oikeudessa; in 
Työoikeudellisen yhdistyksen vuosikirja, Helsinki 2000, p. 152. 
80 Ibid., p. 154.   
81 Kiikeri, p. 237.  
82 See Article 12 of the 1989 Charter and, respectively, Articles 5 and 6 of the European 
Social Charter. On Article 5 (right to organize) as a source for the right to collective 
bargaining, see my comments at (and in) footnote 99, infra.  
83 Ibid., p. 238. 
84 Ibid., p. 239. We thus learned that Kiikeri finally also uses the notion of a right to collective 
bargaining.  
85 Ibid.  
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collective agreements ‘may be invalidated on a very general basis as not belonging to 
the category of collective agreements at all’. 86 I would comment that the purpose tool 
of the Court may definitely lead it to assess even single terms and clauses in a 
collective agreement. However, Kiikeri’s firm conclusion is that it is very problematic 
to use highly instrumental competition rules in invalidating collective agreements and 
their terms. 87 
 
In conclusion Kiikeri denotes that collective bargaining and agreeing have social 
objectives which are in many ways defined in the context of the democratic 
constitutional system. He continued: 
 
‘What is a social objective in this sense is a matter of a political and fundamental 
legal system to define positively. Furthermore, the collective bargaining and agreeing 
is qualified by such elements, which restrict their scope in relation to the “normal 
political rights”. They are socially and politically defined functions and their scope, as 
it regards the social objectives, is defined in a constitutionally valid process.’ 88 
 
My comment is that I would not build too much, if anything, here on the juxtaposition 
political rights – social rights. The latter are also highly political as they often come 
close to or even form part of constitutional protection which is the highest legal-
political activity or sphere of any democratic society. However, Kiikeri continues, 
always interestingly while in an abstract way: 
 
‘In this sense, it is problematic – but not absolutely impossible – to consider the right 
to bargain collectively as a fundamental right belonging to the same category as 
fundamental political and social rights. Thus it seems to be a subordinate “right” 
implementing the social rights’. 
 
Here my structural comment is that the right to collective bargaining is at the heart of 
fundamental social rights. That is why it is solemnly declared as an important goal to 
achieve in the ILO Constitution (via the Philadelphia Declaration, as ‘refreshed’ by 
the 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Rights at Work, paragraph 2(a)), and why it 
is referred to as a right in the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights 
and in the European Social Charter; both Charters are now referred to in Article 136 
EC. Finally it is in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000 
(Article 28), and in the Constitutional Treaty (Article II-88). Therefore, it is 
impossible to conclude that the right to collective bargaining is just a subordinate right 
‘implementing the social rights’ (in the heart of which it is in reality situated and 
which Kiikeri does not really explore 89). Reasoning on the fundamental social right to 
collective bargaining does not need to be abstract anymore since it is already included 
in the international labour standards. Another issue is how binding the right to 
collective bargaining is in the above international normative sources.  
 
Kiikeri leaves open the practical effects of an express right to collective bargaining 
while he refers to its ‘realistically beneficial’ effects, also found by AG Jacobs: 
                                                 
86 Ibid., pp. 239-240. 
87 Ibid., 240. 
88 Ibid., p. 241. 
89 But states that it exists in Sweden. 
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prevention of costly labour conflicts, reduction of transaction costs and promotion of 
predictability and transparency. 90 These effects are of course common ground. 
 
Notwithstanding the partially critical comments above it is easy to share the general 
conclusion of Kiikeri: ‘…no real support from Community law can be indeed found 
for a general examination of collective agreements by the competition law rules.’ 91 
Besides, Albany resolved – I repeat – the basics of this issue. Another issue is why the 
judgment is silent about a fundamental social right to collective bargaining. I will 
attempt to explain this briefly under my next heading.  
 
 
1.3.5 Concluding and Post-Amsterdam Comments 
 
The fundamental opposition line of De Vos vis-à-vis judgment Albany seems to 
present a rather lonely way of doctrinal thinking. The competition law authorities like 
Goyder and Van Bael & Bellis do not share it. E.g. van de Gronden takes Albany as 
one judgment amongst others delimiting the scope of competition rules for public 
policy reasons, however as connected to the rule of reason argument 92 (which he does 
not develop in the context of Albany but in that of Wouters 93  where the Court 
accepted the Dutch ban on barrister-accountant partnerships). Accordingly, the law 
and economics criticism (like that of Ichino) has not resulted in new preliminary 
references or other acts challenging Albany. Indeed, its single direct labour law 
‘descendant’ in the ECJ, judgment van der Woude 94 was rendered by a chamber that 
naturally followed the reasoning in Albany. The same concerns the Norwegian case in 
the EFTA-Court, Landsorganisasjonen i Norge (Norwegian Federation of Trade 
Unions) v. Kommunenes Sentralforbund (Norwegian Association of Local and 
Regional Authorities). 95 All in all, the argumentation of Albany, being linked up to 
                                                 
90 Ibid., p. 241 where Kiikeri refers to paragraph 181 of AG Jacobs’ opinion in Albany. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Johan W. van de Gronden, Rule of Reason and Convergence in Internal Market and 
Competition Law, in Annette Schrauwen (ed.), Rule of Reason. Rethinking another Classic of 
European Legal Doctrine, Europa Law Publishing 2005, p. 83. Rule of reason assessment 
means, in the U.S. context, weighing the pro- and contra-competitive effects of a measure or 
agreement. The Court in Albany did not apply this kind of ’intra-competition’ rule of reason 
assessment but weighed the inherent restrictions of competition of collective agreements 
against their social policy objectives, i.e. a factor outside competition rules which, 
consequently, are not enough to explain the constitutional nature of Albany.  
Barnard has also marked the immunity conditions proposed by AG Jacobs in Albany 
(paragraph 194 of the opinion) as a rule of reason approach. The AG required for the 
immunity that the agreement is concluded in good faith or core issues of collective bargaining 
such as wages and working conditions which do not directly affect third markets and third 
parties. Catherine Barnard, EC Employment Law, Oxford Univresity Press 2000, p. 572. 
Similarly, she has called it as ‘very much the perspective of a competition lawyer’ while the 
Court applied a ‘labour relations approach’; ibid, p. 571. I agree. 
93 Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577. 
94 Case C-222/98 van der Woude [2000] ECR I-7111. The new feature in this judgment was to 
legitimize the running of an agreement-based scheme by a single subcontractor; an insurance 
company runs the agreement-based sickness insurance scheme. On this judgment, see Bruun 
& Hellsten 2001, p. 56. 
95 Case E-8/00, judgment of 22.3.2002. The case concerned a non-erga-omnes collective 
agreement establishing the occupational pension scheme in the municipal sector in Norway.  
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Article 2 EC and embodying the basics of social dialogue in the EC Treaty, is such 
that only the ECJ itself could touch it, and that only by sitting in full Court. While this 
is most unlikely, Albany could in theory be quashed by an amendment of the Treaty 
itself but this is subject to unanimity and ratification process in the Member States. It 
is certain that there would always be at least one Member State prohibiting any 
dilution of the constitutional level protection that Albany grants to (sectoral) collective 
agreements. The passage of time (i.e. a case one day) will decide the only relevant 
subject matter left open in the judgment, thus whether social policy objectives (in 
paragraph 59) or working conditions (in paragraph 63) decide the limits of the 
immunity.  96 
 
Linked to Albany there is also the question about a possible ‘labour exemption’ from 
competition rules. It would obviously cover, next to Article 81, also Articles 82 and 
86(1) EC (Article 86(2) I discuss in the second chapter). Does Albany justify 
concluding that a more general ‘labour exemption’ from EC competition rules exist or 
shall we confine ourselves to an in casu approach? The question normally arises 
between national labour legislation and EC competition rules because it is difficult to 
imagine EC secondary legislation being challenged by virtue of the Treaty’s 
competition rules while it is in theory possible. Another aspect is how vigorously the 
competition argument is perhaps presented, lobbied and accepted as a 
counterargument against new EU labour legislation. However, I recall that in 
particular Becu and Deutsche Telekom v Schröder hint towards a ‘labour law 
exemption’. If collective agreements are granted an exemption (conditioned 
immunity), why not, if not a fortiori, granting the same status to proper state acts, i.e. 
legislation. In principle restrictions of or at least effects on competition are in labour 
legislation inherent but naturally much more variable than in sectoral collective 
agreements. Furthermore, the nature and purpose test applied in Albany (implying a 
safety valve against masked protectionism) looks suitable to legislation as well. Are 
there relevant counterarguments against the application of Albany this way by analogy? 
There are not, that I can see. With these reservations I may conclude that a ‘labour 
law exemption’ looks to be well justifiable by analogy with Albany, as supported by 
Becu and Deutsche Telekom v Schröder. Caution needs to be applied to analogous 
interpretations and this suggests that we should not forget the in casu approach.  
 
Ultimately, I recognise, of course, the ‘competition connection’ in individual 
employment contracts (with its national regulations) but since EC competition rules 
only concern agreements between undertakings I will take the liberty to leave this 
issue for others to address.  
 
The question remains why we do not find in Albany a single word about the 
alleged/possible fundamental social right to collective bargaining. 97 I will make some 
necessary remarks here. I recall how AG Jacobs found that among the international 
legal sources solely Article 6 of the European Social Charter seemed expressly to 
recognise its existence (paragraph 146 of the opinion). However, AG Jacobs quoted, 
                                                 
96 See footnote 23, supra.  
97 The pension funds, the Dutch and French governments and the Commission argued in 
Albany in favour of such fundamental right in EC law, derived from ‘a number of 
international treaties’ as AG Jacobs expressed it (paragraph 132). The Preamble to the French 
Constitution recognises the right of workers to participate, via his representatives, in 
collective determination of working conditions.  
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next to the ‘menu nature’ of the ESC (paragraph 146), relevant judgments of the 
European Human Rights Court undermining – for him sufficiently – the binding effect 
of that right (paragraphs 148 to 156). 98 In so doing he passed over the conclusion of 
the Committee of Independent Experts, related to Article 5 ESC (right to organise), 
that ‘…where a fundamental trade union prerogative such as the right to bargain 
collectively was restricted, this could also amount to an infringement of the very 
nature of the trade union freedom guaranteed under Article 5’. 99  As to the ILO 
conventions, he pointed out (paragraph 147) that the ‘carefully drafted’ Article 4 of 
the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention No. 98 grants no right 
and, thus, he left without attention the fact that the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association has recognised in the monitoring practice of Convention No. 87 that the 
right to bargain freely with employers with respect to conditions of work constitutes 
an essential element in freedom of association. 100 He further found that in Germany 
                                                 
98 AG Jacobs discussed (paragraphs 146 to 156 of the opinion) cases Swedish Engine Drivers' 
Union v Sweden, 6 February 1976, Eur. Court HR Rep., Series A, 20 (1976); National Union 
of Belgian Police v Belgium, 27 October 1975, Eur. Court HR Rep., Series A, 19 (1975); and 
Gustafsson v Sweden, 25 April 1996, R.J.D., 1996-II, No 9. The two first mentioned concern 
Article 6 ESC. In the first one the ECrtHR said that that ‘the Charter does not provide for a 
real right to have any such agreement concluded’. In the second one the ECrtHR held that the 
Charter does not provide for a real right to consultation with the state as employer. Neither 
statement negates the fundamental value of collective agreements concluded  in relation to 
competition rules. Case Gustafsson concerned only the ECHR where the ECrtHR did not take 
any definite stand on the right to bargain collectively but had recourse to the ‘wide margin of 
appreciation’ accorded to the state parties (see paragraph 156 of the opinion).  
99 The conclusion is quoted by Lenia Samuel, Fundamental social rights; Case law of the 
European Social Charter, 2nd ed., Council of Europe Publishing 2002, p. 121. This conclusion, 
concerning Ireland, she describes as ‘well established’ and denotes (ibid.) that ‘[s]ituations 
criticised under Article 5 on this basis for violations of the right to bargain collectively 
include, in addition to that of Ireland, those of Denmark, Malta, Norway and the United 
Kingdom’. She further mentions, under the heading of ‘The link between Article 5 and Article 
6 para. 2’ (ibid., p. 139) how ‘[a]ccording to the case law of the Committee [of Independent 
Experts on the European Social Charter], paragraph 2 of Article 6 “presupposes the guarantee 
of a complete freedom to organise” (Conclusions IV, p. 46, Ireland)’.  Already earlier 
(Conclusions III, p. 35, concerning Ireland) the Committee had concluded that the 
incompatibility with Article 5 also extended to the right to bargain collectively provided for 
under Article 6 para. 2. Conclusions VI, p. 36, for their part read as follows: ‘a precondition 
of satisfactory compliance with the obligations arising out of Article 6 para. 2 was full 
observance of Article 5’. The conclusion of Lenia Samuel is that the interdependence of trade 
union rights and collective bargaining is ‘fully established’ (ibid., p. 141). Sulkunen has also 
concluded, on the basis of the conclusion quoted by Lenia Samuel on her p. 121, that the 
contents of Article 5 ESC have been also elaborated to cover the right to collective 
bargaining; Olavi Sulkunen, Kansainväliset Ammattiyhdistysoikeudet, Helsinki 2000, p. 495. 
More recently the Committee (nowadays called the European Committee of Social Rights) 
has described the Irish situation (i.a.), as follows: ‘[t]he Committee has consistently found the 
negotiation license system to amount to an impairment of the right to freedom of association, 
since the statutory criteria for granting the license are excessive’; Conclusions XVI-1 Vol. 1, 
p. 346. Conclusions 2004 Vol. 1, p. 263, repeat substantively the same. It is impossible, 
indeed, to avoid the conclusion that AG Jacobs discussed a wrong Article, thus Article 6 
instead of Article 5 ESC. 
100 See Digest of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association, available via 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/digestq.htm, paragraph 782: ‘The right to bargain freely 
with employers with respect to conditions of work constitutes an essential element in freedom 
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the Basic Law (Article 9(3)) grants constitutional protection to collective bargaining 
and agreements but passed over the fact that of the then 15 Member States the 
constitutions also in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain accorded 
similar direct constitutional protection and at least in the Netherlands’ monistic 
system similar although indirect protection is recognised via the international 
agreements, notably by the ILO Constitution. Further indirect protection normally 
stems from freedom of association guaranteed in every constitution. 101 Despite these 
elementary aspects the conclusion of AG Jacobs was that there was not convergence 
enough of national legal orders and international legal instruments on the recognition 
of a specific fundamental right to bargain collectively (paragraph 160). I come back to 
the national constitutional traditions at the end on this section. 
 
The ECJ avoided the whole issue since it decided Albany on the basis of an effective 
and consistent interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole. In any case it 
is clear that the Court did not confirm the position of AG Jacobs that there would not 
be convergence enough in the national legal orders and in international instruments 
for the recognition of a fundamental right. The Court avoided any stocktaking thereon. 
Furthermore, while the reasoning in Albany in paragraphs 52 to 60 (or to 64) prima 
facie looks fully free-standing, it was strong vis-à-vis the AG in the sense that the 
judgment (in paragraph 59) rejected the AG’s concept of (and conclusions based on) 
there being also in a collective labour agreement an implied agreement between the 
negotiating employers in the sense of Article 81 (paragraphs 237 to 244 of the 
opinion). The Court upheld a traditional labour law notion of a collective agreement, 
its core being the contractual tie between the negotiating parties, not inside the parties. 
Another position of the AG from which the Court crucially distanced itself was that 
collective agreements would deserve protection in EC law only under the general 
principle of freedom of contract (paragraph 161 of the opinion). It is notorious that 
competition rules quash normal (even informal) contracts (and even concerted 
practices) on a daily basis. Thus, as such, Albany meant setting up the immunity of 
collective agreements in relation to competition rules that are ‘fundamental for the 
Community’ (see judgment Eco Swiss, at footnote 2, supra). Getting immunity (even 
a conditioned one) against such a legal feature justifies one in concluding that 
collective bargaining in itself is of fundamental value, thus it is also a Judge-made (de 
facto) fundamental right in the EU. 102  
                                                                                                                                            
of association, and trade unions should have the right, through collective bargaining or other 
lawful means, to seek to improve the living and working conditions of those whom the trade 
unions represent. The public authorities should refrain from any interference which would 
restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof. Any such interference would appear 
to infringe the principle that workers' and employers' organizations should have the right to 
organize their activities and to formulate their programmes.’ It is impossible, indeed, to avoid 
the conclusion that AG Jacobs discussed a wrong ILO Convention, thus No. 98 instead of No. 
87. Likewise Sulkunen, Ammattiyhdistysoikeudet Euroopan yhteisön oikeudessa, 
Työoikeudellisen yhdistyksen vuosikirja 1999-2000, p. 171-172. 
101 See e.g. Stefan Clauwaert et al. (eds.), Fundamental Social Rights in the European Union. 
Comparative Tables and Documents. Report 82, European Trade Union Institute 2003; and 
the national reports in Bruun & Hellsten (eds.) Collective Agreements and Competition Law 
in the EU, DJØF Publishing, Copenhagen 2001. 
 
102 See the identical position of Sulkunen, too, at footnote 80, supra. After closing the 
manuscript the author found Stefano Giubboni’s ‘Social Rights and Market Freedom in the 
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Regarding the issue of the lack of an express fundamental right to collective 
bargaining in Albany, the legal landscape includes certain vagueness which for its part 
may explain the lack of a reference to a fundamental right. First, the language of the 
ILO Constitution 103 and its Convention No. 98 is slightly programmatic and AG 
Jacobs left without attention the fact that in the ILO the right to collective bargaining 
derives from freedom of association (Convention No. 87; see the comments at 
footnote 100, supra). On the other hand, the judgment and the Opinion – paragraph 
132 – do not reveal if the ILO Constitution and Convention No. 87 were expressly 
invoked in the case. Second, the European Social Charter has a certain subservient 
status 104 in relation to the ECHR, linked to the somewhat arguable and in this issue 
                                                                                                                                            
European Constitution’, Cambridge University Press 2006. Some basic comments are anyway 
necessary. Thus, Giubboni finds that the Court in Albany would have excluded ‘fully in 
harmony with the restrictive approach’ of AG Jacobs the existence in the Community legal 
order of a fundamental right to bargain collectively. This casts “a shadow of worrying 
uncertainty over the nature and extent of the ‘immune’ area of collective autonomy”. This 
further brought back the image of a rigidly ‘functionalized’ collective bargaining; see 
Giubboni, pp. 203-4. The certain uncertainty (‘social policy objectives’ or ‘working 
conditions’ defining the limits of the immunity) I also recognise while I disagree with the 
Court being allegedly ‘fully in harmony’ with the AG, see my explanation above on the 
difference between the approaches of the AG and the Court (there are other methodological 
differences as well). I therefore have to also disagree with Giubboni’s conclusion that the 
contents of the immunity would be therefore essentially limited by the restrictions proposed 
by the AG (in paragraph 194 of the opinion): agreements on core issues, made in good faith 
and ‘without directly affecting the market in products and services’ (the last citation by 
Giubboni; AG Jacobs spoke about affecting ‘third markets and third parties’; these restrictions 
are not in the judgment but the nature and purpose of the agreement concerned). 
103 The Philadelphia Declaration, paragraph III: ‘The Conference recognizes the solemn 
obligation of the International Labour Organization to further among the nations of the world 
programmes which will achieve: (e) the effective recognition of the right of collective 
bargaining…’. Article 4 of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 
98) reads: ‘Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to 
encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary 
negotiation between employers or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with a 
view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective 
agreements.’ In the Convention No. 87 the protection for collective bargaining (see footnote 
100, supra) is based on the organisations’ right to organise their activities and to formulate 
their programmes (Article 3(1)). Effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining 
also includes in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
(paragraph 2(a)). On these ILO provisions, also see sections 4.4.2, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 of  
Hellsten 2006. 
104 The language of the ESC is stricter: ‘Article 5 – The right to organize. With a view to 
ensuring or promoting the freedom of workers and employers to form local, national or 
international organisations for the protection of their economic and social interests and to join 
those organisations, the Contracting Parties undertake that national law shall not be such as to 
impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, this freedom. The extent to which the 
guarantees provided for in this article shall apply to the police shall be determined by national 
laws or regulations. The principle governing the application to the members of the armed 
forces of these guarantees and the extent to which they shall apply to persons in this category 
shall equally be determined by national laws or regulations.’ 
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even negative reasoning of the ECrtHR. Again, the judgment and the Opinion do not 
reveal if Article 5 ESC was invoked. Furthermore, a discourse on fundamental rights 
would have perhaps included a careful and detailed assessment of the status of such a 
right at the national level, which might also have embodied laborious problems for the 
Court. A way out, besides pushing the developments of EC’s own social law, was to 
reason only at the level of the EC Treaty, interpreting it effectively and consistently as 
paragraph 60 of Albany states. 105 The outcome in the judgment means a de facto 
superiority, tied up to Article 2 EC (‘effective and consistent interpretation provisions 
of the Treaty as a whole’), of the social values over competition values whereas the 
paradigm of the AG was a neutral balance between rules of a priori the same rank 
(paragraph 179 of the opinion), followed then by the additional immunity criteria of 
‘good faith’, core issues like wages and working conditions and the requirement of no 
effect on third parties and markets (paragraph 194 of the opinion). 
 
Had the Court been obliged to apply the Treaty of Amsterdam – the factual events 
concerned occurred in early 1990s – it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to 
avoid taking stock in the judgment also on the 1989 Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 106 and the European Social Charter. In this 
sense, the issue might return in future on the desk of the Court, in a context also 
involving collective bargaining and free movement rights.  
 
The 1989 Community Charter is at this point strongly bound by national law and 
practice. It, however, recognises that the employers or employers’ organisations, on 
the one hand, and workers’ organisations, on the other hand, shall have the right to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements, thus under the conditions laid down by 
national legislation and practice. The European Social Charter is stronger (see 
footnote 104). As such, some EU Member States have acceded to the Community 
after having ratified Articles 5 and 6 of the European Social Charter. For that part the 
                                                                                                                                            
 ‘Article 6 – the right to bargain collectively. With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of 
the right to bargain collectively, the Parties undertake’ 1. to promote joint consultation 
between workers and employers; 2. to promote, where necessary and appropriate, machinery 
for voluntary negotiations between employers or employers' organisations and workers' 
organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means 
of collective agreements; 3. to promote the establishment and use of appropriate machinery 
for conciliation and voluntary arbitration for the settlement of labour disputes;…’.  
105 Giubboni has asserted that recognising a fundamental right to collective bargaining in 
Albany would have been ‘capable of overturning, and reversing, the methodological 
perspective expounded by Advocate General and ultimately adopted by the Court’; it would 
have also meant, writes Giubboni, a total inapplicability of competition rules; see Giubboni, 
footnote 102, supra, p. 211. A page further he, too, however, admits that within a very narrow 
margin exceptions to this inapplicability would be acceptable in the general interest. I 
maintain that in practice the effect of the Albany-immunity is nearing the same: the purpose 
test allows the court to outlaw exceptionally (so far only theoretically) a distortion of 
competition masked by a collective agreement. This scope is really narrow. The 
methodological differences between the AG and the judgment I have described on p. 30, 
supra.  
106 Article 12, first paragraph of the Charter reads, as follows: ‘Employers or employers’ 
organisations, on the one hand, and workers’ organisations, on the other, shall have the right 
to negotiate and conclude collective agreements under the conditions laid down by national 
legislation and practice.’ 
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Social Charter falls under Article 307(1) EC and therefore binds the Community as a 
prior international agreement. Otherwise the EU Member States have ratified Articles 
5 and 6 of either the original or the revised European Social Charter, with the 
exception of Austria, Luxembourg and Poland regarding Article 6 and Greece which 
has left Article 5 and 6 non-ratified (there are further reservations by other Member 
States regarding Article 6(4) ESC, irrelevant now). Even in Greece Article 22 of the 
Constitution refers to collective labour agreements and Article 23 guarantees the 
unhindered exercise of rights related to the freedom to unionise. Since Article 5 ESC 
is the crucial one here, it is therefore justified to find – unlike AG Jacobs in Albany - 
that by virtue of Article 307(1) EC and general international law the right to collective 
bargaining, included in Article 5 (and 6 ) ESC and in the ILO Convention No. 87, and 
established by the ILO Constitution as ‘the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining’, also binds the EU as a fundamental right. 107 The result would 
be rather the same as asserting that in Albany the Court de facto established a Judge-
made fundamental right to bargain collectively. The 1989 Community Charter 
naturally supports such an outcome (on the effect of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, see below).  
 
Furthermore, the overall human or fundamental rights developments within the EU 
are in harmony with such an outcome, i.e. recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining as a fundamental right in the legal order of the EU. The most recent 
landmark in those overall developments is judgment Cresson in which the ECJ de 
facto applied certain provisions of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, although following 
the expression ‘even if it be accepted that [the provision first invoked by Mrs. Cresson] 
applies’. Materially they related to the rights of defence and effective judicial 
protection in a case concerning breaches of the obligations arising from the office of a 
Member of the Commission and a partial deprivation of the right to a pension. 108 
Human rights intruded into the heart of the Community, i.e. into its internal 
disciplinary order. To show the overall development characteristics in Cresson I refer 
to judgment Unborn Children (Grogan) of 1991 where the Court passed over freedom 
of expression by delineating the reach of community law via a ‘homo economicus’ 
explanation on the EU’s competence. In that case it was limited by an internal market 
connotation of the free provision of services that was capable of covering the abortion 
                                                 
107 I rhetorically recall that all the EU Member States have acceded to the ILO before access 
to the EEC/EU. The ECJ has recognised the binding effect of general international law 
especially in cases C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019, paragraph 9, 
and C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I-3655 paragraph 45. On the binding effect in EC law of 
general international law regarding the right to strike, see Hellsten Jari, On the Social 
Dimension in Posting of Workers, Publication of Labour Administration (Finland) 2006 No. 
301 (Hellsten 2006), section 4.6. As to detailed descriptions of the subject ‘EU and 
international law’, see e.g. Christiaan Timmermans, The EU and Public International Law, 4 
European Foreign Affairs Review (1999) pp. 181-194, and Koen Lenaerts and Eddy De 
Smijter, The European Union as an Actor in International Law, 19 Yearbook of European 
Law (1999-2000), pp.122-126. - Given the extensive opinion of Advocate General and its 
lack of any reference to Article 307(1) EC and to the binding effect in EU law of international 
agreements by virtue of case-law, it is obvious that these arguments were not presented at all 
in Albany. 
108 Case C-432/04 Commission v Cresson, judgment of 11.7.2006, nyr, paragraphs 112 and 
113. 
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but incapable of protecting the speaking and informing thereof. 109  In contrast to 
Grogan, Cresson reflects a modern universalism of human or fundamental rights. 
That universalism by definition also covers social and labour law.     
 
From today’s perspective the status of the right to collective bargaining as a 
fundamental right in EU law derives directly from the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (the EU Charter), proclaimed solemnly in Nice 2000. Its 
Article 28 (Article II-88 in the Constitutional Treaty) recognises that ‘Workers and 
employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with Community law 
and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreements at the appropriate levels’. In the form of a ‘public subjective right’ it is 
intended to guarantee a minimum standard in the exercise of the right to work. 110 
Notoriously the Charter is nowadays not a binding legal instrument but it is 
nonetheless a valid source of interpretation of law as the recent judgment of the Court 
in Parliament v Council shows. 111  The EU Network of Independent Experts on 
Fundamental Rights, established by the Commission, has characterized the Charter, as 
follows: ‘the Charter also constitutes a catalogue of common values of the Member 
States of the Union. In that respect, the Charter may be taken into account in the 
understanding of Article 6(1) EU, to which Article 7 EU refers. […] the Network 
considers the Charter as the most authoritative embodiment of these common values, 
on which its evaluation therefore may be based.’ 112  Collective agreements are a 
pivotal part of the industrial democracy covered by ‘democracy’ in Article 6(1) EU.  
 
The EU Charter in general terms puts social and labour rights, in this case the right to 
collective bargaining including the conclusion of agreements, on an equal footing 
with the economic rights and principles of the Community, thus it further supports 
and strengthens the outcome in Albany. The most likely outcome would, in a 
corresponding case today, be to establish the immunity of collective agreements on 
the basis of that fundamental right. The essence of the recognition of collective 
bargaining as a fundamental right is that restrictions to that fundamental right in any 
case cannot and shall not impair its substance. 113 On the other hand, the Charter is 
also a reflection of the constitutional traditions of the Member States and, indeed, the 
right to collective bargaining and agreements enjoys constitutional protection in a 
relevant number of the Member States and in the sense of Article 6(2) TEU. Namely, 
                                                 
109 Case C-150/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Grogan 
[1991] ECR I-4685; on this judgment see Hellsten 2005, section II.2.3. 
110 See Xenophon I. Contiades, Social Rights in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, in: Ingolf 
Pernice/Miguel Poiares Maduro (eds.): A Constitution for the European Union: First 
Comments on the 2003-Draft of the European Convention. Nomos 2003, p. 71. As to the 
Charter in more general terms, also see Hellsten 2006, section 4.4.6.  
111 See case C-540/03 Parliament v Council, judgment of 27.6.2006, nyr, paragraphs 38, 58 
and 59.  
112 The report is available via <http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/index_en.htm> or 
with reference ‘CFR-CDF.Conclusions.2004.en’; citation from p. 9. Article 6(1) TEU 
includes the founding legal principles of the Union: liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles common to the Member 
States.  
113 See case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v 
Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraph 80. On this judgment, also see Hellsten 
2006, section 4.10.1, pp. 118-121. 
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next to numerous ‘old’ Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain), express references to collective bargaining and/or agreements are 
also in the constitutions of Cyprus, Latvia, Poland and Slovak Republic. Next to this, 
in the Netherlands (Articles 93 and 94 of the Constitution) and the Czech Republic 
(Article 10 of the Constitution) the monistic system gives the international human 
rights treaties, in this case especially the ILO Constitution, as refreshed by the 1998 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, a directly binding 
force, thus also protecting collective bargaining and agreements. As such, the ILO 
Constitution naturally binds, as mentioned, every EU Member State as a prior 
international agreement under Article 307(1) EC. Summing up, this means a direct 
constitutional protection for collective bargaining and agreements in a relevant 
number of Member States, as supported by the international law protection. Finally, 
indirect constitutional protection of collective bargaining and agreements may flow 
especially from freedom of association (guaranteed by every constitution within the 
EU), more precisely from the liberty to form trade unions and from their freedom of 






Social Services of General Interest; Article 86(2) EC 
 
 
2.1. General Remarks 
 
I discuss services of general interest (SGI) in this paper by keeping my eye mainly on 
elements that are important for social security systems while I also deal with the 
possible justification of the Finnish earnings-related pension scheme TEL under 
Article 86(2) EC. I do not embark on any discussion of the political or economic 
desirability, status or privatization of the SGIs but try to keep a strictly legal approach. 
A background factor is that the Treaty is formally neutral as to ownership relations in 
the Member States (Article 295 EC), i.e. it privatizes nothing. Another issue is what 
the European Commission (and the Member States) have done in conducting their 
liberalisation policy within public utilities.  
 
Article 16 EC nowadays enshrines a principal recognition of SGIs in the EC legal 
order, by referring to principles and conditions which enable them to fulfil their 
missions. Still, no positive definition of SGIs is included in the Treaty. In practice 
they have found their home in Article 86(2) according to which  
 
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing 
monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in 
particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such 
rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the 
particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be 
affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the 
Community. (italics added)  
 
 
2.2 Economic Activities and Undertaking 
 
The notions of ‘economic activities and ‘undertaking’ form the basis for the scope of 
Article 86(2). As enshrined in Article 2 EC, the Community has as its task ‘a 
harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities’ (emphasis 
added). This statement also forms the basis for the competence of the Community, 
and thus the reach of EC law, competition rules included. 114 Regarding the term 
‘economic activities’, it is enough to state here that prima facie some surprising 
activities fall under ‘economic’. Almost any activity involving remuneration is 
regarded as ‘economic’. Even quid pro quo (payment in kind) in a religious society 
may be covered by ‘economic’, 115 as is prostitution. 116 It is sufficient that it involves 
                                                 
114 In my publication On the Social Dimension in Posting of Workers, Publication of Labour 
Adminstration 2006/301, Ministry of Labour, Finland, p. 83, I have drawn the conclusion that 
these overarching ‘economic activities’, as enshrined in Article 2 EC, finally lead to apply the 
Treaty rules to industrial action, too, in the internal market although Article 137(5) EC 
strongly suggests that we cannot expect EC directives (under that Article) in the field 
concerned.  
115 See Case Steymann C-196/87 [1988] ECR 6159.  
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‘genuine’ work and there is some remuneration. For this reason even the normal 
activities of a public hospital fall under economic activities. 117 In the more general 
Community jargon the definition runs as follows:  
 
‘…any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given 
market is an economic activity.’ 118  
 
Thus, offering goods and services to a given market forms the concept ‘economic 
activity’. Given the broad interpretation of the notion ‘economic’ it is important to see 
that it is not unlimited: maintenance and improvement of air navigation safety, 119 as 
well as protection of the environment 120 have been found to be non-economic public 
tasks. Similarly, national education falls outside economic activities. 121 However, the 
broad maxim is that when the public authority, the state, engages in measures within 
‘economic activities’, it also enters into the realm of competition rules. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
116 See Case Jany C-268/99 [2001] ECR I-8615. We can see a too straightforward assertion 
about the social field in the recent Communication from the Commission, Implementing the 
Community Lisbon programme: Social services of general interest in the European Union; 
COM (2006) 177 final. The Commission first denoted (p. 6) on the basis of case 352/85 Bond 
van Adverteerders [1988] ECR 2085, paragraph 16, how the Treaty does not require the 
service to be paid for by those for whom it is performed. From this it deduced that ‘[i]t 
therefore follows that almost all services offered in the social field can be considered 
“economic activities” within the meaning of Articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty.’ This 
conclusion lacks conviction above all due to the lack of a real market in many social cases. In 
any case this kind of broad conclusion ignores many special characteristics in the social field. 
117 In Smits and Peerbooms, C-157/99, para. 58, the Court wrote: "Second, Article [50] of the 
Treaty states that it applies to services normally provided for remuneration and it has been 
held that, for the purposes of that provision, the essential characteristic of remuneration lies in 
the fact that it constitutes consideration for the service in question (Humbel, paragraph 17). In 
the present cases, the payments made by the sickness insurance funds under the contractual 
arrangements provided for by the ZFW, albeit set at a flat rate, are indeed the consideration 
for the hospital services and unquestionably represent remuneration for the hospital which 
receives them and which is engaged in an activity of an economic character."  
118 See the case  Case 118/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2599, paragraph 7. In Case C-
35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851, the ECJ wrote: ”37. The activity of customs 
agents has an economic character. They offer, for payment, services consisting in the carrying 
out of customs formalities, relating in particular to the importation, exportation and transit of 
goods, as well as other complementary services such as services in monetary, commercial and 
fiscal areas. Furthermore, they assume the financial risks involved in the exercise of that 
activity (Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v 
Commission [1975] ECR 1663, paragraph 541). If there is an imbalance between expenditure 
and receipts, the customs agent is required to bear the deficit himself.” 
119 Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft (‘Eurocontrol’) [1994] ECR I-43, paragraph 30: 
Taken as a whole, Eurocontrol' s activities, by their nature, their aim and the rules to which 
they are subject, are connected with the exercise of powers relating to the control and 
supervision of air space which are typically those of a public authority. They are not of an 
economic nature justifying the application of the Treaty rules of competition. 
120 Case C-343/95 Diego Calì & Figli [1997] ECR I-1547, paragraph 23 where the public 
authority argument was used as in Eurocontrol, see the previous note. 
121 See case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365. 
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What is then an undertaking in the sense of competition rules and the Treaty in 
general? There is no definition ipso jure but it is well established in case-law since 
case Höfner where the Court defined it as follows: 
 
21 It must be observed, in the context of competition law, … that the 
concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an 
economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way 
in which it is financed...’ 122 
 
This is the general and abstract definition that gives the basis throughout the sectors. 
However, in the field of social security the approach is essentially concrete, taking 
into account especially the possible non-profit-making nature of a scheme, the way it 
is financed (such as pay-as-you-go or capitalisation principle in pensions), various 
redistributive functions, i.e. existence of solidarity elements in the scheme, and the 
intensity of state control and rule-making. These aspects were developed further by 
the ECJ in AOK Bundesverband in 2004. 
 
 
2.3 Case AOK Bundesverband 
 
Hence, every entity engaging in economic activities can be an undertaking. In the case 
AOK Bundesveband 123 the ECJ first gave an overview of its case-law elaborating the 
notion of ‘undertaking’ and ‘economic activities’ regarding different social security 
bodies. As described in paragraph 47 of AOK Bundesverband,  
 
…[T]he Court has held that certain bodies entrusted with the management of 
statutory health insurance and old-age insurance schemes pursue an exclusively 
social objective and do not engage in economic activity. The Court has found 
that to be so in the case of sickness funds which merely apply the law and 
cannot influence the amount of the contributions, the use of assets and the 
fixing of the level of benefits. Their activity, based on the principle of national 
solidarity, is entirely non-profit-making and the benefits paid are statutory 
benefits bearing no relation to the amount of the contributions (Joined Cases C-
159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637, paragraphs 15 and 
18). 
 
Thus, national solidarity, non-profit-making and statutory benefits without any 
relation to contributions paid were enough to exclude the scheme from economic 
activities. The Court then explained its reasoning (in paragraph 48 of AOK 
Bundesverband) in judgment Cisal, 124 as follows: 
 
                                                 
122 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 21. The Court continued in 
paragraph 22, as follows: ‘The fact that employment procurement activities are normally 
entrusted to public agencies cannot affect the economic nature of such activities. Employment 
procurement has not always been, and is not necessarily, carried out by public entities. That 
finding applies in particular to executive recruitment.’ This is what one may call a potential-
private-activity test. 
123 Joined Cases AOK Bundesverband C-264/01 [2004] ECR I-2493. 
124 Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691. 
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The fact that the amount of benefits and of contributions was, in the last resort, 
fixed by the State led the Court to hold, similarly, that a body entrusted by law 
with a scheme providing insurance against accidents at work and occupational 
diseases, such as the Istituto nazionale per l'assicurazione contro gli infortuni 
sul lavoro (the Italian National Institute for Insurance against Accidents at 
Work), was not an undertaking for the purpose of the Treaty competition rules 
(see Cisal, cited above, paragraphs 43 to 46). 
 
Hence, Cisal shows that the role of the state in deciding finally the benefits and 
contributions was of ultimate importance in assessing the body concerned. Advocate 
General Jacobs highlighted the same aspect. But ECJ went on by referring (in 
paragraphs 49 and 50 of AOK Bundesverband) to cases FFSA and Albany in which it 
decided to hold the social security bodies as undertakings engaged in economic 
activities: 
 
On the other hand, other bodies managing statutory social security systems and 
displaying some of the characteristics referred to in paragraph 47 of the present 
judgment, namely being non-profit-making and engaging in activity of a social 
character which is subject to State rules that include solidarity requirements in 
particular, have been considered to be undertakings engaging in economic 
activity (see Case C-244/94 Fédération française des sociétés d’assurance and 
Others [1995] ECR I-4013, paragraph 22, and Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] 
ECR I-5751, paragraphs 84 to 87).  
 
Thus, in Fédération française des sociétés d’assurance and Others, at 
paragraph 17, the Court held that the body in question managing a 
supplementary old-age insurance scheme engaged in an economic activity in 
competition with life assurance companies and that the persons concerned 
could opt for the solution which guaranteed the better investment. In 
paragraphs 81 and 84 of Albany, concerning a supplementary pension fund 
based on a system of compulsory affiliation and applying a solidarity 
mechanism for determination of the amount of contributions and the level of 
benefits, the Court noted however that the fund itself determined the amount of 
the contributions and benefits and operated in accordance with the principle of 
capitalisation. It deduced therefrom that such a fund engaged in an economic 
activity in competition with insurance companies. 
 
What can be deduced from these passages? A non-profit-making and social character 
activity subject to state rules is no guarantee of a non-economic nature, FFSA tells us. 
The reasons – not all of them referred to in the cited para. 50 of AOK Bundesverband 
– were that membership in the scheme was optional, the scheme functioned upon 
capitalisation and benefits were tied to contributions. An implied possibility of 
competing with life assurance companies existed. As to Albany, self-determined 
contributions and benefits and capitalisation were enough, in spite of fund-wide 
solidarity features present, to push the sectoral pension fund with compulsory 
membership under economic activities, and consequently, to find it as an undertaking. 
 
In AOK Bundesverband the case concerned the setting by the compulsory sickness 
funds in Germany of maximum amounts reimbursed for medicinal products. The ECJ 
counted its essential characteristics:  
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- Implementing a law-based social security scheme founded on national 
solidarity and fulfilling an exclusive social function; 
- An entirely non-profit-making scheme; 
          - Identical obligatory benefits that do not depend on contributions paid; 
- Equalisation of costs and risks between the funds on the basis of 
solidarity; 
- The funds are therefore not in competition with one another or with 
private institutions as regards grant of the obligatory statutory benefits in 
respect of treatment or medicinal products which constitutes their main 
function. 
 
With the above-mentioned grounds the ECJ considered the German sickness fund 
system equal to that in Poucet and Pistre and Cisal, thus not being of economic nature 
(paragraph 55 of AOK Bundesverband). This conclusion was equipped with an 
elementary completion. Namely the ECJ found that its conclusion was not negated by 
the fact that the national legislature had ‘introduced an element of competition with 
regard to contributions in order to encourage the sickness funds to operate in 
accordance with principles of sound management, that is to say in the most effective 
and least costly manner possible, in the interests of the proper functioning of the 
German social security system’; paragraph 56. Pursuit of the last objective did ‘not in 
any way’ change the exclusively social nature of the social security scheme. The 
conclusion was that the sickness funds did not engage in economic activities and were 
therefore not undertakings in the sense of Article 81 and 82 EC (paragraph 57).  
 
Nevertheless, in AOK Bundesverband (paragraph 58) the ECJ left open the possibility 
that the sickness funds could be engaged in economic activities, thus when they 
resorted to ‘operations which have a purpose that is not social’. The judgment shows 
that this was not just an ultimate safety valve because the Court then discussed the 
conditions and procedure in fixing the maximum amounts (paragraphs 59 to 64). The 
crucial question was whether the activity concerned was ‘a specific interest separable’ 
from the social function of the scheme (paragraph 63). The conclusion was that the 
funds merely performed a task of management of the German social security system 
‘which is imposed upon them by legislation and that they do not act as undertakings 
engaging in economic activity’ (paragraph 64). A further consequence was that any 
reasoning under Article 86(2) became unnecessary.   
 
 
2.3.1 Some AOK Debate 
 
As mentioned, it is elementary in AOK Bundesverband that, next to delimiting the 
basic notions of economic activities and undertaking, the ECJ also introduced the 
concept of an acceptable level of competition within social security schemes without 
that changing the basic nature of a scheme as a non-economic activity. This is also 
what Drijber 125 seems to find as the case’s novelty while he contends that the ‘split’ 
in the activities of a given entity was ‘somehow implicit’ in Commission v. Italy, 126 
                                                 
125 See the case annotation of Berend Jan Drijber in CMLRev. 42:523-533, 2005, p. 528. 
126 Case 118/85 [1987] ECR 2599, concerning the Italian tobacco monopoly. I admit that I 
cannot find such an implicit ‘split’ in that judgment because it concentrated on the question 
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Höfner 127 and Wouters. 128 In Höfner a split is rather impossible to be seen while its 
language (‘…any entity engaged in economic activities, regardless of its legal status 
and the way it is financed.’) looks extremely condensed. In Wouters one can see a 
promise of a split at least in the sense that the ECJ – while it held that a national Bar 
forms an association of undertakings - used the requirements of proper practice 
(professional ethics) of the legal profession as a direct justification for a restriction of 
competition. 129  
 
Belhaj and van de Gronden read AOK Bundesverband somewhat differently. They e.g. 
maintain that, following FFSA and Albany, a scheme should be regarded as an 
undertaking ‘when a national legislator has opted for a mix between competition and 
solidarity.’ 130 We have to admit that the outcome in AOK Bundesverband deviates 
from FFSA and Albany but that was due to a difference in the solidarity 131 and 
competition elements present in the respective cases. Belhaj and van de Gronden 
further find the acceptance of a certain competition element as surprisingly not 
leading to the funds being regarded as undertakings. They even write that the point of 
                                                                                                                                            
whether the monopoly was a separate legal entity subject to the transparency rules on 
financial transactions. It was subject to those rules even if it wasn’t a separate legal entity.  
127 Case C-41/90 [1991] ECR I-1979.  
128 Case C-309/99 [2002] ECR I-1577. The case concerned the legality of a lawyer-accountant 
partnership. The ECJ upheld the Dutch ban thereon as to Members of the Bar. The Treaty 
competition rules are porous: the very scope of Article 81(1) is influenced by policy 
objectives located elsewhere in the framework of EC law and policy. Weatherill has indicated 
in the context of Wouters the interpretative link between competition rules and Articles 28 
and 49: ‘It is worth recalling that both Articles 28 and 49 on the free movement of goods and 
services respectively offer similar insight into the way in which the Court interprets EC trade 
law in a manner that seeks to avoid trampling other regulatory objectives underfoot. In fact an 
apparent convergence between the assumptions of EC law of free movement and EC 
competition law emerges from the ruling in Wouters. The Dutch rules prohibiting multi-
disciplinary partnerships between members of the Bar and accountants were not only attacked 
as violations of Article 81 but also as violations of Articles 49 (ex 59) EC concerning the free 
movement of services…’. Stephen Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law, 6th ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 526.  
129 Drijber’s last example, case T-313/02 Meca-Medina, judgment of 30 Sept. 2004, nyr, 
concerned a split in sports activities. The CFI held that doping control represented pure 
sporting values and thus fell outside economic activities. I agree, in principle, that the CFI 
delimited economic activities but that was under free provision of services. Full parallels are 
not justified with competition rules as the ECJ confirmed in its judgment of 18 July 2006 in 
case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina. The ECJ even found that the CFI erred in law when it did not 
determine specifically whether the contested doping rules fulfilled the requirements in 
Articles 81 and 82 EC but relied only on the assessment of economic activities; see 
paragraphs 30-34. As to the substance, the ECJ dismissed the appeal of Meca-Medina because 
it was not shown, rather the contrary, that the doping rules concerned do not ‘go beyond what 
is necessary in order to ensure that sporting events take place and function properly’; 
paragraph 54. We thus have to learn that the ECJ finds itself competent to guard the limits of 
doping control under EC competition rules. Protests from the sport circles seem obvious. – 
The split thinking is well present in this judgment, confirming that excessive doping rules 
may turn to anti-competitive restrictions.   
130 Somaya Belhaj and Johan W. van de Gronden, Some Room For Competition Does Not 
Make a Sickness Fund An Undertaking. Is EC Competition Law Applicable to the Health 
Care Sector? European Competition Law Review 2004 p. 684. 
131 Some 90% of wage-earners in Germany are covered by the scheme.  
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view of the Court ‘does not match’ the efficiency doctrine in competition law. 132 
More elaborate is to find – as did the Court – that the competition element (possibility 
to compete with the contributions) was introduced exactly to enhance efficiency and 
save costs. It is therefore difficult to see, indeed, how this could be in contradiction 
with the efficiency doctrine. 133   
 
Wesseling rightly points out that after AOK Bundesverband one may find that – in 
classifying various bodies as undertakings - it is no longer decisive whether the 
activities of the organisation are ‘necessarily’ undertaken by a public authority (the 
Höfner test). Likewise, the manner of financing and the non-profit-making character 
of a body are nowadays relevant factors in the assessment. 134 The fact that the Court 
in AOK Bundesverband found the funds to be non-undertakings in spite of certain 
competition amongst them has, according to Wesseling, ‘complicated the picture 
further’. He finds it similar to a situation where the law excludes any competition. 
Both situations he finds to be expressions of a ‘rule of reason’, i.e. situations where – 
according to the ‘rule of reason’ principle – competition rules do not apply. 135 Unlike 
many other European scholars, Wesseling does not mean by a rule of reason a rule 
inherent in the US competition law embodying a comparison of anti- and pro-
competitive effects of a measure, the latter emphasis leading to set aside competition 
                                                 
132 Ibid., Belhaj and van Gronden refer to Craig and de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (3rd ed., 2003), pp. 936 and 937; and D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (4th ed., 
2003), p. 9. The references are natural from the point of view of classical competition law 
thinking. On both sources the referred authors, however, present in brief – besides prior to 
AOK Bundesverband – the general principles of the competition law doctrine (in terms of 
Goyder: ‘allocative efficiency’, adjustment to consumer preferences, cost efficiency and 
productive efficiency) without any reasoning on social security schemes. Remarkably, e.g. 
Van Bael & Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, 4th ed., Kluwer Law 
International 2005, p. 31, present AOK Bunderverband succinctly under general principles 
without any reference to a possible contradiction with the fundamental purpose of competition 
law.   
133 Belhaj and van de Gronden further submit that the Court would ‘probably’ have respected 
its own jurisprudence if it had followed the approach of Advocate General Jacobs. He 
acknowledged that it is difficult ‘…to arrive at any precise statement of the point at which the 
redistributive component of a pension or insurance scheme will be so pronounced as to 
eclipse the economic activities…’ (paragraph 35 of the Opinion).  He anyway concluded that 
in fixing the maximum amounts the sickness funds acted as undertakings (paragraph 61 of the 
Opinion). Still, he firmly asserted that the scheme would be exempted from competition rules 
under Article 86(2).    
134 The leading case as to non-profit-making is C-70/95 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395. The 
Court ruled i.a. that Articles [81] and [82], read in conjunction with Articles 3(g), [10] and 
[86] of the EC Treaty, do not apply to national rules which allow only non-profit-making 
private operators to participate in the running of a social welfare system (old people’s home). 
135 Rein Wesseling, The Rule of Reason and Competition Law: Various Rules, Various 
Reasons, in Schrauwen (ed.) Rethinking another Classic of European Legal Doctrine, Europa 
Law Publishing, Groningen 2005, p. 66. Wesseling also points out that taking account of the 
economic context in which the undertakings operate and the structure of the market concerned 
have been labelled as a rule of reason. For Wesseling rule of reason means above all the room 
for national public policy concerns; ibid., p. 60. However, he does not discuss rule of reason 
under Article 86.  
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rules. 136 The value of this ‘rule of reason description’ is somewhat disputable also 
regarding undertakings entrusted with measures of public interest.  
 
In the German doctrine Koenig and Engelmann have held the distinctive question of 
the Court (whether there is an economic activity separable from the purely social 
function of the funds) also unclear. Namely, they assert that a social purpose of an 
activity taken as such is not against its qualification as an economic activity. This idea 
is impossible to share, given the extremely clear language employed by the ECJ in 
paragraph 58 of the judgment. 137 The ECJ operated with a dichotomy economic – 
social. However, Koenig and Engelmann further find that the judgment rather means 
to allow scrutiny under the notion of economic activities regarding any functions of a 
fund. 138 At this point I basically agree but highlight that the argumentation structure 
of the ECJ (main activities in relation to separable activities that are possibly under 
economic activities) means a prima facie shelter for the funds under the notion of 
social function or activities. This is easier to understand if we imagine the structure 
the other way round: the whole fund first qualified as an undertaking engaged in 
economic activities wherefrom we should distil separate social activities as an 
exception from competition rules. Into such a structure it would be impossible to 
introduce the idea of limited competition within a social security scheme.  
 
Baquero Cruz has pointed out that the clear-cut definition in Höfner, with a potential-
economic-activity test (the term is Baquero Cruz’s; is there a possibility for private 
activities), was not applied in AOK Bundesverband. The Court takes into account the 
nature of the activity, its aim and the legal framework to which it is subject. Besides, 
according to Baquero Cruz, ‘that legal framework may rule out the existence of an 
economic activity if the legislator has decided to exclude competition or to impose 
anticompetitive conduct in the general market.’ 139 I fully agree with Baquero Cruz in 
the sense that with respect to social security schemes and institutions the Höfner test 
is only one factor in a more comprehensive assessment. The quoted further 
submission of Baquero Cruz refers to the notion of economic activities still as a 
concept of European law, even though the national legislator is the first decision-
maker. However, the concept cannot be dependent on the decisions of national 
legislators (and Baquero Cruz manifestly does not mean anything like that); a national 
                                                 
136 In caseT-112/99 Métropole [2001] II-2459 the CFI found that there is no rule of reason in 
the application of Article 81(1) EC but only under Article 81(3) EC.  
137 Paragraph 58 of AOK Bundesverband: ‘However, the possibility remains that, besides their 
functions of an exclusively social nature within the framework of management of the German 
social security system, the sickness funds and the entities that represent them, namely the fund 
associations, engage in operations which have a purpose that is not social and is economic in 
nature. In that case the decisions which they would be led to adopt could perhaps be regarded 
as decisions of undertakings or of associations of undertakings.’ Italics by JH. 
138 Christian Koenig and Christina Engelmann, Das Festbetrags-Urteil des EuGH: Endlich 
Klarheit über den gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Unternehmensbegriff im Bereich der 
Sozialversicherung? In EuZW 22/2004, p. 684. 
139 See Julio Baquero Cruz, Services of General Interest and EC Law, in de Búrca (ed.), EU 
Law and the Welfare State. In Search of Solidarity. Oxford University Press 2005, p. 184. As 
to the interpretation of Article 86(2) by Baquero Cruz, see section 2.5.8, infra.   
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monopoly may also engage in economic activities. 140 There are of course some de 
minimis issues, as well as the complete lack of the cross-border trade effect that may 
(already rather exceptionally) lead to the non-applicability of the Treaty rules.  
 
Krajewski and Farley put the judgment into the context of a broader and ‘general 
trend in Community law and practice to respect and protect the intrinsic value of 
public services for the European social model vis-à-vis the unrestricted application of 
competition and state aid law.’ 141 They further point out that some might see in AOK 
Bundesverband a contradiction with the case-law concerning the freedom to receive 
health services abroad (free movement of patients). 142 Namely, this case-law strongly 
emphasizes the economic character of health services whereas the AOK 
Bundesverband judgment points in a different direction. Krajewski and Farley rightly 
point out that that the different approaches are not arbitrary but that they rather 
accommodate the different functions and objectives of market freedoms (freedom to 
receive services abroad) and competition law. The former concerns citizen’s rights, 
the ‘latter more an objective principle based on general policy decisions which the 
Court must balance against other policy objectives.’ 143  
 
In sum, in AOK Bundesverband the ECJ for the first time expressly declared a split in 
the application of competition rules to a social security scheme and made a clear basic 
distinction between economic and social (core) activities. Regarding the latter the 
funds did not act as undertakings. However, the fund as a social security entity was 
able to include an element of competition without losing its own basic nature as a 
social entity. Thus, in a controlled manner the Member States may introduce 
competitive elements in their social regimes without being obliged to step into the 
sphere of competition rules. 144 Judge Rosas has expressed as an overall qualification 
that AOK Bundesverband is an example of a situation where the EU Courts ‘leave 
room for national social policies, including the protection of social rights, of the 
                                                 
140 In judgment C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533, paragraph 14, the Court noted the 
possibility of even excluding any competition, if it is necessary for a service of general 
interest.  
141 See Markus Krajewski and Martin Farley, Limited competition in national health systems 
and the application of competition law: the AOK Bundesverband case, (2004) 29 E.L.Rev., 
849. Forrester, MacLennan and Komninos adhere to this view, also finding that the ‘judgment 
is a welcome clarification of the rather complicated case law in this evolving area. It certainly 
provides for a higher degree of immunity for national sickness funds from the Treaty 
competition rules, even if some residual competition exists between such funds.’ See Ian S. 
Forrester, QC, Jacquelyn F. MacLennan and Assimakis Komninos, EC Competition Law 
2003-2004. Yearbook of European Law 24, Oxford University Press 2005, p. 556. 
142 Ibid., p. 850. Krajewski and Farley refer to cases C-120/95 Decker [1998] ECR I-1831; C-
158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931; C-368/98 Vanbraekel [2001] ECR I-5363; C-157/99 Smits 
and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473; and C-385/99 Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509. Today 
this list would be prolonged by case C-372/04 Watts, judgment of 16.5.2006, nyr. 
143 See Markus Krajewski and Martin Farley, Limited competition in national health systems 
and the application of competition law: the AOK Bundesverband case, (2004) 29 E.L.Rev. 
pp.849-851. 
144 This is what Krajewski and Farley also share; ibid., p. 850. They denote, however, that 
considerable legal uncertainty is created by the judgment while we do not know when there is 
sufficient competition to launch the application of competition law, p. 851. 
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Member States.’ 145 One has also to underline the difference in the approach between 
the Court and the Advocate General who came to the conclusion that the sickness 
funds and their associations acted as undertakings in fixing the maximum amounts. 146 
The Court respected the national social security system.  
 
 
2.4 Case FENIN 
 
An obvious further milestone in assessing “economic activity” and “undertaking” lies 
in the case Fenin. 147 The question at the heart of this case concerned the purchase of 
medical instruments by a public body responsible for the management of the Spanish 
national health system (“SNS”). Two issues are of particular importance. It was 
necessary, first, to establish whether the fact that the activity (medical treatment in 
hospitals) carried on by that body is subject to the principle of solidarity and thereby 
prevents it being classified as an undertaking and, secondly, whether it is possible to 
separate its purchasing activities from those of providing health services. The CFI 
found that the SNS acted as purchaser of medicinal products only to use them for a 
purpose of a ‘purely social nature’ (provision of free health care) and did not therefore 
act as an undertaking in a given market (paragraph 37). AG Poiares Maduro for his 
part found that the CFI erred in law while it resorted to this kind of global assessment 
and did not distinguish between the SNS’s activities. His main submission, however, 
was to refer the case back to the CFI in order to find the facts necessary to determine 
whether or not the activities of the organisations which manage the SNS are economic 
in nature; paragraph 57. He further found, on the basis of judgment Smits and 
Peerbooms, that provision of even free health care is of economic activity. 148 In the 
case that the provision of free health care had been regarded by the ECJ as a non-
economic activity, it would have been necessary, according to the AG, to consider the 
first part of the ground of appeal, which challenges the connection made between the 
nature of the purchasing operation and the subsequent use of the goods acquired 
(paragraph 58 et seq.). For this part the AG concluded, basing himself on Pavlov, 149 
Eurocontrol 150  and Ambulanz Glöckner 151  that where purchase is linked to the 
performance of non-economic functions, it may fall outside the scope of competition 
law; paragraph 66.  
 
                                                 
145 Allan Rosas, The Role of European Court of Justice in the application and interpretation of 
social values and rights, in Palola and Savio (Eds.), Redefining the Social Dimension in an 
Enlarged EU, Stakes, Helsinki 2005, pp. 197-198.  
146 In this respect also see section 2.7.2 infra. 
147 See case C-205/03 P.  
148 See the opinion of 10 November 2005, paragraph 52. For clarity’s sake it is to be noted 
that the AG refers to the application of Article 86(2) EC as a consequence (paragraph 55). As 
to Smits & Peerbooms, see footnote 117, supra. 
149 Joined cases C-180 to C-184/98 Pavlov and Others [2000] ECR I-6451. AG Poiares 
Maduro distinguished, as AG Jacobs and the judgment in Pavlov, between activities related to 
the medical practitioners’ economic sphere and activities related to their personal sphere. 
Only intermediate demand, in contrast to final demand, may be considered to belong to the 
economic sphere.  
150 Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft(‘Eurocontrol’) [1994] ECR I-43. 
151 Case C-475/99 [2001] ECR I-8089. 
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As these condensed remarks show, elementary aspects of EC competition law regime 
were at stake in Fenin. In its judgment of 11 July 2006 the ECJ, however, was very 
straightforward. It found, first, inadmissible (out of time) FENIN’s plea that the 
medical services by the Spanish free health care system SNS would be of economic 
nature. 152 Thus, the possibility of challenging a social system like the SNS on that 
ground remains. Second, the ECJ confirmed that ‘undertaking’ means any entity 
engaged in economic activities. 153 It then confirmed the position of the CFI in the 
definition of economic activities: they consist in offering goods and services on a 
given market and there is no need to dissociate purchasing activities, and that the 
nature of the purchasing activity must be determined according to whether or not the 
subsequent use of the purchased goods amounts to an economic activity (paragraphs 
25 and 26). In this case the subsequent use comprised according to the CFI only 
purely social activities (free medical treatment with a universal cover) which the ECJ 
did not deal with ex officio. The outcome naturally affects (reduces) – by this 
definition of economic activities - the number of potential candidates under Article 
86(2) EC.  
 
A couple of post-FENIN sentences are still needed on the notion of ‘undertaking’ in 
Articles 81, 82 (abuse of dominant position) and 86(2). Namely, as the wording in 
Höfner, paragraph 21 (…any entity engaged in economic activities, regardless of its 
legal status and the way it is financed…’), shows, organising some (mainly economic) 
activities in the form of a state monopoly is not a fully safe defence against 
competition rules if there is the possibility of competing private activities. This 
principle is visible e.g. in case Commission v. Italy of 1985, concerning the Italian 
tobacco monopoly. 154 On the other hand, Höfner and Job Centre II 155 show that 
neither are monopolies in the social field sheltered from competition rules if they are 
manifestly unable to satisfy the demand in the market.  
 
 
2.5 Article 86(2) EC 
 
2.5.1 General Remarks 
 
Discussing Article 86(2) EC and the inherent concept of public services brings us 
back to the origin of the Community. The Spaak Report did not distinguish such 
public services but discussed only the ‘Problème de monopolies’. 156 Indeed, public 
services or such obligations were traditionally entrusted to state monopolies, 
corresponding to their special or exclusive rights under Article 86(1) EC. Accordingly, 
Article 86(2) EC was formulated as a derogation that is – in principle - subject to a 
narrow interpretation. 157 The Community was the European Economic Community. 
 
                                                 
152 Thus, the AG was more liberal in the admissibility issue, also referring to the fact that the 
issue was discussed before the CFI who also took stock on it; paragraph 22 of the judgment. 
153 The ECJ referred to Höfner and AOK Bundesverband. 
154 Case 118/85 Commission v. Italy, [1987] ECR 2599. 
155 On these judgments, see section 1.2.1, supra. As such, it is of course questionable how 
‘social’ is the activity of an executive recruitment service. 
156 Spaak report : Comité Intergouvernemental Créé par la Conférence de Messine. Rapport 
des Chefs de Délégations aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, 21avril  1956,  pp. 55-57.  
157 See e.g. case 127/73 BRT v. SABAM (BRT II) [1974] ECR 313, paragraph 19. 
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A path of evolution is also clear in the interpretation of direct effect of Article 86(2). 
In judgments Hein (1971) and Inter-Huiles (1983) 158 the Court stated (although ‘at 
this stage’) the lack of direct effect of Article 86(2). In Cisal the Court concluded 
(2002) that the provisions of Article 86(2) can be invoked by individuals before 
national courts in order to obtain a review of compliance with the conditions which 
they lay down. The Court drew its conclusion in particular on the basis of judgments 
Corbeau  159 and Albany. 
 
One could be justified in seeing a turning point in judgments Eurocontrol (1994) 160 
and Poucet and Pistre (1993) 161 after which there is a new possibility that – in terms 
of Erika Szyszczak – ‘the competition rules could simply not be applied as regards 
certain activities which were in the general or public interest.’ 162 In Eurocontrol, 
paragraph 20, the Court stated that ‘it is in the exercise of…sovereignty that the state 
ensures…the supervision of their airspace and the provision of air navigation control 
services.’ Therefore an international organization such as Eurocontrol did not 
constitute an undertaking. In Poucet and Pistre the Court had to assess a compulsory 
social security scheme based upon national solidarity. Displaying language of a 
similar type one can see e.g. in judgment Almelo where the term ‘public service’ is 
used as a synonym of ‘services of general economic interest’. 163 Passing over many 
details one can submit that the concept of public services under Article 86(2) had 
undergone significant developments since the beginning of the Community, given the 
widespread scale of public services developed since the 1950s.  
 
A manifestation of a certain new thinking is to be found today in Article 16 EC 
according to which  
 
Without prejudice to Articles 73, 86 and 87, and given the place 
occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values of 
the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial 
cohesion, the Community and the Member States, each within their 
respective powers and within the scope of application of this Treaty, 
shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and 
conditions which enable them to fulfil their missions. 164 
 
There are naturally different ways of reading this proviso. Prosser wants to see in it a 
‘strong case to be made that the crucial change in attitude away from the market-
                                                 
158 Cases 10/71 Hein [1971] ECR 723 and 172/82 Inter-Huiles [1983] ECR 555, paragraph 
15. 
159 See cases C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691, paragraph 19; and C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] 
ECR I-2533. 
160 Case C-364/92 SAT v. Eurocontrol [1994] ECR I-43. 
161 Joined cases C-159 and 160/91 [1993] ECR I-637. 
162 Erika Szyszczak, Public Services in Competitive Markets. Yearbook of European Law 20, 
2001 p. 42. 
163 Case C-393/92 Almelo [1994] ECR I-1520, paragraphs 30 and 31. 
164 Declaration No 13 annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam clarified that 
Article 16 EC ‘shall be implemented with full respect for the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice, inter alia as regards the principles of equality of treatment, quality and continuity of 
such services’. 
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centred approach came with the adoption of the new Article 16…’ 165 Prosser, too, 
relies on Ross who has seen in Article 16 even a ‘critical step in the concretising of 
non-market (or post-market) concerns in both the psyche and legal hierarchy of legal 
development.’ 166 Unlike Ross, Szyszczak highlights that Article 16 EC supports an 
expansive interpretation of Article 86 to bring even more state activity into the realm 
of the market-based rules of the Treaty. 167 Giulio Napolitano sees in Article 16 EC a 
legal principle ‘according to which the Community and the Member States are called 
to guarantee…the missions of general interest, without prejudice to the laws on 
competition and State aids.’ He also sees in it a possible U-turn (obviously vis-à-vis 
respect for market forces) ‘which would reveal the presence of a Community notion 
of services of general economic interest geared towards social cohesion.’ 168 It would 
seem justified to suppose that this kind of definition would include a reference to a 
particular social task under Article 86(2) (explained below) but there is none. 
Mestmäcker has argued that, given the Declaration attached to it (see footnote 164), 
we may even disregard Article 16 EC. 169  Baquero Cruz concludes, as the author, that 
Article 16 (like Article II-96 of the Constitutional Treaty) is an element in the 
interpretation of Article 86(2), supporting (somewhat differing from the position of 
Szyszczak) a line that tries to strike a fair balance between market and public services 
values. 170 AG Poiares Maduro has held that Article 16 EC does not constitute a 
restriction on the scope of Article 86(2) EC, but instead provides a point of reference 
for the interpretation of that provision. 171 Based on Article 16 EC Judge Lenaerts has 
held that public services have become an obligation both for the Community and its 
Member States, each within its limits of powers, and is even understood to be like one 
of the basic principles and objectives of the Treaty. 172  In sum, it seems that a 
doctrinal mainstream sees in Article 16 EC a factor reinforcing the status of social 
activities under Article 86(2). 
 
As to the meaning and interpretation of Article 86(2) EC, it seems to be typical for the 
European doctrine to pursue the reasoning only as far as the level of the utilities 
judgments of 23 October 1997, especially to Commission v. Netherlands therein. In 
that judgment the Court found how Article 86(2) seeks to  
 
                                                 
165 Tony Prosser, Competition Law and Public Services: From Single Market to Citizenship 
Rights? European Public Law, 2005 Vol. 11, Issue 4, p.  553.  
166 Malcolm Ross, Article 16 EC and Services of General Interest: From Derogation to 
Obligation? 25 European Law Review (2000), p. 34. Ross concludes by stating that Article 16 
is significant by articulating the value of services of general economic interest, by assuming a 
communautaire meaning for services and as a civilising force by enabling a further fleshing-
out of the bones of citizenship to occur; p. 38. 
167 Szyszczak footnote 162, supra, p. 64. 
168 Giulio Napolitano, Towards a European Legal Order for Services of General Economic 
Interest. European Public Law, 2005 Vol. 11, Issue 4, p.566-567, footnote 5. 
169 See Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Daseinvorsorge und Universaldienst im europäischen 
Kontext: Ein Beitrag zur Funktion von Art. 90 Abs. 2 EGV, in Ruland, von Maydell and 
Papier (Hrsg.), Verfassung, Theorie und Praxis des Sozialstaats: Festschrift für Hans F. 
Zacher zum 70. Geburtstag (1998), p. 651. 
170 Baquero Cruz, footnote 139, supra, p. 177. 
171 Opinion of 10.11.2005 in case C-205/03 P FENIN, endnote 35. 
172 Koen Lenaerts, Les services d’intérêt économique général et le droit communautaire, in 
Conseil d’État, Rapport public 2002 : Collectivité publiques et concurrence, p. 427. 
 50
‘reconcile Member States’ interest in using certain undertakings, in 
particular in the public sector, as an instrument of economic or fiscal 
policy with the Community’s interest in ensuring compliance with the 
rules in competition and the preservation of the unity of the Common 
Market.’ 173 
 
Thus, the orthodox expression ‘instrument of economic or fiscal policy’ was the flag 
of the ship. However, a new qualitative description with the necessary foundations 
came in Albany, paragraph 103, where the Court demonstrated that Article 86(2) 
encompasses particular economic or social tasks or policy instruments of the Member 
States. Therefore, before any in-depth reasoning on the details of the conditions 
applicable under Article 86(2), it is appropriate to establish the emergence of this 
umbrella concept.   
 
 
2.5.2. Albany: Particular Social Task of General Interest 174 
 
The Commission published in spring 2003 A Green paper on Services of General 
Interest. 175  The Green Paper did not mention the Albany judgement at all. Of 
particular significance was the lack of any reference thereto in the context of Article 
86(2) EC, although Albany dealt with the basics of this Article, i.e. the demonstration 
of a notion of a particular social task of general interest as a distinct feature subject to 
Article 86(2). Furthermore, the same lack is in the subsequent (2004) White Paper on 
services of general interest. 176 Finally, the Commission communication on social 
services in 2006 continues the same path. See Communication from the Commission, 
Implementing the Community Lisbon programme: Social services of general interest 
in the European Union. 177 The neglect of any reference to Albany is particularly 
glaring in this communication, given that it stated how ‘social services do not 
constitute a legally distinct category of service within services of general interest’ 178 
and otherwise noted how various statutory and complementary social security 
schemes formed the other main category of services of general interest within the 
scope of the communication. 
 
                                                 
173 Cases C-157/94 Commission v. Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699, paragraph 39. The same 
formula was in judgment C-202/88 France v. Commission [1991] ECR I-1223, paragraph 12. 
This formula is the place of reference of e.g. Szyszczak, footnote 162, supra, p. 47. 
174 This presentation partially owes to Hellsten Jari, On the Legal Status of Public Services in 
the EU, Finnish Public Service Unions – FIPSU 2003; stencil; published by the Commission 
among the comments to the 2003 Green paper on the Public Services; 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/secretariat_general/services_general_interest. The presentation here 
is both a streamlined and developed version. 
175 Green paper on Services of General Interest COM 2003/270 final. Neither did the 
Commission Staff Working Paper: Report on the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on 
Services of General Interest, 15.3.2004, SEC(2004) 326, mention Albany. 
176 COM(2004) 374 final. 
177 COM (2006) 177 final. 
178 Ibid., p. 4. 
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I will briefly describe the basics in Albany. 179 Next to establishing the immunity of 
collective agreements in relation to competition rules, the Court held that the pension 
fund concerned was to be regarded as an undertaking as defined in the EC 
competition rules. However, the Court found that the exclusive rights in running the 
pension scheme, including e.g. the grant of exceptions, were justified under Article 
86(2). The social factor was prominent in the case and also in the reasoning with 
respect to Article 86(2). 
 
Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to explore the qualification ‘social’ in this 
context. I recall that the wording of Article 86(2) recognises that only particular 
services of general economic interest and fiscal monopolies are capable of enjoying 
this exemption from the Treaty provisions and in particular from the competition rules.  
 
In earlier precedents the Court had emphasised how Article 86(2), as an exception, 
has to be interpreted narrowly. However, in Albany, at paragraph 103, the Court 
culminated its reasoning on the social effect within the ambit of Article 86(2). As a 
result it developed a modification of the traditional formula and stated how an 
instrument of economic or social policy is covered by Article 86(2) and is therefore 
capable of enjoying the exception, although always under the five other conditions 
explained below (see Section 2.7.1).  
 
Thus, I here maintain that the Court elaborated or distilled a new notion under Article 
86(2), namely that of a particular social task of general interest and a social policy 
instrument. Prima facie, ‘social’ would seem to fall outside the wording of Article 
86(2), or that covering it by ‘general economic interest’ would be, indeed, contra 
legem. However, this is one of several focal points in the EC law dialogue, or 
sometimes ‘cold war’, between ‘economic’ and ‘social’. It appears, no more no less, 
that ‘general economic’ in the wording of Article 86(2) is under certain circumstances 
capable of encompassing even ‘social’. 
 
 
2.5.3 Linguistic Aspect 
 
In addition, there is also unfortunately a linguistic problem concerning paragraph 103 
of Albany, which is crucial to the present argumentation. I will try to explain it as 
simply as possible. I would mention that paragraph 103 in the English version is the 
only version of Albany that is burdened by this kind of linguistic problem.  
 
The English version of Albany that is published in the European Court Reports (ECR 
1999 I-5751) uses in paragraph 103 the wording ‘instrument of economic or fiscal 
                                                 
179 The expression Albany is used for the three parallel judgments of 21.9.1999 in the Cases 
C-67/97 Albany, C-115/97 Brentjens and C-219/97 Drijvende Bokken. In Bruun & Hellsten 
2001, we focused on explaining the nature of the basic immunity of collective labour 
agreements in relation to competition rules but as a phenomenon of (mainly) private law 
(paragraphs 59-60 of Albany). We passed over the particular social task of general interest 
with a rather short explanation (see paragraphs 100-105, p.50-53). It is now appropriate to 
present a comprehensive explanation, especially for English-readers, since the English 
wording of paragraph 103 of Albany is liable to create misunderstandings, especially if read 
in isolation. 
 52
policy’ as does the Court’s web-site version too. 180 However, all the other language 
versions use the expression ‘instrument of economic or social policy’, instead of 
“instrument of economic or fiscal policy”. In French it is “instrument de politique 
économique ou sociale”, and in the language of the case, which was Dutch, 
“instrument van economisch of sociaal beleid”; and in German “Instrument der 
Wirtschafts- oder Sozialpolitik”. The relevant paragraph of the English version was 
obviously copied from the English versions of the two precedents referred to in 
Albany, paragraph 103. In these precedents, France v Commission and Commission v 
Netherlands, the previous standard (and Treaty) language: “economic or fiscal” was 
used. However, French is self-evidently authoritative in the decisions of the Court. 
Besides, the language of the case (Dutch in Albany) has an official status. The other 
linguistic versions, such as English, have no official status.  
 
The conclusion to be drawn from the linguistic survey is that paragraph 103 of Albany 
has to be read and understood by reference to the Dutch, French and German etc. 
versions. This means that the expression ‘instrument of economic or social policy’ is 
the correct English translation and meaning in this context.  
 
Immediately after Albany, an English-reader would clearly have had reason to wonder 
about the wording of paragraph 103 (‘instrument of economic or fiscal policy’) in the 
English version of the European Court Reports.  The reasoning of the Court 
concerning the third question of the national court in Albany, 37 paragraphs in all, is 
quite marked by the use of the words ‘social’, solidarity etc. So it is strange that the 
word ‘social’ is not used in paragraph 103, which explains the law. Following the 
facts of the case and the reasoning of the Court, the word ‘fiscal’ does not make sense 
in this context. Was ‘social’ then a lapsus in this point, or did it result perhaps from a 
change in a draft where some passage(s) was(were) later dropped etc.? These 
questions are natural because the outcome of the case legitimised the Dutch social 
quasi-monopoly concerned.  
 
On the other hand, paragraph 103, with the word ‘social’ (not ‘fiscal’), as in the 
French and Dutch versions, seemed to contradict the traditional principle of a narrow 
interpretation of an exception. This explanation is supported by the fact that paragraph 
103 of Albany contained no reference to paragraphs 59 and 60 of Albany, in which 
the basic position, i.e. the conditioned immunity of sectoral collective labour 
agreements in relation to competition rules was concluded. Neither was any 
                                                 
180 Paragraph 103 of Albany read as follows:  “In allowing, in certain circumstances, 
derogations from the general rules of the Treaty, Article 90(2) of the Treaty seeks to reconcile 
the Member States' interest in using certain undertakings, in particular in the public sector, as 
an instrument of economic or fiscal policy with the Community's interest in ensuring 
compliance with the rules on competition and preservation of the unity of the common market 
(Case C-202/88 France v Commission [1991] ECR I-1223, paragraph 12, and Case C-157/94 
Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699, paragraph 39).” (emphasis added) These 
precedents had nothing to do with social security schemes. The French case dealt with 
competition in the markets of telecommunication terminals equipment and the Dutch case 





interpretation method demonstrated at this point as in paragraph 60 of Albany 
(effective and consistent interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole). 
 
How to come through this linguistic jungle? The wording and meaning of paragraph 
103 of Albany must also be read in the context of the Court’s reasoning, which is set 
out in paragraphs 86 to 103 of the judgement. That is the authentic basis for 
understanding the reasoning about Article 86(2) EC in that judgement. Equally, this is 
the only solid way to understand the de facto new formulation regarding a Treaty rule 
promulgated. Paragraph 103 should not be read in isolation.  
 
 
2.5.4 Contextual Explanation 
 
The contextual starting point in explaining paragraph 103 of Albany is paragraph 86 
which stated:  
 
“Undoubtedly, the pursuit of a social objective, the above-mentioned 
manifestations of solidarity [inside the pension scheme - JH] and 
restrictions or controls on investments made by the sectoral pension fund 
may render the service provided by the fund less competitive than 
comparable services rendered by insurance companies. Although such 
constraints do not prevent the activity engaged in by the fund from 
being regarded as an economic activity, they might justify the exclusive 
right of such a body to manage a supplementary pension scheme.” 
(italics here) 
 
Hence, the pension fund concerned, founded by a sectoral collective agreement 
between management and labour outside competition rules, was engaged in economic 
activities and consequently fell under competition rules as an undertaking. 181 Article 
86 is not mentioned here but that is the only place for the justification. The social 
constraints might justify the exclusive rights of the fund. 
 
Further on, paragraph 98 of Albany formulated the final question to be answered 
under Article 86(2) EC, as follows: 
 
“It is therefore necessary to consider whether, as contended by the Fund, 
the Netherlands Government and the Commission, the exclusive right of 
the sectoral pension fund to manage supplementary pensions in a given 
sector and the resultant restriction of competition may be justified under 
Article [86(2)] of the Treaty as a measure necessary for the performance 
of a particular social task of general interest with which that fund has 
been charged.” (italics here) 
 
Thus, paragraph 103 of Albany was an intermediate normative reaffirmation of the 
question quoted. Furthermore, the social policy instrument introduced by paragraph 
103 of Albany must be read in the context of paragraphs 104 and 105. The former 
made the link to objectives pertaining to the Member States’ national policy and the 
                                                 
181 I pass here the criticism that obviously has its place regarding this decision.  
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latter referred to an ‘essential social function within the Netherlands pensions system’ 
that the pension scheme concerned had.    
 
 
2.5.5 Origin of ‘Particular Social Task’ and ‘Social Policy Instrument’ 
 
Hence, the purpose of Article 86(2), namely the performance of a particular task, but 
now elaborated as a particular social task of general interest, was presented in the 
final question as formulated in paragraph 98 of Albany. That question was a logical 
consequence of regarding the pension fund concerned as an undertaking under 
competition rules. However, no precedent was mentioned in the question because 
there was none with a social emphasis elevated into the text of a previous judgment as 
precisely linked to the interpretation of Article 86(2). Still, a question arises about the 
possible origins for inserting ‘social’ in Article 86(2). I have found the origin 
concealed in the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Albany. He wrote, as follows: 
 
‘Article [86(2)] seeks to reconcile the Member States' interest in using 
certain undertakings as an instrument of economic or social policy with 
the Community's interest in ensuring compliance with the rules on 
competition and the internal market. (210) Since it is a provision 
permitting derogation from the Treaty rules, it must be interpreted 
strictly. (211)’ 182 
 
These two sentences merit some comments. Namely at this point also the AG referred 
to the earlier judgment Commission v. Netherlands that concerned exclusive rights to 
import electricity for public distribution.183 However, the paragraph referred to in 
Commission v. Netherlands (number 39, in AG’s endnote 210) after the AG’s first 
sentence did not mention any social task but included the traditional reference to 
national economic and fiscal policy instruments. In that sense one has to conclude that 
the reference to a social policy instrument was an innovation of the AG which he did 
not justify further. The other passage in Commission v. Netherlands, referred to by the 
AG (paragraph 40, in his endnote 212), came closer to a ‘social policy instrument’ by 
asserting how the Member States were entitled to take into account ‘objectives 
                                                 
182 See the Opinion of 28 January 1999, paragraph 436. – AG’s endnote 211 referred to a 
classical narrow interpretation phrase in judgment Commission v. Netherlands. - A motive for 
discussing here the Opinion of AG Jacobs, too, in any greater length is e.g. in the presentation 
of Erika Szyszczak, Public Services in Competitive Market, Yearbook of European Law 20, 
2001, p. 47 where she mentions but does write out paragraph 436 of Jacobs AG. Instead, she 
writes out the older formula in case C-202/88 France v. Commission [1991] ECR I-1223, 
para. 12, that is identical (‘economic and fiscal’) with paragraph 103 of Albany, English 
version.  The impression created by Szyszczak is confusing, I’m afraid, and seems to feed the 
impression that the formula in France v. Commission would still be that applied by the Court 
in Albany while she writes – in 2001 - nothing about paragraph 103 of Albany. Explaining 
paragraph 103 of Albany even with a ‘wire model’ is necessary, especially when Szyszczak 
also submits that ‘[t]he Court has interpreted Article 86(2) EC in a dynamic way, allowing for 
the concept of a service of general economic interest to adapt to technological change, 
societal values, and economic conditions’; ibid. Thus, the most dynamic step in the 
interpretation, i.e. replacing ‘fiscal’ by ‘social’ in the description of Article 86(2) EC she 
passes over. 
183 Case C-157/94 Commission v. Netherlands [1997] I-5699. 
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pertaining to their national policy’. Still, the fact is that only in a few other places 
(paragraphs 42, 45, 55 and 63) did the judgment Commission v. Netherlands refer to 
electricity supply for the whole population ‘in a socially responsible manner’ as the 
phrase is used in the national law concerned. It is therefore justified to conclude that 
the social factor was clearly present in Commission v. Netherlands while it was not 
directly subject to an interpretation under Article 86(2) by the Court.  
 
The second sentence of the quoted passage above of the AG is rather interesting in the 
sense that he – as was natural in the light of Commission v. Netherlands - referred to 
the strict interpretation of Article 86(2) while not remarking on any contradiction with 
the textually expansive interpretation (social policy instrument) declared in his 
previous sentence. The discrepancy is, of course, to a certain extent mitigated by the 
fact that a social policy aspect was present in the case Commission v. Netherlands via 
national law.  
 
Screening the case-law with the phrase of a particular social task of general interest 
leads to no references before Albany (and its sister cases Brentjens and Drijvende 
Bokken). However, this does not negate the presence of the socially responsible 
electricity distribution in case Commission v. Netherlands. In this sense its presence as 
a ground in paragraph 103 of Albany is clearly appropriate. Anyway, it is difficult to 
avoid the impression that the question in paragraph 98 of Albany was somewhat 
teleological. In any case, the question in paragraph 98 and its normative reaffirmation 
in paragraph 103 seem to be in perfect harmony. 
 
I may here also refer to Mestmäcker. He first asserted in 1998 on the basis of 
judgment France v. Commission, C-202/88, paragraph 12 (which did not spell out 
‘social’) – without mentioning any particular further grounds - that Article 86(2) 
encompasses economic or social policy instruments. 184   He further asserted how 
‘general economic interest’ becomes almost without exception connected to the 
cultural, social or other political interests or is even defined by them. The formal 
contradiction with the wording of Article 86(2) disappears when we take into account 
that the primary addressees of Article 86(2) are the undertakings who have to behave 
against their narrow undertaking interest in order to fulfill their public service task. 185 
It is noteworthy that Mestmäcker presented his ‘instrument of social policy’ 
interpretation before Albany.  
 
 
2.5.6 Meaning of the Court’s Normative Assertion 
 
The Court’s normative assertion in English, as legitimated above (i.e. inserting 
instrument of social policy), in paragraph 103 of Albany meant the following: 
 
In allowing, in certain circumstances, derogations from the general rules 
of the Treaty, Article [86(2)] of the Treaty seeks to reconcile the 
Member States' interest in using certain undertakings, in particular in the 
public sector, as an instrument of economic or social policy with the 
Community's interest in ensuring compliance with the rules on 
                                                 
184 Mestmäcker, footnote 169, supra, p. 641. 
185 Ibid., p. 645. 
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competition and preservation of the unity of the common market (Case 
C-202/88 France v Commission [1991] ECR I-1223, paragraph 12, and 
Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699, 
paragraph 39).(underlining here) 
 
How to resolve the on-going ’cold war’ between economic and social in every 
language? A possibly simplistic but logical approach would be to note that the Court 
has taken earlier a very broad interpretation of ‘economic activities’ under the internal 
market rules. It is logical to take an equally broad interpretation of the phrase 
‘services of general economic interest’ in the wording of Article 86(2) EC, and to 
conclude further that ‘general economic interest’ was characterised in this way, i.e. 
encompassing even ‘social’, by the Court in paragraph 103 of Albany. Besides, this 
phrase ‘general economic interest’ under Article 86(2) had in this very case its special 
social roots and characteristics: social objective, solidarity elements, non-profit-
making and investment control linked to the pension fund. All these together resulted 
in a position which was less competitive than competing private insurance companies 
might have had. Anyway, the meaning of the phrase ‘general economic interest’ was 
so much in contradiction with the standard meaning of ‘economic’ in the context of 
the (legal) internal market (such as maximising profits or economic protectionism) 
that it certainly legitimised the use of the word ‘social’ expressis verbis when 
denoting the meaning of Article 86(2) EC in this context, as was done in paragraph 
103 of Albany. 186 
 
The evolutionary step in Albany, which was to demonstrate the ‘instrument of social 
policy’ as a justification under Article 86(2) EC, is not always easy to see. 187 E.g. 
Szyszczak in her article with its telling name Public Services in Competitive Markets, 
thorough as such, comes so close to see it that she asserts how  
 
‘[t]he Europeanization of public services has helped clarify some of the 
problems by dropping the confusing terminology of ‘services of general 
economic interest’.  In the Commission’s Communications [188] the use 
of the word ‘economic’ denotes the activity under scrutiny, rather than 
the interest which is being protected. Thus the confusion between ‘aims’ 
and ‘means’ is clarified…Under Article 86(2) EC it is the objectives of 
                                                 
186 One may wonder what happened to fiscal in Albany, paragraph 103. My answer is that 
nothing happened with fiscal. The Treaty is and will be there, with fiscal monopolies 
constitutionally accepted, although subject to different political and social pressures. 
187 I rhetorically denote that e.g. Goyder, Craig and de Búrca, Giubboni (see footnote 100, 
supra), Van Bael & Bellis and Wyatt & Dashwood have not discussed the ‘social policy 
instrument’ in paragraph 103 of Albany at all. The last mentioned in their European Union 
Law, 4th ed., pp. 723-4, confine themselves to present the treatment of the exclusive rights in 
Albany as a prolongation of Corbeau and Commission v. Netherlands (C-157/94), thus 
highlighting the legal and factual possibility of fulfilling the public service task and the 
alleviation of those conditions, stated in paragraph 107 of Albany.  
188 Szyszczak here means the Commission Communication on Services of General Interest in 
Europe COM(96)443 final and Communication From the Commission on Services of General 
Interest in Europe COM(2000)580 final. 
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the ‘service of general economic interest’ which must be of a non-
economic nature.’ 189 
 
Szyszczak means in her last sentence social policy objectives capable of justifying a 
derogation under Article 86(2) EC. The use of both ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ 
in the same definition (the last sentence in the above citation) manifests the outdated 
nature of the wording of Article 86(2) EC. However, Szyszczak refers to her evidence 
showing how “the division between ‘non-economic’ (or social activities) and 
economic activities is increasingly blurred.” 190 I prima facie agree with this. At the 
same time, Szyszczak’s reasoning proves the very helpful impact which cognisance of 
the ‘social policy instrument’ established in Albany, paragraph 103, has in 
interpreting Article 86(2) EC. 191 The same witnesses in another way Gagliardi (also 
referred to by Szyszczak) who has asserted that there is no clear line dividing 
economic and non-economic activities since many state regulations contain both 
economic and non-economic reasons. As an example he refers to the fixing of drug 
(medicine) prices which ‘could be perceived either as an economic measure to reduce 
the national health budget or as a necessary measure to provide health care to the 
lowest earners’. 192  
 
As a not at all problematic presentation (although as a short one) of issues around 
paragraph 103 of Albany I may refer to Durand, Lewis and van Raepenbusch. Writing 
in French they have been free from any linguistic hardship in paragraph 103 of Albany, 
have quoted it and bind it to paragraph 105 of Albany where the Court noted the 
essential social function within the Netherlands pensions system that the 
supplementary pension fund had. The statutory pension was of limited amount, 
calculated on the basis of the minimum statutory wage. On the basis of ‘instrument of 
                                                 
189 See Szyszczak, footnote 162, supra, p. 69-70. Emphasis is original. Reference to the 
objectives of the public service comes close the assertion of Mestmäcker in the end of section 
2.5.5, supra. The difference is of course that Mestmäcker has boldly asserted how Article 
86(2) also encompasses social policy instruments and consequently solved the contradiction 
with the wording of Article 86(2).  
190 Ibid., Szyszczak’s footnote 171. The Commission’s explanation of Article 86(2) is still 
based on the dichotomy ‘economic – non-economic’, see Communication from the 
Commission, Services of general interest in Europe; OJ C17, 19.1.2001, paragraph 28. 
191 It seems to me that cognizance of the ‘social policy instrument’ establishment in Albany, 
para. 103, would also make Szyszczak’s argumentation more convincing in her debate with 
Tamara Hervey concerning the role of social solidarity. Namely, Hervey in her article Social 
Solidarity: A Buttress Against Internal Market Law? In Shaw (ed.), Social Law and Policy in 
an Evolving European Union, p. 31-47, explores the solidarity elements present in judgments 
C-70/05 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395, para. 27; Albany; C-120/95 Decker [1998] ECR I-
1831, para. 21, and C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931, para. 17. Especially at pp. 44-47 she 
has doubts whether the social solidarity expressed so far by the Court is able to protect the 
national social (security) regimes against Internal Market rules. However, Szyszczak replies 
rightly by referring to the fact that the classification between economic and non-economic 
[like solidarity-bound – JH] is predicated upon outdated assumptions and is not a useful way 
of classifying market activity caught by EC rules; Szyszczak p. 68. If the starting point is a 
‘social policy instrument’ or particular social task of general interest under Article 86(2) EC it 
is easier to see that the solidarity aspect is just one element in classifying an ‘undertaking’ and 
in justification under Article 86(2).     
192 Andrea Filippo Gagliardi, United States and European Union antitrust versus state 
regulation of the economy: is there a better test? (2000) 25 E.L.Rev. pp. 372-3. 
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social policy’ they can without difficulties find how the Court in its pragmatic 
reasoning (in paragraphs 104 to 111) took into account the social function of the 
regime concerned, as well as the margin of appreciation that the Member States have 
in running their social security schemes. 193 On the other hand, reading and writing in 
French is no guarantee of seeing and/or discussing the social policy instrument of 
Albany, paragraph 103. As an example I may refer to the general competition law 
presentation by Marie Malaurie-Vignal. She presents only some other essential details: 
for the application of Article 86(2) it is not necessary for the viability of the service 
provider to be threatened (paragraph 107 of Albany); and the possibility of ‘good 
risks’ leaving a pension scheme (with spiralling negative cost effect) in the absence of 
exclusive rights of a pension fund (paragraph 108 of Albany). 194  
 
Since the judgement of September 1999 in Albany, Advocate General Léger, referring 
to paragraph 103 of Albany, used in the case Wouters 195 and later in Altmark 196 the 
formula “…instrument of economic, fiscal or social policy…” but he, too, writing in 
French, had no objection concerning the contents and meaning of paragraph 103 in 
Albany and that was exactly the place of his reference. The same concerns Judge 
Lenaerts who in 2002 has described Article 86(2) as including the connotation of 
‘instrument of economic, fiscal or social policy’ with paragraph 103 of Albany as his 
point of reference. 197 
 
The outcome in paragraph 103 of Albany (instrument of social policy demonstrated) 
simply surmounted a textual or literal and isolated interpretation of ‘economic’ in 
Article 86(2) EC. It was no lapsus but it was a carefully considered and balanced 
Court judgement and a normative reaffirmation or answer to the Court’s own question 
in paragraph 98 of Albany on a particular social task of general interest that reflects 
the realities in society. It meant that the social task (the pension fund) was first located 
(forced, I might say) 198  under the ‘economic activities’ category (notion of 
undertaking and competition rules) but it later qualified as an independent potential 
candidate for the exception in Article 86(2). In this way the category of a particular 
                                                 
193 Claire-Françoise Durand, Xavier Lewis and Sean van Raepenbusch, Les principaux 
développements de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice et du Tribunal de première instance 
du 1er août 1999 au 31 juillet 2000, Cahiers de droit européen 2001 nos 3-4, pp. 504-505. 
194 Marie Malaurie-Vignal, Droit de la concurrence interne et communautaire, 3e édition, 
Armand Colin 2005, p. 43, and, for the latter aspect, p. 72. 
195 Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577. See the AG’s Opinion in Wouters of 
10.7.2001, paragraph 162; the Court decided the case on different grounds (no infringement 
of the cartel prohibition etc. regarding the ban of lawyer-accountant partnership between 
members of a Bar of Advocates and accountants) and, hence, avoided any stock-taking on 
Article 86(2).  
196 See the first Opinion of Advocate General in Altmark, C-280/00, 19.3.2002, paragraph 80. 
The Court gave its judgement in Altmark 24.7.2003 but only on the basis of Article 92(1) on 
state aids.  
197 Koen Lenaerts, Les services d’intérêt économique général et le droit communautaire, in 
Conseil d’État, Rapport public 2002 : Collectivité publiques et concurrence, p. 427. 
198 Durand, Lewis and van Raepenbusch also find that it would have been ’more functional’ to 
free in Albany the pension fund from competition rules directly by virtue of the solidarity 
aspects present, thus regarding it as falling outside the notion of ‘undertaking’; ibid., p. 507. It 
is clear that freeing the fund under Article 86(2) gives the Court more room for sophisticated 
solutions. 
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social task of general interest and a social policy instrument under Article 86(2) EC 
was established in Albany. 
 
This explanation also corresponds to the overall broad meaning of ‘economic’ in the 
Treaty as elaborated in case-law. As mentioned already, even quid pro quo in a 
religious society may be covered by ‘economic’, 199 as is prostitution 200 and health 
care in public hospitals. 201 Regarding the quid pro quo it is enough that the activity is 
‘genuine’ work and it is for remuneration. ‘General economic’ is therefore understood 
in a very broad way and in this particular case the term is capable even of 
encompassing ‘social’ under Article 86(2). 202 
 
Further in Albany, given the rule demonstrated in paragraph 103, the pension fund 
succeeded in the practical and special type necessity test under Article 86(2). 203 The 
reasoning of the Court after paragraph 103, in paragraphs 104 to 111, was indeed a 
practical test of a particular social task of general interest. Its culmination point was 
the reasoning in paragraph 108 that accepted the fact that the a priori compulsory 
(erga omnes) membership safeguarded the solidarity aspect inherent in the rules on 
pension benefits, and moreover blocked any endangering of the fund’s existence. 204 
 
 
2.5.7 Commission v. Spain 
 
A further, in fact the conclusive, step in the argument (in Albany a new, elaborated 
notion promulgated) is the judgement in the case Commission v Spain, given by the 
Court on 13 May 2003. 205 It gave, concerning Article 86(2), the passage being a plain 
side path or argument in the case, the same explanation as in Albany, hence 
“instrument of economic or social policy”. The Court, sitting in a mini-plenum of 11 
Judges, held: 
 
82 “[…] the argument which the Spanish Government bases on Article 86(2) 
EC. In that regard, although it is true that paragraph (2) of Article 86 EC, read 
with paragraph (1) thereof, seeks to reconcile the Member States' interest in 
using certain undertakings, in particular in the public sector, as an instrument 
                                                 
199 See Case C-196/87 Steymann [1988] ECR 6159. 
200 See Case C-268/99 Jany [2001] ECR I-8615. 
201 Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, paragraph 58. 
202 Similarly, if not identically, Baquero Cruz also finds that a narrow approach to the concept 
of economic activity would reduce the scope of application of Article 86(2). Baquero Cruz, 
footnote 127 supra, p. 185. 
203 For this necessity-test (instead of a traditional proportionality test) see section 2.7.1, infra. 
204 Paragraph 108 of Albany was worded as follows: “If the exclusive right of the fund to 
manage the supplementary pension scheme for all workers in a given sector were removed, 
undertakings with young employees in good health engaged in non-dangerous activities 
would seek more advantageous insurance terms from private insurers. The progressive 
departure of 'good' risks would leave the sectoral pension fund with responsibility for an 
increasing share of 'bad' risks, thereby increasing the cost of pensions for workers, particularly 
those in small and medium-sized undertakings with older employees engaged in dangerous 
activities, to which the fund could no longer offer pensions at an acceptable cost.” 
205 Case C-463/00 Commission v. Spain [2003] ECR I-4581, paragraph 82, in explaining 
Article 86(2) EC, following to an expressed (and deviating) position of the Spanish 
government. 
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of economic or social policy with the Community's interest in ensuring 
compliance with the rules on competition and the preservation of the unity of 
the common market (Case C-202/88 France v Commission [1991] ECR I-1223, 
paragraph 12; and Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-
5699, paragraph 39), it is none the less the case that the Member State must set 
out in detail the reasons for which, in the event of elimination of the contested 
measures, the performance, under economically acceptable conditions, of the 
tasks of general economic interest which it has entrusted to an undertaking 
would, in its view, be jeopardised (Commission v Netherlands, paragraph 58).” 
(italics here) 
 
Here there is a minor difference from Albany in that this time Article 86(2) is read 
together with 86(1) which then results in the requirement for the Member States to set 
out in detail the reasons for the exclusive rights concerned. Whether this is a real 
change or just a natural development in case-law, I need to set aside here. In any case, 
there is no linguistic problem this time. The use of ‘social’ was corroborated. If there 
is any problem with clarity, the lack of a reference to Albany might qualify. However, 
the landmark position on Article 86(2) taken in Albany was clearly confirmed by this 
new judgement and, accordingly, the ‘instrument of economic or social policy’ is now 
settled case-law. 206 Finally, I would like to refer to the need to amend the Treaty to 
reflect appropriately the case-law as developed in Albany, hence also enshrining 
‘social’ in the very wording of Article 86(2). The European political ’machinery’ 
should understand the need to resolve this discrepancy between economic and social. 
The EU citizens deserve to have a Treaty that they understand, not least because of 
the fact that EC competition rules, Article 86(2) included, have direct legal effect in 
the Member States. EU citizens should be able to know the real contents of the EU 
law that they can invoke before national courts and authorities. They should be given 
the opportunity to know that ‘general economic interest’ no longer restricts the 
application of Article 86(2) and that it already covers social policy instruments. Thus, 
the Treaty should simply correspond to that case-law. However, it is telling that 
during the preparations of the Constitutional Treaty the author was unable to convince 
even the Finnish government about the need for such an amendment. 
 
2.5.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
After Albany and Commission v. Spain the question arises: which kind of social policy 
instruments are qualified under Article 86(2)? It would seem to cover particularly 
those in the public sector like social protection in the form of an elderly people’s 
                                                 
206 That the ‘social policy instrument’ is not always found becomes clear in the explanation of 
Gippini Fournier and Rodríguez Míguez. They explain thoroughly (with 47 pages) the so-
called ‘golden shares’ judgments, thus also case C-463/00 Commission v. Spain, and confine 
their observation to one sentence (justified as such) of the rejection of Spain’s additional 
argument under Article 86(2) because Spain had not set out in detail the reasons for 
unacceptable economic conditions flowing from the elimination of the contested measures 
(golden shares). However, significantly, they qualify the public service task as being of 
general economic interest. See Eric Gippini Fournier and José-Antonio Rodríguez Míguez, 
Actions spécifiques dans les sociétés privatisées: le beurre ou l’argent du beurre. A propos des 
arrêts de la Cour de justice des 4 juin 2002 et 13 mai 2003 sur les <<golden shares>>. Revue 
du Droit de l’Union Européenne 1/2003 p. 72.  
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home à la Sodemare. It is natural to reason that those under the Employment and 
Social Policy Chapters of the Treaty would also qualify. A further question is whether 
this ‘policy instrument model’ could or should also be enlarged so as to cover in the 
Treaty expressis verbis other related areas, such as health services and medical care, 
education and culture. My submission is that it would be difficult to find a better 
instrument that would be both politically viable and linked to the existing case-law. 
Anyway, a likely path of development is that the Member States will not find the 
unanimity required to amend Article 86(2) which will simply underline the judicial-
constitutional manner (in contrast to a politico-constitutional manner) of deciding 
these issues in the Community. 
 
Since the Treaty of Nice, the ‘social policy instrument’ category under Article 86(2) 
EC is naturally to be interpreted also in the light of Article 137(4) EC, first indent, 
according to which EC Directives shall not affect the right of Member States to define 
the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must not significantly 
affect the financial equilibrium thereof. In the light of Albany, there is no 
contradiction. In fact, Article 137(4) enshrines the previous case-law as to the rights 
of the Member States. 
 
However, the ‘particular social task of general interest’ and ‘social policy instrument’ 
today characterise Article 86(2) not only in social security matters but more broadly. 
That is not just a matter possibly of broadening the scope of Article 86(2) but also has 
an impact on its material interpretation, the proportionality assessment included. I 
discuss that interpretation below in the light of a concrete case, i.e. that of the Finnish 
Statutory Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (TEL). It suffices here to denote that in a 
material sense Article 86(2) does not mean any a priori precedence given either to 
competition or public service values. This is also the firm conclusion – after a 
thorough analysis – of Baquero Cruz. 207 Interestingly as such, he takes the idea of the 
‘priority problem’ from Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, namely from Rawls’ attempt to 
reduce the role of intuition in the theory of justice by introducing the idea of a ‘serial 
or lexical order’. 208 The author, however, dares to suggest caution, especially in an 
                                                 
207 See footnote 127,  supra, p. 211.   
208 Ibid., p. 174 where Baquero Cruz refers to Rawls, pp. 42-43. Thus, Rawls means ‘an order 
which requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before we can move on to the 
second, the second before we consider the third, and so on. A principle does not come into 
play until those previous to it are either fully met or do not apply. A serial ordering avoids, 
then, having to balance principles at all; those earlier in the ordering have an absolute weight, 
so to speak, with respect to later ones, and hold without exception’. This is what Baquero 
Cruz has also quoted. However, a few lines further Rawls himself gives as an example (‘as an 
important special case’) that the principle of ‘equal liberty’ is prior to the principle regulating 
‘economic and social inequalities’. For Rawls, ‘[t]his means, in effect, that the basic structure 
of society is to arrange the equalities of wealth and authority in ways consistent with the equal 
liberties required by the preceding principle’. Well, Rawls discusses constitutional matters but 
has certainly not taken here any stand on norms like Article 86(2). We may still assume that 
regulating (or reducing) social inequalities by social policy measures (like by pension 
schemes – see sections 2.6 and 2.7, infra) under Article 86(2) may delimit the liberty of at 
least legal persons on the (internal) market and thereby that of some individuals which would 
prima facie seem to contradict Rawls’ serial or lexical order. ‘Salvation’ is in Rawls’ 
explanation on equal liberty and the concept of liberty where he, too, of course comes to a 
balancing between conflicting liberties and thereby restricting them; Rawls, p. 203. Next to 
harbouring finally into these liberty explanations, the margin of discretion, even elusive 
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EU context, in any direct analogical application of this kind of theoretical ideas 
(inspiration from them is another issue); the Treaty is predominantly a legal-political 
compromise and a quasi-constitution of a sui generis legal structure; the EU is neither 
a state, nor a mere international organisation. Besides, as the own text of Baquero 
Cruz sets forth, Fritz Scharpf has contended (in a very simplifying way) – echoing 
Rawls, as Baquero Cruz writes - that in the Community context there is a priority of 
economic over social policy. 209 For the author, Scharpf’s article above all does not 
discuss European law, especially not in its evolution, but is filled with reasoning 
mainly from the perspective of the political sciences. Accordingly, Baquero Cruz 
himself convincingly proves that Article 86(2) is finally a delicate balance where the 
market values and public service values are on an equal footing. In that sense his 
conclusion, which the author shares, is that the case-law of the Court has not 
undermined the public service values whereas the Community legislation on public 
services shows signs of a relative priority being given to competition. 210 However, as 
to Albany, he does not discuss the social policy instrument under Article 86(2) but 
bases his conclusion in brief on the Member States’ margin of discretion in arranging 
their social security schemes. This is, of course, included in paragraph 122 of Albany 
but is far from all in that judgment.  
 
A general question on Article 86(2) still remains. Thus, is Article 86(2) a justification 
or an exception or neither of these? I recall that in Commission v. Netherlands (case 
C-157/94) the Court qualified it as derogation from the rules of the Treaty. 
Accordingly, in Albany (paragraph 103) the Court called it a derogation from the 
‘general rules of the Treaty’ (thus, not just from competition rules). The difference 
between these two judgments is that in the previous case-law the Court also declared 
how the interpretation of Article 86(2) must be kept strict (paragraph 37 of 
Commission v. Netherlands) while in Albany this qualification of the interpretation is 
not present. For clarity’s sake the author – like Baquero Cruz – highlights that in 
Commission v. Netherlands the interpretation finally was not especially strict while 
the Court found that the exclusive rights to import electricity for public distribution 
were found to be compatible with the Treaty. In any case, it would have been rather 
exceptional in Albany for the Court to first declare the need for a strict interpretation 
of Article 86(2) and then as the next step to proceed with an interpretation that at least 
                                                                                                                                            
balancing between economic and social factors, and the complexity of the (e.g.) social policy 
matters concerned, which are all inherent in the interpretation and application of Article 86(2) 
(well also found by Baquero Cruz), are reasons why it does not always follow Rawls’ serial or 
lexical order. It is more fruitful to discuss Article 86(2) above all via concrete cases (this is 
what Baquero Cruz in fact also does) than via general theoretical structures.  Besides, the 
serial order is in an EU context liable to misleading simplifications similar to that of Sharpf, 
below.   
209 Ibid. As to Sharpf, see Fritz W. Sharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the 
Challenges of Diversity, Journal of Common Market Studies 2002 Vol. 40, Number 4, p. 647 
and 665. At a later point Sharpf summarizes and finds a fundamental asymmetry between 
policies promoting market efficiencies and those promoting social protection and equality. 
The author dares to disagree. Sharpf’s simplifying contention is substantively the same as that 
presented from a legal-constitutional angle by Barry Fitzpatrick in his ‘Theory of Conversed 
Pyramids and the EU Social Constitution’, in Jo Shaw (ed.), Social Law and Policy in an 
Evolving European Union, Hart Publishing 2000, pp. 303-324. For a criticism of such an 
alleged and general supremacy of economic policy over social policy, see Hellsten 2005, 
Chapter II, passim. 
210 Baquero Cruz, footnote 139, p. 211. 
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prima facie seems to exceed the wording of the Treaty. However, Baquero Cruz 
argues that Article 86(2) is neither a justification nor an exception but ‘rather a 
binary- or switch-rule that establishes the conditions for the application or non-
application of the treaty with regard to situations involving undertakings entrusted 
with the operation of services of general economic interest.’ 211 
 
The author’s view is - certainly after Albany while Baquero Cruz does not rely on 
Albany at this point – that Article 86(2), first, includes a justification pattern (that I 
explore below), and, second, is a derogation (however radically grown over time) 
from general Treaty rules. Its interpretation, however, is a sui generis issue. 212 It 
cannot be described as strict in the sense that it has surmounted the wording of Article 
86(2) so as to reflect a certain change in the status of public services, thus it is not 
limited only to the classical ‘general economic interest’. It is a potential shelter of 
public services in more general terms, covering especially different social policy 
instruments. As to social security instruments, their recognised status under Article 
86(2) EC is naturally supported by Article 34(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU according to which ‘the Union recognises and respects the entitlement to 
social security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as …old 
age,…in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws 
and practices’. While the nature of this provision is disputed (a right or a principle in 
the sense of Article 51(1) of the Charter and Article II-112(5) of the Constitutional 
Treaty) a meaningful interpretation thereof in any case lends support to the 
independence and immunity of social security schemes in relation to competition rules 








                                                 
211 Ibid., p. 176. 
212 Reference can be made to judgment in case 94/74 IGAV v. ENCC [1975] ECR 699, 
paragraph 34, where the Court described Article 86(2) as laying down ‘a particular system in 
favour of undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest’. 
This reference owes to Baquero Cruz, footnote 139, supra, p. 176.  
213 For the Charter as a point of reference in EU law, see case Parliament v Council in 
footnote 107, supra. As to the nature of Article 34(1) of the Charter, e.g. Contiades, footnote 
106, supra, p. 71, holds – unlike the author - that it would be only a principle (judicially 
cognisable according to Article II-112(5) only in the interpretation of the implementing acts 
and in ruling on their legality). Sandra Fredman clearly finds it a social right; see Sandra 
Fredman, Transformation or Dilution: Fundamental Rights in the EU Social Space, European 
Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 57-58. Antoine Lyon-Caen finds that it is firm 
in its formulation and merits the designation of a social right; see Antoine Lyon-Caen, The 
legal efficacy and significance of fundamental social rights: lessons from the European 
experience, in Hepple (ed.), Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context, Cambridge 
University Press 2002, p. 183.  In case that the EU Charter becomes legally binding (either as 
a part of the Constitution or otherwise) it is for the Court to decide on the nature of the clauses 
of the Charter. 
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Each EU Member State has a unique statutory earnings-related or other employment 
pension scheme(s). 214  A Finnish speciality is that seven private and authorized 
insurance companies (and to lesser extent numerous pension foundations and funds 
established by single employers) run the statutory Earnings-Related Pension Scheme 
‘TEL’ (hereinafter also ‘TEL’, 215 ‘the TEL-scheme’ or ‘the scheme’; ‘TEL’ is also 
the abbreviation of the pension law concerned) applicable to workers and employees 
in the private sector. These companies represent roughly 80% of total pension 
responsibilities and the two largest of them some 65%. Nevertheless, as a statutory 
scheme it falls under the so-called first pillar in the EU’s social security jargon and is 
subject to Regulation 1408/71, this being replaced by Regulation 883/04 etc. In 
addition to its fundamental nature in the national social security system, TEL is also a 
challenging legal feature, both as touching, as to some of its components and features, 
even the border line of competition rules and collective labour law (see Albany, 
paragraphs 59 and 60), 216  and as a potential candidate for exemption from EC 
competition rules under Article 86(2) EC. Both aspects can be meaningfully discussed 
only after a sufficient presentation of the main features of the highly complex  (in its 
details) pension scheme as such.   
The TEL-scheme thus forms an elementary part of the law-based national social 
security system and doubtlessly falls under ‘social security systems’ referred to by 
Article 137(4) EC according to which Community provisions adopted pursuant to this 
article ‘shall not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental 
principles of their social security systems and must not significantly affect the 
financial equilibrium thereof.’ This proviso clearly has an interpretative impact even 
outside the strict ambit of Article 137 EC. The purpose of the TEL-scheme is to 
guarantee every wage-earner (or his survivors) in the private sector a reasonable 
income level when retired.  
The TEL-scheme is grosso modo based upon solidarity, even over generations, which 
requires its basis to be defined in law and a system equipped with comprehensive state 
control. Nearly a third (or, a quarter, depending on the details of assessment) of the 
financing of pensions is nowadays based upon funding and the non-funded rest is 
financed by contributions (the pay-as-you-go part, hereinafter also ‘PAYG’; 
jakojärjestelmä). The state does not finance it at all. Given that the pension benefits 
(i.e. the accrual rules etc.) are equal throughout the scheme this kind of financing 
(only a partial funding) requires fixing in law the calculation basis for contributions 
and pension liabilities, decision-making on the funding degree and limiting the profit 
rights of the owners of the TEL companies. 217 The Ministry of Social Affairs must 
                                                 
214 See e.g. the Commission’s data bank MISSOC, 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection/missoc_en.htm. 
215 The abbreviation ‘TEL’ may also refer to the law concerned, the Employees’ Pensions Act. 
216 On the Albany-immunity in general, see section 1.3, supra. 
217 According to Sections 21 and 22 of the Act on Pension Insurance Companies the yield 
(profit) must be reasonable and correspond to the risk of losing the capital included in 
ownership. In practice the TIR (see section 2.6.3.2, infra) plus one percent has been regarded 
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have a particular reason if it approves differences in the calculation basis that would 
make the treatment of pension institutions’ joint tasks more difficult (Section 3(a) 
TEL). The tiny possibility of differences (that cannot concern pension benefits) has 
remained residual, if it has any practical effect at all from a systemic point of view. 
While writing this, the Diet was dealing with a governmental bill that would also 
enshrine the compulsory co-operation of the pension insurers directly in law. 218  
 
Seen from a systemic point of view, the activities are also subject to permanent state 
control for the part that implies discretionary powers for the TEL-companies and 
other institutions running the scheme. However, the system includes the possibility to 
refund contributions (asiakashyvitys) and is in this way subject to competition 
between the companies. A further sensitive or critical part is the inherent restriction of 
competition in fixing the minimum and maximum amount of refunds from the yearly 
contributions. Furthermore the single ‘technical interest rate’ (sometimes also called 
as interest assumption, laskuperustekorko, hereinafter also ‘TIR’), applied throughout 
the scheme and defining the funded part of the benefits, can be seen as a restriction of 
competition. The refunds indirectly have – by lowering the total contribution – the 
effect of also lowering the workers’ contributions. I discuss these refunds briefly 
below, in section 2.6.3.1 Contributions.  
 
When Finland joined the EU the debate about the TEL-scheme resulted in a proviso 
that the First Life Insurance Directive 79/267/EEC (codified by Directive 2002/83/EC) 
does not concern pension insurance companies running the TEL scheme. 219 The main 
condition in this set of provisions is that these companies, while they must be 
established in Finland and can belong to bigger insurance groups as subsidiaries, must 
completely differentiate these activities from any other activities and de facto run 
them in a separate legal entity. In practice the companies concerned are mutual with 
two exceptions. However, in the context of EU law it is obvious that the authorized 
insurance companies (as well as the company foundations and funds) running the 
statutory scheme are undertakings in the sense of competition rules, especially 
because there are certain competition elements in their activities. Furthermore, from 
the point of view of a worker, the pension rights and duties are directly statutory with 
the exception of fixing the yearly amount of contributions where the social partners 
intervene. 220   
 
In sum, the restrictions of competition inherent in agreeing upon the single TIR and 
the contributions, as well as in confirming them by a decision of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs may become subject to a legal assessment in the light of the EC Treaty, 
                                                                                                                                            
as reasonable, see Ilari Kallio, Vakuutuksenottajan oikeudet työeläkevakuutusyhtiön 
varallisuuteen, Suomen Vakuutusalan Kustannus ja Koulutus OY, Helsinki 2005, p. 33.  
218 Governmental Bill (HE) 45/2005, Sections 167, 172 and 212. 
219 See the Accession Act of Austria, Finland and Sweden, Documents, Article 29, Annex I, 
Paragraph XI(B)(II) Insurance; OJ C241, 29 August 1994. Article 3(8) of Directive 02/83/EC 
now incorporates the same provisions. 
220 The worker may nowadays, however, decide on his or her retirement age between 63 and 
68 years. In describing and assessing the Finnish Earnings-Related Pension Scheme TEL I 
also use the notion ‘worker’ to cover any employees. In the language usage of the scheme, an 
‘employee’ covers both blue and white collar workers. 
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notably in relation to its competition rules. 221   The non-application of the First 
Insurance Directive does not de jure exclude such an assessment in relation to and on 
the basis of the Treaty’s competition rules, notably under Article 81 EC, that 
according to settled case-law also has the horizontal direct effect, thus it can also be 
invoked between private parties. 222 Article 81 EC first of all prohibits and declares 
void any price agreements between the competing undertakings.  
 
Notable is also the equally settled case-law that Article 81 EC, read in conjunction 
with Article 10 EC requires the state ‘[n]ot to introduce or maintain in force measures, 
whether legislative or regulatory, which may render ineffective the competition rules 
applicable to undertakings. Such is the case, according to the same case-law, where a 
Member State requires or favours the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted 
practices contrary to Article [81] of the Treaty or reinforces their effects or deprives 
its own legislation of its official character by delegating to private traders 
responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere.’ 223 
 
A further discussion point is which elements and to what extent the TEL scheme can 
be exempted from EU competition rules under Article 86(2) EC. However, a 
preliminary discussion is whether the agreements on contributions, the minimum and 
maximum refunds included, and the TIR include relevant features of collective labour 
agreements (hereinafter ‘collective agreements’) and may thus arguably fall even 
under the basic Albany-immunity of collective agreements, i.e. under that established 
in paragraphs 59 and 60 of Albany. A more conventional question is whether these 
features may weigh as arguments in an assessment of the scheme under Article 86(2) 
EC. This would be based on the agreements concluded by the central social partners 
on these issues. A brief recap of history is first necessary.  
 
 
2.6.2 Major Agreements of Social Partners 
 
The central social partners, nowadays the Confederation of Finnish Industries EK 
(employer organisations’ national confederation), Central Organisation of Finnish 
Trade Unions SAK (blue collars’ confederation), Finnish Confederation of Salaried 
Employees STTK and Confederation of Unions for Academic Professionals  AKAVA, 
                                                 
221 I take it for granted that the restrictions of competition in the TEL scheme embody the 
‘trade effect’, i.e. may effect the trade between Member States which is the prerequisite for 
the applicability of Article 81 EC because the restrictions cover the TEL activities throughout 
the country; see e.g. case C-35/99 Arduino [2002] ECR I-1529, paragraph 33. There is also, of 
course, the theoretical possibility that foreign pension operators would challenge the TEL 
scheme by virtue of rules for of free provision of services. Such an action would, however, 
reflect general reliability (image) problems in the eyes of the general public, employers 
included, which renders such an action unlikely to the extent that I set aside any reasoning 
thereon. For foreign operators the establishment of a subsidiary company in Finland for TEL 
purposes in not excessively difficult or costly. 
222 See case 127/73 SABAM (BRT-I) [1973] ECR 51, paragraph 16.  
223 See Albany, paragraph 65 and the case-law referred to there. There is no space for any in 
depth reasoning on this ‘state act prohibition’. However, the prohibition first means that a 
state act (or omission etc.) is not any comprehensive escape per se from Article 81 EC. 
Second, and more importantly, in the context of TEL it is elementary to see that the scheme 
exceptionally, while being law-based social security, includes certain competition elements. 
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have de facto negotiated and agreed orally on many parts in the TEL scheme since its 
beginning in 1963. This is what one would expect because there is no financing by the 
state in the scheme.  
 
In the autumn of 1991 when an economic recession was already hitting Finland, the 
central social partners agreed as a part of the central income policy agreement (tupo) 
224  for the years 1992 and 1993 upon principles to be followed in a long-term 
balancing of the scheme. A central measure was the introduction of the employee’s 
contribution from 1993 onwards; see my explanation under section 3.6.3.1, infra.  
 
In 1995 the central social partners concluded as a part of the national recovery policy 
– still as a follow-up to the deep economic recession of the early 1990s – an 
agreement on balancing the financing and certain calculation elements with a long 
term perspective, i.e. as far into the future as 2030. The agreement was implemented 
by the state by relevant amendments in the TEL. In a broader framework agreement in 
2001 they agreed upon a flexible retirement age system (63-68 years) and further 
comprehensive balancing measures to keep the short and long-term contribution 
pressure under control. This was realised by amendments of TEL that came into force 
in 2005. At the same time, they agreed upon amending the TIR so that it ‘supports the 
long-term financial balance of the TEL-scheme and is suitable for every pension 
institution.’ 225 The revised TIR has been used since 2003. 
 
Since 2001 the central income agreements (tupo) include a sentence on pension 
matters under the heading of Continuous Negotiation Procedure (jatkuva 
neuvottelumenettely). The present central tupo-agreement for 2005 to (30.9.) 2007 
laconically states that 
 
‘The continuous negotiation procedure may also include issues requiring 
tripartite 226 treatment like pension policy…’.  
 
Even without this kind of entry in the income policy agreement the central social 
partners have concluded oral agreements, as mentioned, on pension contributions and 
the TIR at least since 1992/1993 when the workers’ contributions were also 
introduced in the TEL scheme.   
 
 




For three decades, i.e. until 1993, the financing of TEL was based solely on 
contributions paid by the employer. Nowadays the contributions vary, depending on 
the age of the worker and the size of the employer’s workforce (less or more than 50 
workers), so that in 2006 the average total contribution is 21.2% out of wages paid. 
                                                 
224 For central tupo-agreements see the explanation at footnote 243, infra.  
225 See paragraph 9(2) of the framework agreement of the central social partners of 
12.11.2001. 
226 Tripartite negotiations on working life issues have their roots in the ILO, of course. 
However, the procedure is deeply rooted in the Finnish practice, historically stemming even 
from the national experience during and immediately after the WWII.  
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The workers’ contributions thereof are 4.3% until the age of 52 and 5.4% for older 
people. The age factor is a consequence of the new policy to support a prolonged 
working of aged employees, up to the age of 68 years. The basis also for the workers’ 
contribution is – naturally, in this kind of social security system - fixed directly in law 
(Sections 1 and 12(b) TEL).  
 
When the workers commenced to pay contributions in 1993 the central social partners 
also agreed upon the employers’ and workers’ shares changing in future in relation to 
the amendments of the total contribution, unless agreed otherwise. If the total 
contribution increases, the increase is divided into two. Similarly, any reduction of the 
total contribution is divided into two. 227  Since 2001 the oral agreements on 
contributions have been in a formal sense concluded within the Continuous 
Negotiations Procedure. Nevertheless, the contribution components are determined on 
the basis of actuarial principles established by law. 
 
The refunds of contributions are also based on the law 228  that requires – in order to 
guarantee all the time a solid financial status of the whole system – collecting 
contributions slightly in excess of the expected final real requirements. Based on the 
solvency ratio the TEL companies are then entitled to grant to the policy holders as 
refunds a percentage (confirmed by the Ministry) of the investment yield (investment 
capital) that exceeds a minimum ratio.   
 
2.6.3.2 Technical Interest Rate TIR 
The TIR defines the growth of the funded part of the benefits. It should be noted that 
TIR has no effect on benefits themselves, which are stated in the legislation. 
However, the TIR determines how much of the benefits are financed from the funds 
held by the TEL institutions and how much from the PAYG part collected jointly in 
TEL contributions. 229 It has its basis in law 230 that prescribes that a single TIR is 
applied throughout the scheme and pension institutions. A motive for this is that, if 
the TIR varied between institutions, then the institutions having lower TIR’s would be 
subsidized via the PAYG part by institutions having higher TIR. In practical terms it 
                                                 
227 See the central income policy agreement (tupo) of 29 November 1991, Annex 1, p. 1. The 
same was repeated by the central agreement of 30 November 1992, Annex I, p. 6.  
228 See Section 12(a)(2) TEL. Furthermore, Chapters 7 and 8 in Act on Pension Insurance 
Companies (354/1997) stipulate that a reasonable share of surplus shall be reimbursed to 
policy holders but only to the extent that it is not already ‘consumed’ in reinforcing solvency 
and the yield for share or guarantee capital. In practice the minimum and maximum refunds 
are confirmed by the Ministry on a yearly basis.   
229 The TIR varied during 1980s and early 1990s between 8 and 10%. A structural 
change took place in 1993 in the context of targeting to a long term sustainability of 
the whole scheme; introducing the workers’ contributions in 1993 was a similar move. 
The TIR was lowered from 9% in 1993 (first half) to 6.5% in 1994. A further 
‘structural’ decrease from 6.5% to 5.5% took place in 1997 in order to give more 
space for investments by the insurance companies. Since 1999 the lowest TIR has 
been 4.00%. For the second half of 2006 it is 6.5%.   
230 Section 12(a)(5) TEL. 
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shows the amount of the investment return that has to be added to the pension capital 
funds. The first three percentages form a general discount rate. The part of the TIR 
which exceeds the discount rate is used to maintain and accrue the real value of the 
old-age pension liabilities, and the part of the yield which exceeds the TIR is used to 
strengthen the solvency margin of the insurance companies and reduce the 
policyholders’ and insured persons’ contributions. 231 While writing this, the Diet was 
dealing with a bill that would stipulate that in fixing the amount of a ‘supplement 
factor’ (täydennyskerroin, replacing the present TIR) account shall be taken of ‘the 
requirements in guaranteeing the pensions and solvency of the pension institutions’. 
232 Substantively there would be no change in relation to the present TIR. The central 
social partners have further agreed on 30 January 2006 upon proposing amendments 
to the calculation of the TIR/supplement factor so as to reflect a targeted future 
increase of the share of equity type assets in the investment portfolios. The weight of 
equity return would be 10% of the TIR/supplement factor gradually after five years 
from its entry into force. 233 
The amount of the TIR is subject to a natural tension whereof only a simplified 
description is possible here: a high TIR means more money transferred to pension 
capital funds and in this way it lowers cost pressures on a time span of decades, in fact 
even over generations. A relatively lower TIR leaves more money for ‘working 
capital’ (toimintapääoma) of the pension companies, i.e. more room for high risk 
investments which on the other hand also have higher expected return and so would 
lead to lower future contributions. However, the maximum limit for refunds of 
contributions increases when the working capital increases. So, lower TIR may also 
mean higher refunds. In general terms the trade union side drives for a relatively high 
TIR so as to avoid disruptive total contribution increases in future which could also 
lead to a reduction of the pension rights and benefits. This is a question of solidarity 
towards the diminishing active work force in future which has to bear the bulk of total 
pension costs because the system is based only on a partial funding. The employer 
side has a tendency to advocate a more PAYG system oriented solution, and, 
accordingly, towards a relatively lower TIR while it also gives more space for refunds 
of contributions. Practice shows that the TIR represents a compromise between these 
two main lines. 234 It is based on a formula, agreed between the parties under the same 
negotiation procedure, according to which the TIR is higher if the average free 
investment capital of the TEL companies and other TEL actors is increased. A 
permanent agreement is that the TIR cannot be raised more than half a percent per six 
months.  
                                                 
231 Christina Lindell, Financing Pensions, in Marjukka Hietaniemi and Mika Vidlund (eds.), 
The Finnish Pension System, The Finnish Centre for Pensions 2003, p. 79. 
232 See the governmental Bill 45/2005, section 171 (my translation).  
233 See the ‘Investment Report on the Statutory Earnings Related Pension System’ 
(Työeläkejärjestelmän sijoitustoimintaa koskeva selvitys) by the negotiation group of the 
central social partners of 30 January 2006. In this report the social partners also call it an 
agreement, the implementation of which requires amendments in legislation and decrees of 
the Ministry, p. 14. 
234 In the Report mentioned in the previous footnote the social partners agree that an always 
maximally high TIR may also turn against its original purpose, depending on the fluctuation 
of the investment yield, p. 3. 
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It is obvious that in this kind of multi-actor system which also operates on the 
financial market there are single actors (perhaps amongst the company pension 
foundations and funds) that might see an advantage in having a TIR fixed per pension 
institution. Furthermore, the participation of the social partners in fixing the TIR 
makes it a prima facie attractive target for a competition-law-minded or ‘anti-
corporatist’ legal criticism or even attack. 
 
2.6.4 Procedure Regarding Contributions and TIR  
An essential joint feature of contributions and TIR is that their levels are also subject 
to a central agreement 235 within the Continuous Negotiation Procedure between the 
central social partners: EK, SAK, STTK and AKAVA. A further joint feature is that 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health confirms with its decision the amounts, 
normally for a six months’ period regarding the TIR and for the calendar year 
regarding the contributions. In formal terms the decision is adopted on the basis of an 
application of the different TEL-companies that mandate their joint national umbrella 
association, the Finnish Pension Alliance TELA, to present the application to the 
Ministry. 236  It is also subject to an opinion of the Finnish Centre for Pensions that is 
the law-based and tripartite cooperation body of the pension institutions. In practice 
its contents normally come from actuarial expertise (nowadays prepared by the 
Finnish Centre for Pensions) but are nevertheless subject to a negotiation and 
agreement of the social partners under the Continuous Negotiation Procedure whereby 
the representatives of the big TEL-companies are also present as experts. 237  
 
2.6.5 Elaborating Remarks on TEL in a European Context 
 
There are still essential differences in the formal basis of the national employment or 
earnings-related pension schemes. As seen above, in the Dutch case subject to 
judgment Albany, the scheme as such was once established by a collective agreement 
under private law. The state intervention was realised essentially in rendering the 
membership in a sectoral scheme compulsory and bringing the decision-making of the 
fund under certain administrative and judicial control. In the unofficial EU 
classification of pension schemes the Dutch scheme(s) mainly fell under the second 
pillar. The non-profit-making scheme includes several essential elements of solidarity 
238 but was nevertheless deemed by the European Court of Justice, due to the funds 
                                                 
235 A Working Group of the Ministry (so-called ‘competition working group for the 
evaluation of the statutory employment pension system’; Memorandum of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health 2001:35, p. 62-63) stated in its memorandum that the social partners 
agree upon the level of the TIR which is then subject to the confirmation by the Ministry.   
236 For the company foundations and funds the ministerial decree confirms the same amounts. 
237 This way the procedure is also described by the Report in footnote 233, supra, section 1.5, 
pp. 13-14. 
238 See paragraph 75 of Albany, describing the submissions of the pension fund concerned: 
‘Such solidarity is reflected by the obligation to accept all workers without a prior medical 
examination, the continuing accrual of pension rights despite exemption from contributions in 
the event of incapacity for work, the discharge by the fund of arrears of contributions due 
from an employer in the event of the latter's insolvency and by the indexing of the amount of 
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determining themselves the amount of contributions and benefits 239 and operating on 
the principle of funding, to be an undertaking in the sense of Article 81 EC. As a 
whole, the sectoral schemes form an important part of the national pension system in 
the Netherlands (Albany, paragraph 105).  
 
In comparison to the Dutch scheme, the Finnish TEL as a statutory one also forms in 
the pecuniary sense the core of the national first pillar. This part of the total pension of 
a person is normally 60 to 90%, the rest comprising typically the National Old-Age 
Pension provided by the State. Unlike the Dutch scheme the TEL scheme was 
established in 1962 as a directly – and regarding pension rights a fully - statutory 
scheme, based on an ordinary law enacted by the Diet. In that system any employer is 
obliged to cover the pension insurance either by choosing a TEL-company or by 
making his own arrangements in the form of a company pension foundation 
(eläkesäätiö) or fund (eläkekassa). Some sectoral funds also exist. It is not permitted 
to meet the TEL-obligations by book reserves. The employer may freely change the 
company which inserts one element of competition in the scheme. The scheme is 
based on a partial funding so that a quarter of the contributions paid must be 
transferred to pension capital funds so as to secure for its part the payment of future 
pensions. Regarding the economic responsibility, a solidarity element in TEL is that 
in case of bankruptcy the other TEL-companies are responsible for the pensions 
concerned. This has been tested in the case of the pension insurance company Eläke-
Kansa with a grosso modo unproblematic result. However, a much more important 
feature is that for the non-funded part of pensions (being of the PAYG-system) the 
TEL companies bear a joint responsibility. 
 
2.6.6 Justification of TEL in EC Law 
2.6.6.1 General Remarks 
After the introductory explanation above I recall my proper question: do the 
contribution and TIR agreements fall under the Albany-immunity of collective 
agreements or do they remain subject only to the application of Article 86(2) EC? The 
difference between the two options is not negligible. Under the Albany-immunity the 
Commission has no independent role, unless by testing its limits in an infringement 
procedure while it has an independent role under Article 86(2) EC, even by issuing 
directives and decisions. Next to this, under the Albany-immunity a usual 
proportionality assessment does not take place (but that under the nature and purpose 
of an agreement) while the proportionality assessment is debatable under Article 86(2) 
                                                                                                                                            
the pensions in order to maintain their value. The principle of solidarity is also apparent from 
the absence of any equivalence, for individuals, between the contribution paid, which is an 
average contribution not linked to risks, and pension rights, which are determined by 
reference to an average salary. Such solidarity makes compulsory affiliation to the 
supplementary pension scheme essential. Otherwise, if 'good‘ risks left the scheme, the 
ensuing downward spiral would jeopardise its financial equilibrium.’ 
239 Additionally, the level of benefits depended on the results of investments made by the 
fund. 
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EC. 240 Under the Albany-immunity (only) the purpose and nature of the agreements 
determine the outcome.  
In considering whether the ‘TEL-agreements’ of the central social partners on 
contributions and TIR may fall under the Albany-immunity one has to emphasize at 
the outset that the position of the TEL scheme is in the national debate (as connected 
to the exemption clause in the application of the First Life Insurance Directive) often 
presented in a misleading way. It means highlighting how there is an exemption from 
competition in running the TEL scheme. In reality the situation is – also in a European 
context – the other way round; i.e. that the TEL scheme is one of the rare schemes in 
the first pillar that on the whole includes some competition. Accordingly, from a 
systemic point of view, the only clear alternative for the TEL scheme would be a state 
monopoly running it.  
Concerning the fixing of the contributions, the maximum and minimum refunds 
included, and the joint TIR/supplement factor one may well refer to the fact that the 
TEL creates for the pension providers a legal framework which itself widely 
eliminates the possibility of competitive activity. In such a situation there is no 
autonomous conduct of the undertakings and Article 81 EC does not apply. 241 If this 
submission is not accepted, then it is also the case that the contributions and the 
TIR/supplement factor remain subject to an assessment under Article 86 EC. 
 
2.6.6.2 TEL Scheme and Albany-Immunity 
As background one has to recall the structure of the Albany-immunity: collective 
labour agreements are by their nature and purpose exempted from competition rules. 
Furthermore, the essential passage in this case is in paragraph 62 of Albany:  
First, like the category of agreements referred to above which derive 
from social dialogue, the agreement at issue in the main proceedings 
                                                 
240 I deal with the proportionality assessment under Article 86(2) in section 2.7.1, infra. 
241 See case C-359/95 Ladbroke Racing Ltd. [1997] ECR I-6265, paragraph 33. However, 
Article 81 EC may apply if it appears that the national legislation does not preclude 
undertakings from engaging in autonomous conduct which prevents, restricts or distorts 
competition (paragraph 34 and the case-law referred to there).  On the other hand, although 
Articles 81 EC and 82 EC are, in themselves, concerned solely with the conduct of 
undertakings and not with laws or regulations emanating from Member States, those articles, 
read in conjunction with Article 10 EC, which lays down a requirement to cooperate, none the 
less require the Member States not to introduce or maintain in force measures, even of a 
legislative or regulatory nature, which may render ineffective the competition rules applicable 
to undertakings, or where it divests its own rules of the character of legislation by delegating 
to private economic operators responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic 
sphere (see i.a. case C-198/01 Fiammiferi [2003] ECR I-8055, paragraph 45). Articles 10 EC 
and 81 EC are infringed where a Member State requires or favours the adoption of 
agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 81 EC or reinforces their 
effects (Fiammiferi, paragraph 46). In the light of Fiammiferi (and the settled case-law 
referred to therein), it seems indispensable, indeed, to continue the reasoning on TEL under 
Article 86(2). 
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was concluded in the form of a collective agreement and is the outcome 
of collective negotiations between organisations representing employers 
and workers.(emphasis added) 
 
I would remind the reader that ‘organisations representing’ should be read 
‘representative organisations’. 242 However, that condition is simple in a Finnish TEL 
context: the national social partners are representative while the union density is some 
80 percent and the representativeness is high on the employer side, too.  But that is far 
from all in considering the scope of the Albany-immunity ratione personae in this 
case. A preliminary issue is the fact that in formal terms the central income 
agreements (tupo) are not collective agreements in the strict legal sense, 243 thus they 
do not create ipso jure obligations and rights between individual employers and 
workers. In this case, however, the agreement concerned is not the only descriptive 
clause on the Continuous Negotiation Procedure in the central agreement (tupo) itself 
but the ‘material’ agreements, thus concerning the precise yearly and six months’ 
agreements on the proposals for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health concerning 
the contributions and the TIR. These agreements are clearly meant to have practical 
consequences even on the level of single contracts of employment, although via a 
ministerial decision; the Ministry confirms the employee’s contributions by a decree. 
Hence, the agreements concerned are meant to be binding. 
 
Traditionally in the Finnish labour law doctrine the collective agreements may include, 
in addition to normative clauses (normimääräys) binding de jure between single 
employer (who is a member of the employer organization concluding the agreement) 
and his individual workers, also so-called obligatory clauses (velvoitemääräys) that 
are legally binding between the contracting parties. 244 In this case the parties are the 
central social partners. The obligatory clauses derive their binding effect directly from 
the collective agreement itself, ‘without needing another contractual relationship as 
their substratum.’ 245  Thus, there would be an obvious temptation to explain the 
agreements of the central social partners to be obligatory clauses in an agreement 
under the Collective Agreements Act.  
 
The temptation above still clashes against two insurmountable obstacles. First, the 
yearly and half-year agreements on the contributions and TIR are not made in the 
form of a written agreement but are concluded by expressing consensus on a 
memorandum prepared by the Finnish Centre for Pensions. Only the framework 
                                                 
242 See the explanation in section 1.3.2, in fine, supra. 
243 The reason is that according to their statutes the confederations do not have any general 
power to make agreements binding the member federations and their members; see e.g. Antti 
Suviranta, Labour Law in Finland, Kluwer Law International 2000, p. 184. Bruun has 
characterized these ‘tupo-agreements’ as informal agreements. They form a framework or 
guidelines in making binding collective agreements between employers’ and workers’ 
national (sectoral) federations; see Niklas Bruun, Labour Law and Non-Discrimination Law, 
in Pöyhönen (ed.), An Introduction to Finnish Law, p. 194. The effect of the central  
(tupo-)agreements is based on the overall strength of the central social partners in the society, 
as augmented by their capacity to make sustainable deals, as to relevant state measures, with 
almost any government. 
244 As to obligatory clauses, see the nutshell explanation of Suviranta, footnote 243 supra, pp. 
183-184.   
245 Ibid., p. 181 
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agreements on amendments in the TEL scheme of 1992/3, 1995 and 2001/2 are in the 
form of a written agreement between the central social partners. This means that the 
contribution and TIR agreements do not qualify in the sense of paragraph 62 of 
Albany. Second, the purpose of the central social partners has not been to conclude 
even the above-mentioned 1992/3, 1995 and 2001/2 agreements as collective 
agreements under the Collective Agreements Act, let alone the yearly agreements on 
contributions and TIR. 246 I therefore conventionally call the latter ‘TEL agreements’.  
 
The contents of the TEL agreements in any case mean a mutual commitment of the 
contracting parties, i.e. the confederations EK, SAK, STTK and AKAVA in the 
procedure of fixing the yearly pension contributions and the TIR. 247  In more precise 
terms it also means continuing the 1992/3 agreement concerning the division of an 
increase or reduction of the total contribution and fixing the TIR within the 
calculation formula concerned. In the national practice they are, however, prima facie 
(while not de jure) comparable to separate central General Agreements (like that 
between the SAK and STK, nowadays EK, of 1997) or the SAK-EK agreements on 
paid annual holidays or dismissal grounds that are collective agreements in the legal 
sense of the term although not in the daily language of the social partners. 248 
Furthermore, given the multi-sectoral nature and effect of the TEL-agreements 
throughout a national social security scheme, it is important to see that the only 
meaningful negotiation procedure – for both management and labour - thereon must 
be fully concentrated on the central level. Therefore, the practical effect of the TEL-
agreements is, as to their strength, clearly comparable even to that of classical 
normative clauses on remuneration in collective agreements.  
  
My conclusion that the present TEL-agreements do not fall even as obligatory clauses 
within the Albany-immunity does not exclude such possible agreements in future – so 
as to overcome any competition law criticism against the TEL agreements and a 
single TIR. It has to be underlined that nowhere in Albany is it said or even hinted that 
only the normative clauses in a collective agreement may enjoy the Albany-immunity.  
 
I still see a likely counterargument relating to the nature of the agreements concerned. 
It is that the Albany-immunity is an exception from competition rules and should 
therefore be construed narrowly even ratione personae, thus covering just sectoral 
agreements in the (hypothetic) Finnish case. 249 My counterargument is that the TEL-
agreements could be concluded by representative central social partners acting in their 
role as labour market organizations; furthermore, they could be concluded in the 
written form required by the national Collective Agreements Act; they would include 
                                                 
246 In the history there seems to be an ‘Agreement by the Confederations on Certain Working 
Life Measures’ of 24 May 1993 by which the social partners have i.a. agreed upon ‘keeping 
the total contribution in 1994 on the level of this year’; see the said Agreement, Annex 2.  
247 See that a relevant institutional ‘labour market’ feature in the TEL scheme is that the social 
partners have their representatives on the boards of the pension companies, with the 
possibility of influencing all the decisions. Accordingly, the social partners are represented on 
the board of the compulsory cooperation body of the TEL institutions, the Finnish Centre for 
Pensions. 
248 Ibid., p. 170. See that there is a compulsory and sanctioned peace clause in law applicable 
to collective agreements under the Collective Agreements Act.  
249 I recall how in Albany the ECJ resorted even to European social dialogue as an argument; 
see paragraph 58.  
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(obligatory) clauses on pension rights and duties as a part of the remuneration; finally, 
according to the traditionally predominating interpretation rule based on the parties’ 
purpose one has to note that the agreements could fairly be meant to be binding inter 
partes. The formal difference in relation to Albany is that the TEL-scheme is ipso jure 
a multi-sectoral one whereas in joint cases (sic!) Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende 
Bokken the agreements concerned were sectoral. I maintain that in this particular TEL 
context the difference between sectoral and multi-sectoral agreements is of procedural 
importance, only. It does not have per se any competition-reducing nature. Besides, I 
recall, it is useless even to imagine that a decentralized negotiation procedure 
(separate TEL-agreements with corresponding acts of the authorities on a sectoral 
basis) could maintain the coherence and solidarity necessary in a national social 
security scheme. Finally, equal benefits throughout industries promote cross-sectoral 
professional mobility.   
 
As to the application of the Albany-immunity ratione materiae also in the TEL- 
scheme, the contents of the contribution and TIR agreements are intended, as in 
Albany, to improve or preserve one of the working conditions, i.e. pension benefits as 
a part of the total remuneration. In other words, the purpose of the TEL-agreements 
concerned fully corresponds to that in Albany, paragraph 63. Seen from a procedural 
point of view, the confirmation of the contributions and the TIR by a ministerial 
decision clearly corresponds to the erga omnes declaration by a state organ (ministry) 
in Albany (paragraphs 66 to 70). It was declared as justified in Albany.  
 
There remains the question what would happen if the social partners were to conclude 
their TEL agreements as collective agreements in the sense of the Collective 
Agreements Act. Self-evidently, it would not change the procedure fixed in law as to 
confirming the contributions and the single TIR by the Ministry. However, it would 
further strengthen the argumentation in favour of releasing them as well as the 
contributions and the single TIR from the scope of EC competition rules under Article 
86(2) EC. 
 
2.7 Justification of TEL under Article 86(2) EC 
A general remark is that there would be solid reasons for maintaining that fixing the 
contributions (maximum and minimum refunds included) by a ministerial decree and 
confirming the single TIR by the Ministry would fall under the state defence as in 
case Ladbroke. 250 Thereby Article 81 EC would not apply and the reasoning under 
Article 86(2) EC would become superfluous. Given that there is no guarantee – while 
the state measures anyway restrict the behaviour of private law companies which 
compete, too - of the breakthrough of the state defence and thus against a finding that 
the TEL agreements anyway represent autonomous conduct restricting competition, I 
see it as appropriate to continue the reasoning under Article 86(2).  
 
 
                                                 
250 See footnote 241, supra. 
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2.7.1 General Conditions under Article 86(2) EC 
In case Wouters Advocate General Léger distinguished six conditions for the 
application of Article 86(2), as follows: 
Article [86(2)] of the Treaty lays down six conditions for its application. 
It provides that: undertakings (first condition) entrusted (second 
condition) with the operation of a service of general economic interest 
(third condition) are to be subject to the rules contained in the Treaty in 
so far (fifth condition) as the application of those rules does not obstruct 
(fourth condition) the performance of the particular tasks assigned to 
them, subject to the reservation that the development of trade (sixth 
condition) must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to 
the interests of the Community. 251 
Applying this break-down of conditions is here not problematic at all regarding the 
first three ones. Namely, the TEL companies, first, undoubtedly are, due to their 
partial competition and the possibility of regulated profits, undertakings in the sense 
of EC competition rules. Second, having obtained the licence from the government to 
run a TEL-insurance company, they are appropriately entrusted in the sense of Article 
86(2). 252 Third, it is self-evident – in particular after judgments Poucet and Pistre and 
Albany - that the TEL companies run a service of general economic interest, even 
though after Albany it is more appropriate to call it a particular social task of general 
interest under Article 86(2).   
The fourth, fifth and sixth conditions in the break-down of AG Léger are worth 
special attention. I provisionally follow the reasoning of AG Léger in the sense of 
distinguishing between the obstruction and proportionality issues, i.e. between the 
fourth and fifth conditions.   
Developments in case-law show clearly a relative mitigation of the fourth condition 
concerned (obstruction). The Court had originally required proof that the application 
of the competition rules was incompatible with the performance of the undertaking's 
particular public service tasks. 253  In Albany (paragraph 107) the Court, clearly 
inclining towards more lenient conditions, concluded that  
                                                 
251 Opinion in case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, paragraph 157.  
252 In terms of AG Léger the Court ‘[i]n Albany…by implication held that the mere fact, for 
employers and workers, of creating a sectoral pension fund and of requesting the public 
authorities to make affiliation to that fund compulsory was enough to support the conclusion 
that the fund constituted an undertaking entrusted with the operation of a service of general 
economic interest within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Treaty’; paragraph 160 of the 
Opinion, original italics. To be precise, in paragraph 90 of Albany the Court found that the 
state act (erga omnes declaration) to make the affiliation to the sectoral pension fund 
compulsory implied exclusive rights granted which then led to consider their justification 
under Article 86(2); paragraphs 98 to 111 of Albany.  
253 See case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409, paragraph 15; case 311/84 CBEM [1985] ECR 
3261, paragraph 17; Höfner and Elser, paragraph 24; and case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-
2925, paragraph 33. 
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[It] is not necessary, in order for the conditions for the application of 
Article 90(2) of the Treaty to be fulfilled, that the financial balance or 
economic viability of the undertaking entrusted with the operation of a 
service of general economic interest should be threatened. It is sufficient 
that, in the absence of the rights at issue, it would not be possible for the 
undertaking to perform the particular tasks entrusted to it, defined by 
reference to the obligations and constraints to which it is subject 
(Commission v Netherlands,… paragraph 52) or that maintenance of 
those rights is necessary to enable the holder of them to perform tasks of 
general economic interest which have been assigned to it under 
economically acceptable conditions (Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] 
ECR I-2533, paragraphs 14 to 16, and Commission v Netherlands,…  
paragraph 53).254 
A few remarks suffice here. The mitigation of the obstruction condition thus means 
that the public service is of independent meaning (‘…to perform the particular tasks 
entrusted to it …’) which besides must be read from the viewpoint that the Member 
States are entitled to first define their public service tasks. In addition, next to the 
practical obstacle to the service concerned, economically acceptable conditions 
suffice to justify the exclusive rights concerned. Judgment Corbeau is of special 
importance in this context. I recall that the case concerned an attempt to ‘skim cream’ 
within the national postal services. Preventing this was regarded as justified while the 
national monopoly had the right to operate under economically acceptable conditions.   
The question about a proportionality test as a condition for justification under Article 
86(2) is controversial. AG Léger maintained that it is applicable and founded his 
position on Corbeau (paragraph 14) and Almelo. 255  In both of them the Court, 
however, accepted restrictions of competition in so far as the restriction of 
competition which it brings about is necessary in order to enable the undertaking to 
perform its task of general interest. However, this is not a real proportionality test 256 
which would entail reasoning at least on 1. whether the public service measures are 
appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue and 2. 
whether they go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. The last element would 
be the proportionality test in its less stringent form. A stricter solution would mean 
                                                 
254 Judgment Commission v. Netherlands concerned exclusive rights in the import and 
distribution of electricity, finally in a socially responsible manner as the national law required 
(i.a. paragraph 55). 
255 Case C-393/92 Almelo [1994] I-1477, paragraph 49   
256 This is also the firm position of Baquero Cruz, footnote 139, supra, pp. 185-198; at p. 191 
he denotes that proportionality is not mentioned in Corbeau. He also highlights how cases 
Commission v. Netherlands C-157/94 and Albany do not include a real proportionality test (I 
fully agree), ibid., pp. 193-4. Baquero Cruz also connects (p. 186) the proportionality issue to 
a competition approach by referring as an example to the presentation of Buendía Sierra 
regarding the compulsory assessment of the (hypothetical) less restrictive measures. He has 
argued in favour of this strictest form of proportionality applied under Article 86(2). Worth 
mentioning is also that Judge Lenaerts has denoted (footnote 197, supra, p. 427) how the 
proportionality test applies under Article 86(2), however referring to paragraph 14 of Corbeau 
only, and, regarding the least restrictive measure test, to the opinion of AG Léger in Wouters, 
paragraph 165. Indeed, there is no relevant judgment including this least restrictive measure 
test; especially, see the next footnote, as to case Commission v. Netherlands. 
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replacing the second element with considering whether the public service objective 
could be achieved by less restrictive means. It is clear that the proportionality issue is 
of importance regarding any public service subject to scrutiny under EC competition 
rules. In this sense it is also important that the Court in Albany – while it referred to 
Corbeau and Commission v. Netherlands 257 - did not write out any proportionality 
test as we can see in the quoted paragraph 107 of Albany.  
Thus, adhering to the position of Baquero Cruz I conclude, by virtue of judgments 
Corbeau, Commission v. Netherlands and Albany, that it is a necessity-test (whether 
the public service rights concerned are necessary for fulfilling the public service task) 
which is applicable under Article 86(2). It means the requirement of a legitimate 
public service objective and necessary measures or rights tailored in order to achieve 
that objective. It accordingly and clearly means that the Court does not require the 
national legislator to choose the option that is least restrictive for competition. In this 
way the Court has avoided giving priority to competition over services of general 
interest.    
Before continuing the reasoning on the necessity-test regarding the Finnish TEL 
scheme it is appropriate to denote that regarding the sixth condition of AG Léger, the 
effect on intra-Community trade, the Court has not yet given its verdict. It looks, as 
Judge Lenaerts (referring to AG Léger in Wouters) has put it, 258 that it is fulfilled 
when the other conditions for the exception under Article 86(2) are fulfilled. To prove 
the opposite would require a demonstration that the contested national measure has 
really had a substantive effect on intra-community trade.  
Finally, in considering the status of the TEL agreements on contributions and TIR 
under the fourth and fifth condition of Article 86(2) (by AG Léger) it is to be 
highlighted that these agreements are parts of a system (regime) which is subject to 
complex socio-political considerations, even to a certain balance between capital 259 
and labour, not the least because it is financed by the contributions based upon work 
done (and to a lesser extent by the investment return of the TEL-companies). That 
balance has now been developed over some 45 years. The threshold for upsetting it by 
the intrusion of EC competition rules must a priori be high. Furthermore, while 
especially judgments Poucet and Pistre, Albany (see i.a. paragraphs 105 and 122) and 
Cisal (paragraph 45) all refer to the respective schemes’ position as parts of a national 
social security system, one still has to underline this systemic starting point by 
referring to its so far most illustrative example in the European case-law, namely 
judgment AOK Bundesverband. Its interpretative value is by no means compromised 
by the fact that the judgment did not need to come under Article 86(2) because the 
associations of the health care funds were deemed to fulfil an exclusively social 
function and were therefore not deemed to constitute undertakings or associations of 
undertakings.   
 
                                                 
257 On this judgment Baquero Cruz has pointed out (footnote 139, supra, p. 193) – by solid 
reasons – how the Commission proposed the less restrictive measures test (paragraph 35) but 
the Court clearly ruled it out when considering the burden of proof (paragraph 58).  
258 Lenaerts, footnote 197, supra, p. 426 
259 This is said with the reservation that except two the TEL companies are mutual insurance 
companies. 
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2.7.2 Case AOK Bundesverband Once Again 
In discussing the justification of TEL under Article 86(2) EC I first refer to my overall 
presentation thereof. 260 Second, I recall that the TEL-scheme is a law-based social 
security system covered by Article 137(4) EC that includes certain, and perhaps over 
time slightly increasing, elements of competition. Furthermore, it is a system, an 
integrated whole in itself. The contributions and the single TIR are essential pillars of 
this whole, also seen from a legal angle. The system had evolved over a period of 
thirty years until the early 1990s without anybody dreaming of EC (or even national) 
competition rules. In any case, the system has to prevail over the details, and not vice 
versa, while this does not pre-empt a legal assessment of the contribution and TIR 
agreements under Article 86(2).  
This ‘motto’ above (the system prevailing over its details) finds a direct 
correspondence, I maintain, in case-law in the form of AOK Bundesverband. 261 In his 
opinion Advocate General Jacobs described the case, as follows:  
1. These four joined cases raise a number of questions concerning the compatibility 
with the Community competition rules of the arrangement, provided for by statute, 
whereby the leading associations of sickness funds in Germany collectively determine 
the maximum amounts (known as 'fixed amounts') paid by sickness funds towards the 
cost of various types of medicinal product. Insured patients are left to pay the excess 
cost of any prescribed product which is priced above the amount thus fixed. 
A subtle but significant message is in the last sentence above: ‘Insured patients are 
left to pay the excess cost…’. The viewpoint clearly tends towards or even is of 
private insurance law. I do not maintain that this would dominate the reasoning of the 
AG but I note it as a background factor. Besides, we also meet this ‘suffering’ patient 
in the first ruling proposed by the AG (that the Court did not sign). However, the AG 
continued by stating the legal framework in EC law, i.e. how 
2. ‘…The questions referred by each of the national courts differ somewhat in 
formulation and scope. When taken together, the issues which they raise 
include in particular whether sickness funds are undertakings and therefore 
subject to the Community competition rules; whether the decisions of their 
leading associations to set fixed amounts are capable of breaching Article 81 
EC; and, if so, whether those decisions might be defended by reference to 
Article 86(2) EC. 
After this legal analysis the AG directly moved on to the analysis of the criteria of an 
undertaking under Article 81 EC. The approach of the Court was different. It first 
                                                 
260 See the previous section.  
261 Officially it is joint cases AOK Bundesverband, Bundesverband der 
Betriebskrankenkassen (BKK), Bundesverband der Innungskrankenkassen, Bundesverband 
der landwirtschaftlichen Krankenkassen, Verband der Angestelltenkrankenkassen eV, 
Verband der Arbeiter-Ersatzkassen, Bundesknappschaft and See-Krankenkasse v Ichthyol-
Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & Co. (C-264/01), Mundipharma GmbH (C-306/01), Gödecke 
GmbH (C-354/01) and Intersan, Institut für pharmazeutische und klinische Forschung GmbH 
(C-355/01) [2004] ECR I-2493. The defendants are medicine companies that challenged the 
system in determining maximum amounts paid in respect of medicinal products. 
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noted the national dispute, in terms comparable to what the AG wrote in his paragraph 
1 but without referring to the suffering patient. 262 The judgment then presented the 
societal essence as its starting point, as follows: 
Economic and social context  
 
3 It is apparent from the orders for reference of the Bundesgerichtshof that, according 
to Federal Government findings, the costs of the German statutory health insurance 
scheme have increased appreciably faster than the incomes used as the basis for 
calculation of contributions, and therefore much more rapidly than the resources of 
that scheme. Such an increase is stated to be due to a lack of competition between 
suppliers in the health-care sector, insufficient awareness among insured persons of 
the cost of treatment and medicinal products, and the inability of sickness funds to 
influence the choice made between medicinal products whose cost is borne under the 
scheme. The German legislature therefore adopted a series of measures designed to 
fill these gaps, one of the measures being the determination of fixed maximum 
amounts payable by those funds in respect of the cost of medicinal products 
(hereinafter ‘fixed maximum amounts’). 
Thus, the judgment explained first why the system of fixed maximum amounts 
regarding prices of medicinal products was introduced. The main reason was, of 
course, saving money. The viewpoint is that in the development of a social security 
system, not that of a single patient (whose socio-economic situation may vary 
considerably). The lesson in the judgment continued with a succinct presentation of 
how the sickness fund system works in practice. The difference in approach between 
the AG and the judgment partially also explains the difference in the outcome: the AG 
found that the sickness funds act as an association of undertakings in fixing the 
maximum amounts and thereby limiting their liability to insured persons; the Judges 
concluded that fixing the maximum amounts was a fully social activity and the funds 
therefore did not act in that respect as undertakings in the sense of Article 81 EC. The 
consequence was that the judgment avoided any discussion under Article 86(2) EC.  
Importantly, AOK Bundesverband also legitimized a certain dose of competition 
within a law-based social security system without that system losing its basic 
character of fulfilling an essentially social function.   
 
2.7.3 Contributions and Technical Interest Rate (TIR) Agreements under the 
Obstruction Criterion of Article 86(2) EC; Concluding Remarks 
Self-evidently the key to the justification of the TEL agreements under Article 86(2) 
is at this stage only the obstruction criterion, i.e. whether the removal of the jointly 
defined contributions and TIR would obstruct the TEL institutions from fulfilling their 
                                                 
262 The Court wrote as follows: ‘2. Those questions were raised in a number of actions 
between the AOK Bundesverband, … and pharmaceutical companies producing medicinal 
products … concerning the determination of fixed maximum amounts payable by sickness 
funds towards the cost of medicinal products and treatment materials.’ – I highlight that it is 
not my purpose to neglect the lot of individual patients but the purpose – in the reference to 
them - is to highlight the difference in the approach between the AG and the judgment.  
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public service task. This is what one may also call (à la Baquero Cruz) a necessity 
test.  
I observe first that the TEL scheme performs a particular social task of general 
interest, as did the Dutch pension funds in case Albany (paragraph 98). In other words, 
it is an essential instrument of national social policy on pensions (Albany, paragraphs 
103 and 105). 
By analogy to AOK Bundesverband I highlight that, in assessing the single TIR and 
the agreements on contributions with the refunds in TEL, the starting point must be 
the essence of the TEL as a social security system. In reality its financing and short 
and long-term financial equilibrium form a whole, the parts of which are not meant to 
be assessed separately, thus pursuant to Article 81 EC.  Accordingly, its justification 
under Article 86(2) EC must keep the same ‘systemic’ starting point, not that of an 
individual pension institution or employer who might gain some benefit by the 
application of EC competition rules. However, from the legal point of view it seems 
clear that the agreements on the contributions and TIR can be challenged in 
distinguishing litigation (and by invoking the directly effective Article 81 EC). 
Another strongly systemic aspect is that like the German sickness insurance scheme 
that was subject to judgment in AOK Bundesverband, the TEL scheme also includes 
elements of competition, i.e. in the investment yields and thereby in the refunds of 
contributions while it doubtlessly is a social security scheme. Resorting to private 
companies in running the TEL scheme - while strictly regulating their conduct - is a 
reflection of a fundamental national choice in realizing an elementary part of social 
security. There is no real societal (and legal) reason why Finland should all of a 
sudden lose its right to define the fundamental principles of its social security systems 
(see Article 137(4) EC and Albany, paragraph 122). Furthermore, also the ‘mere’ 
financial equilibrium of a social security scheme enjoys protection under Article 
137(4).  
A third, in fact a crucial, systemic aspect is that the TEL scheme is only a partially 
funded system (to the extent of a quarter or a third) whereby the PAYG-part of 
pensions is run jointly by all the TEL companies and institutions. A further 
elementary characteristic of the scheme is its earning-related nature whereby the 
accrual basis of the pensions is uniformly fixed by law. 263  This kind of system 
definitely requires also having a uniform calculation basis (including contributions) 
and the technical interest rate TIR. That is why the bill under scrutiny of the Diet 
perhaps even more clearly than before spells out the obligation of the pension 
institutions to co-operate. We may, of course, imagine a fully funded earnings-related 
pension scheme with an institution-related calculation base, technical interest rate 
included. It would however not be meaningful to collect such a huge sum of money 
for pension purposes. Such an alternative is out of any serious consideration. Only a 
state monopoly would be a viable alternative for the present TEL.    
In conclusion, the restrictions of competition in the TEL agreements and otherwise in 
the procedure for fixing the contributions and the single TIR are necessary, in order to 
                                                 
263 I recall that the decision-making on the funding degree and delimiting the profits of the 
pension companies are also based on law. 
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achieve a pension policy characterized by solidarity. If they were to be removed, the 
TEL scheme could not function in its present form. I would also highlight that the 
financing of the TEL scheme incorporates national solidarity to a considerable degree, 
even over generations, next to the joint responsibility of the pension institutions in 
running the PAYG-part of pensions. I therefore conclude that the obstruction 
condition (the necessity-test) in the application of Article 86(2) EC is fulfilled, with 
respect to the TIR and contribution agreements. 264 As the final argument in support of 
this conclusion I refer to the fact that the inherent restrictions of competition at the 
same time are specific labour market agreements which are clearly comparable, as to 
their practical effects, to legally binding collective agreements between management 
and labour.  
Ultimately, the transparency lesson from judgment Commission v. Spain remains. 
Thus, if contested in the infringement or other judicial proceedings, Finland must set 
out in detail – at the latest before the ECJ – the reasons legitimising the restrictions of 
competition (as well as the ‘dose’ of competition) inherent in the TEL scheme, thus to 
show above all the fulfilment of the obstruction criterion (necessity test) regarding the 
contribution and TIR agreements. That task is characterised by both economic and 
social aspects.  
 
2.8 Summary of Chapter II 
The analysis in this chapter shows first the framework which the broad interpretations 
of ‘economic activities’ and ‘undertaking’ form for social services of general interest. 
Case AOK Bundesverband added in this framework a new concept by introducing the 
principle of an acceptable dose of competition within a social security scheme without 
necessarily changing its nature as fulfilling a social (security) function. In AOK  
Bundesverband therefore the conclusion was that the sickness funds concerned were 
not engaged in economic activities in fixing the maximum amounts for reimbursement 
of medicinal costs of their insured patients and were therefore not undertakings in the 
sense of Article 81 (and 82) EC. The ECJ thereby avoided applying Article 86(2) EC. 
In that judgment one can see a general trend in EC law to respect – in the spirit of 
Article 16 EC – the intrinsic value of public services in relation to an unrestricted 
application of EC competition law.  
On the other hand, the broad notions of ‘economic activities’ and ‘undertaking’ 
necessarily imply that many undertaking-run social security schemes and institutions 
fall under competition rules. This leads to assessing them under Article 86(2) EC. 
That provision covers, as to its letter, undertakings that are entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest. In the course of case-law the 
requirements for the application of this provision (regarding the obstruction criterion) 
                                                 
264 Other restrictions, thus those on the market freedoms (in practice right of establishment, 
free provision of services and free movement of capital) maybe present in the TEL scheme 
merit a couple of words. I recall that TEL-companies e.g. need to be licensed by the 
government. If this requirement is challenged by invoking a forbidden restriction of 
establishment rights, Article 86(2) EC may offer the channel for the necessary justification. 
Article 86(2) also includes already textually a general derogation from the Treaty rules, thus 
also covering then all the market freedoms.  
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were loosened in the 1990s (especially in Corbeau and Commission v Netherlands), 
meaning that the necessary obstruction argument is fulfilled when the performance of 
the public service task is, without the exclusive rights or privileges concerned, not 
possible under economically acceptable conditions.  
In Albany the interpretation of Article 86(2) evolved by introducing the concept of a 
‘particular social task of general interest’ and the use of an undertaking as a ‘social 
policy instrument’ under Article 86(2), thus in reconciling the national public service 
interest with the competition interest of the Community. The inclusion of a ‘social 
policy instrument’ in Article 86(2) was later reconfirmed in Commission v Spain. 
These concepts, particularly the latter, were judge-made law (with roots in the opinion 
of AG Jacobs in Albany which corresponds to one source found in the German 
doctrine) that surpassed the letter (general economic interest and fiscal monopolies) of 
Article 86(2). Besides, prior to Albany that statute itself was generally seen as an 
exception, consequently subject to a narrow interpretation (Commission v 
Netherlands). Thus, the paradox is that today the ‘general economic interest’ (as 
interpreted in case-law) is capable of also encompassing purely social services of 
general interest. However, it is to be underlined that this evolution of the case-law 
corresponds to the developments of (social) public services since the foundation of the 
Community. The broad line of interpretation is that the social factor is today clearly 
on an equal footing with the economic one in the application of Article 86(2).   
Chapter II also covers the Finnish Statutory Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (TEL) 
that is of law-based social security in the private sector, although fully financed by 
employers and workers. For its main part the scheme is based on pay-as-you-go while 
the rest is funded by each institution. The scheme implies solidarity aspects extending 
even over generations. The legal analysis here deals with the restrictions of 
competition inherent in fixing the contributions and calculation basis, especially the 
single technical interest rate TIR applied throughout the scheme that is run by seven 
pension companies and numerous company-level and some sectoral institutions. The 
contributions and TIR are also subject to agreements between the central social 
partners (outside the ambit of the Collective Agreements Act) while both the 
contributions and the TIR are confirmed by a state act. However, while the TEL-
institutions also compete based on their investment return, especially in the form of 
refunds of contributions, and have a possibility of making a regulated profit, it is 
unlikely that the restrictions of competition would enjoy the state action defence 
against the application of the EC competition rules. This finally requires its analysis 
under Article 86(2).  
In assessing the TEL scheme under Article 86(2) it is crucial that, given the financing 
mode of the scheme, it cannot function in a financially meaningful, fair and pension 
rights safeguarding way without a uniform calculation basis, the single TIR included, 
thus without the inherent restrictions of competition. This leads to assessing the 
restrictions of competition as necessary in the sense of the obstruction criterion in the 
application of Article 86(2) EC. At the same time the scheme is a Finnish application 
of the principle that a social security scheme may include a dose of competition 
between institutions running it without that changing its crucially social function, i.e. 
forming the main part of old-age pensions in private sector. It reflects a choice of a 
Member State as to the fundamental principles of its social security systems (see 
Article 137(4) EC and Albany, paragraph 122). These reasons, supported by the 
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specific agreements between the social partners on the TIR and contributions that 
reflect even a certain delicate balance between capital and labour and are for their 
practical binding effect clearly comparable to collective agreements enjoying the 
Albany-immunity, strongly require that the present TEL scheme be regarded as 
justified, if ever challenged by virtue of EC law, under Article 86(2) EC.    
 85
Bibliography 
Arnull Anthony, Dashwood Alan, Ross Malcolm and Wyatt Derrick, European Union 
Law, 4th ed., Sweet and Maxwell 2000. 
Barnard Catherine, EC Employment Law, Oxford University Press 2000. 
Baquero Cruz Julio, Beyond Competition: Services of General Interest and European 
Community Law, in de Búrca (ed.), EU Law and the Welfare State. In Search of 
Solidarity. Oxford University Press 2005, pp. 169-212.  
Belhaj Somaya and van de Gronden Johan W., Some Room For Competition Does 
Not Make a Sickness Fund An Undertaking. Is EC Competition Law Applicable to 
the Health Care Sector? European Competition Law Review 2004, pp. 682-687. 
Besselink Leonard F.M., Case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekom v. Lilli Schröder, joined 
cases C-234/96 and C-235/96 Deutsche Telekom v. Agnes Vick and Ute Conze, 
joined cases C-270/97 and C-271/97, Deutsche Post AG v. Elisabeth Sievers and 
Brunhilde Schrage, Judgments of the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) of 10 February 
2000, Common Market Law Review 38: 437-454, 2001. 
Bruun Niklas, Labour Law and Non-Discrimination Law, in Pöyhönen (ed.), An 
Introduction to Finnish Law, Kauppakaari 2002, pp. 169-210. 
Bruun Niklas and Hellsten Jari (eds.), Collective Agreement and Competition Law in 
the EU, Djøf Copenhagen 2001 (Bruun & Hellsten 2001). 
Clauwaert Stefan et al. (eds.), Fundamental Social Rights in the European Union. 
Comparative Tables and Documents. Report 82, European Trade Union Institute, 
Brussels 2003. 
Communication from the Commission: Services of General Interest in Europe; COM 
(2000) 580 final. 
Communication from the Commission, Implementing the Community Lisbon 
Programme: Social services of general interest in the European Union; COM (2006) 
177 final. 
Contiades Xenophon I., “Social Rights in the Draft Constitutional Treaty”, in: Ingolf 
Pernice/Miguel Poiares Maduro (eds.): A Constitution for the European Union: First 
Comments on the 2003-Draft of the European Convention. Nomos 2003. The article is 
available via http://www.ecln.net/elements/conferences/booklisbon/contiades.pdf. 
Craig Paul and de Búrca Gráinne, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd ed., 2003). 
Oxford University Press. 
De Vos Marc, Collective Labour Agreements and European Competition Law. An 
Inherent Contradiction? In De Vos (ed.), A Decade Beyond Maastricht: The European 
Social Dialogue Revisited, Kluwer Law International 2003, pp. 53-86. 
 86
Digest of Decisions of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, available via 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/digestq.htm. 
Drijber Berend Jan, annotation of case AOK Bundesverband et al., joined cases C-
264/01, C-306/01, C-453/01 and C-355/01 in Common Market Law Review 42:523-
533, 2005.  
Durand Claire-Françoise, Lewis Xavier et van Raepenbusch Sean, Les principaux 
développements de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice et du Tribunal de première 
instance du 1er août 1999 au 31 juillet 2000, Cahiers de droit européen 2001, Nos 3-4, 
pp. 440-528. 
Ellis Evelyn, The supremacy of Community pensions equality law: a two-edged 
sword? European Law Review 2000, vol. 25, pp. 564-568. 
Evju Stein, Collective Agreements and Competition Law. The Albany Puzzle, and van 
der Woude. The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations Vol. 17/2, 165-184, 2001. 
Fahlbeck Reinhold, book annotation: Niklas Bruun og Jari Hellsten (red.), Collective 
Agreement and Competition in the EU. The Report of the COLCOM-project, 
Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap No. 4-5 2001, pp. 914-921. 
Fitzpatrick Barry, Theory of Conversed Pyramids and the EU Social Constitution, in 
Jo Shaw (ed.), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union, Hart 
Publishing 2000, pp. 303-324. 
Forrester Ian S., QC, MacLennan Jacquelyn F. and Komninos Assimakis, EC 
Competition Law 2003-2004. Yearbook of European Law 24, Oxford University Press 
2005, pp. 511-617. 
Fredman Sandra, Transformation or Dilution: Fundamental Rights in the EU Social 
Space, European Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 41-60. 
Gagliardi Andrea Filippo, United States and European Union antitrust versus state 
regulation of the economy: is there a better test? (2000) 25 European Law Review pp. 
353-373. 
Gippini Fournier Eric et Rodríguez Míguez José-Antonio, Actions spécifiques dans 
les sociétés privatisées: le beurre ou l’argent du beurre. A propos des arrêts de la Cour 
de justice des 4 juin 2002 et 13 mai 2003 sur les <<golden shares>>. Revue du Droit 
de l’Union Européenne 1/2003 p. 39-86.  
Giubboni Stefano Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution. 
Cambridge University Press 2006. 
Goyder D.G., EC Competition Law (4th ed. 2003), Oxford University Press.  
Green paper on Services of General Interest; COM 2003/270 final. 
 87
Gyselen Luc, case annotation (Cases Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken), 
Common Market Law Review 37:425-448, April 2000. 
Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle työntekijän eläkelaiksi ja eräiksi siihen liittyviksi 
laeiksi, HE 45/2005. 
 
Hellsten Jari, On the Legal Status of Public Services in the EU. Finnish Public Service 




Hellsten Jari, On Social and Economic Factors in the Developing European Labour 
Law; Reasoning on Collective Redundancies, Transfer of Undertakings and Converse 
Pyramids. National Institute for Working Life (Sweden), Work Life in Transition 
2005:11; (Hellsten 2005);  
 
Hellsten Jari, On the Social Dimension in Posting of Workers, Publication of Labour 
Administration (Finland) 2006 No. 301. (Hellsten 2006); available also via  
http://www.mol.fi/mol/fi/06_tyoministerio/06_julkaisut/01_tutkimukset/index.jsp 
Hervey Tamara, Social Solidarity: A Buttress Against Internal Market Law? in Shaw 
(ed.), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union, Hart Publishing 2000, 
p. 31-47. 
Ichino Pietro, Collective Bargaining and Antitrust Laws: an Open Issue. The 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations Vol. 17/2, 
185-198, 2001. 
Kallio Ilari, Vakuutuksenottajan oikeudet työeläkeyhtiön varallisuuteen. Suomen 
Vakuutusalan Kustannus Oy, Helsinki 2005. 
Kenner Jeff, EU Employment Law. Hart Publishing 2003. 
Kiikeri Markku, Comparative Legal Reasoning and European Law, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 2001. 
Koenig Christian and Engelmann Christina, Das Festbetrags-Urteil des EuGH: 
Endlich Klarheit über den gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Unternehmensbegriff im Bereich 
der Sozialversicherung? EuZW 22/2004, p. 682-686. 
Krajewski Markus and Farley Martin, Limited competition in national health systems 
and the application of competition law: the AOK Bundesverband case, (2004) 29 
European Law Review pp. 842-851. 
Lakisääteisen työeläkejärjestelmän kilpailutyöryhmän muistio (Memorandum of the 
competition working group for the evaluation of the statutory employment pension 
system, with English summary). Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön työryhmämuistioita 
2001:35. 
 88
Lenaerts Koen, Les services d’intérêt économique général et le droit communautaire, 
in Conseil d’État, Rapport public 2002: Collectivité publiques et concurrence, p. 425-
437 ; http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/024000128/0000.pdf. 
Lenaerts Koen and De Smijter Eddy, The European Union as an Actor in International 
Law, 19 Yearbook of European Law (1999-2000), pp. 95-138. 
Lindell Christina, Financing Pensions, in Marjukka Hietaniemi and Mika Vidlund 
(eds.), The Finnish Pension System, The Finnish Centre for Pensions 2003, pp. 72-87. 
Lyon-Caen Antoine, The legal efficacy and significance of fundamental social rights: 
lessons from the European experience, in Hepple (ed.), Social and Labour Rights in a 
Global Context, Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 182-191. 
Malaurie-Vignal Marie, Droit de la concurrence interne et communautaire, 3e éd., 
Arman Colin 2005. 
Mestmäcker Ernst-Joachim, Daseinvorsorge und Universaldienst im europäischen 
Kontext: Ein Beitrag zur Funktion von Art. 90 Abs. 2 EGV, in Ruland, von Maydell 
and Papier (Hrsg.), Verfassung, Theorie und Praxis des Sozialstaats: Festschrift für 
Hans F. Zacher zum 70. Geburtstag. C.F.Müller Verlag 1998, pp. 635-651. 
Napolitano Giulio, Towards a European Legal Order for Services of General 
Economic Interest. European Public Law, 2005 Vol. 11, Issue 4, pp. 565-581. 
Prétot Xavier, La cour de justice des Communautés Européennes et les fonds de 
pension néerlandais. Droit social 1/2000, pp. 106-110. 
Prosser Tony, Competition Law and Public Services: From Single Market to 
Citizenship Rights? European Public Law, 2005 Vol. 11, Issue 4, pp. 543-563. 
Rawls John, A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, 1973. 
Rosas Allan, The Role of European Court of Justice in the application and 
interpretation of social values and rights, in Palola Elina and Savio Annikki (eds.), 
Redefining the Social Dimension in an Enlarged EU, Stakes, Helsinki 2005, pp. 195-
201.  
Ross Malcolm, Article 16 EC and Services of General Interest: From Derogation to 
Obligation? 25 European Law Review (2000), pp. 22-38.  
Samuel Lenia, Fundamental social rights; Case law of the European Social Charter, 
2nd ed., Council of Europe Publishing 2002. 
Sciarra Silvana, Market Freedom and Fundamental Social Rights, in Hepple (ed.), 
Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context, Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 
95-121. 
Sharpf Fritz W., The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of 
Diversity, Journal of Common Market Studies 2002 Vol. 40, Number 4, pp. 645-670. 
 89
Sopimus keskusjärjestöjen toimenpiteistä eräiden työelämää koskevien kysymysten 
osalta, 24.5.1993. 
 
Sopimus yksityisalojen (TEL, LEL) työeläkejärjestelmän rahoituksen ja etujen 
tasapainottamisesta, työmarkkinakeskusjärjestöt 8.6.1995. 
 
Sopimus yksityisalojen työeläkkeiden kehittämisestä, 12.11.2001 (täydennetty 
5.9.2002). 
Spaak report: Comité Intergouvernemental Créé par la Conférence de Messine. 
Rapport des Chefs de Délégations aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, avril 21, 
1956. 
Sulkunen Olavi, Kansainväliset Ammattiyhdistysoikeudet (International Trade Union 
Rights), Suomalaisen Lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja A-225, Helsinki 2000 (with an 
English summary). 
Sulkunen Olavi, Ammattiyhdistysoikeudet Euroopan yhteisön oikeudessa; 
Työoikeudellisen yhdistyksen vuosikirja, Helsinki 2000 pp. 55-195. 
Suviranta Antti, Labour Law in Finland, Kluwer Law International 2000. 
Szyszczak Erika, Public Services in Competitive Markets. Yearbook of European Law 
20, 2001, pp. 35-77. 
Szyszczak Erika, The New Paradigm for Social Policy: a Virtuous Circle, Common 
Market Law Review 38: 1125-1170, 2001. 
Timmermans Christiaan, The EU and Public International Law, European Foreign 
Affairs Review 4:181-194 1999.  
Tulopoliittiset sopimukset vuosille 1992-1993, 2001-2002, 2003-2004 ja 2005-2007. 
Työeläkejärjestelmän sijoitustoimintaa koskeva selvitys (‘Investment Report on the 
Statutory Earnings Related Pension System’ by the negotiation group of the central 
social partners), 30.1.2006. 
Van Bael & Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, 4th ed., Kluwer 
Law International 2005. 
van de Gronden Johan W., Rule of Reason and Convergence in Internal Market and 
Competition Law, in Annette Schrauwen (ed.), Rule of Reason. Rethinking another 
Classic of European Legal Doctrine, Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2005, pp. 
77-94. 
Van den Bergh Roger and Camesasca Peter, Irreconcilable Principles? The Court of 
Justice exempts collective labour agreements from the wrath of antitrust. European 
Law Review Vol. 25, 2000, pp. 495-9.  
 90
Weatherill Stephen, Cases and Materials on EU Law, 6th ed., Oxford University 
Press, 2003. 
Wesseling Rein, The Rule of Reason and Competition Law: Various Rules, Various 
Reasons, in Annette Schrauwen (ed.) Rethinking another Classic of European Legal 
Doctrine, Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2005, pp.59-76. 












The Fourth (Synthesis) Article 
of the Doctoral Dissertation 




From Internal Market Regulation to ordre communautaire 
social 
 





Jari Hellsten (ML) 
University of Helsinki
 II  
Table of Contents 
 
Index           II 
Abstract          III 
Introduction          1 
 
Chapter I 
The concept of ordre communautaire social     7 
1.1 The EU’s Legal Order and Labour Law as Part of It     7  
1.2 Overview of European Labour Law Today     14  
1.3 Prologue in Case-law: General Principles of Labour Law    21 
1.4 The Substance and Constitutive Elements of ordre communautaire social  26  
 1.4.1 Overview        26 
1.4.2 The EU’s Founding Legal Principles; ‘Labour Is Not a Commodity’  29 
1.4.3 The EU’s Social Policy and Upward Harmonisation   33 
1.4.4 Respect for Fundamental Rights     35 
1.4.5 The European Social Model and Social Dialogue   50 
1.4.6 Non-discrimination on the Basis of Nationality   52 
 
Chapter II 
Economic and Social Factors in the Light of ordre communautaire social;  
Recapping the Development of Economic and Social Factors from Previous 
Articles          56 
2.1 General Remarks         56 
2.2 Collective Redundancy and Transfer of Undertaking (Acquired Rights)  
      Directives           56 
2.3 Machinery Safety         58 
2.4 Posting of Workers        60  
2.5 Right to Collective Action       66  
2.6 Freedom of Association; the ITF’s Action     76  
2.7 Gender Equality; Especially Equal Pay       78  
2.8 The Social Dimension in the Context of Competition Rules    82  
  
Chapter III 
Ordre communautaire social in a Historical Perspective    87  
3.1 General Conclusions on ordre communautaire social    87  
3.2 Ordre communautaire social and Collective Labour Law.  
      Future Perspectives        90 
3.3 The Effect of Laval and ITF and FSU v Viking Once Again   98  
3.4 Reform Treaty         102  
3.5 Concluding Remarks        109  
 
Bibliography          110
 III  
Abstract   
 
This article is the synthesis part of the research project entitled ‘From Internal Market 
Regulation to European Labour Law’. The previous articles published in this study have 
predominantly discussed the relationship and interaction between the economic and 
social factors in these areas of European labour law. This analysis shows in broad terms 
the gradual emergence of the social factor into the legal edifice of the European 
Community. Today it is justified, given especially the wide although fragmentary body of 
secondary EU law, to speak about European labour law as a specific field of EU law. 
However, the generally underdeveloped nature of collective labour law remains salient, 
notwithstanding the fact that European Social Dialogue has emerged and resulted in 
several directives based on the agreements of the European social partners, as well as in 
three free-standing European collective agreements.  
 
Progress in statutory European collective labour law requires unanimous decision-making. 
The pending cases Laval and ITF and FSU v Viking, however, present a clash between 
the right to collective action and the EU market freedoms, in particular the free provision 
of services. These factors direct the doctrine to seek new ways to explain the role and 
status of collective labour law in particular within the European legal Union. Obviously 
the interplay of the economic (the market freedoms) and social factors (collective labour 
rights) is not sufficient in that respect. The author therefore adheres to the concept of 
ordre communautaire social, consisting of the leading premises and principles underlying 
European labour law. It has also meant development since establishing recourse to 
‘general principles of labour law’, as the ECJ has done in early case-law. Its constituent 
elements can be tentatively claimed to cover the principle that ‘labour is not a 
commodity’ (linked to the leading legal principles in Article 6(1) EU), improvement of 
working conditions as the leading principle of the EU’s social policy, respect for 
fundamental rights (including international ones), the European social model (with a 
prominent role for collective agreements) and the traditional common market principle of 
non-discrimination. Breaching these principles should also lead to losing legal protection 
in EU law. 
 
This article discusses each of the five constituent principles of ordre communautaire 
social and includes an assessment of Collective Redundancy and Transfer of 
Undertakings Directives, machinery safety, posting of workers, the right to collective 
action, freedom of association, equal pay and the social dimension in the context of 
competition rules. This assessment generally shows that an ordre communautaire social 
assessment is a useful tool in shaping the role and status of these features of the EU’s 
legal order.  
 
This article argues that in future the EU will probably be bound to a legal framework in 
the field of collective labour law, the emergence of which will be dictated by the 
Europeanization of the economy in the long run. At present it seems to take shape in a 
combination of case-law, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the effect of the 
international labour law agreements. Ordre communautaire social may serve as a legal-
ideological basis for such a framework. 
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This article is the fourth and last in a research project entitled ‘From Internal Market 
Regulation to European Labour Law’. The main underlying idea of its previous 
publications∗ has been the role of and interaction between the economic and social 
factors in EC labour law; see in particular Chapter II of the first article: ‘Social and 
Economic in EC Law; Pyramid (Hierarchy) Thinking’. This article is not a simple 
summary of the earlier writings but tries to give a more general view of the 
development and status of European labour law. However, the hypothesis is that the 
roles and interaction between the economic and social factors is always important in 
understanding and exploring EU labour law, while it obviously is not sufficient for an 
EU labour law paradigm at the same time, at least in relation to market freedoms and 
competition rules. Such a paradigm would cover founding premises and principles or 
otherwise constitutive elements on which it is possible to construct and elaborate the 
‘real’ social constitution of the Community. This paradigm can be called the ordre 
communautaire social (hereinafter also ‘OCS’), mutatis mutandis the concept of 
public policy (ordre public social) as used in the French social and labour law 
tradition. This is what I try to introduce in the first chapter by discussing its tentative 
significance. Suggesting elements for such a newly-formulated paradigm 
unfortunately cannot genuinely take place without first discussing the nature of 
European labour law as a legal order and its place in the whole Community’s legal 
order. Accordingly, the main features and components (legal acts) of European labour 
law first need to be counted. I have to keep these discussions at a general level.  
 
Given my earlier writings, some of the audience might feel that the attempt to shape a 
new paradigm even beyond the level of the EU’s ‘social constitution’ (normally 
understood as leading labour law principles in the primary EU law) is simply too 
grand an objective, ‘beyond’ meaning essentially the impact of international labour 
                                                 
∗ The first article, ‘On the Social and Economic Factors in the Developing European Labour 
Law’, published in 2005 (the National Institute of Working Life (Sweden), Work Life in 
Transition 2005:11; http://www.tsr.fi/files/TietokantaTutkittu/2007/107023Loppuraportti.pdf)  
briefly discussed the genesis of the social dimension in the Community, and the Collective 
Redundancy and Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights) Directives. The second 
publication, ‘On the Social Dimension in Posting of Workers’, published by the Finnish 
Ministry of Labour (Publication of Labour Administration (Finland) 2006/301; 
http://www.mol.fi/mol/fi/99_pdf/fi/06_tyoministerio/06_julkaisut/06_tutkimus/tpt323.pdf), 
discussed the Posted Workers Directive and (inter alia) the right to strike in EU law. The third 
article, ‘On the Social Dimension in the Context of EC Competition Law’ (Publication of 
Labour Administration 2006/323; 
http://www.mol.fi/mol/fi/99_pdf/fi/06_tyoministerio/06_julkaisut/06_tutkimus/tpt323.pdf), 
reasoned on (i) the relationship between collective labour agreements and competition rules 
on the basis of Albany and (ii) Article 86(2) EC, including the Finnish Earnings-Related 
Pension Scheme TEL under Article 86(2). The synthesis article will be available on the 
internet on the E-thesis website (http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/en/) of the University of Helsinki, as 
well as all the articles on the Work Environment Fund’s homepage: 
 http://www.tsr.fi/files/TietokantaTutkittu/ 2007/107023Loppuraportti.pdf.  
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law. My answer is twofold. First, the Court has referred in past case-law to ‘general 
principles of labour law’, which naturally generates discussion on their meaning and 
substance now, especially their relationship to economic market freedoms. Second, in 
the history of the European integration we have indeed seen many other new ideas 
presented and evolutionary steps taken, such as the adoption of the labour law 
directives in 1970s on the basis of Article 94 EC as reflecting a change in the social 
values underlying the Treaty. Time will also show whether this trend will follow the 
direction outlined in this study. On the other hand, one cannot avoid the impression 
that the literature does not bring too many recent attempts to describe EU labour law 
in general or paradigm-setting terms, especially in its relation to market freedoms and 
competition rules.  
 
Fundamental rights occupy a central place in OCS thinking. While time and space do 
not allow very detailed reasoning on the fundamental rights as such, the intention is to 
try to create a fundamental rights view sufficient to explain the position and trends 
within the main topic. It is of course very pleasing that progress can even be counted 
recently in the Cresson and Parliament v Council judgments. Since the latter, the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights has had a sure legal effect even as a non-binding 
human rights instrument. There is also an implied fundamental rights dimension in 
Mangold. As a modern approach in exploring fundamental rights, this study 
underscores those enshrined in international labour law, mainly as defined by the ILO 
and Council of Europe, on the basis of the analysis in the second publication. Thus, 
the author finds that the EU must also take international labour rights beyond the 
European Human Rights Convention seriously and makes bold to repeat this approach 
throughout the study in more than a dozen places. 
 
The second chapter first reiterates the debates on the interaction and relationship 
between economic and social factors in the previous publications of this study. Thus, I 
will pick up in brief the Collective Redundancy and Transfer of Undertakings 
Directives, machinery safety, posting of workers, the right to collective action, 
freedom of association and the social dimension in the context of EC competition 
rules. I additionally briefly discuss the possibility of claiming a so-called market wage 
against a service provider posting workers from another Member State. This has its 
original roots in the pending Laval case but this issue is included in the ITF and FSU 
v Viking case (hereinafter ‘Viking’) as well. In the second chapter I will also discuss 
equal pay, describing only in brief the history of the application of Article 141 EC, 
mainly as showing the changing paradigm (from a balance between economic and 
social to a predominantly social precedence) in that field.  
 
My concern will thus be mainly collective labour law. Its main features, freedom of 
association, the right to strike (in the broad meaning) and right to collective 
bargaining, are partially located in a grey area where a paradigmatic view of EU 
labour law is most important. They are natural points of conflict with market 
freedoms. An especially graphic example is the question of a transnational collective 
action, which is present in the pending Viking case (although only in the form of a 
letter of the International Transport Workers’ Federation). Further on, I will not 
entertain the European citizenship. I do not mean to neglect the value of this legal 
category —on the contrary, one might well maintain that European citizenship would 
be in perfect harmony with developing true European collective labour law as rights 
of European citizens. Still, it seems a remote issue indeed. However, so far European 
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citizenship has played a role outside the hard core of employment law, as in the 
Martínez Sala case in residence rights. In any case, my hypothesis is that at least in 
relation to market freedoms and competition rules the OCS approach seems to be a 
fruitful interpretative and doctrinal tool. A further delimitation is that I do not discuss 
free movement of workers in this synthesis article. I confine myself merely to 
mentioning The Employment Title in the EC Treaty, given its so far modest direct 
impact on labour law; however, we will encounter traces of employment policy as in 
the Mangold case in section 1.4.4. The open method of coordination (OMC) I touch 
on only in a couple of remarks at the end.  
 
The underlying idea in the second chapter will be to consider whether the idea of 
ordre communautaire social has any added value in the areas discussed first regarding 
the interaction and relationship of economic and social factors. At this introductory 
stage, it is appropriate to state the basics: the possible conclusions remain open in all 
the individual issues to be discussed, with the predictable exception that the more 
underdeveloped an area of EC labour law is (like a strike targeting market wages), the 
more productive the OCS notion looks. In the concluding remarks I try to shape the 
value and impact of the OCS approach, especially on the interpretative balancing 
between economic and social factors.  
 
In the third chapter I will introduce a general characterization of OCS and touch on 
the question of whether the OCS is a realistic approach to the evolution of EU labour 
law, including the EEC Treaty, SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam, (Nice) and the Reform 
Treaty 2007; the Constitutional Treaty I will mention only occasionally, given its 
abandonment. From a future perspective, I then pose the question of whether the EU 
is bound to operate in collective labour law only in a fragmentary and highlighted 
market-triggered way, promulgating soft law and leaving it to the Judges in 
Luxembourg to develop European collective labour law judgment by judgment, but in 
cases arbitrarily coming up from the Member States. Will a full-fledged EU labour 
law really remain a utopia? My thesis is that in any case the EU has to confine itself to 
framework legislation only on the hard core of collective labour law (freedom of 
association, collective bargaining and action) in the foreseeable future (having already 
issued the Information and Consultation Directive 2002/14/EC); provided that the EU 
can settle the competence problem of Article 137(5) EC). This handicap is of course 
essentially mitigated by the fact that the international sources of labour law, notably 
the ILO and Council of Europe provisions, give and even impose relevant substance 
on collective labour relations (in particular the right to collective bargaining and 
action) within the EU as well. Thus one task is to align the internal market regulation 
with international labour law. Whilst the fundamental social rights on the one hand 
are an essential part of the OCS thinking and whilst they are directly dependant on 
international (notably Council of Europe and ILO) provisions on the other, it looks 
particularly important to pose the question about the usefulness of the OCS thinking 
regarding this core of collective labour law. This is, however, not to deny the OCS’s 
role in exploring individual EU labour law.   
 
The final EU-constitutional issue to be raised right here is the impact of the Reform 
Treaty 2007, if it enters into force as one may rather confidently presume in making 
the EU Charter legally binding, after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. I have to 
confine myself here to some elementary questions. There is first the issue of what it 
would do to the overall balance between the economic and social factors. Would that 
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balance change with the Reform Treaty that makes the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights legally binding except in Poland and the UK? Next to this, its impact on the 
OCS as regards the issue of social rights v. market freedoms is a natural extension. 
Would the Reform Treaty also be the final step in endorsing/maturing a more 
comprehensive OCS view, especially by rendering the EU Charter legally binding? I 
will try to answer these questions briefly in the third chapter. 
 
It is also appropriate to touch briefly the background postulates of this research that 
do not necessarily appear outside this introduction. To begin with, the three articles 
published earlier are mainly on legal dogmatics, i.e., discussion on case-law and 
traditional doctrinal debate (sometimes seeking new dimensions). In this synthesis 
article, the approach has been to articulate and even argue with the partially 
ideological parameters (such as ‘labour is not a commodity’) and to present a proposal 
for an EU labour law paradigm. In so doing, the author has been inspired by Snyder’s 
social theory of law (or, ‘European Community law in context’), ‘an important 
element in any critical study of European Community law’. He has mentioned (i) 
institutions, rules, ideologies and processes, (ii) law, the economy and society, (iii) the 
international political economy and (iv) state forms and legal pluralism (Community 
law in relation to national law) as its various themes in explaining substantive law.1 A 
difference from Snyder’s typology is that, instead of international political economy, 
this synthesis article confines itself to relying on international human rights treaties 
(especially within the ILO) that naturally also have their socio-economic roots, like 
the right to strike. However, any coherent application of the social theory of law to 
EU labour law must be left for future studies.  
 
Some further remarks may also arise from the dichotomy between Slaughter’s, Stone 
Sweet’s and Weiler’s ‘purist’ and ‘realist’ lawyers. 2  The launch of ordre 
communautaire social can also be seen as a ‘purist’ doctrinal attempt to present a 
paradigm stemming from the ‘EU labour law Grundnorm’, established mainly in 
Article 2 EC (balanced and harmonious development of economic activities) and 136 
EC (improved working conditions and references to fundamental rights), and 
essentially explaining the role and substance of EU labour law and in particular the 
relationship between collective labour rights and market freedoms. The ‘realist’ 
lawyer may counter this by saying that ordre communautaire social is nothing until 
the ECJ is persuaded. In that sense it is important to see that legal-ideological 
developments in the EU normally go slowly, even taking decades (cf. the 
constitutionalisation process or the emergence and growth of fundamental rights since 
1960/70s). The Grundnorm must also be seen in and as enriched by its legal-
ideological context, even as linked to the Community’s founding legal principles in 
                                                 
1 Francis Snyder, New Directions in European Community Law, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
London 1990, p. 14. Weiler has called Snyder’s approach ‘both manifesto, agenda, and 
methodology’; and that ‘there is now, embryonically, a European-law sociology and 
sociology of European law’; J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, CUP 1999, p. 229. 
As an applied reflection of similar legal-sociological thinking, this time in discussing the 
relationship between the ECJ and national courts, one may also refer to the ‘Beyond Doctrine’ 
questions (like ‘National Identity’, ‘National and European Political Context’ and ‘The 
Impact of Legal Culture’ as headings) in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (eds.), The 
European Courts and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence; Legal Change in Its 
Social Context, Hart Publishing 1998, Prologue pp. x-xiv.  
2 Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler, footnote 1, supra, Prologue p. x.  
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Article 6(1) EU; see the presentation of ordre communautaire social in sections 1.4.1 
and 1.4.2, infra. 
 
What can be said about European labour law in general terms, following Snyder’s 
concept of a social theory of law freely? Initially, there is no distinct, coherent and 
generally accepted theory on European labour law precisely but the general state-of-
art of European law where the legislator’s action stems (or does not, as the case may 
be) from a multi-layered political framework radically different to that in national law. 
Since law, often in the form of directives, is commonly fragmentary or more general 
than nationally, the role of the judiciary, acting under the necessity of deciding, but 
only on cases brought before it, is crucially more prominent than nationally. How 
many sui generis features that unique legal structure, the European ‘legal Community’ 
or ‘legal Union’ and its legal order, created originally under international law and 
having intensity of powers, although complementary in the social field, and primacy 
as its essential characteristics (with a certain direct effect), includes, it cannot however 
escape general and even constitutional parameters in assessing the law’s origin, 
development, content and impact. Thus, any academic writing or, put more 
challenging, legal theory on European labour law is also ultimately tied to social 
realities (otherwise they are useless), as to both actors and substance. This is 
especially graphic in labour law that, despite any well developed social partnership, 
incorporates management and labour as opposite pools whose tug-of-war is 
continuous but who may even drift into serious economic or political struggles. On 
the other hand, the history of national labour laws shows that such struggles (or, the 
cold war at one time) have also generated qualitatively new law or legal structures. To 
summarise, European labour law is especially challenging in a strictly legal sense, 
because of the combined effect of the unique nature of European law and the tension 
and settlements inherent in labour law. The original generic imbalance with the 
‘super-power’ of the economic factors and the subsequent gradual emergence and 
further growth of the social dimension, refined later by the changes in the impact of 
fundamental rights that are broadly international, characterises European labour law. 
This law is now also subject to the growing challenges of globalisation. The attempt 
to establish the ordre communautaire social is to be seen above all as a continuing 
European doctrinal step in the historical trend.  
 
Seen from a legal-sociological or the social theory point of view, European labour law 
has so far often developed under social partnership and as a project of the leading 
political circles, where both management and labour have been and indeed are 
involved. This also has a personal dimension. Thus, the author has worked within 
trade unions (the European level included) or in close contact with them for more than 
30 years and does not want at all to hide or minimize this experience. It has both its 
value and impact, hopefully imposing no limitations insurmountable by open 
argumentation. This is even a quasi-theoretical substratum within the complicated 
European framework described above. Hence, this academic work is both legal 
reasoning that truly respects the trade union values and an attempt to describe 
European labour law generally and as it stands —sometimes also as it should stand 
under legitimate expectations. 
 
On the other hand, one may also find that labour law sensu lato is also in some sense 
its own meta-theory, i.e., a theory about regulating, understanding, systematizing, 
interpreting and describing both as principles (including constitutional ones, as well as 
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in terms of individual international fundamental rights) and in minutiae the rights and 
duties of employers and workers and employees (including the setting up of their 
actual terms and conditions of employment), and of management and labour in a 
broader collective sense, again even touching international law. Needless to say, it is 
discussed here on the presumption that in this European context collective labour 
rights fall within labour law, whatever the definitions may be on the national scene. In 
this study, the reasoning also tries to break some new ground for a better 
understanding of European labour law and indeed for its development when that area 
of law also faces new challenges in clashes between collective labour law and the 
market freedoms and competition rules, when labour law faces the economic market 
freedoms in the newly modified internal market and during the lengthy and 
convoluted EU constitutionalisation process. On the other hand, reliable labour law 
writings also require openness in thinking about and discussing the arguments of the 
other side as well as those in differing doctrinal thinking (be it ever so neutral on the 
face of it, or even neo-liberal). A ‘cold-blooded’ description and interpretation of the 
case-law of the European Courts instead of one’s own wishes or fears as a starting-
point is exceptionally important. I have tried to show this in the three articles 
published already and this is what I also try to do in this synthesis article. Needless to 
say, I do not predict the outcome in the pending Laval and Viking cases, but confine 







                                                 
∗ Case-law is covered up to 16 October 2007.  
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Chapter I 
The concept of ordre communautaire social 
 
 
1.1 The EU’s Legal Order and Labour Law as Part of It 
 
The discussion of EU labour law in this article essentially requires a historical 
approach to be successful. Thus, in considering the present status of labour law in a 
Community context, an elementary although already worn background postulate is 
that the Community was once born as a legal-political entity with a crucial focus on 
economic integration; the European Economic Community based on a functional 
integration concept. Creation of a Common Market with free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital was to be established within that market, functioning on 
the basis of free and undistorted competition. Social policy and integration had 
practically no role in Community policies while upwards harmonisation of working 
conditions was predicted to happen as a result of the functioning of the common 
market (‘the market credo’; article 117 EEC). Even the free movement of workers 
was a market-bound concept. In crucial social policy fields such as labour law, 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, the EEC Treaty (Article 118 EEC, 
now Article 140 EC) foresaw only studies and other cooperation between the Member 
States. It was self-evident that discussion of EEC labour law was rather limited in 
such circumstances. Today, after several Treaty amendments and expansion of 
secondary and case-law, the situation is radically different. However, the subsequent 
legal-ideological discussion of European labour law, i.e., the discussion on ordre 
communautaire social, necessitates considering this law first from a normative and 
systemic point of view in this article; thus, to what extent it now corresponds to the 
criteria of a supranational legal order. This self-evidently leads to stating the basics in 
the overall legal nature of the EU first.3 
 
The EEC, as well as the EU later, was created by a treaty of sovereign states under 
international law. However, this had characteristics that made it unique in 
international law from the outset. The nascence of a new legal order and its main 
characteristics had already been stated in Van Gend en Loos4  in 1963, thus also 
                                                 
3 The Reform Treaty of June 2007, planned to come into force in 2009, does not change the 
basic nature of the Community, although it makes the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
legally binding (outside the UK). I will deal with it in section 3.5, infra.   
4 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. The historic passages read: ‘The conclusion 
to be drawn … is that the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for 
the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
fields, and the subject of which comprises not only the Member States but also their 
nationals.  
Independently of the legislation on Member States, Community law not only imposes 
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become 
part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by 
the Treaty but also by reason of obligations which the treaty imposes in a clearly defined 
way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the 
Community.’  
Soon after, in case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, the ECJ established the principle 
of the primacy of Community law, thus even over-riding national constitutions.  
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covering the rights and duties of the nationals of the Member States. In the EEA I 
opinion, the ECJ further described the nature of the Community’s legal order in 1991 
as follows: 
 
[T]he EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, none 
the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law. 
As the Court of Justice has consistently held, the Community treaties established a 
new legal order for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, 
in ever wider fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but 
also their nationals (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos 
[1963] 1). The essential characteristics of the Community legal order which has thus 
been established are in particular its primacy over the law of the Member States and 
the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals 
and to the Member States themselves. 5 
 
In the same opinion, the ECJ strongly underlined and defended the autonomy of the 
Community’s legal order (paragraph 35), being itself its final guardian as an EU 
constitutional court. Still, basis in a constitutional charter, rule of law, conferred 
powers ‘in ever wider fieds’, autonomy, primacy of Community law6 and the direct 
                                                                                                                                            
In Case C-294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339, paragraph 23, the ECJ emphasized the 
Community as one based on the rule of law, and described the EEC Treaty its ‘basic 
constitutional charter’. 
5 Opinion 1/91 on the draft European Economic Area [1991] ECR I-6079, paragraph 21. This 
opinion is itself a graphic example of the autonomy and power of the new legal order. 
Schermers has recalled that if, before the Treaty of Rome, 19 sovereign states (12 Member 
States of the Community and 7 EFTA countries) ‘had reached an international agreement 
(with or without the help of an international institution) no one would have accepted the 
possibility of an international organ to prevent such an agreement from entering into force. 
Today the standing of the Community is such that its Court of Justice can prevent 19 
sovereign states from accepting particular rules in an international agreement’; see Henry G. 
Schermers, case annotation on Opinion 1/91 of the Court of Justice, CMLRev. 29, 1992 p. 
1004.  
6 The Italian and German Constitutional Courts have expressed reservations regarding 
primacy over national constitutional rights. Thus, in 1974 the German Court in its Solange I 
decision (37 BVerfGE 271, English translation in [1974] 2 CMLR 540) found that 
Community law did not entail adequate protection of fundamental rights and preserved the 
right to scrutiny in that respect under the German constitution. In its Solange II decision (73 
BVerfGE 339, English translation in [1987] 3 CMLR 225), the Constitutional Court noted 
progress in the protection of fundamental rights by the Community and held that it would 
cease reviewing Community law for its compatibility with fundamental rights in the German 
constitution ‘so long as the European Communities, and in particular in the case law of the 
European Court, generally ensure the effective protection of fundamental rights as against the 
sovereign powers of the Communities’. In its Maastricht ruling (89 BVerfGE 155, English 
translation in [1994] 1 CMLR 155), the Constitutional Court emphasized i.a. its ultimate 
power to decide on the limits of the Community competence (judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz) 
which certainly cannot be said to serve the unity of Community law. Later the Court in 
substance upheld the line in Solange II (order of the Second Senate of 7 June 2000, 2 BvL 
1/97) in the so-called banana litigation. However, despite these reservations one may note that 
the primacy of EU law (certainly like the direct effect) has also been accepted ‘everywhere, at 
least for most practical purposes’, Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature 
of the Legal Order, in Craig and de Búrca (eds.), the Evolution of EU Law, OUP 1999, p. 
208. Later he still refers to existing reservations as to the autonomous validity of Community 
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effect of a whole series of provisions7 are the essential legal characteristics of the 
Community, making it a unique legal order in international law.  
 
This constitutional structure is the basis of the material economic core in that legal 
order; i.e., functioning of the internal market freedoms and competition rules, also 
called the European Economic Constitution.8 It means – in a nutshell – free movement 
of goods, workers, services and establishment, and capital, complemented by 
competition rules that may also bind the Member States. We may generally ignore the 
strictly framed exceptions in principle (those established on public policy grounds in 
the Treaty and those often called ‘rule of reason’ exceptions) to free movement rules 
here. It suffices to note that, as developed in consistent case-law, ‘rule of reason’ 
                                                                                                                                            
law and the supreme legal authority of the EC Treaty, ‘not indisputably granted by the courts 
and political institutions of the Member States’ (ibid., p. 209). 
As to the judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, Weiler has forcefully defended its existence in the 
hands of the ECJ, mainly on the basis of Article 230 EC (on annulling Community acts i.a. by 
lack of competence); Joseph Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, CUP 1999, pp. 298-317. In 
case 66/80 SpA International Chemical Corporation [1981] ECR 1191, paragraph 12, and 
case 314/85 Foto Frost [1987] ECR 4199, paragraphs 15 to 20, the ECJ preserved to itself the 
prerogative of declaring a Community act (law) void. The reasons were mainly legal 
certainty, unity of Community law and ‘a complete system of legal remedies and procedures 
designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the 
institutions’, established in Articles 230, 234 and 241 EC (Foto Frost, paragraph 16). 
7 There is no need for the purposes of this article to explore in detail the limits and 
consequences of direct effect (with its conditions; according to settled case-law sufficiently 
precise and unconditional provisions may in principle have it). Thus, in brief, for direct effect 
(thus in general, not just for that of directives) Ojanen refers to a definition of Prechal as the 
‘obligation of a court or another authority to apply the relevant provisions of Community law, 
either as a norm which governs the case or as a standard for legal review’; Tuomas Ojanen, 
The European Way, Gummerus 1998, p. 258. The direct effect of sufficiently precise and 
unconditional provisions of directives does not cover horizontal relations between private 
parties (case 152/84 Marshall I  [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 48) while directives always have 
the interpretation effect; see, for instance, the joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer et 
al. [2004] ECR I-8835, paragraphs 108-120. For the conditions and contents of the 
interpretation effect, see Ojanen, pp. 181-237.  
8 On this concept, see, e.g., Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court, the European Court of 
Justice and the European Economic Constitution, OUP 1998; for his conception, see further 
the discussion in section 3.1 (at footnotes 259 to 263, infra). Joerges has described the 
original economic constitution as follows: ‘[T]he fact that the agreement made among the 
founder states resulted in the development of a Treaty dominated by very strong anti-
interventionist policies, and thus favoured the establishment of a liberal economic regime, has 
been interpreted as "the cunning of reason" …. The interpretation of the EEC Treaty as an 
economic constitution committed to the advancement of market integration and the 
achievement of the principles of a market economy then gave a theoretical evaluation of this 
cunning of reason. This brought two results: on the one hand, the Community, through its 
interpretation as an order constituted by law and committed to economic freedoms, acquires a 
legitimacy that protects it against all attacks motivated by democracy theory or constitutional 
policy … On the other, the restriction of Community powers provokes an effect of blocking 
social policy moves considered illegitimate from the point of view of neoliberal order 
theory …’ (italics added); Christian Joerges, The Market without the State? The 'Economic 
Constitution' of the European Community and the Rebirth of Regulatory Politics; European 
Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 1 (1997) N° 19, p. 2. The concept of Joerges can be to a 
certain extent contested at least by the breakthrough of EU social policy in the Treaty of 
Maastricht 1992, followed by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
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restrictions on free movement can also be justified by overriding requirements related 
to the public interest, provided that these restrictions are not discriminatory, respect 
guarantees given in the home state (mutual recognition), are appropriate for securing 
the attainment of the objective which they pursue and must not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to attain it (proportionality).9 As to the relationship between the 
internal market and the social area, functioning of the internal market was originally 
and formally still is also seen as a partial source of upwards harmonisation of working 
conditions as reflected by Article 117 EEC and Article 136 EC, third sub-paragraph. 
Functioning of the internal market was the official justification of the labour market 
directives of the 1970s, with a legal basis in Article 100 EEC (now Article 94 EC; see 
the first publication, Chapter I.2).  
 
Furthermore, fundamental rights, legally a corollary of the rule of law, have been an 
integral part of general principles of Community law since the Stauder case in 1969.10 
Their growing impetus in the legal edifice of the Community will be discussed below, 
especially in sections 1.4.4 and 3.4. Otherwise it suffices to note here that the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(‘ECHR’) has ‘special significance’ in defining fundamental rights the observance of 
which the Community Courts ensure. 11  However, this firmly anchored ‘special 
significance’ doctrine – in fact, by definition – does not exclude the full effect of the 
other international human rights commitments of the Member States under Article 
307 EC, first paragraph, or under the recognised effect of general international law, 
especially where all the Member States have adhered to an international treaty, as 
indeed is the case of the ECHR, as well as the ILO Conventions No. 87 and 98 in the 
social field.12  
                                                 
9 For the ‘rule of reason’ exceptions, see, e.g., Annette Schrauwen (ed.), Rule of Reason. 
Rethinking another Classic of European Legal Doctrine, Europa Law Publishing 2005. In the 
field of free provision of services, see, e.g., case C-369/96 Arblade [1999] ECR I-8453 
(explored in section 1.2.3 et seq. of the second publication), in the field of free movement of 
goods case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649 (also present in case 
Schmidberger, paragraph 78, discussed below i.a. in section 3.1), of establishment case C-
208/00 Überseering [2002] ECR I-9919 (for Überseering, also see footnote 255, infra) and of 
capital case C-484/93 Gustafsson and Svensson [1995] ECR I-3955. Free movement of 
workers concentrates on the realisation of equal treatment for which see, e.g. case C-281/98 
Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139. The minor differences in justifying restrictions to market 
freedoms are not immmediately relevant. – See also the discussion of the market freedoms 
and the European economic constitution in section 3.1, infra. – As to competition rules, it 
suffices to note how Article 81 EC ‘constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for 
the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the 
functioning of the internal market’ (case C-126/97 Eco-Swiss [1999] ECR I-3055, paragraph 
36). 
10 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419. One finds a brief explanation of fundamental rights as 
general principles of EU law in AG Stix-Hackl in case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, 
paragraphs 48 to 66. Next to Article 220 EC, Article 6(2) TEU is a demonstration of their 
pivotal role in the Community. See also the comment by Tridimas at footnote 54, infra. 
11 See for this special significance doctrine e.g. case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-
5659, paragraph 71, and case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769, paragraph 
35.  
12 For the international treaties under Article 307 EC, first paragraph, see especially the 
position of De Schutter in section 2.5, at footnote 204, infra. As to the recognised effect of 
general international law in EU law, see in particular cases C-286/90 Poulsen [1992] ECR I-
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What then is the status and role of labour law in terms of the same constitutional 
structure of a legal order, i.e., the EC Treaty as the constitutional charter (and thus 
also the basis for secondary law), autonomy, the independent powers of the 
Community, primacy, direct effect and the rule of law with fundamental rights as its 
corollary? Can we, under these criteria, speak meaningfully about EU labour law as a 
legal order as well as about ordre communautaire social as we do of European 
economic constitution?  
 
To answer the latter question first, it is important to note that there is in principle no 
wholly separate ‘labour law’ regime within Community law as to the above 
constitutional structure as there is a separate Social Charter within the Council of 
Europe. There is one set of founding legal principles in Article 6(1) EU and only one 
EC Treaty (a framework treaty with a Social Chapter), one set of legislative 
instruments of secondary law, one type of primacy, a uniform dimension of direct 
effect (or lack of any horizontal direct effect of directives), an inherently coherent 
principle of the rule of law and fundamental rights as general principles of 
Community law, one type of autonomy and one attitude in accepting the effect of the 
rights and obligations in international law in the EU.13 As such, social policy and 
internal market rules are equally enumerated as Community activities in Article 3 
EC,14 and raising the standard of living and quality of life, economic and social 
cohesion and a high level of employment and of social protection are counted as the 
basic aims of the Community, together with the harmonious, balanced and sustainable 
development of economic activities, in Article 2 EC. Besides, Article 136 EC still 
refers to upwards harmonization and the principle of improved working conditions. 
There is, however, a difference between the ‘economic constitution’ and the ‘social 
constitution’, so that the basic economic rights and obligations are already broadly 
established in the EC Treaty (although it is a framework treaty, traité cadre), whereas 
in the social field (next to free movement of workers) only equal pay in Article 141 
EC ‘bites’ directly and the Community’s legislative competence is supportive and 
complementary to that of the Member States (Article 137(2) EC). Another difference 
                                                                                                                                            
6019, paragraph 9, and C-162/96 Racke [1998] I-3655, paragraph 45, and the discussion in 
section 4.6 of the second publication. As a recent example of a discussion of international 
treaties other than the ECHR, see case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769, 
paragraph 37, where the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child are mentioned by the ECJ as intruments to be taken 
into account in applying the general principles of EU law. The judgment also highlighted the 
European Social Charter as a source for greater protection of the rights of the child than that 
provided for by the directive concerned (paragraphs 39 and 107). The ILO conventions I have 
discussed in sections 4.4.2 and 4.5 to 4.7 of the second publication. That the ECJ takes the 
ILO obligations seriously is highlighted by cases C-158/91 Levy [1993] ECR I-4287 and C-
203/03, Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-935. For the former, see the comments in 
footnote 241 of the second publication; for the latter, see footnote 250 of the second 
publication.  See also the remarks in section 2.5, infra, at footnotes 201 to 213.  
13 As to the effect of general international law, see the cases in the previous footnote. I 
highlight this receptive attitude here, while the effect of international law will show up later, 
linked to respect for fundamental rights and in the discussion of collective action in section 
2.5, infra. 
14 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, paragraph 54, notes how social policy and 
competition rules in the internal market are of the same rank, although influenced by the 
Community’s tasks in Article 2 EC.  
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is in the legislative powers, so that many secondary labour law issues still require 
unanimous decision-making, such as social security and social protection of workers, 
protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, representation 
and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including 
codetermination.15  
 
Concerning freedom of association and the right to collective action, no directive can 
be issued under Article 137 EC, but only on ‘representation and collective defence of 
the interests of workers and employers’ (Article 137(2)(f), which may include 
collective bargaining. It is arguable whether a directive on the right to collective 
action and freedom of association would be possible under Article 94 or 308 EC in 
any case. In the Germany v Parliament and Council judgment in 2000, the ECJ laid 
down strict conditions for the use of Article 95 EC as a legal base (and this normally 
applies by analogy to Article 94 EC); it must be linked closely to the functioning of 
the internal market or genuine distortions of competition.16 These basic labour rights 
in any case fall under the ambit of EU law in principle.17 As to fundamental rights, 
Article 136 EC refers to the European Social Charter and the 1989 Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, drawing them into the sphere of 
EU law.18 In so doing the EC Treaty works as a ‘constitutional charter’. Whatever the 
Treaty says, there is also the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that arguably puts 
social rights on an equal footing with the economic ones, rights which may also have 
a direct effect as general principles of Community law as the Mangold judgment 
shows.19  
 
In sum, despite the differences in detailing the basic economic rights and duties (the 
latter in such things as competition rules) in the EC Treaty and the differences in the 
Community competence, it is fair to state that, from a systemic point of view, social 
policy and labour law are now an integral part of the EU’s legal order (although 
                                                 
15 Under Article 137(2) EC, second subparagraph, a qualified majority decision may follow a 
preceding unanimous decision on its use, while not regarding social security and social 
protection. 
16 See case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419. Phil 
Syrpis, Smoke Without Fire: The Social Policy Agenda and the Internal Market, (2001) 30 
ILJ, p. 277, concludes from this judgment that ‘…internal market legal bases such as Articles 
…94 and 95… may no longer be used for the adoption of social legislation; unless the 
legislation eliminates differences between the laws of the Member States which are capable of 
either impeding free movement or creating appreciable distortions of competition.’ He further 
asserts that the Collective Redundancies Directive ‘would be vulnerable under the approach’ 
adopted in this judgment (ibid.). See also the position of Wedderburn that Article 94 could 
serve as a basis for a directive on freedom of association, expressed in 1992, and a lenient 
position on or estimation of Ryan, both in footnote 286, infra. 
17 See, e.g., the reasoning of AG Mengozzi regarding collective action in case C-341/05 
Laval, paragraphs 48 to 57. See also section 4.3 of the second publication.  
18 For the 1989 Community Charter, see judgment Chacón Navas, and for the European 
Social Charter, see judgment Parliament v Council, both discussed in section 1.4.4, infra. The 
reference in Article 136 EC to the 1989 Community Charter also implies that United 
Kingdom (as well Austria, Finland and Sweden) adhered to it, even de jure. Furthermore, 
there are no exceptions from Article 136 provisions regarding the 12 new Member States.  
19 For fundamental rights and judgment Mangold, see section 1.4.4, infra. As to 
characteristics of the EU Charter, see the scholarly comments in section 1.4.4, infra, at 
footnotes  100, 101, 120 and 121. 
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materially fragmentary; see the next section). Political and policy level reality is 
another thing. 
 
Consequently, when considering the EU’s labour law as such a regime (but not a 
priori as a separate one), the general criteria for distinguishing a unique EU legal 
order under international law as they stem in particular from Van Gend en Loos, Costa 
v ENEL and the EEA I opinion, apply in principle to its labour law as well. This 
means that primacy, direct effect and the rule of law (with fundamental rights falling 
under general principles of Community law as its corollary) also form the core EU 
principles in labour law. To mention the most obvious examples, in Mangold (on age 
discrimination, explained in section 1.4.4, infra) we find general principles, primacy 
and the direct effect of Community law, and in Defrenne II the direct effect of Article 
141 EC. Furthermore, the recognition of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights since 
the Parliament v Council of 27.6.2006 judgment (see section 1.4.4, infra) as a source 
of EU law is a further step broadening and strengthening the role of fundamental 
social rights especially and thus justifying the EU’s labour law as a more complete 
legal order. Next to these aspects, there is a considerable body of autonomous but 
treaty-based secondary labour law (see the next section), with directives on Transfer 
of Undertakings (Acquired Rights),20 Posting of Workers, European Works Councils 
and workers participation as a precondition for a European Company (Societas 
Europea) under Regulation 2157/2001 at the top as to the cross-border effect (which is 
the basis of the internal market effect). For the rest, this secondary law causes real 
changes in the legal position of workers (and their collectives) throughout the 
Member States via national law. It is not just programmatic like recommendations, 
but ‘hard law’. This secondary law as a whole certainly forms an element 
distinguishing EU labour law within international labour law. Furthermore, the 
Treaty-based social dialogue in the EU is another distinctive element. Thus, certain 
elements of primacy and direct effect, fundamental rights as a reflection of the rule of 
law, an extensive body of autonomous secondary law based on the ‘constitutional 
charter’, the EC Treaty, and social dialogue justify calling EU labour law a distinctive 
supranational legal order (or, a supranational labour law order), and at the same time 
an elementary part of the EU’s overall legal order. This is the conclusion at a 
normative and systemic level. This is also the main answer to my question concerning 
the role and status of labour law in the light of the overall constitutional structure of 
the EU. 
 
Indeed, within labour law the neighbouring international structures, the Council of 
Europe with its Social Charter and the International Labour Organisation with its 
corresponding material Conventions (mainly Nos. 87 and 98), form a useful mirror in 
considering the EU’s labour law as a supranational legal order.The difference is that 
the EU’s system is one of ‘hard law’ where the judgments of the Community courts 
are ultimately binding, whereas the Council of Europe and the ILO must rely on 
‘name and shame’. It is hardly conceivable that an EU Member State would not at all 
comply with a judgment of the Community courts,21 whereas experience shows that 
                                                 
20 I recall that the reasoning in the first publication led to establishing the cross-border 
applicability of that directive, see section II.2.2 of the first publication.  
21 Regarding obligations under the EC Treaty, the ECJ may impose a lump sum or penalty 
payment against a Member State not complying with a judgment of the ECJ (Article 228(2) 
EC); see case C-177/04 Commission v France [2006] ECR I-2461. 
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some Member States are reluctant to comply with the Council of Europe and ILO 
standards,22 being hardly burdened by the consequences.  
 
Historically, since the beginning with the Treaties of Paris and Rome, the legislative 
activity on labour law in 1970s, the Single European Act and the Treaties of 
Maastricht and Amsterdam, complemented by the secondary law and social case-law 
(such as Defrenne II, Albany, Mangold and the pending Laval and Viking cases) are 
the EU-internal milestones on the route towards a supranational EU labour law order. 
Whereas I find the use of that concept justified, it is logical to discuss its leading 
premises and principles that together form its legal-ideological paradigm, although 
right here just provisionally justified as an ordre communautaire social that can also 
be seen as correspondent to the ‘European economic constitution’. Thus, dealing with 
its tentative constitutive elements and impact will follow in this chapter and an ‘OCS 
assessment’ of certain main topics in the earlier publications of this study project in 
the second chapter. Both areas form the research task of this article, eventually 
leading to mapping the elements and principles conclusively in the third chapter 
(regarding especially collective labour law), which altogether are labelled ordre 
communautaire social. Before moving onto these tasks, it is appropriate to offer an 
overall picture of the EU’s labour law today. 
 
 
1.2 Overview of European Labour Law Today 
 
Some terminological remarks are first necessary in initiating a description of EU 
labour law. What do we mean by the notion of European labour law? Does it 
encompass only the primary and secondary labour law of the EU or does it also cover 
the national law implementing EU law and, furthermore, the national law (in the 
broad sense, thus, case-law and international obligations of the Member States 
included) filling a given legal ‘space’ alone?23 Robert Rebhahn has asserted, albeit in 
the context of collective labour law and the development of a genuine European Labour 
Law, that  
 
Contrary to a widespread but misguided usage, European (Labour) Law does 
not consist solely of the European Union’s legal acts, but also and primarily of 
the law of the Member States.24 
 
This statement is naturally true in many senses. European directives acquire their full 
force only by implementation and reinforcement in the Member States; the EU lacks 
enforcement machinery in general terms (although its Commission in particular may 
order fines as a competition authority); and it has ‘omitted’ or left important legal 
areas for the Member States within labour law as well, the collective labour law being 
the manifestation of this. On the other hand, a direct and interpretive effect of the 
primary and secondary EU law exists, with pay equality as its flagship (Article 141 
EC), and the ‘widespread and misguided usage’ of the term ‘European labour law’ has 
                                                 
22 See footnote 226, infra, regarding the United Kingdom, and footnote 197, infra for 
Germany. 
23 By this I mean a situation where a given legal phenomenon depends only on national case-
law and the EU lacks enactments.  
24 Robert Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective (Part I), 
IJLLIR Volume 19/3, 2003, p. 273. 
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produced so many books, articles, seminars and rumination that it is appropriate to 
call it the mainstream. European labour law understood this way, covering the EU 
enactments and charters and various other forms of soft law (so far), is what I mean 
by European labour law. One could even call it genuine European labour law created 
by the EU. It still has the important feature that it is what the Member States have 
been able to produce together within the EU as gathered nowadays within the Council 
and the European Parliament. Another aspect is that the EU does not act in an 
international vacuum (beside being itself a creature of international law originally) but 
is an actor in the international field and, more importantly here, is bound to respect the 
international labour law obligations adopted by the EU Member States.25  
 
This approach does not mean to neglect the necessary implementing and reinforcing 
national law in an EU context, but it cannot stop with the idea that European 
collective labour law in particular is primarily national. National law here means, as 
Rebhahn does in his article, purely national enactments, thus excluding the 
international labour law commitments of the Member States and omitting the 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989 and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000.26  Not just individual but also collective 
labour law is already and irrevocably a real EU issue as the pending Laval and Viking 
cases demonstrate regarding the right to collective action. 27 Whatever scholars and 
other participants in the European legal audience expect, fear, like or dislike, and 
however residual the Community’s legislative competence in collective labour law is, 
the ECJ cannot avoid operating with a European concept of the right to collective 
action and strikes in these cases which it has to ‘borrow’ from the ILO (and, partially, 
from the European Social Charter),28 as well as to draw on the constitutional traditions 
of the Member States. It is the conflict with the fundamental cross-border economic 
freedoms (in these cases the freedom to provide services) that imposes this emergence 
of a qualitatively new step in the EU’s social dimension and history.  
 
The reasoning above shows the direct connection with content that the terminology 
inevitably achieves in the course of roughly a page, at least regarding collective 
labour law. However, the same basic remarks concern individual labour law,29 where 
it is easier to stick to the narrow definition of European labour law: primary and 
                                                 
25 See footnote 12, supra, and the remarks in section 2.5, at footnotes 201 to 212, infra.  
26 To avoid any misunderstanding, Rebhahn’s article, together with its Part II, (Collective 
Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective (Part II), IJLLIR Vol. 20/1, 2004 pp. 
107-132), is a good break-down of national legislations on collective labour law in 14 ‘old’ 
Member States, even amounting to a mini-handbook, but is short of international law aspects.   
27 Cases C-341/05 Laval v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet (Swedish Building Workers’ 
Union), its local union No. 1 (‘Byggettan’) and Elektrikerförbundet (Swedish Electricians’ 
Union), and C-438/05 The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and the 
Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) v. Viking Line.  See the fourth of the second publication. As 
to the latter case, see also footnotes 154, 186 and 187, infra, and the fourth chapter section of 
the first publication. The opinions of Advocates General are discussed in section 3.3, infra. 
28 See footnote 294 of the second publication. 
29 The demarcation between individual and collective labour law is blurred, as e.g. the 
Collective Redundancy Directive shows. It is sometimes under ‘European Labour Law and 
the Enterprise’ (Bercusson Butterwoths 1996) or ‘Restructuring of Enterprises’ (Blanpain 
Kluwer Law International 2000), both in books entitled ‘European Labour Law’, but not 
covered by the heading ‘Collective Labour Law’. I put it later in this section under the 
‘information and consultation’ aspect of secondary EU law. 
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secondary EU law, with the corollary EU Charters. The treaty definition in Article 
137(1) EC is that, since Maastricht, the EU shall ‘support and complement’ the 
activities of the Member States in the field of labour law (while Article 136 EC, third 
paragraph, still repeats the old ‘common market credo’ as a source of harmonisation). 
This secondary nature does not always hold true, given the detail of the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Acquired Rights) Directive and the applications of the concept of 
indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex, for instance. The present Article 137 
leaves a lot of opportunity to enact minimum conditions (instead of harmonisation), 
especially in the fields covered by the elastic concept of ‘working conditions’ in 
Article 137(1)(b), but non-enactment, especially on temporary work, reflects the 
political impasse in the legislative process.  
 
Leaving aside further terminological discussion, accounting in brief for the 
instruments of EU labour law is ahead in this article. Nevertheless, its generally 
fragmentary nature and an underdeveloped collective labour law (in addition to social 
dialogue) suggests or encourages to new efforts to conceptualize EU labour law, given 
the developments throughout the integration process.  
 
Thus, some half a century after the Treaty of Rome coming into force, European 
labour law now consists of the Social Title and Chapter in the EC Treaty itself, 
accompanied by the references to a high level of employment and of social protection, 
equality between men and women, raising the standard of living (Article 2 EC)30 and 
social policy (Article 3(j) EC), as well as by the general non-discrimination provision 
on grounds of nationality (Article 12 EC), free movement rules (Article 39 EC et seq.) 
and the Employment Title (which I do not really entertain further). The Treaty itself is 
a result of fragmentary developments with some embarrassingly contradictory results. 
The most salient is the fact that the Treaty promotes European social dialogue, but 
foresees that the Community will not adopt directives under Article 137 EC on basic 
issues of collective labour law: pay, the right of association, and the right to strike or 
to impose a lock-out (Article 137(5)). A formal part of the contradiction is the fact 
that Article 136 EC refers to the European Social Charter and the 1989 Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights that include both the right to strike and the 
principle of fair remuneration. Besides, the Member States also confirmed their 
attachment to these Charters in the fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the Treaty on 
the European Union. Another issue is that Article 137(5) is subject to different 
interpretations and obviously does not completely exclude these basic issues from the 
ambit of EC law.31  This contradiction is highlighted by Articles 12 (freedom of 
                                                 
30 As a nuance I recall that the Preamble to the EC Treaty refers to ensuring economic and 
social progress. The Preamble to the EU Treaty also confirms the Member States’ ‘attachment 
to fundamental social rights as defined in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 
October 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers’ and the determination ‘to promote economic and social progress for their peoples’. 
31 See, e.g., my reasoning on Article 137(5) under the heading ‘Right to Strike in the Ambit of 
EC Law?’ in the second publication, section 4.3. Lord Wedderburn held immediately after 
Maastricht that a Community instrument on freedom of association would be possible on the 
basis of Article 94 (ex 100) EC. This implies that the right to strike, like freedom (right) of 
association, is not ‘constitutionally’ excluded from the Community competence by Article 
137(5) EC. Lord Wedderburn, Freedom of Association and Community Protection: A 
Comparative Enquiry into Trade Union Rights of the European Community and into the Need 
for Intervention at the Community Level, May 1992, paragraph 35.1; a stencil for the 
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association) and 28 (the right to collective bargaining and action) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Furthermore, even the Constitutional Treaty would have 
reproduced this controversy or confusion, as does the Reform Treaty.  
 
However, it suffices here to point out that the EC Treaty itself is subject to 
interpretation, as is the division of competence between the Community and the 
Member States. A general notion is that, according to Article 137(1) EC, the 
Community shall support and complement the activities of the Member States in the 
various social policy fields in line with the partially rudimentary Article 140 EC). A 
reasonable interpretation is that the Treaty itself is somewhat ambiguous as to a full-
fledged EC labour law being developed (I will discuss this issue mainly in chapter III, 
infra). Since Nice Article 137(2)(a) EC excludes ‘any harmonisation’ in the social 
policy cooperation/coordination process (and only within that process, I argue), while 
Article 136 EC still upholds the original harmonisation target: ‘harmonisation while 
the improvement is being maintained’ is in the first sub-paragraph, ‘the procedures 
provided for in this Treaty and…the approximation of provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action’ is still the legislative tool enshrined in the third 
subparagraph where the Treaty has even kept the original ‘common market credo’ as a 
source of harmonisation — an upwards harmonisation arguably also ensuing from the 
functioning of the Common Market. The notorious compromise result since 
Amsterdam is to issue minimum directives under Article 137(2)(b) EC so as to 
achieve the objectives of Article 136.  
 
Whereas the EC Treaty itself is fragmentary (and even unclear) on labour law, not 
much more can be expected on secondary labour law. However, five main forms of 
rule can be distinguished: (i) free movement rules; (ii) safety and health provisions, 
and, within the field of proper employment law; (iii) directives on ‘information and 
consultation’; (iv) those on ‘working conditions’; the employment law field is then 
supplemented by non-discrimination provisions, including gender equality (v). This 
break-down is of course conventional. Working time is sometimes put under ‘safety 
and health’ (as in the United Kingdom v Council case),32 sometimes under ‘working 
conditions’ as below. I focus on (iii) to (v).  
 
                                                                                                                                            
European Commission. I also refer to Lenaerts and van Nuffel who have stated that ‘[i]n some 
cases, Art. 137 is inapplicable, namely, in the case of pay, the right of association, the right to 
strike and the right to impose lock-outs’. Lenaerts and van Nuffel (ed. Bray), Constitutional 
Law of the European Union, 2nd ed. 2005, p. 302-303. Thus they do not say that the Treaty is 
inapplicable. A narrow reading of Article 137(5) is also present in judgment C-307/05 Del 
Cerro Alonso, 13.9.2007, nyr, where the ECJ found that equal treatment and non-
discrimination, as applied by the Fixed-term Directive 1999/70, also covers pay provisions in 
fixed-term contracts in spite of Article 137(5) EC. AG Maduro suggested the reverse; see the 
opinion of 10.1.2007. The ECJ also read Article 137(5) in the light of Article 136 (paragraph 
39); fixing pay levels in general remains a task of the Member States under Article 137(5).  
32 See case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-5755. The United Kingdom 
claimed the annulment of the Working Time Directive on the basis of an allegedly incorrect 
legal basis in vain. The directive was based on the (then) health and safety Article 118a. The 
ECJ employed a broad definition of health and safety, basing itself finally on the definition 
adopted by the World Health Organisation in which all EU Member States were (and are) 
members (paragraph 15). 
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The third facet includes the directives on collective redundancy (98/59/EC), the 
European works council (94/45/EC), employee involvement in European Company 
(2001/86/EC, to be read in conjunction with the Council Regulation (EC) No 
2157/2001 establishing a Statute for a European company) and in European 
Cooperative Society (2003/72/EC), information on and consultation with employees 
(2002/14/EC), transfer of undertakings (acquired rights; 2001/23/EC) 33  and 
information and consultation in the context of takeovers (Directive 2004/25/EC). At 
the Collective Redundancy Directive the qualification ‘information and consultation’ 
is appropriate with regard to the substance of the instrument. It is essentially 
procedural, although its Preamble refers to material harmonisation. The Transfer of 
Undertaking Directive also includes material clauses, most obviously the transfer of 
the employment relationships. In this sense it could well be put also under the heading 
of ‘working conditions’. The information and consultation directive (2002/14/EC) is 
in general terms a very modest solution of employee involvement compared 
especially to the national co-determination regimes in force in Germany, Sweden and 
the Netherlands.34 
 
The fourth facet above (‘working conditions’) includes the Directives on employer 
insolvency (80/987/EEC, amended by directive 2002/74/EC), fixed-term work 
(99/70/EC), the safety and health of workers at work with a fixed-duration 
employment relationship (91/383/EEC), information on employment conditions 
(91/533/EEC), posting of workers (96/71/EC), part-time work (97/81/EC), working 
time (93/104/EC, replaced by directive 2003/88/EC; supplemented by the agreement-
based sectoral directives 99/63/EC on seafarers’ working time, 2000/79/EC on 
working time in civil aviation, 2002/15/EC on working time for mobile road workers 
and directive 2005/47/EC on mobile rail work), young people (94/33/EC) and parental 
leave (96/34/EC). Protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data is subject to directive 95/46/EC, as complemented by directive 2002/58/EC. Of 
these instruments, those on parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term work were 
based upon agreements between the cross-sectoral social partners, whereas the 
directives on seafarers, civil aviation, road and rail work were based on agreements in 
European sectoral social dialogue. Part-time and fixed-term directives essentially 
employ the principle of non-discrimination against differing conditions due to part-
time or fixed-term work; the part-time directive also promotes part-time work, 
whereas the fixed-term directive is intended above all to end the abuse of successive 
fixed-term contracts. The Posted Workers Directive (hereinafter also ‘PWD’) is a 
legal framework of its own as my second publication shows, but an integral part of 
EU labour law in any case. The Working Time Directive is relatively weak in a 
continental assessment (with a maximum of 48 hours per week, although overtime is 
included) but includes a viable four weeks’ paid annual leave as a minimum.  
 
Within the fifth facet, the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) combats 
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin. The Employment Framework 
Directive (2000/78/EC) establishes a general framework for equal treatment in 
                                                 
33 I have discussed the directives on collective redundancy and transfer of undertakings in my 
first publication (sections I.2.1 and I.2.2).   
34 A brief explanation on co-determination laws appears in Robert Rebhahn, Collective 
Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective (Part II), IJLLIR Vol. 20/1, 2004, p. 
120-131. 
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employment and occupation regarding discrimination on the grounds of religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Both are based on Article 13 EC, inserted 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Based on Article 141(3) EC, the recent directive (recast) 
on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of 
men and women in matters of employment and occupation (2006/54/EC) will replace 
the existing directive 75/117/EEC on the implementation of equal pay, directive 
76/207/EEC on equal treatment in employment, vocational training and promotion, 
and working conditions (revised by Directive 2002/73/EC), directive 86/378/EEC on 
equal treatment in occupational social security schemes, directive 92/85/EC on 
maternity protection and directive 97/80/EC on burden of proof in cases of 
discrimination based on sex by 2009.35 Still, the most prominent stipulation within 
equal treatment is the directly effective Article 141 EC on equal pay, although the 
equal treatment directives are a constant source of litigation and the Article 13 EC 
directives include a lot of evolutionary potential.  
 
In sum: if we presuppose an abstract ‘European worker’ or employee dependent only 
on this written acquis communautaire social as it stands in secondary EU law,36 it 
would appear that (s)he is not supposed to be paid by the employer when sick or out 
of work due to an accident; is never laid-off or dismissed for individual reasons; is 
without real material protection if made redundant on collective grounds; gets no 
protection against hindrances to joining a trade union; on the other hand (s)he gets 
information about conditions in a relevant collective agreement and protection if 
posted to work in another Member State; is protected as a migrant, part-time or fixed 
term worker; and (s)he does not have even an individual right to withdraw her/his 
labour, not even in cases of a clear breach of contract on the employer’s part. (S)he is, 
however, genuinely protected by Community law concerning health and safety, 
gender equality and transfer of undertakings, the three salient areas of EC 
employment law. As to pay, (s)he only gets information but is otherwise dependent 
only on national law, since no European minimum wage exists. Finally, (s)he is 
covered by an information and consultation structure. This partial caricature naturally 
is ameliorated when we take the fundamental rights into account, like freedom of 
association (Article 12 of the EU Charter) or protection against unjustified dismissal 
(in Article 30 of the EU Charter). On the other hand, it is fair to note that historically 
the secondary EU labour law also represents remarkable progress since the first Social 
Action Programme of 1974. I highlight that I will come back to the question about a 
full-fledged European and especially collective labour law in section 3.2, infra.  
 
As to collective EU labour law, the lack of secondary legislation underlines in general 
terms its rather under-developed nature (it is one entire class less developed than the 
EU’s individual labour law), although the European Social Dialogue is enshrined in 
the EC Treaty and has also brought positive results in the form of three agreement-
based cross-sectoral directives and the three sectoral ones mentioned above, as well as 
the three free-standing European collective (framework) agreements on telework in 
                                                 
35 Equal treatment in statutory social security is still subject to ‘gradual implementation’ 
according to Directive 79/7/EEC.   
36 Hence, I set aside the Treaties, fundamental rights and international law for a while. See 
however Article 30 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on 
protection in the event of unjustified dismissal and Article 31 on just and fair working 
conditions. 
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2002, work-related stress in 2004 and harassment and violence in 2007. 37  This 
underdevelopment naturally goes back to the division of competencies between the 
Community and the Member States. The original Article 118 EEC subjected the right 
of association and collective bargaining between employers and workers only to 
Commission-promoted cooperation between the Member States. The EEC Treaty was 
silent on pay. On the other hand, ‘labour law and working conditions’ in Article 118 
EEC did not prevent the labour law directives of the 1970s, adopted on the basis of 
Article 94 EC. The Treaty of Amsterdam reproduced this residual position by leaving, 
directives on representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and 
employers on the basis of Article 2(3) of the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement and 
now in Article 137(2) EC, second subparagraph, including co-determination (Article 
137(1)(f) EC), subject to unanimous decision-making unless they fall under Article 
137(5), in which case a directive on the basis of Article 137 is obviously impossible. 
Similarly, Article 95(2) EC excludes Community provisions ‘relating to the rights and 
interests of employed persons’ from qualified majority voting (QMV). Article 137(2) 
EC, second subparagraph, accordingly excludes protection of workers where their 
employment contract is terminated from QMV unless the Council first unanimously 
decides on resorting to QMV. 
 
EC law also includes two important delimitations of internal market law in relation to 
labour law. The first is the so-called Monti-Regulation (officially Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2679/98 of 7 December 1998 on the functioning of the internal market in 
relation to the free movement of goods among the Member States). According to its 
Article 2, it does not affect the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in 
Member States, including the right or freedom to strike. The second is the Services 
Directive (officially Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market). According to 
Articles 1(6) and 1(7), the directive does not affect labour law, employment and 
working conditions, collective labour relations and agreements and the exercise of 
fundamental rights, the right to industrial action included, as recognised in the 
Member States and by Community law. The Services Directive thus indirectly 
recognises this list of issues as also protected in Community law. Furthermore, the 
Directive does not apply to temporary work agencies (Article 2(2)(e)). The legislative 
history of both the regulation and the directive shows that the Commission originally 
proposed stipulations affecting labour rights as well.38 
                                                 
37 The works council (EWC) directive 94/45/EC also has to be mentioned as a tool which the 
Member States could not have hammered out without the Community. The same applies, by 
definition, to employee involvement in the European Company (SE). These issues can already 
be said to represent an independent development of EU labour law. The Posted Workers 
Directive reflects similar development, although with legislative roots in the ECJ’s case-law. 
The European cross-sectoral agreements are available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment 
_social/ index_en.html. As to agreements by the European industry federations, the recent (12 
July 2007) European agreement (the first in the metal industry) between the European 
Metalworkers’ Federation and the Schneider Electric group on the ‘anticipation of change’ in 
the group is noteworthy; the Executive Vice President of the group called the agreement a 
‘European collective agreement’ that is also filed under the French prud’homme regime; 
http://www.emf-fem.org. 
38 On the right to strike in the draft Monti-Regulation, see section II.2.4 of the first 
publication. For the Services Directive, see the country of origin principle and, i.a., 
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On the other hand, the pending Laval and ITF & FSU cases39 also demonstrate that 
issues not directly regulated by secondary EU law such as the right to collective 
action and to strike may clash with EC law, particularly its economic freedoms and 
competition rules. In principle, the same may happen regarding individual labour law 
issues not regulated by EC law. In EU law, such grey areas exist both in collective 
and individual EU labour law. 40 These grey areas emphasize the need to search for 
and establish constitutive factors and/or concepts both for solving the inevitable 
interpretation problems by filling gaps and balancing social rights and economic 
freedoms in a meaningful and socially acceptable way, and for helping overall 
understanding of EC labour law. This is in functional terms what I try to serve by 
adhering to and exploring the idea of ordre communautaire social. On the other hand, 
such a framework looks like a useful interpretative tool; e.g., in the case of a 
contradiction between written EC (secondary) law and fundamental rights, or between 
the EU and EC Treaties and secondary law. It also has its necessary relations with the 




1.3 Prologue in Case-law: General Principles of Labour Law 
 
Prior to a discussion on ordre communautaire social it is appropriate to discuss 
briefly general principles of labour law, well known throughout the Member States. 
This doctrinal notion is defined nowhere internationally, but it certainly exists as a 
doctrinal tool and is by definition the most convincing in qualifying international 
labour law. General principles of labour law naturally include for instance the effect 
of general civil law principles on the contract of employment like a general loyalty 
                                                                                                                                            
amendments to the Posted Workers Directive in the Commission’s proposal COM(2004) 2 
final. 
39 Case C-438/05 The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish 
Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line. The legal issue is whether free movement rules ban a strike 
concerning the wages after future reflagging of a Finnish vessel (M/S Rosella) in another 
Member State (Estonia), planned to be followed by replacement of the predominantly Finnish 
crew with an Estonian one. The collective action would be realized mainly on the shipowner’s 
vessels other than Rosella. See also the second publication, On the Social Dimension in 
Posting of Workers, section 4.10.5. See also sections 2.5, 3.3 and 3.3.2, infra. 
40 That the grey area may have deep origins is highlighted by the so-called Supiot report 
which indicated how the Community has been unable to agree on a definition of the term 
wage-earner as an example of the ‘raw’ nature of EC labour law in general. Transformation of 
labour and the future of labour law in Europe, Final report, para. 4; 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social /labour_law/docs/supiotreport_en.pdf. On the other 
hand, a Community notion of ‘worker’ has emerged within free movement; see, e.g., case C-
3/87 Agegate [1989] ECR 4459, paragraph 35, which reads (inter alia): ‘The essential feature 
of an employment relationship, however, is that for a certain period of time a person performs 
services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives 
remuneration.’ That the Member States retain the right to define a ‘worker’ outside the free 
movement is recognised e.g. by the Commission’s recent Green Paper: Modernising labour 
law to meet the challenges of 21st century, COM (2006) 708 final, p. 11; as well as in the 
Transfer of Undertakings Directive 2001/23, Article 2(1)(d); for a definition of equal pay, see 
case C-256/01, Allonby [2004] ECR I-8349; cf. Working Time Directive 2003/88, which 
includes a definition of ‘night worker’, ‘shift worker’ and ‘mobile worker’, complemented by 
certain derogations under Articles 17 et seq. but no general definition of a ‘worker’.  
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requirement between the parties, but it is relevant in collective labour law as well. In a 
Community context it is natural first of all to refer to the General Union of Personnel 
(Syndicat Général du Personnel) of European Organizations, Amalgamated 
European Public Service Union (Union Syndicale) and Maurissen II cases as a proof 
of the existence and recognition of ‘general principles of labour law’.41 All of them 
concerned inter alia the right of a trade union of European officials to bring 
proceedings against the decision of a Community institution (that right was in casu 
recognized only in Maurissen II). In each of these cases the Court reasoned on the 
freedom of association recognized under Article 24a of the Staff Regulations, 42 
asserting the following principle in General Union of Personnel and Amalgamated 
European Public Service Union  
 
Under the general principles of labour law, the freedom of trade union activity 
recognised under Article 24a of the Staff Regulations means not only that 
officials and servants have the right without hindrance to form associations of 
their own choosing, but also that these associations are free to do anything 
lawful to protect the interests of their members as employees.43  
 
Thus, the Staff Regulations were to be interpreted ‘under the general principles of 
labour law,’ a concept clearly used as a source of law, thus not just a mere point of 
reference or a source of inspiration. In Maurissen II the Court (full as in the two other 
cases above) first repeated the same principle on forming associations and their 
freedom of action while not referring at this point to the ‘general principles of labour 
law’.44 In discussing the merits of the case, the Court then traced general principles of 
labour law by asserting how ‘freedom to engage in trade union activities constitutes a 
general principle of labour law’.45 It was again regarded as a source of law. However, 
in casu it could not ‘be extended so as to require Community institutions and bodies 
                                                 
41  Case 18/74 General Union of Personnel of European Organizations (Syndicat Général du 
Personnel) v Commission of the European Communities [1974] ECR 933 and its sister case 
175/73Union syndicale - Amalgamated European Public Service Union - Brussels, Denise 
Massa and Roswitha Kortner v Council of the European Communities [1974] ECR 917; 
joined cases C-193/87 and C-194/87 Henri Maurissen  and European Public Service Union v 
Court of Auditors of the European Communities (‘Maurissen II’) [1990] ECR I-95.   
42 Article 24a of the Staff Regulations provided that ‘Officials shall be entitled to exercise the 
right of association; they may in particular be members of trade unions or staff associations of 
European officials’. 
43 Paragraph 10 of General Union of Personnel and paragraph 14 of Amalgamated European 
Public Service Union. One may wonder why the ILO Convention No. 87 was not mentioned 
in this context. Whatever the reason was (like the era during which the Court still emphasized 
the independent nature of Community law), in General Union of Personnel ILO Convention 
No. 87 corroborated the opinion of AG Trabucchi, who found that granting a personnel union 
the capacity to be a party to proceedings concerning the validity of a decision affecting the 
union’s members ‘appears also to be in accordance with the spirit and the objects of 
Convention 87 of the I.L.O. on trade union freedom and the protection of trade union rights’; 
General Union of Personnel [1974] ECR 933 at 948. In the judgment the union was not 
granted locus standi, neither did the Advocate General eventually propose to grant it. 
44 See paragraph 13 of Maurissen II, which referred to General Union of Personnel and 
Amalgamated European Public Service Union. While natural as such, the Maurissen II did 
not define ‘anything lawful’ but we may hold that it means in principle anything that has not 
been prohibited by law. 
45 Paragraph 21 of Maurissen II.  
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to make their messenger services available to trade unions for the distribution to staff 
of the communications issued by those organizations’ (paragraph 21).   
 
Further, in the Acton staff case, concerning non-payment of wages during a strike, the 
Court held that ‘according to a principle recognized in the labour law of the Member 
States, wages and other benefits pertaining to days on strike are not due to persons 
who have taken part in that strike. This principle may be applied to relations between 
the institutions of the Communities and their officials ...’.46 The principle of no pay 
during a strike is universal in market economies, although unwritten in international 
labour law. However, a ‘principle recognized in the labour law of the Member States’ 
was introduced in the field of collective labour law. 
 
In Dunnett v EIB 47  (again a staff case) the Court of First Instance for its part 
recognized under a ‘general principle of employment law’ that ‘an employer can 
unilaterally withdraw a financial advantage which he has freely granted to his 
employees on a continuous basis only after consultation with those employees or their 
representatives’ (paragraph 85). A few passages later this was called (as in the key 
words on the judgment’s front page), based on an expert report, ‘a general principle of 
labour law common to all the Member States’ (paragraph 89).48 However, this case 
provides evidence subject to the reservation that the EIB Staff Regulations (Article 44) 
already referred to the general principles common to the laws of the Member States of 
the Bank applicable to individual contracts. Relevant ‘general principles practice’ 
within individual labour law also occurred in the X v ECB case.49 
 
One may also see a reflection of general principles of labour law in Pfeiffer, where the 
Court justified the unusual move of the case from a Chamber of five judges to the 
                                                 
46 Joined cases 44/74, 46/74 and 49/74, Acton and others v Commission [1975] ECR 383, 
paragraphs 12 and 13. The latter referred to an earlier Commission decision of 16 December 
1970, according to which 'it stands to reason that there can be no payment for days on strike'. 
A curiosity is that the Commission did not deduct pay for three days on strike, and other 
institutions deducted nothing (paragraph 25). The principle of non-payment during a strike 
was reconfirmed in the joined cases T-576/93 to 582/93 Browet and others v Commission 
[1994] ECR II-677.  
47 Case T-192/99 Dunnett v European Investment Bank [2001] ECR II-813. 
48 ‘All’ is not in the French version. Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases 
and Materials, 3rd ed., OUP 2003, p. 372, footnote 4, have called this statement ‘a recent 
unusual example’ of inevitable drawing upon principles from the legal orders of the Member 
States. AG Poiares Maduro in his opinion in case C-384/02 Criminal proceedings v Knud 
Grøngaard and Allan Bang [2005] ECR I-9939, paragraph 56, also elevated social rights 
relating to the consultation and providing information to workers to the legal order of the 
Community as general principles of Community law because he considered that they 
belonged to the constitutional tradition of the Member States, as confirmed by Dunnett, 
paragraphs 89 and 90; see endnote 20 of the opinion in case C-384/02. There was an expert 
report on national law in Dunnett whereas the judgment Dunnett itself does not show any 
expressly constitutional protection. Today it naturally stems from Article 27 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
49 The CFI accepted the employer’s connotation of ‘general principle of labour law according 
to which working tools of the employer given to employees at the workplace are to be used 
for working purposes’; case T-333/99, X v European Central Bank [2001] ECR II-3021, 
paragraph 120. The principle also applied in the absence of any express stipulation; paragraph 
122. 
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Grand Chamber inter alia by holding how the Working Time Directive means to 
protect workers specifically as the weak party to an employment contract, meaning 
protection the ‘useful effect’ (effet utile) of which was to be assured both by national 
and Community jurisdictions.50 In another working-time case, Jaeger, the Court also 
assessed rest periods under ‘the need to observe the general principles of protection of 
the safety and health of workers which constitute the foundation of the Community 
regime for organisation of working time.’51 
 
In sum, case-law shows that in the field of collective labour law the unwritten ‘general 
principles of labour law’ have expressly been used by the Community Courts as a 
source of EU law. At the same time, it should be stressed that the significance of the 
‘general principles of labour law’ is by no means diluted by their being used 
exclusively in European staff cases. General principles are by definition universal. 
Besides, their usage by the Court has been deliberate, dealing with core issues of the 
cases, and has concerned core issues in collective labour law in the staff cases above, 
covering the basic trade union freedom to do ‘anything lawful’ to protect the interests 
of the members. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in General Union of Personnel, 
Amalgamated European Public Service Union and Maurissen II ‘general principles of 
labour law’ were not limited to those in the internal law of the Member States as in 
Acton and Browet. Although the three first mentioned cases did not explicitly refer to 
international labour law, it was not excluded either, being covered implicitly.  
 
A natural question arises about the relationship between ‘general principles of labour 
law’ and the notion of the standard formula regarding fundamental rights, i.e., 
whether they form an integral part of ‘general principles of Community law’, the 
observance of which the Court ensures. Were ‘general principles of labour law’ in 
General Union of Personnel, Amalgamated European Public Service Union and 
Maurissen II an application of ‘general principles of law’, that notion having been in 
use by the Court since Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 1970 (put as ‘general 
principles of Community law’ in Stauder 1969, as again nowadays)?52 It would be 
prima facie attractive to find that ‘general principles of labour law’ were simply a 
facet of ‘general principles of Community law’ (the observance of which the Court 
ensures). However, any comment in that sense must first respect the circumstances of 
and claims and reasoning in these staff cases. Indeed, the cases do not reveal a 
genuine fundamental rights or ‘general principles of Community law’ discussion but 
only a general reference by the unions to international treaties as the basis for trade 
union freedom and an express reference to ILO Convention No. 87 by AG Trabucchi 
in the General Union of Personnel case (see footnote 43, supra). Secondly, the Court 
clearly and actively protected trade union freedom as mentioned by Maurissen II: 
 
                                                 
50 Joined cases C-397 to 403/01 Pfeiffer, order of the Court of 13 January 2004, paragraph 9; 
Brian Bercusson reports the order in Social and Labour Rights under the EU Constitution, in 
de Búrca et al. (eds.), Social Rights in Europe, OUP 2005, p. 178.  
51 Case C-151/02 Landeshauptstadt Kiel v Norbert Jaeger [2003] ECR I-8389, paragraph 97. 
52 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, paragraph 4; case 29/69 
Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 7. Recent case-law again uses the expression ‘general 
principle of Community law’ (‘un principe général du droit communautaire’); see, e.g., case 
C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981, paragraph 75. On this judgment, see section 1.4.4, 
infra. 
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14 …the Community institutions and bodies may not prohibit their officials 
and servants from joining a trade union or staff association or from 
participating in trade union activities, or impose any penalty whatsoever on 
them by reason of such membership or activities…  
 
This protection aspect hints at the notion that trade union freedom under ‘general 
principles of labour law’ would fall under ‘general principles of Community law’, like 
fundamental rights. On the other hand, ‘general principles of labour law’ certainly 
include elements inherent in the individual employment contract where both parties 
also have rights (like permissive ones) that do not fall under fundamental rights. 
Thirdly, the basis for the introduction of ‘general principles of labour law’ was 
obviously the principle of rule of law in Article 220 EC (as for ‘general principles of 
Community law’). Fourthly, the fact that the Court in Maurissen II (in 1990), for 
example, had the opportunity to enshrine trade union freedom irrevocably under 
‘general principles of Community law’ but did not do so in any case militates against 
‘general principles of labour law’ falling under ‘general principles of Community law’. 
The time was not ripe53 and the decision upon the substance did not impose any stock-
taking in that respect. Thus, it looks as if ‘general principles of labour law’ was (even 
in Maurissen II) a case-related doctrinal extrapolation which however has relevant 
features of the ‘general principles of Community law’ doctrine in these cases. 
Crucially, by resorting to ‘general principles of labour law’, the Court recognised the 
status of both written and unwritten labour law as reflected by extra-Community 
sources (sensu stricto), i.e., by the laws and doctrines of the Member States and their 
international commitments. Even after seventeen years this encourages doctrinal 
development exercises. 
 
A further clarifying remark on ‘general principles of Community law’ is appropriate 
here. Thus, for instance, Tridimas distinguishes those unwritten principles deriving 
from the rule of law (such as protection for fundamental rights, equality, 
proportionality, legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations, and the 
rights of defence), although as closely intertwined categories, and those ‘systemic 
principles which underlie the constitutional structure of the Community and define the 
Community legal edifice’, such as primacy, direct effect, attribution of competences, 
subsidiarity and Member States’ loyalty.54 Here the focus is on the former. As to their 
status and effect, Tridimas concludes that technically they are not superior to primary 
Community law (but normally to the secondary one) while they ‘have equivalent 
status with the founding Treaties’ since they their origin lies in the EC Treaty. He 
further highlights their role in the interpretation of the Treaties and in judicial review 
of Community acts.55 56   
                                                 
53 This can be compared to the recent Cresson case, briefly explored in section 1.4.4, at 
footnote 113, infra, where the Court obviously took relevant human rights aspects into 
consideration of its own motion in interpreting the very EC Treaty that includes a sui generis 
regime on the obligations of the Commissioners. Thus, primary EU law was reviewed under 
human rights requirements. Equally, the old case-law on staff does not prevent the ECJ in 
Laval and Viking from confirming that the right to strike is a general principle of Community 
law, as proposed by the Advocates General; see section 3.3, infra. 
54 Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, OUP 2006, p. 4. 
55 Op. cit., pp. 50-55. 
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Coming back to the staff cases, it is finally noteworthy that in none of them did the 
Advocates General discuss the general principles of labour law as such. In General 
Union of Personnel, AG Trabucchi, however, summarised the broad historical 
developments of trade union law:  
 
4. Coming now to trade unionism against its historical background, in order to 
understand the precise significance of Article 24a of the revised Staff 
Regulations of Officials, it is important to remember that the pattern of trade 
union law developed from the situation when, in earlier times, a trade union 
was regarded as something extra-legal and sometimes illegal as well, until 
more modern attitudes brought recognition of the value of union activities. 57  
 
Similarly, the reference by the Advocate General to development and changing 
attitudes encourages legal reasoning in order to explore and develop further the 
substance of ‘general principles of labour law’ in an EU law context. In other words, 
what are those general principles of European labour law that are relevant now, 
especially in describing the relationship between labour rights and the market 
freedoms and competition rules? The answer will show that it is already justified to 









The idea of ordre communautaire social (OCS) was first introduced by Professor 
Brian Bercusson in a lecture.58 It was later included in the written observations of the 
Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) in Viking. Both sources presented it as something 
‘[that] may be called’ this. The concept is certainly mutatis mutandis borrowed from 
the French legal-doctrinal tradition where ordre public social has meant and means 
‘the social minimum’ hammered out by compulsory state norms. 59  Given the 
difference in the labour law tradition, there is no viable and equivalent English term 
for ordre communautaire social. Borrowing simply mutatis mutandis in this case also 
means accepting the extra-community and legal-ideological dimensions to be covered 
by that concept next to the normative ones. I come back to its Community 
characterization below in chapter III. 
 
Ordre communautaire social must be related in terms of Bercusson to the historical 
‘evolution of the EU from a purely economic Community establishing a common 
market to a European Union with a social policy aimed at protecting workers 
                                                                                                                                            
56 However, see also, for the question of the possible future ‘supra-constitutional’ status of 
fundamental rights, the perspective opened up by AG Mengozzi See section 3.4, at footnote 
308, infra. 
57 Case 18/74 General Union of Personnel [1974] ECR 933 at 951, opinion of 10.7.1974. 
58 EU Law and Right to Industrial Action. Lecture on 15 February 2006 at the Hanken School 
of Economics, Helsinki, Finland.  
59 See, e.g., Camerlynck, G.Lyon-Caen and Pelissier, Droit du travail, 13th ed., Dalloz 1986, 
pp.  38-39. 
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employed in the common market who are also citizens of the Union’. As one 
manifestation of this evolution, I may refer to the Deutsche Telekom v. Schröder case, 
in which the ECJ stated in 2000 (identically to Sievers v Deutsche Post) – obviously 
of its own motion – how the economic aim of Article 141 EC nowadays has to be 
considered secondary to its social aim that reflects a fundamental human right.60 One 
also may refer to the BECTU case as a similar expression of a paradigmatic evolution 
in an EU context. There the ECJ had to rule on the right to paid annual leave, which is 
also an expression of improving workers’ safety and health sensu lato. It stated that 
this improvement should not be ‘subordinated to purely economic considerations’ 
which repeats the fifth recital of the Preamble to the Working Time Directive 
(93/104/EC) and with which the ECJ dismissed the UK’s argument that operated with 
the necessity to avoid imposing excessive constraints on small and medium-sized 
undertakings, i.e., an economic argument.61 Hence, both the European judicature and 
legislator may be the source of such a paradigmatic evolution of labour law.  
 
Thus, on the basis of the historical evolution of EC labour law and international 
labour law one may tentatively present the five constitutive premises or legal 
principles62 (in the form of the FSU observations63 unless otherwise indicated) of 
ordre communautaire social which partially overlap the acquis communautaire social:  
 
(i) linked to the founding legal principles of the EU as enshrined in 
Article 6(1) EU (‘liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are 
common to the Member States’), a universal premise of international 
labour law based on the Constitution of the ILO to which all EU 
Member States belong: ‘labour is not a commodity’;64 
                                                 
60 Case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekom v. Schröder [2000] ECR I-743, paragraph 57; its 
identically worded sister case was judgment in joined cases C-270 and 271/97 Sievers v 
Deutsche Post [2000] ECR I-929. As formulated by the national court posing the question for 
the ECJ, the claim for a retrospective application of the principle of equal pay would risk 
distortion of competition and have a detrimental economic impact on employers. This is what 
the ECJ set aside in its evolutional interpretation of Article 141 EC. On these judgments, see 
section 2.7, infra. 
61 Case C-173/99 BECTU [2001] ECR I-4881, paragraph 59. 
62 I use ‘principle’ here in its Dworkinian legal sense, thus as a part of law (and as 
distinguished from rules) but equipped with variable weight; see Ronald Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously, HUP 1978, pp. 22-30. Dworkin’s distinction between rules and principles 
is, however, not literally applicable to the distinction between rights and principles in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights explored in section 1.4.4, infra; this distinction is a specific, 
‘EU-constitutional’ and sui generis issue. For a ‘principle’ as a part of EU law, see, e.g., case 
43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455, paragraphs 28 and 29, where the ECJ discussed equal pay 
as a binding principle, distinguishing it from a vague declaration; the ECJ noted that the term 
‘principle’ is specifically used in order to indicate the fundamental nature of certain 
provisions, as is shown, for example, by the heading of the first part of the Treaty which is 
devoted to ‘Principles’ (paragraph 28); see section 2.7, infra.  As to ‘labour is not a 
commodity’ as a premise, see section 1.4.2, infra.  
63 The FSU has given its permit for making its observations public. 
64 The reference here to principles in Article 6(1) EU was presented by the FSU only, not by 
Professor Bercusson in his lecture. Article 2 of the EU Treaty as (to be) amended by the 
Reform Treaty will read: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
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(ii) the activities of the Community include ‘a policy in the social sphere’ 
(Article 3(1)(j) EC) and the Community and the Member States ‘shall 
have as their objectives…improved living and working conditions’ 
(Article 136 EC); 
 
(iii) respect for fundamental rights of workers reflected in the intra-
Community or international legal instruments (ILO, Council of Europe 
and United Nations);65 
 
(iv) the distinctive characteristic of the European social model which 
attributes a central role to social dialogue at EU and national levels in 
the form of social partnership; 
 
(v) the common market principle of equal treatment of all workers without 
discrimination based on nationality. 
 
In brief, in the first place the law on free movement in the EU is to be interpreted in 
the light of ordre communautaire social:66 as linked to the founding legal principles of 
the EU, labour is not a commodity like others (goods, capital), free movement and 
competition rules are subject to the objective of improved working conditions, 
respecting the intra-Community or international fundamental rights of workers as 
human beings, acknowledging the central role of social dialogue and social 
partnership at EU and national levels, and adhering to the strict principle of equal 
treatment without regard to nationality.  
 
Applied to an industrial action in relation to free movement and competition rules, the 
OCS approach would mean – mutatis mutandis the terms of Bercusson – that 
collective action is not subject to the EU law on free movement where its exercise 
involving workers (not a commodity) conflicts with the founding legal principles of 
the EU, has the intention and/or effect of undercutting working conditions, denies the 
exercise of fundamental rights by workers and their organisation, undermines the 
central role of social dialogue and social partnership and/or promotes unequal 
treatment based on the nationality of the workers.   
 
Later in this article (chapter II), I will test what the OCS approach may mean 
regarding the actual issues discussed earlier in this study project. Before doing so, it is 
useful to discuss each of the constitutive elements or principles of ordre 




                                                                                                                                            
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a 
society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail.’ The first sentence corresponds to the present Article 6(1) 
EU on issues relevant here. 
65 The difference at this point is that Professor Bercusson did not refer to international sources 
of fundamental rights other than the European Social Charter. 
66 Relying essentially on the typology of Bercusson, lecture on 15 February 2006 at Hanken 
School of Economics, Helsinki, pp. 19-20.  
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1.4.2 The EU’s Founding Legal Principles; ‘Labour Is Not a Commodity’ 
 
It is not necessary to explore here the founding legal principles of the EU in Article 
6(1) EU in abstracto at any greater length. Respecting them has been a precondition 
for EU membership since Amsterdam according to Article 49 EU, and infringements 
may lead to suspension of Treaty rights (Article 7 EU). Douglas-Scott has noted 
briefly that Article 6(1) EU is an example of the common basis of values. The 
statement of the leading legal principles in Article 6(1) EU has more significance 
because of the simple fact that Europe lacks a demos (one nationality as a source of 
the European legal-political power) whereas there might still be linking social, 
economic and cultural forces and work. 67  Democracy for its part is normally 
understood to have its core in political decision-making.68 More generally, the Article 
6(1) EU principles are of institutionalized value in interpreting and applying 
Community law. On the other hand (and more elaborating), the principle of equality 
as a constitutive element of democracy must also mean that there cannot be any 
formal supremacy of management and owners or market freedoms over labour in law.  
 
Article 6(1) EU nowadays also has a direct impact on secondary EU law. The 
preambles to the Racial Directive (2000/43/EC; recital 2) and the Employment 
Framework Directive (2000/78/EC; recital 1) refer not just to the protection of 
fundamental rights in Article 6(2) EU but also to Article 6(1). The judgment in 
Mangold shows the combined impact of general principles of Community law (of 
which fundamental rights form an integral part) and the whole of Article 6 EU, over 
and above Directive 2000/78. The fundamental rights doctrine of the ECJ can be seen 
as a corollary of the principle of the rule of law. 69 
 
Essential in this particular context is that the Union is also ‘based on the rule of law 
and the correlative requirements of legal protection’.70 Thus the rule of law must 
                                                 
67 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union, Longman 2002, p. 
195.  
68 As to the power of democracy, one may refer to case C-70/88 European Parliament v 
Council [1990] ECR I-2041, paragraphs 26-27, where the Court accepted locus standi for the 
Parliament to challenge the acts of other institutions when the prerogatives of the Parliament 
were infringed. There was at that time no such provision in the EC Treaty so that the decision 
in fact went beyond the text of the EC Treaty to keep up the inter-institutional balance, i.e., 
democracy.  
69 See, e.g., the opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen 
[2004] ECR I-9609, paragraph 49, and the opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in case C-
354/04P Gestoras Pro Amnistía (opinion of 26.10.2006, judgment of 27.2.2007, nyr), 
paragraph 77. Similarly Bruno de Witte, The Past and Future Role of the European Court of 
Justice in the Protection of Human Rights, in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, OUP 
1999, p. 864, notes the rule of law in Article 220 EC, together with the reference to ‘any rule 
of law’ relating to the application of the Treaty in Article 230 EC, as a legal ground for the 
‘general principles of Community law’ doctrine. Judgment in case C-303/05 Advocaten voor 
de Wereld of 3.5.2007, nyr, paragraph 45, presents them as a pair: the Union is founded on the 
principle of the rule of law (Article 6 EU) and respects fundamental rights as general 
principles of Community law. See, however, also footnotes 6, supra, and 92, infra on the 
doctrine’s more factual origin. 
70 Koen Lenaerts and Piet van Nuffel (ed. Bray), Constitutional Law of the European Union, 
2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2005, p. 652. The classic case on the role of rule of law in the EU is 
294/83 Les Verts v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, in which the Court accepted that 
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mean that in deciding on ‘grey area’ cases where the EU law itself does not supply 
ready-made answers for the legal application, like Laval and Viking, the reasoning of 
the judges of the ECJ is bound to take into account all relevant legal sources, in these 
cases respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms also as referred to in Article 
136 EC, enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and guaranteed in 
international law (see especially sections 4.5 to 4.7 of the second publication).  
 
Let us move on to the premise that ‘labour is not a commodity’, which may be traced 
back to the ILO Constitution. The Philadelphia Conference of 1944 adopted a 
Declaration defining the aims of the International Labour Organisation. The 
Declaration was annexed to the ILO Constitution that is a binding Treaty in 1946. 
Paragraph I(a) of that Declaration adopted ‘labour is not a commodity’ after an incipit 
referring to aims, purposes and principles which should inspire the policy of the ILO’s 
Members. I have called it a (universal) ‘premise’ because this maxim is already 
broader than a mere ‘principle inspiring the policies of the ILO Members’. It has 
inspired not just state ‘policies’ but also actual legislation, clauses in collective 
agreements and certainly court decisions, where it may also work as a binding 
principle (perhaps most often as an unexpressed one) in the Dworkinian sense. It can 
also be understood as meaning that workers and employees are independent subjects 
of labour rights that may cross or at least modify their status as subordinated ‘factors 
of production’. This is its legal-ideological aspect. Furthermore, it can be seen as a 
specific form of the general and inviolable human dignity that must also be respected 
and protected according to Article 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
 
Historically ‘labour is not a commodity’ was introduced with the aim of granting a 
worker remuneration that would suffice for a decent life for him and his family.71 
Silvana Sciarra has noted how it is “much more than a principle or an aim set out in 
an international source. It has been powerful enough to inspire other sources and to 
favour the inclusion in them of the right to fair remuneration for workers, ‘such as 
will give them and their families a decent standard of living’,72 as in Article 4 of the 
1961 European Social Charter, echoed later by the 1989 Community Charter.  
 
The premise ‘Labour is not a commodity’ must also be interpreted in its immediate 
context. In that sense, it is noteworthy that the Philadelphia Declaration also stated 
how lasting peace can be established only if it was based on social justice (paragraph 
II). It went further by stating that ‘the central aim of national and international policy’ 
in terms of Valticos and von Potobsky (paragraph II(b)) should be to attain the social 
                                                                                                                                            
an action for annulment was amenable against measures adopted by the European Parliament 
(that concerned financing the electoral campaigns) intended to have legal effects vis-à-vis 
third parties, even though there was no such provision in the Treaty. 
71 Article 427 of the Treaty of Versailles 1919, laying the foundations of the International 
Labour Organisation, had already proclaimed ‘the guiding principle…that labour should not 
be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce’. On this and other roots of the 
1944 formula in the Philadelphia Declaration, see Paul O’Higgins, ‘Labour is not a 
Commodity’ – an Irish Contribution to International Labour Law, ILJ 1997, Vol. 26, No. 3, 
pp. 225-234.  
72 Silvana Sciarra, European Social Rights Policy Convergence, in Alston et al. (eds.), The EU 
and Human Rights, Oxford University Press 1999, pp. 487-8. 
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conditions described in the Declaration73 whereby the ‘social conditions’ refer to the 
principle of social justice. The subsequent passage in the Declaration (paragraph II(c)) 
then sets out that ‘all national and international policies and measures, in particular 
those of an economic and financial character, should be judged’ in the light of these 
social objectives, i.e., social justice.  
 
These principles confirmed the interest of the ILO in economic matters74 and are, I 
maintain, transplantable or valid in the sphere of the EU at an ideological and 
interpretative level in principle, although the EU’s legal order includes a sui generis 
regime or regimes for the economic freedoms and competition rules, the balancing 
and reconciliation of which with the prevailing social aims is a unique Community 
phenomenon or task. Besides, as ILO Member States, the EU Member States are also 
bound by the principles incorporated into the ILO Constitution to which they all 
adhered before adhering to the EEC/EU.75 Furthermore, the rhetoric on social justice 
is not completely alien to the EU itself while the second Recital in the Preamble to 
Single European Act referred to it expressis verbis (together with freedom and 
equality) as a constituent principle of democracy, promotion of which was declared to 
be a determined and joint task of the Member States.76 Another issue (I mean this 
mainly at the level of principles) is whether this rhetoric has remained lip service only 
in practice. In any case, promotion of social justice was also enshrined in Article I-3 
of the Constitutional Treaty among the objectives of the Union. 
 
Under ‘labour is not a commodity’ (or ‘is not an article of commerce’), the underlying 
and immediate (although often distant) goal is fair and just working conditions. The 
EU shares this goal, although not expressly referring to ‘labour is not a commodity’, 
as Article 31 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights shows. 77  The 1989 
                                                 
73 Nicolas Valticos and Geraldo von Potobsky, International Labour Law, 2nd rev. ed., Kluwer 
1995, p. 27. 
74 Ibid.  
75 I also repeat here the moral argument in the second publication (see section 4.6, p. 100) that 
the EU Member States cannot have rules (and principles, I may say) for themselves different 
from what they have as ILO Member States within the EU.  
The ILO Constitution also has independent significance regarding trade union rights. Thus, in 
cases where an ILO Member State has not ratified ILO Conventions No. 87 and 98 especially, 
the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO has dealt with 
complaints on alleged violations of freedom of association on the basis of ‘the fundamental 
aims and purposes set out in the ILO Constitution’ since its creation in 1951. The Committee 
has ‘emphasized in this respect that the function of the International Labour Organization in 
regard to trade union rights is to contribute to the effectiveness of the general principle of 
freedom of association’. See Committee report No. 332, case 2227 AFL-CIO and CTM v 
United States, Vol. LXXXVI, 2003, Series B, No. 3, paragraph 600; 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/caseframeE.htm.  
76 See Official Journal L169, 29.6.1987. The same Recital also referred to the European 
Human Rights Convention and the European Social Charter. This ‘social justice’ rhetoric was 
in a way continued by the Preamble to the Treaty on European Union, the eighth Recital of 
which referred inter alia to economic and social progress, and to implementing ‘policies 
ensuring that advances in economic integration are accompanied by parallel progress in other 
fields.’  
77 Article 31 of the Charter reads: ‘Fair and just working conditions. 1. Every worker has the 
right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity. 2. Every 
worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest 
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Community Charter expressed the same principle as to fair remuneration (point 5) and 
improvement of working conditions (point 7) especially. A specific tie between 
‘labour is not a commodity’ and fair and just working conditions is the dignity aspect: 
workers and employees are independent subjects of social rights, whose dignity is to 
be protected as to working conditions. If regarding safety, health and working time 
Article 31 expresses a free-standing fundamental right, its dignity dimension can be 
seen as a broader maxim having its impact on other social rights guaranteed by the 
Charter, especially covering the whole spectrum of working conditions insofar as they 
can affect human dignity; thus remuneration as well, which is not mentioned as such 
by the Charter.78  
 
As to doctrinal writings, this article is certainly not the first one in an EU context 
resorting to the assumption that labour is not a commodity. Next to the article by 
O’Higgins 79  and lecture by Bercusson, 80  mention has also to be made to Roger 
Blanpain, Bob Hepple, Silvana Sciarra and Manfred Weiss, who wrote a pamphlet, 
Fundamental Social Rights: Proposals for the European Union in 1996, proposing a 
revision of the old Article 117 EEC with an eye to the then forthcoming 
Intergovernmental Conference of Amsterdam by introducing ten fundamental social 
rights. That structure was preceded by an incipit enshrining the ‘Labour is not a 
commodity’ principle.81 The pamphlet was signed by 110 professors of labour law 
throughout the then 15 Member States.  
 
Finally, one may also take the phrase ‘labour is not a commodity’ as the most 
prominent one among general principles of labour law. It is only to be added that the 
ILO Constitution is much more than an expression of an attitude that first changed the 
legal-political ‘landscape’. 82  It is the highest possible recognition of the values 
concerned and at the same time an international treaty-based obligation of every EU 
Member State as a Member of the ILO, which obligation they have also reiterated in 
the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.83 Since the 
                                                                                                                                            
periods and to an annual period of paid leave.’ Article 1 of the Charter declares that ‘[h]uman 
dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.’ Since according to the Convention’s 
explanation it is a part of the substance of the rights laid down in the Charter, it must be 
respected, even where a right is restricted. 
78 This broad notion of dignity is advocated by Thomas Blanke, Fair and just working 
conditions, in Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, Nomos 2006, pp. 375-377.  
79 See footnote 71, supra.  
80 See footnote 58, supra.  
81 Roger Blanpain, Bob Hepple, Silvana Sciarra and Manfred Weiss, Fundamental Social 
Rights: Proposals for the European Union (1996).  
82 Cf. the position of De Vos (mentioned in another context in the third publication, section 
1.3.2.1) that ‘labour is not a commodity’ is of ‘clear Marxist phraseology that diametrically 
opposes the neo-liberal approach of labour relations’.  
83 Paul O’Higgins rhetorically asks, given that all the EU Member States have also committed 
themselves to the principles of the 1998 ILO Declaration as ILO Member States, ‘what 
obstacles should there be to the Court giving effect to the these principles as part of the law of 
the European Communities?’ He sees no obstacle. See Paul O’Higgins, The interaction of the 
ILO, the Council of Europe and European Union labour standards, in Hepple (ed.), Social and 
Labour Rights in a Global Context, Cambridge University Press 2002, p. 63. O’Higgins does 
not, however, discuss Article 307, first paragraph, EC and general international law, which 
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EU promotes and rewards the realization of basic labour rights covered by the 
Declaration in its trade agreements with third countries (under Regulation 980/05/EC), 
it is only natural that its paradigmatic impact is recognized by the EU. General 
principles of labour law as a connotation recognized by the ECJ also link it to EU law 




1.4.3 EU’s Social Policy and Upward Harmonisation 
 
Article 3(1)(j) EC, enshrined by the Treaty of Maastricht, refers to ‘policy in the 
social sphere’ which is in itself a programmatic declaration. However, it is reasonable 
to read this ‘social policy’, first, in the light of ‘a harmonious, balanced and 
sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of 
social protection, equality between men and women … the raising of the standard of 
living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among 
Member States’, as Article 2 EC counts the tasks of the EU. Reading Article 3(1)(j) 
EC in conjunction with Article 2 EC is also the lesson from the Albany judgment. 84  
 
Second, the concept of ‘social policy’ is of course to be read in the light of the 
principal social policy provision, i.e., Article 136 EC. This provision has somewhat 
developed the already pivotal assertion of the original Article 117 EEC, in which the 
Member States agreed ‘upon the need to promote improved working conditions and 
an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their 
harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained.’ The amendment by the 
Amsterdam Treaty highlighted the new Community nature of the proviso; it now 
highlights how the Community and the Member States ‘shall have as their 
objectives…improved…working conditions’, making upward harmonisation possible. 
Article 117 EEC, second paragraph, mentioned as the source of upward harmonisation 
a ‘common market credo’85 (as well ‘procedures provided for in this Treaty’ and the 
approximation of laws) and Article 136 EC, third subparagraph, still repeats this.  
 
In Defrenne III, the ECJ had already confirmed that Article 117 EEC was essentially 
programmatic.86 In Zaera, the ECJ added: ‘The fact that the objectives of social policy 
laid down in Article 117 are in the nature of a programme does not mean that they are 
deprived of any legal effect. They constitute an important aid, in particular for the 
interpretation of other provisions of the Treaty and of secondary Community 
                                                                                                                                            
impose such an effect. He still finds that ‘labour is not commodity’ is a legally binding 
principle.   
84 See case C-67/96 Albany International [1999] ECR I-5751, paragraph 54, which referred to 
Article 2 EC as it stood after the Treaty of Maastricht.   
85 Article 117 EEC read inter alia: ’…such a development will ensue … from the functioning 
of the common market…’. This ‘common market credo’ is still enshrined in Article 136 EC, 
third subparagraph. Accordingly, the bounds to economic conditions are highlighted by the 
reference to ‘the need to maintain the competitiveness of the Community economy’ in the 
second subparagraph of Article 136 EC. So far this new condition has not been reflected in 
actual secondary legislation or cases. Another aspect is that its presence may reflect the 
legislator’s general disinclination for new legislative initiatives.   
86 Case 149/77 Defrenne III [1978] ECR 1365, paragraph 19. 
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legislation in the social field.’87 Accordingly, Article 117 EEC was mentioned in the 
preambles to the directives on collective redundancy (75/129/EEC), transfer of 
undertakings (acquired rights; 77/187/EEC), employer insolvency (80/987/EEC) and 
information on working conditions (91/533/EEC).  
 
Given this history, Article 136 EC is equally programmatic and mainly takes a bottom 
line effect in terms of principles and interpretation. While it draws the fundamental 
rights referred to (thus those in the 1989 Community Charter and in the European 
Social Charter) into EU law, it is not a valid legal basis for secondary legislation like 
Article 137 EC. However, the present wording of Article 136 EC reflects a new 
emphasis given to a Community social policy with improvement of working 
conditions and upward harmonisation as one of its leading principles.88 Accordingly, 
Article 136 EC is of importance in interpreting other provisions of the EC Treaty, 
such as those on free movement and competition or Article 137 EC.89 Finally, the 
EU’s social policy is a real entity as the breakdown of secondary legislation in section 
1.2 above shows.  
 
As a real test of improving working conditions, one has to mention the draft Directive 
on Temporary Work. 90  Its legal basis is Article 137(2) EC and hence ‘working 
conditions’, which is covered by Article 137(1)(b). The Directive would in general 
terms require paying temporary workers the wages applicable in the case of a direct 
employment relationship with the user undertaking. Derogations would be possible in 
case of a permanent contract with the temporary agency (who continues to pay wages 
between the postings), by way of collective agreements and in the case of postings 
shorter than six weeks. This would raise the wages of agency workers in many 
Member States, particularly the UK. The Directive would not prejudice the Posted 
Workers Directive 96/71/EC. It has, however, been blocked in the Council of 
Ministers since summer 2003.   
 
A much more controversial approach appears in the recent Green Paper of the 
Commission on ‘Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century’, 
which highlights the growing importance of atypical employment relationships as a 
reflection of the overly rigid regulation of the standard employment contracts and 
advocates ‘flexicurity’ (a combination of flexibility and security) as the overall 
remedy. Thus, one of its (rather rare) concrete references is the assumption that 
‘[r]ecourse to alternative forms of employment could further increase in the absence 
of moves to adapt the standard employment contract to facilitate greater flexibility to 
both workers and enterprises alike.’ As a remedy, the Paper refers to deterioration’ of 
protection in standard employment contracts, although hidden under an ‘alteration 
where necessary; ‘accordingly, the [European Employment] Task Force urged 
Member States to assess, and where necessary alter, the level of flexibility provided in 
standard contracts in areas such as periods of notice, costs and procedures for 
                                                 
87 Case 126/86 Zaera [1987] ECR I-3696, paragraph 14. 
88 I recall that, as I have shown in my first publication, section I.2.1, upward harmonization 
has also been subject to lip service long since, for example, in the sense that the Collective 
Redundancy Directive, contrary to the promise in the Preamble, finally does not harmonize 
the redundancy payments, nor fixes any minimum amount for them.  
89 See, e.g., case C-13/05 Chacón Navas [2006] ECR I-6467, paragraph 55. 
90 See Communications of the Commission (2002) 149 final and (2002) 701 final. 
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individual or collective dismissal, or the definition of unfair dismissal.’91 The obvious 
tendency to degrade the conditions in standard contracts is not in conformity with the 
principle of upwards harmonisation and improved working conditions. Enhanced 
protection in atypical contracts would be a measure in that direction.  
  
  




It is possible to present only the main lines of the status of fundamental rights in the 
EU here, i.e., those necessary for the formulation and understanding of their status as 
a part of ordre communautaire social. Thus, fundamental rights nowadays have a 
natural place in any thorough description of EU labour law and are equally 
indispensable in an ‘ordre communautaire social way of thinking’. Whereas the 
Community does not have proper written collective labour law (unless on information 
and consultation of employees, and on social dialogue) fundamental rights as 
expressed in various charters and treaties have a more salient impact on collective 
labour law than on individual employment law. Freedom of association and the right 
to collective bargaining and action are the core rights, variably but generally taken, 
already deeply rooted in international and EU human rights instruments (see sections 
4.4 to 4.7 of the second publication and section 2.5, infra, on the right to collective 
action). The international instruments include above all the ILO Constitution and 
Conventions No. 87 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise and No. 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, as reiterated 
by the 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work. All the EU 
Member States have also ratified either the original European Social Charter of 1961 
or the 1996 Revised Social Charter with just a few relevant reservations on the 
essential labour rights. In December 2000, the European Council, Parliament and 
Commission solemnly proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (OJ 2000 C 364, p.1; ‘the EU Charter’), which includes inter alia the 
abovementioned basic labour rights. 
 
As fundamental rights sources referred to by the same EC Treaty, Article 136 EC, the 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989 and the 
European Social Charter (ESC) merit some remarks additional to what I wrote in the 
second publication.92 The main point was that the reference to them in Article 136 EC 
makes them a part of EC law and forms when the references are taken seriously, in 
principle a guarantee for such things as the right to collective action in EC law. 
However, I note that both these Charters have also already shown their interpretative 
                                                 
91 Green Paper on Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century, 
COM(2006) 708 final, p. 3. The report referred to was ‘Jobs, Jobs, Jobs; Creating more 
employment in Europe. Report of the Employment Taskforce’, European Commission 
November 2003, p. 30. The Green Paper does not deal with collective labour law. 
92 See sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.6 of the second publication. The ‘mode of emergence’ of the 
ECJ’s fundamental rights doctrine is worth noting; thus, it once was a response of the ECJ to 
the reservations of the German and Italian constitutional courts especially regarding the direct 
effect and primacy of EC law (see footnote 6, supra); see, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The 
Constitution of Europe, CUP 1999, p. 108, and Tuomas Ojanen, The European Way, 
Gummerus 1998, p. 106.   
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value: the ECJ has used the ESC as a real argument already in the early Defrenne III 
and Blaizot cases, as well as recently in Kiiski. 93  The Community Charter was 
referred to via the Preamble to the Working Time Directive, at least in the United 
Kingdom v. Council, BECTU, Jaeger, Pfeiffer and Dellas cases,94 whereas this year 
we see a subtle but genuine modification. In Chacón Navas the Court (Grand 
Chamber) presented the 1989 Community Charter under the heading of Community 
law and did so not via the Preamble to the Employment Framework Directive 2000/78 
(the object of the litigation) that refers to the Charter (sixth Recital), the Court 
introducing the Charter via Article 136 EC.95 Furthermore, Articles 13 and 137 EC 
were to be read in conjunction with Article 136 EC when defining the Community 
competence (paragraph 55). This might imply that the Charters, since referred to by 
Article 136, also have an impact in discussing the Community competence in light of 
Article 137(5) in the view of the Court, thus towards accepting the author’s argument 
that Article 137(5) does not exclude collective labour rights from the Community 
competence (see section 4.3 of the second publication). Recently in the working time 
case Commission v United Kingdom, the Court (the Third Chamber) added the 
qualification that the Community Charter was ‘adopted at the meeting of the 
European Council’ and ‘mentioned in Article 136 EC’ to the traditional ‘Charter 
formula’ (of cases United Kingdom v Council etc.). 96 These are again small but real 
steps.  
  
To base further reasoning on the relationship between the fundamental rights and the 
economic market freedoms, I repeat in brief some basics of the fundamental or human 
rights developments in the EU. Fundamental rights are nowadays subject to the 
following settled legal formula in EU law following the voluminous case-law since 
Stauder:97  ‘Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of 
Community law the observance of which the Court ensures. For that purpose, the 
Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
                                                 
93 Case 149/77 Defrenne III [1978] ECR 1365, paragraph 28; case 24/86 Blaizot [1988] ECR 
379, paragraph 17; case C-116/06 Kiiski, judgment of 20.9.2007, nyr., paragraph 48. 
Advocates General have resorted to the ESC in some ten cases. A certain sensitivity in 
respecting the obligations (on family reunification) arising from the European Social Charter 
is reflected by case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769, paragraph 107, 
although the Charter was not at the heart of the litigation but annulment of a Council 
Directive that recognized the better protection by the ESC regarding the Member States that 
have ratified the ESC provisions concerned. 
94 Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v. Council [1996] ECR I-5755, paragraph 76; case C-173/99 
BECTU [2001] ECR I-4881, paragraph 39; case C-151/02 Jaeger [2003] ECR I-8389, 
paragraph 47; case C-397/01 Pfeiffer[2004] ECR I-8835, paragraph 91; case C-14/04 Dellas 
[2005] ECR I-10253, paragraph 40. 
95 Case C-13/05 Chacón Navas [2006] ECR I-6467, paragraph 11. A further qualification by 
the Court was that the Charter was ‘adopted at the meeting of the European Council’. The 
difference is clear in comparison to what AG Jacobs asserted in Albany. He wrote (in 
paragraph 137 of the opinion): ‘However, the Charter has very limited legal effects. It is not a 
legal act of the Community but a solemn political declaration adopted by Heads of State or 
Government of 11 of the then 12 Member States, and it has not been published in the Official 
Journal. In the Agreement on social policy attached to the Treaty on European Union the 
same 11 Member States which adopted the Charter were not willing to confer legal effect on 
the rights to which they had given their political support in the Charter.’ 
96 Case C-484/04 Commission v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-7471, paragraph 35. 
97 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419.   
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States and from the guidelines supplied by international instruments for the protection 
of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are 
signatories. The European Convention on Human Rights has special significance in 
that respect’.98 The Roquette Frères judgment (paragraph 29) also shows how the ECJ 
modifies its case-law according to the developments of the case-law of the European 
Human Rights Court (hereinafter also ‘ECrtHR’), as is appropriate. Furthermore, 
Article 6(2) EU enshrines the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter also ‘ECHR’) as a source and 
parameter of EC law. The Treaty of Amsterdam gave the Court jurisdiction to ensure 
that Article 6(2) EU is observed by the EU institutions (Article 46(d) EU). The 
Reform Treaty proclaims respect for fundamental rights and will require the EU to 





Despite the magnificent progress driven by the ECJ originally as a reflection of the 
human rights concerns, certainly in Germany and Italy (see footnotes 6 and 92, supra), 
the relationship between fundamental rights and the economic market freedoms is still 
evolving (if it ever reaches maturity). Even the methodology in Schmidberger can be 
criticized from a fundamental rights angle, while the Court preliminarily discussed the 
in casu existence of a restriction on free movement of goods (paragraphs 51 to 64) at 
length, presenting fundamental rights essentially as a justification for restriction of a 
market freedom. 99  On the other hand, the judgment confirms the principle that 
infringements of fundamental rights ‘are not acceptable in the Community’ 
(paragraph 73). Thus, the decision on that relationship in this judgment was based on 
a balance between the fundamental right and free movement of goods, where the 
former was ‘relied upon as justification for a restriction of the latter’ (paragraph 77). 
                                                 
98 See, inter alia, Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 41; Opinion 2/94 [1996] 
ECR I-1759, paragraph 33; Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR I-1611, 
paragraph 37; Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, paragraph 25; Case C-
112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraph 71; Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-
9609, paragraph 33; Case C-540/03 Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I-5769, paragraph 35. 
99 For the critics on this line (‘in judgment too much or even misplaced emphasis on the 
market values’), see, e.g., John Morijn, Balancing Fundamental Rights and Common Market 
Freedoms in Union: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the European Constitution, 
European Law Journal Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 15–40, at 39-40. The point of 
reference for Morijn is the opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in the Omega case 
(previous footnote), paragraph 53, where she finds that the weighing up of common market 
freedoms against fundamental rights as such reflects the negotiable nature of fundamental 
rights, whereas the proper approach would be to protect market values only in so far as 
(inherent) ‘openings’ in the fundamental rights themselves allow. Tuomas Ojanen on the 
same line also writes in his case annotation (in Finnish) on Schmidberger in Lakimies 1/2004, 
p. 134, emphasizing that the question about the ‘basic principle’ or the Habermasian ‘legal 
paradigm’ is not just a question of principle or otherwise non-significant. The paradigm 
finally decides in hard cases where a reconciliation of market freedoms and fundamental 
rights is absolutely impossible. For Ojanen, Schmidberger shows how the EU’s ‘legal 
paradigm’ still is based on market freedoms rather than fundamental rights. However, he finds 
that Schmidberger in the end was not such a ‘hard case’, necessitating profound reasoning on 
the relationship between fundamental rights and market freedoms. The author agrees. Laval 
and Viking arguably are such hard cases. 
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The Court was also faced in any case with the question of the market freedom 
interfering with the fundamental right, which had to happen only in the general 
interest, be based on a pressing need in a democratic society and be both proportionate 
and acceptable and not impair the substance of the right guaranteed (paragraphs 79 
and 80). Thus, the starting-point was not the possibly unacceptable interference with 
the fundamental freedoms of expression and assembly. In any case, the contents in 
Schmidberger genuinely also dealt with the protection of fundamental rights 
(paragraphs 79 and 80) and de facto led to their precedence in casu under the ‘wide 
margin of discretion’ of the national authorities; paragraphs 81 and 82. In the second 
publication (fourth chapter) I have asserted that this type of protection is transferable 
to the protection of pure labour rights, in this case the right to collective action as 
combined with the principle of protection of workers. I also note how that principle 
has worked as the yardstick of the proportionality assessment in justifying restrictions 
on the freedom to provide services. It is logical to foresee that it is also a relevant 
yardstick in assessing the narrow restrictions possible on fundamental labour rights. 
This combination of a fundamental right and protection of workers normally works 
out as a protection anchored in the commitments of all the Member States given 
within the ILO, in the Community Charters, the European Social Charter, the ECHR 
and the constitutional traditions.     
 
If Schmidberger reflects a market-bound approach on fundamental rights, however 
also bolstered by their genuine protection, in any case it simultaneously witnesses the 
growing importance of fundamental or human rights in the EU legal order and 
demonstrates their ability to (at least) delimit the fundamental market freedoms. 
Indeed, at least among human rights scholars, the fundamental rights developments 
have perhaps enabled fundamental rights to become no less than a new foundation for 
the EU’s legal order. Douglas-Scott explains this by remarking that direct effect and 
supremacy once were the original foundations for a community that had the common 
market as its vision. ‘However, with the common market now largely achieved, 
fundamental rights could take its place as the foundation, especially at a time when 
the EU draft Constitution seems to have been abandoned, or at the very least 
adjourned.’ 100  This prospect is highly evolutionary (if not in a way quasi-
                                                 
100 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing 
European Human Rights Acquis, CMLRev. 43, 2006, p. 661. The point of reference for 
Douglas-Scott was Armin von Bogdandy’s article ‘The European Union as a Human Rights 
Organization? Human Rights and the Core of the European Union’, CMLRev. 37: 1307–1338, 
2000. Von Bogdandy discussed the issue of a ‘New Foundation for the Legal Order?’; ibid., p. 
1333 et seq. In his conclusions, written when the first Convention had just drafted the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU, however, he more modestly asserted that ‘[h]uman rights, 
though important, should not be understood as the raison d’être of the Union’; ibid., p. 1338. 
On the other hand, von Bogdandy noted how this (‘main’) raison d’être was what ‘les sages’, 
Antonio Cassese, Catherine Lalumière, Peter Leuprecht and Mary Robinson, had proposed 
under the heading ‘Leading by Example: A Human Rights Agenda For the European Union 
for the Year 2000’, in Alston et al. (eds.), the EU and Human Rights, OUP 1999, p. 926. In 
case C-354/04P Gestoras Pro Amnistía, judgment of 27.2.2007, nyr, Advocate General 
Mengozzi described the pivotal role of fundamental rights (as linked to the rule of law), as 
follows: ‘Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the principle of the rule of 
law are therefore an ‘internal’ dimension, being a foundation of the Union and a criterion for 
assessing the legality of the action of its institutions and of the Member States in the matters 
for which the Union has jurisdiction, and an ‘external’ dimension, as a value to be ‘exported’ 
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revolutionary), while only time will finally show its validity. The author also suggests 
that the developments will obviously be less straightforward than supposed in 
Douglas-Scott’s view, which was itself conditional. In any case the 
constitutionalisation process of fundamental rights has also produced the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (so far; I comment on the Reform Treaty of 2007 below in 
section 3.4) as the highest embodiment of the common values of the Member States 
with several social and labour rights included and, besides, on an equal footing with 
the civil and political as well as economic rights.101 Among the market freedoms, 
freedom of establishment and provision of services as well as the right to conduct a 
business are mentioned by the Charter (Articles 15 and 16), while free movement of 
goods and capital are not included in the Articles. On the other hand, the third 
paragraph of the Preamble to the Charter states how the Union ensures free movement 
of persons, goods, services and capital, and the freedom of establishment. It thus 





As an example of the growing impetus of fundamental rights, one has also to mention 
the recent Mangold judgment in which the Court (the Grand Chamber) recognised 
that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age is a general principle of 
Community law as a specific form of equality. Thus, the judgment did not spell out 
that protection against age-discrimination is also a fundamental right, but the context 
justifies assuming that the outcome implies this, as becomes clear below. The 
recognition of a general principle of Community law was expressed independently 
from the Employment Framework Directive 2000/78, which is intended to implement 
the prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of age. The ECJ identified the 
source of the prohibition being found in various international human rights 
instruments (also referred to by the Preamble to the Directive, starting from the 
Article 6(1) EU principles and even covering the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights) and in the tasks set out in the Employment Guidelines adopted by the Council 
in 1999.102 In contrast to Mangold, once in Defrenne III (1978) Article 141 (ex 119) 
                                                                                                                                            
beyond the borders of the Union by means of persuasion, incentives and negotiation’ 
(paragraph 79). 
101 Brian Bercusson, Stefan Clauwaert and Isabelle Schömann, Legal prospects and legal 
effects of the EU Charter, in Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, Nomos 2006, p. 78. The book includes an extensive discussion of trade 
union rights included in the Charter. That the Charter puts fundamental social rights on an 
equal footing with economic ones is also the position of Miguel Poiares Maduro, The Double 
Constitutional Life of the Charter, in Hervey and Kenner (eds.), Economic and Social Rights 
under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Hart Publishing 2003, p. 286. The Preamble to 
the Charter (third paragraph) states that the Union ensures free movement of persons, goods, 
services and capital, and the freedom of establishment. Article 15 of the Charter recognizes 
the right of establishment and to provide services in any Member State and Article 16 
correspondingly the right to conduct a business. In settled case-law, the ECJ has recognized 
that the right to property and to carry on a business are general principles of EU law, subject 
however to proportionate and tolerable restrictions that correspond to objectives of general 
interest and do not impair the substance of the rights guaranteed (see, e.g., joined cases 
C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04 ABNA Ltd [2005] ECR I-10423, paragraph 87).  
102 Case C-144/04 Mangold v. Helm, [2005] ECR I-9981 paragraphs 74 and 75. The case also 
merits a couple of comments outside the ‘general principle’ issue. The proceedings at issue 
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the EC was incapable of quashing an age-limit of 40 for an air hostess.103 It is also 
noteworthy that a strict treatment of the reference questions did not necessarily 
require a position to be taken on a possible general principle of Community law. In so 
doing the Court acted in its special role as the guardian of general principles of 
Community law. Thus, the decision in Mangold has been described as ‘[a]dding a new 
chapter to the judicial constitution of the European Union’, and ‘[t]he relevance of 
this constitutional turn in Mangold cannot be underestimated’.104 A relevant detail is 
still that in substance the Court accepted objective and reasonable difference in 
treatment for the purpose of promoting the integration into working life of older 
unemployed persons. However, employment promotion in the (unexpressed) terms of 
‘flexicurity’ via fixed-term contracts weighed less in the judgment than prohibition of 
age discrimination as a general principle of Community law.  
 
A logical consequence of regarding the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds 
of age a general principle of Community law was that it was to be observed 
irrespective of the time limit in the implementation of the Employment Framework 
Directive, the national court furthermore being obliged to guarantee the full effect of 
the Community principle in a dispute between private parties and thus setting aside 
any conflicting national rule.105 A general principle of Community law (that includes 
                                                                                                                                            
concerned a single fixed-term contract. In paragraphs 41 to 43 the Court, guided by the clause 
5(1) of the Fixed-term Agreement that refers to prevention of abuse by successive agreements 
seems to assume that a single fixed-term agreement would not require any justification. This 
is the interpretation on the judgment of Loredana Zappala, Abuse of Fixed-Term Employment 
Contracts and Sanctions in the Recent ECJ’s Jurisprudence, ILJ Vol. 35, No. 4, December 
2006, p. 440. However, it is possible to read Mangold as not being a final position on the 
justification of a single agreement, but only on the effect of Clause 5(1) of the Agreement in 
this case. This would be in line with the protection granted against discrimination regarding 
single agreements for older workers (paragraph 64). However, Bercusson and Bruun have 
also held that a single fixed-term contract requires justification by virtue of paragraph 7 of the 
General Considerations of the Fixed-Term Agreement. This refers to the use of fixed-term 
contracts based on objective reasons as a way to combat abuse. See Bercusson and Bruun, 
The Agreement of Fixed-Term Work - A First Analysis, in Vigneau et al., Fixed-term work in 
the EU, National Institute for Working Life, Stockholm 1999, pp. 81-82. 
103 Case 149/77 Defrenne (III) v Sabena [1978] ECR 1365, paragraphs 20-23. The plea was 
that the age limit had pecuniary consequences for Ms. Defrenne in her working relationship. 
The Court found that the matter fell under Articles 117 and 118 EEC that offered no remedy.  
104 See Dagmar Schiek, The ECJ Decision in Mangold: A Further Twist on Effects of 
Directives and Constitutional Relevance of Community Equality Legislation, ILJ Vol. 35, No. 
3, September 2006, p. 333 and 335 respectively.   
105 See paragraphs 77 and 78 of the judgment; reference was naturally made to Case 106/77 
Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 21, and Case C-347/96 Solred [1998] ECR I-937, 
paragraph 30. Judgment Mangold itself does not discuss any conditions for the horizontal 
direct effect (like a sufficiently clear and unconditioned right) but takes it for granted in this 
case. Horizontal direct effect as such regarding a general principle of Community law had 
already been confirmed in case 43/75 Defrenne II. On that judgment, see the first publication, 
section 2.2, the third publication, section 1.2.4, and section 2.7, infra. See also Andrew 
Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere, pp. 250-255. One of his conclusions is that the 
ECrtHR has not shown federalism similar to that of the ECJ in Defrenne II which, according 
to Clapham, is the key to understanding the difficulties surrounding the extension of the 
ECHR into the private sphere, p. 256. For recent labour law cases from the ECrtHR showing 
the state responsibility system under the ECHR, see, e.g., Sørensen v. Denmark and 
Rasmussen v. Denmark, applications Nos. 52562/99 and 52620/99, judgments of 11 January 
 41  
a fundamental right) can have also a horizontal direct effect, as the Mangold case 
itself shows, involving a dispute between a practising lawyer (Rechtsanwalt) and his 
lawyer employee, although this is not a general attribute of Community human rights.  
 
The outcome in Mangold (a general principle of Community law with horizontal 
direct effect) has also provoked constitutional criticism; editorial comments in the first 
Common Market Law Review following the judgment suggested that it meant 
interpreting Article 13 EC contra legem by introducing the horizontal direct effect as 
linked to the general principle of law and, regarding the direct effect of directives, 
rendered ‘the task of providing a coherent account of this area of Community law 
more daunting than ever’.106 This criticism is not convincing because of the bold 
underestimation of the human rights values and obligations (that the comments call 
‘vague’), connected to Article 6 EU, the recognised effect of international law in the 
Community107 and the principle of equality. The point of the criticism relies on an 
intra-Community aspect, although constitutional, while the principle of equality 
simply stems from higher (essentially international) human rights values. Furthermore, 
the judgment did not establish the horizontal direct effect of directives.    
 
Writing recently, but prior to Mangold, Clapham has asserted in general terms that 
non-discrimination provisions in the EC Treaty may be enforced against private 
individuals as part of Community law, basing his view on Walrave, Defrenne II and 
Angonese and even the British High Court judgment in Viking v. International 
                                                                                                                                            
2006. Article 11 ECHR (after voting) outlawed a pre-entry closed shop and it was the state 
that had to pay 2,000€ damages to Mr. Sørensen.  
106 Editorial Comments: Horizontal direct effect -A law of diminishing coherence? Common 
Market Law Review 43, 2006 p. 8. A.A., writes in a similar vein in Editorial comment ‘Out 
with the old…’, (2006) 31 E.L.Rev. [1-2], insisting that the judgment impliedly meant to 
introduce the horizontal direct effect both of Article 13 EC and a directive encapsulating a 
general principle of law. In fact, the judgment did neither. Advocate General Mazák has 
levelled similar constitutional criticism in case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa, opinion of 
15.2.2007, especially in paragraphs 87 to 97 and 105 to 138, where the last paragraph refers 
inter alia to unacceptable undermining in Mangold of the ‘no horizontal direct effect of 
directives’ maxim by recourse to a general principle of Community law. The opinion also 
includes a reference to the variety of general principles in Community law (paragraphs 134-5), 
with reference to the analysis of fundamental rights as general principles of Community law 
of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, paragraphs 48 
to 66). In case C-227/04P Lindorfer, Advocate General Sharpston did not call Mangold into 
question as such, considering it better to read it as implying that the general principle of 
equality has always included the prohibition of age discrimination, whereas Directive 2000/78 
introduced a specific, detailed framework for dealing with this (and certain other forms of) 
discrimination (paragraph 58 of the opinion in Lindorfer of 30.11.2006). The ECJ in its 
judgment in Lindorfer (of 11.9.2007) did not, however, refer to Mangold. In its judgment of 
16.10.2007 in Palacios de la Villa, the ECJ did not discuss age discrimination as a general 
principle of EU law but accepted compulsory retirement ages on the basis of Directive 
2000/78 ‘where the measure, although based on age, is objectively and reasonably justified in 
the context of national law by a legitimate aim relating to employment policy and the labour 
market’, and ‘it is not apparent that the means put in place to achieve that aim of public 
interest are inappropriate and unnecessary for the purpose.’ 
107 See cases C-286/90 Poulsen [1992] ECR I-6019, paragraph 9, and C-162/96 Racke [1998] 
I-3655, paragraph 45, and section 4.6 of the second publication.  
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Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union (that the Court of 
Appeal later referred to the ECJ).108 However, in the case last mentioned, the British 
lower court indeed established direct discrimination (and direct effect of Article 43 
EC) and therefore issued an injunction against the right to strike, whereas the Court of 
Appeal set this judgment aside. Taken generally, Mangold certainly adds to the 
strength of Clapham’s argument, although it does not guarantee that any general 
principle of Community law including a fundamental right entails horizontal direct 
effect. In the case of age discrimination, the effect is of course inherent, otherwise the 
whole normative framework must be taken into account, not just the presumption that 
the norm concerned expresses a clear and unconditional rule.  
 
Hence, Mangold referred to international human rights instruments and the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States (paragraph 74) as a basis for the 
‘general principle of Community law’ assertion in general terms, but also presented it 
as a reflection of the general principle of equality (paragraph 76). Had the case been 
decided after judgment in case C-540/03 Parliament v Council (discussed below), we 
would also have probably seen an express reference to the prohibition of age 
discrimination in Article 21 of the EU Charter. However, it is certainly arguable that 
the other forms of discrimination covered by Article 13 EC Charter (thus concerning 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability and sexual orientation) would 
not receive treatment different from Mangold in a future case (as, in fact, Defrenne II 
has already shown regarding pay equality). Age discrimination is equated in principle 
to a longer list of prohibited discrimination in Article 21 of the EU Charter (including 
colour, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property and birth) which forms a further natural field where we 
may expect extensions of Mangold. In any case, the judgment shows that prohibition 
of age discrimination also implies a fundamental right against such discrimination. 
The decision is, no doubt, of constitutional relevance in defining general principles of 
Community law, reflecting (in judicial law-making de facto) the combined effect of 
the international human rights instruments (although they do not expressly proclaim 
the prohibition of age discrimination, unless in Article 21 of the EU Charter), the 
founding legal principles of the Union (Article 6(1) EU) and the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States, this last aspect being not explored in any detail.  
 
What then is the impact of Mangold, for labour rights, i.e., those enshrined in the 
‘Solidarity’ Chapter of the EU Charter after all? I mean especially the right to 
collective bargaining and action in Article 28. The editorial comments in the Common 
Market Law Review refer to the Solidarity Chapter rights (calling them ‘social 
aspirations’ and the Chapter a ‘fertile source of such speculative claims’) in the hands 
of ‘ingenious’ counsel,109 subject to invoking such things as the right to collective 
action as a general principle of Community law with the horizontal direct effect à la 
Mangold. The first half of the force of the editorial comments is eliminated by the fact 
that the comments themselves recognise how the Mangold solution could have been 
adopted in Marshall110 and other gender equality cases. The second half clashes with 
                                                 
108 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, OUP 2006, pp. 190-
192 and note 115. On Viking v. International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish 
Seamen’s Union see also sections 2.5 and 3.3, infra. 
109 Editorial comments of CMLR, footnote 106, supra, p. 8. 
110 Case 152/84, Marshall [1986] ECR 723. 
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the fact that general principles of Community law (including fundamental rights) do 
not come out of thin air and especially in this case are not merely ‘social aspirations’. 
They are expressly formulated as a ‘right’ in the case of the right to collective 
bargaining and action that also stems from well-established international law 
instruments like the ILO Constitution and Conventions 87 and 98, with their 
monitoring practice in minutiae spanning the decades. Besides, as shown in the 
second publication, by virtue of Article 307 EC, first paragraph, the EC Treaty does 
not affect such prior obligations of the Member States and for the rest settled case-law 
recognises the effect of general international law in EU law, international labour law 
agreements included. 111  Taking the EU Charter rights seriously – certainly after 
Parliament v. Council of 27.6.2006 – is in line with this (as is the European Social 
Charter, also referred to in Article 136 EC), and indeed it would be no surprise to see 
Article 28 of the Charter as provided with a horizontal direct effect à la Mangold.112 
Another aspect is that such an effect also stems directly from the international sources. 
Furthermore, it would be wholly unbalanced to grant freedom to provide services (or, 
alternatively, freedom of establishment) horizontal direct effect in Laval and Viking 
but not to attribute it to the right to collective action as a general principle of EC law. 
 
In sum, Mangold, by building upon international human rights instruments and 
Article 6 EU, accomplishes the argument based on Article 307 EC, first paragraph, 
and general international law. By reinforcing the status of fundamental rights in 






There are also other recent reflections of the rising status of fundamental rights. In the 
third publication (at footnote 108) I have asserted that the recent Cresson judgment113 
reflects the modern universalism of human or fundamental rights in comparison to 
Grogan, for instance, where the Court was able to cover abortion by the freedom to 
provide services in 1991 but was unable to protect freedom of expression (i.e., 
providing information and speaking of abortion abroad), which fell outside 
                                                 
111 See footnote 12, supra, and the remarks in sections 4.5 to 4.7 of the second publication and 
section 2.5, at footnotes 201 to 213, infra.  
112 Krebber, The Social Rights Approach of the European Court of Justice to Enforce 
European Employment Law, Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal Vol. 27:2006, pp. 
402-3, taking the effect of Mangold on the Solidarity Chapter rights seriously, has in any case 
held that a corresponding direct effect of these social rights would require existing (secondary) 
European legislation, as in the ‘Defrenne II and Mangold mechanism’. The author cannot 
accept this position. In Defrenne II, the Equal Pay Directive 75/117 was fully auxiliary and 
simply not capable of depriving Article 119 EEC of its direct effect (specifically paragraphs 
60 and 67). Accordingly, in Mangold the direct effect was expressly linked to the general 
principle of law alone, not to Directive 2000/78. Besides, Krebber’s position would lead to 
the difference that Article 27 of the EU Charter, given the Information and Consultation 
Directives, would show the ‘Mangold effect’, whereas Article 28 and 30 rights would not. 
This is ultimately not defensible and comes more than close to according the horizontal direct 
effect to the directives concerned.  
113 Case C-432/04 Commission v Cresson [2006] ECR I-6387. 
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Community law.114 Thus, the fundamental rights angle in Cresson is subtle but indeed 
still apparent. The former European Commissioner maintained that the lack of legal 
recourse (the possibility of appeal) against the ECJ’s judgment constituted an 
infringement of the fundamental right of defence and the right to effective judicial 
protection. She observed that a European official may, by contrast, challenge a 
decision of the Appointing Authority before the Court of First Instance and then bring 
an appeal before the Court of Justice (paragraph 111). The Court responded that: 
 
112 Reference should be made in this regard to Article 2(1) of Protocol No 7 to the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
signed at Rome on 4 November 1950, which provides that everyone convicted of a 
criminal offence by a court or tribunal has the right to have his conviction or sentence 
reviewed by a higher court or tribunal. Even if it be accepted that that provision 
applies to proceedings based on Article 213(2) EC, it is sufficient to point out that 
Article 2(2) of that Protocol states that that right may be subject to exceptions in 
cases, inter alia, where the person concerned was tried in the first instance by the 
highest court or tribunal. (italics added) 
 
In paragraph 113, the Court concluded that the requirements of effective judicial 
protection were met in this case. However, based on the judgment it seems that the 
full Court of its own motion115 had recourse in paragraph 112 to Article 2(1) of 
Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR and noted the principle of judicial review. Its natural 
exceptions in the following sentence are then preceded by the somewhat ambiguous 
incipit ‘[e]ven if it be accepted that that provision applies to proceedings based on 
Article 213(2) EC…’. This conditional incipit may arise because, strictly speaking, 
Mrs. Cresson was not reproached in these proceedings because of an alleged criminal 
offence, but under civil law. In practice, paragraphs 112 and 113 of Cresson mean an 
application by analogy with Protocol No. 7, Articles 2(1) and 2(2), in proceedings 
based on Article 213(2) EC. Thus, paragraphs 112 and 113 as a whole mean, no less 
than that even the EC Treaty and thereby the internal disciplinary order of the EU is 
subordinated to fundamental or human rights aspects and even to a ‘direct’ application 
of the ECHR (although by analogy) with its Protocols. The Court did not repeat the 
usual fundamental rights formula with a reference to general principles of Community 
law, etc. Fundamental rights did not fall beyond the competence of the Community 
like freedom of expression in Grogan. Cresson can also be seen as a continuation of 
Schmidberger, where free movement of goods was eventually subordinated to 
freedom of assembly and expression. While the substance in Cresson is not close to 
that of this study, its universal fundamental rights view is also of indirect importance 
for European labour law that seeks new impetus in fundamental rights, especially for 
collective labour rights.  
 
There are also recent developments regarding the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (the EU Charter). I have also discussed the Charter in my second 
publication in section 4.4.6, to which I generally refer. It suffices here above all to 
                                                 
114 Case C-150/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Grogan 
[1991] ECR I-4685; on this judgment see also the first publication, section II.2.3. 
115 The submissions of Mrs. Cresson, as explained by the judgment, do not seem to include 
this Protocol. At the same time, her reference to the position of ‘ordinary’ European officials 
is referred to. It is reasonable to suppose that had Mrs. Cresson referred to the Protocol, this 
would have been mentioned in the judgment.  
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note developments since the second publication with some additional remarks on 
justiciability and the overall impact of the Charter.116 
 
 
Parliament v Council etc. 
 
Since its proclamation, the EU Charter has been referred to and discussed by 
numerous opinions of Advocates General, as well as by some judgments of the Court 
of First Instance. The ECJ (the Grand Chamber) for its part has resorted to the EU 
Charter as an argument for the first time in the Parliament v Council judgment of 27 
June 2006, in a case concerning Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family 
reunification.117 The Court stated the overall status and importance of the Charter, 
under the heading of ‘The rules of law in whose light the Directive’s legality may be 
reviewed as follows: 
 
38. The Charter was solemnly proclaimed by the Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission in Nice on 7 December 2000. While the Charter is not a legally binding 
instrument, the Community legislature did, however, acknowledge its importance by 
stating, in the second recital in the preamble to the Directive, that the Directive 
observes the principles recognised not only by Article 8 of the ECHR but also in the 
Charter. Furthermore, the principal aim of the Charter, as is apparent from its 
preamble, is to reaffirm ‘rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional 
traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on 
European Union, the Community Treaties, the [ECHR], the Social Charters adopted 
by the Community and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court … and 
of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
Thus, the formal bridge for the reliance on the Charter was the reference to the 
Charter in the directive concerned, but at the same time this passage shows how the 
Court also relied on the Community legislator’s will to act in conformity with the 
Charter. Furthermore, the Court discussed the Charter substantively – thus relating to 
the merits of the case – in the context of Article 8 ECHR and the Convention on the 
Rights of a Child, as follows: 
 
58. The Charter recognises, in Article 7, the same right to respect for private or family 
life. This provision must be read in conjunction with the obligation to have regard to 
the child’s best interests, which are recognised in Article 24(2) of the Charter, and 
taking account of the need, expressed in Article 24(3), for a child to maintain on a 
regular basis a personal relationship with both his or her parents.  
 
Hence, the Charter also stressed the importance to a child of family life (as also in 
paragraph 59). As a whole, paragraphs 38, 58 and 59 of the judgment show how the 
Court really considered the Charter as a substantive argument. There will be no 
stepping back from the use of the EU Charter as a point of reference, interpretative 
source or substantive argument. Obviously the Court found that time was finally ripe, 
pending the full ratification of the Constitutional Treaty (at that time), to resort to the 
EU Charter in a judgment. One might see there is also a response to the criticism 
generated by Mangold. However, the EU Charter will also be a natural and 
                                                 
116 I come back to the references to national law and practice in section 3.4, infra, at footnotes 
314 - 316.   
117 Case C-540/03 Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I-5769.  
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substantive point of reference and source of interpretation in the labour law cases 
covered by the Charter, like Laval and ITF and FSU v Viking, given the lacuna that 
the EC Treaty does not include any substantive regulation of freedom of association 
and the right to collective action118 and that the recognition of fundamental rights in 
Article 2 of the Monti-Regulation 2679/98/EC within free movement of goods is 
finally declaratory (on the effect of that specific Regulation), which is no legal 
guarantee (being simply an argument) against the possible effect of free movement of 
goods.  
 
As a whole, even as a non-binding instrument, the Charter as now refined by 
Parliament v Council, is also a milestone in building up a European industrial 
relations system (discussed in sections 3.2 to 3.5, infra). A further confirmation of the 
role of the Charter as a source of EU law came in the Unibet judgment, in which the 
ECJ referred to it as a further foundation of the principle of effective judicial 
protection, ‘reaffirmed’ by Article 47 of the Charter (next to the ECHR and the 
constitutional traditions) as the judgment noted; in the Advocaten voor de Wereld 
judgment, the ECJ again referred to the EU Charter, this time regarding the principle 
of the legality of criminal offences and penalties and the principle of equality and 





The Court’s recourse to the EU Charter as an argument (or a source of law; it was in 
any case more than a mere source of inspiration) in Parliament v Council, etc. also 
leads us to tackle in brief the issue of justiciable and programmatic rights in the 
Charter. This is of interpretive relevance before the Reform Treaty renders the Charter 
legally binding (as is obvious). Of course, the Charter rights will only be directly 
justiciable in principle following a formal binding effect by the entry into force of the 
Reform Treaty which I touch on below and discuss further in section 3.4. The 
interpretive effect of the Charter as a non-binding instrument naturally depends on the 
power of the wording of the clause concerned. It may naturally overlap with the 
Treaty provisions and secondary EU law concerned. Basically the distinction between 
justiciable and programmatic rights also applies, mutatis mutandis, regarding the 
interpretive effect. Whereas the Charter is a proclamation of the Member States 
(although via the Council of Ministers), it would be natural to support a more binding 
effect now, and thus vertically (although not a binding effect de jure) vis-à-vis a 
Member State. This is not to deny the interpretive effect in horizontal relations, which 
exists as well. On the other hand, it is appropriate to note that the justiciability debate 
may also reflect a simplistic insight into the way the Charter functions. As de Búrca 
                                                 
118 See that I take Article 137(5) EC as a procedural norm implying only that the Community 
will not adopt a directive on freedom of association and right to strike under Article 137 EC. 
This does not definitively rule out a directive under Article 94 or a measure under 308 EC. 
See, however, the negative position of Syrpis in footnote 16, supra, and of Mengozzi at 
footnote 289, infra, and the more lenient vision of Ryan in footnote 286, infra. Lord 
Wedderburn has defended the possibility of a directive under Article 94, see footnote 286, 
infra. Judge Schintgen has found it open whether a directive on Article 137(5) matters could 
be based on Article 308 EC, see footnote 285, infra.  
119 See case C-432/05 Unibet, judgment of 13.3.2007, nyr, paragraph 37; case C-303/05 
Advocaten voor de Wereld, judgment of 3.5.2007, nyr, paragraph 45. 
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has stated, the Charter will normally function, like the ECHR, as a source of values 
and norms other than those set out in the other treaties, to influence the interpretation 
of EU legislative and other measures, and to feed into policy-making and into EU 
activities more generally.120 This is where Fredman also sees the greatest present 
impact of the Charter, giving ‘the Court of Justice a sound basis on which to counter 
market freedoms.’121 However, given the differences in the wording of the Charter 
Articles on the one hand and the Article 52(5) inserted later (see below) on the other, 
it is not appropriate to avoid discussing justiciability further. 
 
Hence, the background for the justiciability debate is that some members opposed the 
inclusion of social rights as entitlements at the convention drafting the Charter but 
were ready to recognise programmatic social rights, not justiciable, but subject to 
promoting, etc. policy measures. The outcome was that no separate section of 
programmatic social rights was included in the text122 but in some cases it clearly 
indicates the programmatic nature of the ‘right’ concerned, such as that regarding 
consumer protection where the ‘Union policies shall ensure a high level’ of such 
protection (Article 38).123 Additionally, Article 51(1) of the original Charter refers to 
                                                 
120 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Fundamental Rights and Citizenship’, in Bruno de Witte (ed.) Ten 
Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe (European University Institute, 2003), p. 
24. 
121 Sandra Fredman, Transformation or Dilution: Fundamental Rights in the EU Social Space 
 European Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006, p. 57. 
122 On this debate, see the brief explanation of Brian Bercusson, Social and Labour Rights 
under the EU Constitution, in de Búrca and de Witte (eds.), Social Rights in Europe, OUP 
2005, pp. 170-171.  
123 The basic distinction between principles and rights is recognised by Judge Rosas, The Role 
of the European Court of Justice in the application and interpretation of social values and 
rights, in Elina Palola and Annikki Savio (eds.), Refining the Social Dimension in an 
Enlarged EU, Stakes, Helsinki 2005, p.199. Rosas does not enumerate all the rights to be 
regarded as real (individual) entitlements, while he mentions Article 15 on the right to work 
as an entitlement and Article 38 on consumer protection as a principle (p. 199). He later refers 
to the fact that ‘some of the social clauses of the Charter are formulated as individual 
entitlements rather than principles’ and notes how the border-line between justiciable rights 
and mere principles is finally to be drawn by the Court (p. 200). Maduro, footnote 101, supra, 
p. 286, also recognises (as a future area of debate as well) the distinction between social rights 
and ‘goals’. Within the international human rights discourse, having a historical source in the 
distinction between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and 
cultural rights on the other in the corresponding UN Covenants of 1966, it is already normal 
to stress the indivisibility, interdependence and interrelated nature of human rights. In this 
study, it is more linked to the debate on Article 34 of the Charter on social security rights (see 
the third publication, at footnote 213). As to the international law argument, see, e.g., Martin 
Scheinin Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Models of Enforcement (lecture), IHRC 
conference, Dublin 9-10 December 2005, who has also argued for interdependence with non-
discrimination as an example that does not allow any compartmentalisation into civil or social 
rights, etc. (p. 13). On the other hand, the UN itself has issued a Declaration ‘On the Right to 
Development’, adopted in 1986 (General Assembly resolution 41/128). Article 6, paragraph 2 
of the Declaration provides that ‘All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible 
and interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the 
implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights.’ The same position was expressed by the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, 
UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), paragraph I.5 (http://www.unhchr.ch) and by the 
Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
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respect of rights and observance of principles. The Charter, as redrafted by the 
Convention on the Future of Europe and the 2004 IGC, reiterates this distinction 
between rights and principles by providing that the principles will be judicially 
cognisable only in the interpretation of legislative and executive acts by the EU 
institutions and in ruling on their legality (Article II-112(5)). However, as to the hard 
core of collective labour rights, freedom of association for workers is clearly 
guaranteed like the right of everyone in trade union matters, i.e., the right to form and 
to join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests in Article 12; the rights of 
workers and their organisations to collective bargaining and action in Article 28 
would also be clearly justiciable. Since both articles expressly refer to ‘rights’ (instead 
of mere principles or ‘recognised protection’) they should not be subject to dissenting 
justiciability opinions, as is the case regarding Article 34 of the Charter.124 There is 
also a difference between Articles 12 and 28 in that the latter refers to a right ‘in 
accordance with Community law and national laws and practices’. The author does 
not find that this has any direct impact on the justiciability issue, although it 
necessarily entails a debate on the reference’s effect.125 In any case, Article 28 also 
includes the reference to Community law, implying protection there as well (not just 
possible and limited restrictions).    
 
The value and impact of fundamental rights is paramount in the pending Laval and 
Viking cases, on which I will make more detailed remarks in sections 2.5 and 3.3, 
infra. Besides, within the field of fundamental rights, these cases engage a collective 
right (indeed, the right to collective action, as the right of workers’ organisations as 
well, also expressed by Article 28 of the EU Charter in addition to the ILO tradition 
and Article 6(4) ESC) whereas historically fundamental rights have been understood 
and developed primarily as individual rights. 126  Furthermore, these cases will 




Member State Obligation 
 
A remark is also still needed on the status of EU fundamental rights at the Member 
State level. The doctrine and international legal instruments within human or 
fundamental rights have markedly changed the EU ‘law landscape’ at the national 
                                                                                                                                            
Rights adopted by the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Meeting of Deputies on 10 
December 1998, paragraph 4 (https://wsd.coe.int). It seems that the debate on the EU Charter 
forms a sui generis discourse in relation to the international one.    
124 See the position in the previous footnote and the discussion about Article 34 of the Charter 
in the third publication, at footnote 213. 
125 See the comments in section 3.4, infra, at footnotes 314-316.  
126 There is no need to explore in detail the nature of the right to collective action in the 
Member States. In the Nordic-German tradition, Ireland and Greece it is a right of the 
organisations, whereas in France, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and UK as well as in the 
Mediterranean tradition (save Greece) it is an individual right. See further, e.g., Robert 
Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective (Part II), IJCLLIR, 
Vol. 20/1, 2004, p. 110-111. It is essential is that the EU Charter express both the individual 
and collective tradition.  
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level as well. 127  In ERT, the ECJ (small plenum) unambiguously covered the 
protection of fundamental rights (and the reach of its jurisdiction), meaning measures 
of the Member States within the ‘scope of Community law’. 128  Furthermore, 
Schmidberger laconically remarks, as a conclusion flowing from Article 6(2) EU, how 
infringements of fundamental rights are ‘not acceptable in the Community’. 129 
Consequently, whereas the right to collective bargaining and action ultimately do fall 
under the ‘harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities’ 
(Article 2 EC), i.e., the scope of EU law, the Member States and their courts are also 
enjoined to respect the fundamental rights as defined by the EU and/or the ECJ as the 





In concluding one may state that, as to collective labour law, the respect for 
fundamental and human rights in the EU relies both on internal and international law 
sources, notably the European Social Charter and ILO Constitution and Conventions 
regarding social matters. The broad line of development since Stauder130 on the other 
hand shows the ever-growing impetus of fundamental social rights, also reflected by 
the amendments of the EC Treaty and new secondary legislation, especially by the 
Article 13 EC directives, and the adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Despite these developments the market freedoms and competition rules will obviously 
be equally fundamental for the Community legal order for quite some time while the 
scales are seemingly tipping in favour of fundamental rights (as Parliament v Council 
and Cresson indicate). At the same time, it already is justified to conclude that the 
‘all-encompassing and overriding role [of the market freedoms and competition rules] 
seems to belong to the past’.131 Still, in the field of collective labour law Laval and 
                                                 
127 The change has been remarkably salient, not just in the new Member States from Eastern 
Europe but also in Finland that for political reasons did not adhere to the Council of Europe 
until 1989 and the ECHR 1990. 
128 See C-260/89 ERT v. DEP [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraphs 41 and 42. 
129 See case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraph 73; in paragraph 75 
Schmidberger defines the scope of the fundamental rights obligation as being that of 
Community law. The author does not find that the narrower wording of the human rights 
obligation regarding the Member States (i.e., when they implement the Union law), present 
for case-related reasons in the recent judgments within the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, 
such as C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld, judgment of 3.5.2007, nyr, paragraph 45, has 
any effect on that obligation as defined in ERT and Schmidberger. See also the discussion at 
footnotes 310 to 312, infra. A pending case, C-361/07 Polier v Najar, lodged 2.8.2007, 
includes the question about the validity of the French loose dismissal rules under the New 
Recruitment Contract (Contrat Nouvelle Embauche) in light of 1. ‘European law, as defined 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights’; 2. ILO Convention 158; and 3. the European Social 
Charter. While the EU’s secondary law does not include dismissal rules, this case might still 
shed further light on the fundamental rights obligations of the Member States, the effect of the 
EU Charter and the role of the ILO and Council of Europe provisions.  
130 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419. 
131 See Allan Rosas, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the application and 
interpretation of social values and right, in Elina Palola and Annikki Savio (eds.), Refining 
the Social Dimension in an Enlarged EU, p. 201. 
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Viking include reference questions that – following the path opened by Albany – may 
lead to judgments comparable to Defrenne II that launched the path for equal pay 
towards a mature ‘fundamental human right’.132  
 
This picture of the growing impetus of fundamental rights in the EU legal order  
generally and its labour law, especially collective labour law, will be subject to a 
historically and qualitatively new step via the Reform Treaty of 2007, the basic 
contents of which were decided upon by the Brussels Summit of 21/22 June 2007. 
The EU Charter will become legally binding in 2009 – having the same legal value as 
the Treaties in the Member States other than Poland and the United Kingdom.133 
While I will discuss its effect in some more detail in section 3.4, infra, two elementary 
remarks must be made here. First, the binding Charter paves the way to a final 
paradigmatic change in assessing the relationship between fundamental labour rights 
and market freedoms, thus endorsing with good reason the argument that the latter 
should be seen primarily as restrictions of the former in a conflict, not the other way 
round as the historical burden in EU law has suggested until recently. Second, the 
binding Charter will intensify the debate and probably cause litigation involving the 
question about justiciable and programmatic rights, as well as the effect of the 
references to national law within the Charter.  
 
 
1.4.5 The European Social Model and Social Dialogue 
 
Just basic remarks about the European Social Model and Social Dialogue suffice here. 
What are the basic elements of the European social model, an ideological cornerstone 
in an ordre communautaire social approach? In 1994, the Commission published a 
White Paper on social policy that described a European social model as including 
‘democracy and individual rights, free collective bargaining, the market economy, 
equality of opportunity for all and social welfare and solidarity’. 134  What really 
distinguishes the European social model from those in the USA and Japan is the role 
of collective bargaining and collective agreements in defining working conditions. 
                                                 
132 ‘Fundamental human right’ was the expression used (inter alia) by case C-50/96 Deutsche 
Telekom v Schröder [2000] ECR I-743, paragraph 57. On Defrenne II, see section 2.7, infra. 
As to early ECJ practice, I am reminded of the classic human rights case concerning trade 
union rights within free movement of workers, 36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219, paragraph 52. 
Those rights in general terms were protected under EC law against any adverse effect by a 
Member State. The ECJ also relied on Articles 8 to 11 ECHR, beside Article 8 of Regulation 
1612/68/EEC. 
133 See Presidency conclusions, Annex 1, point 5, p. 25; www.consilium.europa.eu. 
134 White Paper on European Social Policy. A Way Forward for the Union, COM (94) 333, p. 
9. The Nice European Council in 2000 defined the European social model as follows: ‘The 
European Social Model, characterized in particular by systems that offer a high level of social 
protection, by the importance of the social dialogue and by services of general interest 
covering activities vital for social cohesion, is today based … on a common core of values’. 
These values mean ‘solidarity and justice as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ 
(paragraph 11). The European Parliament recently noted that ‘social dialogue in its various 
manifestations is an essential element in the traditions of the Member States’. At the same 
time it requested ‘the renewal of the social dialogue at both national and European level and 
the development of a greater role for the trialogue at European level’; see the Resolution on a 
European Social Model for the future, 6.9.2006, paragraph 25; document P6_TA-
PROV(2006)0340. 
 51  
The most salient feature is determining pay by collective agreements at sectoral level 
via the extension procedures of collective agreements (erga omnes)135 that usually 
lead to a coverage of workers ranging from 90-100% in Austria, Belgium and 
Slovenia, 80-90% in the Nordic countries, 70% in Germany, less than 40% in the UK 
and most of the new Member States, and only 15% in the USA.136 
 
Other dimensions are also important in the European social model. These range from 
European Works Councils (directive 94/45/EC) and company level cooperation in the 
form of workers’ participation, now compulsory in the EU since Directive 
2002/14/EC on information and consultation, to sectoral and intersectoral national 
cooperation (and bargaining) that covers a wide range of working life issues and 
influences the drafting of legislation. This national structure is complemented by the 
European social dialogue, anchored in Articles 136, first subparagraph, 138 and 139 
EC, which include the possibility of negotiated legislation and independent European 
collective agreements, as well as covering the participation of the European social 
partners, the ETUC, Businesseurope (ex UNICE), UEAPME and CEEP, even in the 
macroeconomic dialogue with the relevant Community institutions. Furthermore, the 
Commission is obliged to consult the social partners on matters of social policy 
concerning the ‘possible direction of Community action’, and the social partners have 
a kind of a privilege to enter into negotiations on these matters. This structure is – this 
said without any screening of national constitutional provisions – obviously more 
corporatist than the procedures at the national level where, at least on paper, the ILO 
modeled tripartism (mainly consultative)137 functions in drafting social legislation. At 
the EU level, the negotiated legislation emerges without the European Parliament 
having any official status in the proceedings while it has been informed by the 
Commission and has delivered a resolution on the subjects concerned. The formal 
absence of the European Parliament led the Court of First Instance in the UEAPME 
case to apply a collective representativity test: ‘the principle of democracy on which 
the Union is founded requires…that the participation of the people be otherwise 
assured, in this instance through the parties representative of management and labour 
who concluded the agreement which is endowed by the Council…with a legislative 
foundation at Community level’.138 Thus the Court of First Instance clearly found that 
                                                 
135 There is no extension possibility in Denmark, Sweden and the UK.  
136 The figures are given by Brian Bercusson and Niklas Bruun, European Industrial Relations 
Dictionary 2005, p. 6. 
137 See, e.g., Conclusions concerning tripartite consultation at the national level on economic 
and social policy, International Labour Conference, 1996. 
138 Case T-135/96 UEAPME [1998] ECR II-2335, paragraph 89. In this case the European 
Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAPME) challenged the 
Parental Leave Directive because the UEAPME was excluded from the negotiations on the 
agreement underlying the directive. For a detailed discussion on this case, see, e.g., Brian 
Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law, ILJ, Vol. 28., No. 2, June 
1999, pp. 153-170. See also Jari Hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European 
Communities, EC Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European 
Collective Agreements. Labour Policy Studies No. 259, Ministry of Labour (Finland) 2004, 
pp. 115-127.   
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collective bargaining at the EU level constitutes a form of representative democracy. 
It is in this sense thus also an issue of public law.139 
 
The social dialogue at EU level has official recognition in the Treaty and clauses on 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Articles 12 and 28). National collective agreements have been 
directly recognized, e.g., by the Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights) Directive, 
the Working Time Directive, the Posted Workers Directive and in the Article 13 
Directives (the Racial Directive and the Employment Framework Directive), and as a 
general tool in the implementation of directives in Article 137(3) EC. Furthermore, 
the social partners are involved in the EU employment policy.   
  
The ideological premise of the European social model may be called social 
partnership, i.e., the settlement of various working life matters, particularly working 
conditions, by negotiation and agreement between management and labour. The 
importance of the social policy objectives pursued by these agreements also obtained 
principal recognition in the Albany judgment, which established the conditioned 
immunity of collective agreements from EC competition rules; see the third 




1.4.6 Non-discrimination on the Basis of Nationality 
 
The fundamental legal principle of equal treatment irrespective of nationality is one of 
the cornerstones of the Community, as expressed in ex-Article 7 EEC, then Article 6 
EC and now Article 12 EC. That directly applicable provision 140  applies unless 
specific non-discrimination clauses in the Treaty are of use, such as Articles 39(2), 49 
and 50(3) EC.  
 
The principle of equal treatment has been elaborated in free movement of workers by 
Regulation 1612/68 (Regulation 1408/71 in the field of social security of migrant 
workers) and, within free provision of services, by the Posted Workers Directive 
96/71/EC (PWD). Within this directive, equal treatment means generally that the 
posted construction workers are directly subject to same (agreement-based) pay 
provisions as domestic workers by virtue of the directive141 and the Member States 
                                                 
139 The public law aspect (‘the CFI has made it a public law issue’) is also noted by Catherine 
Barnard, The Social Partners and the Governance Agenda, European Law Journal Vol. 8, No. 
1, March 2002, p. 97. 
140 See, e.g., Kapteyn and van Themaat (ed. Gormley), Introduction to the Law of the 
European Communities, 3rd ed., pp. 172-173. Kapteyn and van Themaat refer to cases 293/83 
Gravier v. City of Liège [1985] ECR 593 and 36/74 Walrave & Koch [1974] ECR 1405 and 
refer as an example of systematic discrimination in employment relationships and hold that 
there can be no reason why such treatment would not infringe Article 39 EC. There is also 
case 1/78 Kenny [1978] ECR 1489, paragraph 12, where the ECJ confirmed the direct 
applicability of the first paragraph of Article 7 EEC within the field of Regulation 1408/71, 
‘as implemented by Article [39(3)]’ and the Regulation. On Walrave & Koch, see also section 
4.2 of the second publication. 
141 The German system is an exception in this sense; see sections 3.3 and 3.4 of the second 
publication.  
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have the option of requiring compliance with collective agreements regarding all 
sectors (Article 3(10) PWD).  
   
The ban on discrimination based on nationality extends to any covert 
discrimination.142 On the other hand, unequal or differential treatment can be justified 
only if it is based on objective considerations independent of the nationality of the 
persons concerned and is proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national 
provisions. 143  Finally, unequal treatment could be justified by the exceptions 
stipulated in Articles 39(3) (migrant workers) and 55 EC (referring to Article 46; 
posted workers) on grounds of public policy (ordre public), public security or public 
health.144 The role of these exceptions in employment matters is extremely limited, if 
existent at all regarding migrant workers, and, in the case of posted workers, non-
existent within the hard core of working conditions enumerated in Article 3(1) of the 
Posted Workers Directive.145  
 
The possibility of the Member States adding items to the hard core of compulsory 
working conditions in Article 3(1) PWD has been only of academic interest so far. It 
is, however, worth a brief comment because it is linked both to equal treatment and 
the basic nature of the PWD.146 Thus, outside the rank of the hard-core issues in 
Article 3(1) PWD, the Member States can – respecting the Treaty and equal treatment 
as Article 3(10) PWD expressly states – require compliance with the host state 
benefits if they are of public policy (ordre public) nature. On the other hand, Article 
3(7) shows that the PWD is a minimum directive that does not prevent the application 
of more favourable conditions of employment. This clearly refers to the relatively free 
                                                 
142 Case 61/77 Commission v. Ireland [1978] 4117, paragraph 78.  
143 See inter alia case C-147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969; case C-274/96 
Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637, paragraph 27, and case C-224/98 D'Hoop [2002] ECR 
I-6191, paragraph 36. 
144 As to public policy (ordre public) exceptions to free provision of service, see also section 
4.9.3 of the second publication. 
145 The requirement to apply the minimum conditions, pay included, to posted workers in a 
collective agreement in force in the host state extends by virtue of the Directive (Article 3(1)) 
to the construction sector, as defined by the safety and health directive 92/56/EC. The 
Member States are entitled to extend this to cover collective agreements in all sectors (Article 
3(10)). In practice, according to the Commission, the vast majority of those Member States 
where collective agreements are made universally applicable require that, in the sector(s) 
covered by the relevant collective agreement, undertakings established in another Member 
State comply with the terms and conditions of employment listed in Article 3(1) of the 
Directive which are laid down in the collective agreements. Germany and Hungary are 
exceptions in this regard, having put in place limitations in this area. See Commission Staff 
Working Document; Commission's services report on the implementation of Directive 
96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, 
COM(2006) 159 final, p.19.  
146 I also refer to my example in footnote 55 of the second publication, where I raised as an 
extreme example the issue of a paid 50th anniversary only in the host state collective 
agreement, thus whether it is within the concept of pay in the sense of Article 3(1) PWD. I left 
the issue without any proposed or predicted outcome. I now wish to stress the principle of 
equal treatment that requires that if a host state worker is entitled to a paid 50th anniversary, 
the same should apply to a posted worker. However, since it would not be a surprise to see the 
opposite decision in light of Portugaia, footnote 149, infra, the benefit as not ‘augmenting 
significantly’ the protection of the posted worker. 
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hand on the part of the Member States to extend the hard-core list in Article 3(1). A 
succinct explanation is that even as a minimum directive the PWD applies in the 
framework of the Treaty,147 i.e., the restrictions on free provision of services have to 
pass the Arblade test, be justifiable with the overriding requirements of general 
interest, and be apt for their purpose and not go beyond what is necessary to attain 
it.148  In practice, the Commission v Germany case shows that the proportionality 
assessment works as a final safety valve against social protectionism. A source for a 
practical solution one finds in Arblade itself, where the Court held that imposition of 
payments of wage components via a host state social fund requires an ‘advantage 
capable of providing [the posted workers] with real additional protection which they 
would not otherwise enjoy’ (paragraph 54).149  Even so, an ultimate weighting in 
assessing the advantage concerned, normally under the interpretation of ‘public 
policy’, will obviously happen between the basic objectives of the Directive of free 
provision of services and protection of workers.150    
 
In case of posted workers, the ECJ has also accepted in Finalarte a ‘positive’ 
differential treatment of posted workers so as to strengthen their protection in 
realising the payment of holiday pay.151 This line-drawing was clearly connected, 
although not via an express reference to the specific need of protection for posted 
construction workers in the Finalarte judgment, recognised already in judgements 
Guiot and Arblade.152 
 
                                                 
147 This is the main point of the first chapter of my second publication. 
148 On the Arblade test, see section 1.2.3 of the second publication. On the proportionality test, 
see sections 2.2.5 (in the context of Wolff & Müller) and sections 3.3.3 and 3.4 (in the context 
of the Commission v. Germany case) of the second publication.  
149 A similar definition is in case C-164/99 Portugaia [2002] ECR I-787, paragraph 29, 
which, although relating to the justification of the imposition of host state pay provisions in 
the light of the protectionist grounds of the German posting law AentG, referred to ‘a genuine 
benefit on the workers concerned, which significantly augments their social protection.’ 
150 This weighting is the ultimate ‘solution’ also found by Eeva Kolehmainen and Ulla 
Liukkunen (who however seems to anticipate ‘a quite narrow’ interpretation of Article 3(10)). 
See Eeva Kolehmainen, The Posted Workers Directive: European Reinforcement of National 
Labour Protection. European University Institute, 2002, pp. 47-50; Ulla Liukkunen, The Role 
of Mandatory Rules in International Labour Law; A Comparative Study in the Conflict of 
Laws. Talentum, Helsinki 2004, pp. 185-187. 
151 The differential treatment is linked to the payment of holiday pay via a paid leave fund 
(called ULAK at that time, nowadays SOKA-BAU). The contributions paid by the employer 
to the fund form the holiday pay. For domestic workers, this money is paid from the fund to 
the employer, to be forwarded to the workers concerned. The fund pays the holiday 
entitlement for workers posted by an employer from another Member State (or from third 
countries) directly. This system was challenged as forbidden unequal treatment under Articles 
59 and 60. The ECJ found, first, that it was for the national court to verify whether this system 
was disadvantageous for domestic employers (which was clearly unlikely), and, second, that 
there were in any event objective differences in the situation of foreign and domestic 
employers. The ECJ referred to the question of whether the worker really gets the holiday pay 
and naturally found that it was more effective to pay the posted workers directly. 
Accordingly, these objective differences justified the different treatment; see joined cases C-
49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte and Others [2001] 
ECR I-7831, paragraphs 60-65. 
152 See cases C-272/94 Guiot [1996] ECR I-1905, paragraph 16, and C-369/96 Arblade [1999] 
ECR I-8453, paragraph 36. 
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Equal treatment in the field of free movement of workers also implies a protective 
element in relation to domestic workers, who have an interest in prohibiting pay offers 
and work by migrant workers with conditions lower than those applicable to them. 
This is what the ECJ confirmed in 1974 in an infringement case against France.153 It 
must equally be taken into consideration when assessing a collective action against 
such behaviour. EU law cannot shield any behaviour violating the principle of equal 
treatment, whether within free movement of workers or in posting of workers. 
Consequently, it is clear that a collective action by workers and their organizations 
that would intentionally infringe equal treatment in Articles 12 and 13 EC cannot be 
protected by EU law. On the other hand, so far as I know, no Member State has 
passed law on this subject.154   
 
Coming back to the essential, i.e., the broad-brush explanation of equal treatment 
regardless of nationality in EU law, is it crucial to note that the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights Article 21(2) also enshrines it. It is thus a fundamental and 
constitutional principle, and a natural component of any paradigmatic presentation of 
EU labour law as well.  
                                                 
153 Case 167/73 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359, paragraph 45: ‘The absolute nature of 
this prohibition [against discrimination], moreover, has the effect of not only allowing in each 
state equal access to employment to the nationals of other Member States, but also … of 
guaranteeing to the State’s own nationals that they shall not suffer the unfavourable 
consequences which could result from the offer or acceptance by nationals of other Member 
States of conditions of employment or remuneration less advantageous than those obtaining 
under national law, since such acceptance is prohibited.’  
154 I recall that in judgment KKO 2000:94 Estonian Shipping Company (Rakvere), (see 
section 4.10.5 of the second publication) the Supreme Court of Finland foresaw an express 
prohibition in directly applicable EC law for the prohibition to be legitimate. The sensitivity 
of the issue is reflected by the fact that the British High Court in case C-438/05 The 
International Transport Workers’ Federation and the Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) v. 
Viking (see section 4.10.5 of the second publication) found that the action threatened by the 
FSU would amount to direct discrimination, when and if the FSU demanded that the Estonian 
crew on board the re-flagged Viking Rosella get a Finnish wage. The High Court saw direct 
discrimination in the fact that the FSU in its press releases also spoke about protecting Finnish 
jobs and that such a demand would lead to excluding the Estonian seafarers from the jobs 
concerned (paragraphs 118-120 of the judgment). The Court of Appeal, which referred the 
case to the ECJ, did not adhere to this discrimination reasoning of the High Court. 
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Chapter II 
 
Economic and Social Factors in the Light of ordre communautaire 
social: Recapping the Development of Economic and Social Factors 
from Previous Articles 
 
2.1 General Remarks 
 
Considering ordre communautaire social as an EU labour law paradigm requires a 
historical approach. Within such an approach it is useful and illustrative to draw 
attention to the main characteristics and developments of the social and economic 
factors as reflected in my previous publications. I do not maintain that the relationship 
between these factors explains everything essential, but it is at least a good bridge into 
a comprehensive discussion. 
 
Deviating from the much more social approach of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community was built up and assumed a 
markedly functional way of integration from the outset, that concerning the 
establishment of the common market with free competition. Upward harmonisation 
was the supposed result of the functioning of the Common Market (the Common 
Market credo). Social partners the Community did not recognise at all. In sum, it was 
the European Economic Community with some embryonic characteristics of 
independent labour law (in addition to free movement of workers), such as equal pay 
(Article 119 EEC) and the ‘equilibrium of paid annual holidays’ (Article 120 EEC). 
However, the Treaty structure also laid down the necessary foundations for future 




2.2 Collective Redundancy and Transfer of Undertaking (Acquired Rights) 
Directives  
 
The Treaty of Rome remained intact when E(E)C employment law started to emerge 
in the 1970s, which means that only a change in the shared system of values explains 
this emergence. This change of values, also related to the first oil crisis in the early 
1970s and favourable political changes in France and Germany, resulted in the labour 
law directives of 1970s on collective redundancies, equal pay and equal treatment and 
transfer of undertakings. The social dimension gained new ground. The Collective 
Redundancy Directive did not touch on the employer’s prerogatives but remained, 
notwithstanding the promise on harmonising the redundancy conditions in the 
Preamble, essentially procedural, let alone dealing with problems like those in 
multinational companies, such as whether they have looser requirements for material 
grounds for dismissal. This is still true today, although directive 92/56/EC added the 
responsibility of the daughter company for negligence by the controlling undertaking 
of the directive (Article 2(4)) concerning information and consultation of workers. 
The same rule was added to the Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights) Directive 
98/50/EC, a directive which has more teeth. While its main effect is to transfer the 
                                                 
155 More details appear in the first publication, pp. 3-9. 
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employment relationships, it also transfers the collective agreement concerned for at 
least a year following the transfer (unless it expires earlier or is replaced by another 
agreement). In this sense, the directive already operated with collective agreements in 
the 1970s.  
 
The Transfer Directive does not aim at preventing even pure transfers in shareholders’ 
interest operationally, but smoothes them and protects workers’ rights as much as 
possible. In any case, it is not justified to say that as a specific act it realises the 
supremacy of an economic factor in EC law. It rather represents a general balance 
between the economic and social factors. The alleged transferee in the Allen et al. v 
Amalgamated Construction case invoked competition rules so as to prevent a transfer 
within a group of companies from falling within the ambit of the Directive. The Court 
dismissed this argument with the assertion that ‘nothing’ justified it, which was 
finally based on social values. The social purpose of the Directive counted for more 
than this economic argument about competition.156  
 
As a whole the Transfer Directive is perhaps the most penetrating part of secondary 
European employment law, especially by governing the concept of transfer and 
covering also cross-border transfers.157 158 Seen in terms of fundamental rights, it 
implements the information and consultation rights of the 1989 Community Charter 
(points 17 and 18) and the EU Charter (Article 27), as does the Collective 
Redundancy Directive. Only the Transfer Directive really implements material 
protection against unjustified dismissal (Article 30 of the EU Charter)159 while the 
                                                 
156 Case C-234/98 [1999] ECR I-8643; see section II.2.3 of the first publication, especially p. 
33. See also chapter II, section 2.7 of the first publication.  
157 As a detail to be elaborated I mention the upwards harmonisation in the context of the 
Transfer Directive. In the first publication (p. 44) I mentioned that the consolidated Transfer 
Directive 2001/23/EC no longer includes a reference to upwards harmonisation (thus, to 
Article 136, which succeeds Article 117 EC). What the consolidation directive still spells out 
(fifth recital of the preamble) is the reference to the Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers of 1989 point 7, which states that ‘The completion of the internal 
market must lead to an improvement in the living and working conditions of workers in the 
European Community’. 
158 The Commission has now also published Bob Hepple’s 1998 report ‘The Legal 
Consequences of Cross-border Transfers of Undertakings within the European Union’ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/labour_law/documentation_en.htm#21) on the 
internet, in which he discusses these transfers (especially pp. 3 to 7), however, not transfers 
specifically within a group of companies that I covered in my first publication (section 2.2.3). 
Gaul et al. (CMS Employment Practice Area Group), Study on the Application of Directive 
2001/23/EC to Cross Border Transfers of Undertakings, European Commission 2006 
discusses the effects of cross-border transfers in nine Member States and proposed 
amendments in the Directive. 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/labour_law/documentation _en.htm#21. They, too, see 
no problem in principle over transfers within a group of companies. Finally, the Commission 
published a report on the application of Directive 2001/23, COM(2007)334 final on 
18.6.2007, and launched the consultation of the social partners under Article 138 EC on 
possible amendments to the Directive on 20.6.2007, although only in the context of a change 
of work-place at cross-border transfers. 
159 Judgment (26.10.2006, nyr) of the Civil Service Tribunal in case F-1/05 Landgren v 
Commission shows how Article 30 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was used as a 
legal source, together with the ILO’s Termination of Employment Convention 158 and the 
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Redundancy Directive is essentially procedural. The background for this is that the 
Redundancy Directive requires notification of the reasons for the projected 
redundancies as well as the obligation to negotiate with a view to reaching an 
agreement, and a protective element of economic nature, but it does not in itself set up 
any ‘redundancy threshold’, such as whether the redundancies are just an ultima ratio 
as in Austria, Belgium, France and Germany. In general terms these two directives, 
each in their particular ways, (more or less) still reflect the principle that ‘labour is not 
a commodity’, are also linked to fundamental rights and represent the negotiation 
tradition of the European social model, the Redundancy Directive by requiring 
negotiations directed at an agreement and the Transfer Directive by transferring the 
collective agreement concerned as well. They thus seem now to be tied to ordre 
communautaire social in several ways.160 An issue as such is that both directives 
guarantee information and consultation only at the level of a subsidiary instead of the 
controlling undertaking, a lack emphasized by the growing transnational (even global) 
restructuring of enterprises. This deficiency is, of course, alleviated to some extent (in 
groups of companies with at least 1000 employees of whom 150 are in each of at least 
two Member States) by the fact that the European Works Council Directive imposes 
information and consultation in restructuring cases involving establishments in at least 
two Member States.  
 
Taking the ‘labour is not a commodity’ maxim and protection against unjustified 
dismissal more seriously and governing the relationship between management and 
labour more comprehensively would require defining the redundancy threshold and 
redundancy payments in the Collective Redundancy Directive in the spirit of ordre 
communautaire social above all.  
 
 
2.3 Machinery Safety 
 
Machinery safety was one of the topics discussed in the first publication, highlighting 
the point that only safe machines are allowed onto the market under Article 2(1) of the 
Machinery Directive 98/37/EC (MD). The social aspect ‘works’ as a precondition for 
                                                                                                                                            
Revised European Social Charter, in interpreting the Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European 
Communities respectively; see paragraphs 69-72. Materially the case concerned grounds for 
dismissal and their compulsory expression. Article 30 of the EU Charter, read in line with 
Article 24 of the Revised European Social Charter, is obviously to be interpreted as also 
covering protection in collective redundancies for economic/collective reasons; see Niklas 
Bruun, Protection against unjustified dismissal, in Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Nomos 2006., p. 351. This interpretation supports adding 
substantive norms on redundancy payments to the Collective Redundancy Directive. 
160 As a ‘direct application’ of ordre communautaire social, Bercusson has come up with a 
proposal to amend the Transfer Directive to cover transfers of undertaking realised by 
purchasing the shares of an undertaking as well. This would lead to disclosing information 
and consulting the representatives of the employees affected by the transfer. It would mean ‘a 
foothold gained for worker involvement in share transfers on the stock market’. Other purely 
financial transactions could be functionally linked to a change in the enterprise substantial 
enough to equate to the transfer of an undertaking. Brian Bercusson, Results of the “Paths to 
Progress” Working Group, the ETUC’s ‘Paths to Progress’ Conference, Vienna 19 May 2006, 
paragraphs 25 and 26; available via 
http://www.etuc.org/IMG/doc/Discussion_paper_Bercusson.doc. 
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the enjoyment of the economic freedom (free movement of goods) whereas the 
essential safety requirements set up by the MD also cover machines not marketed in 
other Member States. This is the result of the exhaustive harmonization of the 
essential safety requirements.161 At the same time, the structure in the MD (safety, the 
social factor, precedes the economic freedom) in principle militates against superiority 
of the economic freedom. In practice the issue may be much more complicated once a 
machine gets a compliance certification from a so-called notified certification body. 
 
As an example of a situation where national measures concern free movement of 
goods tested and certified in another Member State, I referred in the first publication 
to the A.G.M.-COS.MET v Suomen valtio (the Finnish State) and Lehtinen case.162 
This concerns compensation for the damage AGM claims to have suffered in the form 
of reduced sales as a result of breaches of the MD in the form of the public conformity 
criticism expressed by the market supervisor Lehtinen; despite this criticism the 
Finnish authorities issued a positive market supervision decision. AGM has also 
directed its compensation claim against Lehtinen. 
 
At the heart of the case is the material question of conformity with the MD of a 
vehicle lift used in garages, a machine involving working under a heavy load and 
therefore being particularly risky in the sense of the Directive. However, the ECJ did 
not answer a particular conformity question posed by the national court in its 
judgment of 17 April 2007 because Finland had not resorted to the possibility under 
Article 7(1) MD of exceptionally withdrawing a machine from the market for safety 
reasons; see paragraphs 60 to 65 and 74 of the judgment. Thus, the conformity 
presumption was in force, based on the compliance certification granted in another 
Member State. The Court decided literally to respect the institutional structure and 
status of the Member States in implementing the Machinery Directive. In so doing it 
also avoided any reasoning on the status of safety and health in EU law in principle, 
tied as it is at least to Article 31 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and free as 
it should be from any diluting proportionality doctrine.163 
 
However, there was a legitimate expectation, certainly on the basis of the effective 
judicial protection of the market inspector Lehtinen, that the Court would have 
answered the particular question on the conformity of the machine, given the settled 
case-law expressed in Bosman, where the Court stated that ‘it has no jurisdiction to 
give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite 
obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by that court bears no 
relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose’.164 This ‘obviously no 
relation’ doctrine gave way to the particular status of the Member States in the 
implementation of harmonised secondary law, since as long as a Member State has 
not prohibited marketing of machinery under Article 7(1) MD, the conformity 
presumption is valid and the Court does not answer questions linked to possible non-
conformity. On the other hand, a legitimate expectation is that the Court would 
answer such a question in a preliminary reference in the proceedings instituted by a 
                                                 
161 Article 95(3) EC leaves a tiny opportunity for national safety norms which I pass over 
here. 
162 Case C-470/03, preliminary ruling of 17.4.2007, nyr; see also section II.2.5 of the first 
publication.  
163 For the proportionality reasoning, see section 2.5 of chapter II in the first publication.  
164 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 61. 
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trade union. Hence, whereas the principle of effective judicial protection is a general 
principle of Community law, affirmed by the ECHR and reaffirmed by the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights,165 it seems clear that a trade union must be able to 
challenge a conformity decision of a Member State, i.e., before national courts and 
obviously leading to a substantive preliminary ruling by the ECJ. Otherwise these 
decisions would fall outside effective judicial control, infringing the ECHR and the 
EU Charter.  
 
However, the judgment in AGM-COS.MET illustrates the close link between the 
substantive and procedural aspects of the Machinery Directive. In this case the safety 
experts of the then 25 Member States and the Commission have adopted the position 
that the machine does not conform.166  Obviously only the Finnish administration 
disagrees. Nevertheless, so far these AGM-proceedings show the superiority of the 
economic freedom over the health and safety aspects inherent in machinery safety. It 
remains to be seen whether this will be the final position. 
 
What then can be said about the AGM proceedings in the light of ordre 
communautaire social thinking? The first remark is that the MD does not foresee 
effective judicial protection (required by Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, as well as by 
Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) in a case like this, requiring it 
only in the reverse situation, i.e., for the producer or importer if a machine has been 
withdrawn from the market by the authorities. The MD should be amended 
accordingly, although the effective judicial protection as a general principle of 
Community law must lead to a legal remedy available to at least the workers 
concerned and their representatives. Secondly, the treatment reserved for mechanics 
working under a heavy load does not conform to the ‘labour is not a commodity’ 
premise. It seems to be that as long as they work under a heavy load on the AGM lift 
their safety and health situation is not being taken seriously. Thirdly, the introduction 
of the lift type concerned in the 1990s meant a deterioration of the health and safety 
position which runs counter to the principle of improved working conditions. Fourthly, 
the right to healthy and safe working conditions is a fundamental right (Article 31 of 
the EU Charter). These points corroborate the conclusion on the substantive non-
conformity of the machine. It remains to be seen if a complaint by the Finnish 
Metalworkers’ Union might lead to a decision by the Commission to withdraw the 
machine concerned from the market, or if new national judicial proceedings may lead 




2.4 Posting of Workers 
 
There is no need to repeat the general analysis on the social dimension in posting of 
workers within the free provision of services which fills the first chapter of the second 
publication. Some succinct remarks suffice. Indeed, the developments in posting of 
                                                 
165 See, e.g., case C-432/05 Unibet, judgment of 13.3.2007, paragraph 37. 
166 See the position of the ‘Working Group 98/37 Machinery’ that, preceded by the 
Commission and gathering the experts of the Member States, works in connection with the 
Commission; the position is expressed by the data sheet of 1.7.2004, document 
CNB/M/08.016, of the Coordination Body of the bodies notified under the Machinery 
Directive.  
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workers are based on the seminal interpretation of the Treaty in the Seco case in 1982, 
according to which Community law does not prevent the Member States from 
extending their laws and collective agreements relating to minimum wages to posted 
workers (extension right). The Advocate General had proposed the obligation to 
tolerate low-wage competition from other Member States in posting situations as a 
fundamental feature of the Common Market.167 In Arblade, the full Court reconfirmed 
the overall status of protection of workers as an overriding requirement of general 
(public) interest justifying restrictions to the fundamental freedom of provision of 
services and the extension right (application of national minimum wages in law or 
collective agreements to posted workers) as a response to a particular question posed 
by a national court. It is justified to speak about the Arblade test in assessing labour 
law restrictions on free provision of services.168 The extension right is its intrinsic 
corollary.   
 
In the first publication, I have already referred to the fact that economic aims cannot 
constitute grounds of public policy or overriding reasons of general interest justifying 
restrictions on the free provision of services. 169  The first chapter of the second 
publication for its part showed above all how the Posted Workers Directive (PWD) is 
to be understood today as a political confirmation of the Court’s case-law (Seco, Rush 
Portuguesa, Vander Elst), according to which protection of workers enables the 
Member States, respecting the obligations of Treaty, notably proportionality,170 to 
extend their hard-core employment law provisions (especially those on pay, working 
time and paid annual holidays) to posted workers. In the construction sector the 
Directive also imposes the provisions in the relevant (national) collective agreements 
(erga omnes) on posting employers directly, and in other sectors the Member States 
are also entitled to cover collective agreements as binding legal sources of the posting 
employer’s obligations. The Directive also recognises the Danish-Swedish ‘erga 
omnes de facto’ of collective agreements (Article 3(8) PWD). The PWD in itself is a 
compromise combining the promotion of free movement of services (by establishing a 
level playing field for it) and the rights of workers, as the fifth Recital of its Preamble 
demonstrates.  
 
What can be said about the EU’s posting regime, i.e., the PWD in the framework of 
the Treaty, in an ordre communautaire social sense?  
 
First, the regime combines the PWD with a seminal interpretation of the EC Treaty by 
the Court (establishing the extension right), the PWD then turning the extension right 
of the Member States into their obligation. It is also reasonably settled as to working 
                                                 
167 Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81 Seco and Desquenne & Giral v EVI [1982] ECR 223, 
paragraph 14; see section 1.2.2 of the second publication.  
168 Joined cases C-369/96 and 376/96 Arblade [1998] ECR I-8453. The Arblade test is in 
paragraphs 33 to 36 and the extension right in paragraph 41. 
169 See section II.2.3 of the first publication.  
170 Proportionality in practice works as a safety valve against social protectionism that has no 
restrictive substance in ‘normal’ cases because protection of workers is its yardstick. See 
especially the analysis of case C-341/02 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-2733 in 
section 3.3.3, p. 65, of the second publication. That case also confirmed that the 
proportionality assessment covers the extension of national minimum wages to posted 
workers (paragraph 24). Case C-164/99 Portugaia [2002] ECR I-787, paragraph 24, already 
expressed the same. 
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conditions enumerated in Article 3(1) PWD.171 Regarding working conditions not 
enumerated in Article 3(1) PWD, the Member States may impose national rules of a 
public policy nature (Article 3(10) PWD) based on the fact that the PWD is a 
minimum directive (Article 3(7) PWD) while always respecting the Arblade test on 
overriding reasons of general interest as well.172 The essential concept in that test is 
protection of workers (Arblade, paragraph 36) that justifies restrictions on freedom to 
provide services as an overriding reason/requirement of general interest. Protection of 
workers can also be found applicable regarding other market freedoms (free 
movement of workers, goods and capital and right of establishment whose 
convergence with the freedom to provide services is notorious on this conceptual 
level) 173  and competition rules for valid reasons, thus limiting market freedom. 
Protection of workers can therefore be said to represent a concept stemming from the 
heart of EU law (the internal market), more precisely from the interaction between the 
economic and social factors in the application of the market rules, which, however, 
belongs firmly to ordre communautaire social. 
 
Second, the posting regime ‘works’ within and regulates the free provision of services, 
a fundamental freedom on the internal market, in a very specific way. I would say that 
‘social’ even regulates ‘economic’ to some degree, although the PWD also has the 
capacity to press the actual wages of ‘host state’ workers downwards by the influx of 
posted workers with minimum wages (while not below the minimum;, in this sense, 
economic considerations still regulate or, more appropriately put, affect social 
considerations). As we learn, in addition to Seco, especially from Wolff & Müller, 
prevention of social dumping is recognised as a potential overriding reason capable of 
restricting the free provision of services.174 
 
Third, the posting regime does not reflect the supremacy of the economic (free market) 
values but rather sets up a balance between the economic (free market) and social 
values by imposing compliance with the host state’s minimum pay and other basic 
                                                 
171 As to extreme pay provisions obviously not fully settled by the directive and its reading 
under the public interest doctrine (the Arblade test), see the question of a paid 50th anniversary 
under the host state rules (if not paid under the home state rules) in footnote 146, supra.  
172 Dismissal and lay-off rules are an example of this type of regulation. They may also imply 
direct cost factors capable of distorting competition. Delicate situations may arise in the use 
of the right to strike by the posted workers. The PWD does not affect the strike rules of the 
Member States, given Recital 22 of its Preamble. Normally, strike rules are of matters of 
national public policy, which hints at the interpretation that a host state may impose its strike 
rules on posted workers. However, it is questionable whether the host state may reduce the 
right to strike guaranteed by the home state. While this reasoning is so far only of academic 
interest (the strikes concerned have not led to litigation at the European level and such 
litigation is also obviously rare nationally), I pass over any detailed reasoning on this matter. 
The issue is also linked to the concept of the ILO right to strike as a minimum binding in the 
EU (as supported by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights); see chapter IV of the second 
publication and section 2.5, infra.  
173 Analogical interpretation of the market freedoms is salient for instance in case C-36/02 
Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609, paragraphs 30, 35 and 36. 
174 See case C-60/03 Wolff & Müller [2004] ECR I-9553, paragraph 41. The judgment used 
the neutral formula of ‘unfair competition on the part of undertakings paying their workers at 
a rate less than the minimum rate of pay’. 
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working conditions.175 The PWD is a measure for market consolidation combining 
social and economic reasons. Thus, a special EU characteristic is that this regime 
represents both a social policy measure and a competition regulator that found its 
‘legal home’ in the framework of ´the free provision of services.  
 
Fourth, in the construction sector, the EU regime operates with national collective 
agreements that are the most typical feature of the European social model.  
 
For these reasons it is certainly justified to see the EU’s posting regime (the Treaty 
interpretations and the PWD) as an elementary reflection of ordre communautaire 
social, being in reality a tailor-made and internal-market-bound regime.176 It also 
absolutely reflects the principle that ‘labour is not a commodity’, which in the case of 
workers posted from the new Member States to an old Member State may mean a 
wage treble or even quadruple that earned in the home state. Had the Court in Seco 
confirmed the Advocate General’s view on compulsory tolerance of low-wage 
competition from other Member States, one could describe this as reflecting the 
hypothetical principle that ‘labour is (only) a commodity’, subject like goods to free 
export and import in principle, one might add. Accepting the Advocate General’s 
view in Seco would have legitimated and initiated a drastic race to the bottom in 
posting situations with an obvious spill-over effect on other areas of EC law. 
Reversing the effect of such a judgment in Seco would have obviously required an 
amendment of the EC Treaty, perhaps unachievable.  
 
However, the developments in the posting field continue in the form of the pending 
Rüffert case. 177  Elementary comments suffice here. The national court 
                                                 
175 Bruno de Witte has written that ‘the enactment of this Directive was a politically and 
legally controversial use of internal market competences to favour social policy ends.’ I 
disagree somewhat because de Witte’s contention loses the economic, i.e., the competition 
regulating incentive on the side of the employers, which pushed the organised employers 
(especially the FIEC, the European Construction Industry Federation) to support the 
Directive. However, de Witte also asserts that, the Directive can be seen as a contribution to 
the protection of the fundamental social rights of workers; see Bruno de Witte, The Trajectory 
of Fundamental Social Rights in the EU, in de Búrca et al. (eds.), Social Rights in Europe, 
OUP 2005, pp. 164-165. The contention on protection of host state workers’ fundamental 
rights is easy to share because the Directive de facto protects the nation-wide collective 
agreements of the host state, the collective agreements (in the construction sector) stemming 
from the use of freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and sometimes also 
from the right to collective action.  
176 The PWD has a model in the ILO’s Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention, 1949 
(convention No. 94). It requires compliance with the relevant collective agreements and 
legislation (Article 2) in public works and performance or supply of services, as to wages, 
hours of work and other conditions of labour,. Ten EU Member States have ratified it.   
177 Case C-346/06 Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony); Rechtsanwalt Dr. Rüffert 
acts as liquidator of the assets of Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co. KG. The decision of the 
referring court does not reveal the extent to which the Polish workers in the bricklaying works 
concerned fall under the proper collective agreement (wage groups 2a to 6) or the minimum 
wage regulation (the Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz –AEntG implementing the PWD, thus 
wage groups 1 and 2). In any case the decision reveals that the Polish subcontractor had paid 
its workers 46.57% of the minimum wages under the AEntG. Hence, the case concerns social 
dumping. In a recent judgment (18.7.2007) in case C-490/04 Commission v Germany, nyr, the 
ECJ (contrary to the AG) found that Germany has not infringed Article 49 EC (instead of the 
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(Oberlandesgericht Celle, Germany) asks whether it is compatible with Article 49 EC 
to require compliance with the collective agreement in force in a public procurement 
contract by virtue of a German state law (Lower Saxony), instead of the lower 
minimum wages set up by the national law primarily implementing the PWD. In the 
grounds of the reference question the national court inter alia adheres to a position (a 
majority in the German doctrine, writes the court) that such compliance exceeds what 
is required by the protection of workers and prevents employers from another 
Member States from benefiting from their cost advantage by lower wages. There is, 
indeed, a considerable cost advantage if German employers have to comply with the 
collective agreement while the foreign employers, applying the philosophy of the 
national court, were able to operate with 20 to 50% lower wage costs. It is striking 
that the national court in its reference decision does not discuss the PWD at all. It is a 
minimum directive that certainly legitimizes compliance with the whole wage scale of 
the collective agreement concerned.178 Besides, such implementation of the PWD is in 
a clear majority among at least the ‘old’ Member States (the UK applies purely 
statutory minimum wages instead of collective agreements). As to the cost advantage, 
it seems apparent that the national court has not read paragraph 41 of Wolff&Müller 
where the ECJ referred to wages lower than the host state minimum (the national 
court selectively refers to Wolff&Müller down to paragraph 35),179 let alone compared 
the opinion of the Advocate General and the judgment in Seco. 180 However, there is 
hardly serious doubt about the outcome in this case. Continuing settled case-law 
(normally also with recourse to the Directive) seems to legitimate the Lower Saxony 
procurement law. In his recent opinion, AG Bot adheres to this position, relying 
essentially on the minimum nature of the PWD (Article 3(7), first subparagraph) and 
to a classic analysis under what I have called the Arblade test. Under Article 49 EC, 
proportionate restrictions on freedom to provide services like wages higher than the 
                                                                                                                                            
PWD) by inter alia requiring a foreign construction employer posting workers into Germany 
to discharge the holiday pay via the German Social Fund of the sector (SOKA-BAU) unless 
there is a corresponding fund in the home state (paragraphs 45 to 55). The payment 
requirement via a social fund is covered by Declaration No. 7 attached to the PWD (see, e.g., 
the Council document 10048/96 for the Council meeting of 24.9.1996 ‘Statements for entry in 
the Council minutes’, Addendum 1 (SOC264, CODEC 550)). Thus, while the PWD at this 
point elaborates Article 49 EC, it would have been a legitimate expectation that the 
infringement claim would have been assessed (i.e., dismissed) on the basis of the PWD and 
the Declaration. The reason for assessing the holiday pay scheme under Article 49 EC was 
that the PWD does not harmonise the payment rules concerned (paragraph 19). The necessary 
conclusion (deviating from the purpose of the PWD and leaving aside the Declarations) seems 
to be that issues not expressly mentioned by the PWD are scrutinised under Article 49. In 
Commission v Germany, the ECJ also accepted the German requirement to have the basic 
working documents translated into German (paragraphs 63 to 80). 
178 See also the 12th recital of the preamble to the Directive and Article 3(1), second 
subparagraph, which leaves the definition of the minimum wages concerned to the Member 
States. Another issue is that Germany in its national law (the Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz) 
primarily implementing the PWD has recourse only to wages lower than those in the 
collective agreement for the construction sector, or is limited to the two lowest wage 
categories, whereas they are seven in all in the collective agreement concerned; see section 
3.3.1 of the second publication. The public procurement laws de facto also implement the 
PWD, corresponding better to its spirit than the AentG as well.  
179 See above, at footnote 174, supra. 
180 See above, at footnote 167, supra, and section 1.2.2, at footnote 14, of the second 
publication.  
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national ‘minimum of minima’ fixed by law or collective agreements, are justified 
where they significantly augment the benefits of the posted workers and, in public 
procurement, meet the requirements of transparency.181 
 
One principal aspect remains in posting of workers. In the second publication I left it 
open whether the trade union organisations of the host state may resort to collective 
action in order to claim a market wage payable to the posted workers.182 By market 
wage I mean one that, depending on historical, sociological and political factors, 
availability of manpower, economic trends, geographic circumstances, etc., is higher 
than that in the law or national collective agreement concerned. In the second 
publication I initially referred to Articles 2 (including ‘a harmonious, balanced and 
sustainable development of economic activities’ and ‘the raising of the standard of 
living’), 3, 4, 12, 50(3) and 136 EC (improved working conditions and upward 
harmonisation), as well as Article 6(1) EU as strongly suggesting that the EU law 
does not outlaw a claim based on market wages.183 A couple of additional remarks can 
also be made. First, the minimum nature of the PWD, a political confirmation of the 
European legislator to the Treaty-based case-law of the Court, also supports this 
outcome. Second, if the market wage can be legally claimed against a non-organised 
domestic employer184 (as is the case in a Swedish or Finnish context, for instance) 
then the application of the non-discrimination principle (Articles 12 and 50(3) EC) to 
a non-organised foreign service-provider doubtlessly leads to the same. Third, in 
applying the principle of the open market economy (Article 4 EC),185 one may ask 
whether a ‘market action’ would be allowed only for the companies and 
corresponding economic actors; there is no real legal reason to deny this right 
regarding workers and their organisations as ‘market actors’ and thus to restrict a 
fundamental right. In sum: the claim on a market wage obviously enjoys protection 
under EU law.  
 
In the light of ordre communautaire social it is easy to see that the interpretation 
suggested above in the market wage issue represents upward harmonisation and 
improved working conditions (within the limits of protection of workers) and the use 
of the fundamental right to collective action, and respects the principle of non-
discrimination. The other way round, EU law will not protect an employer’s 
                                                 
181 See the opinion of 20 September 2007. The only prominent statement requiring comment 
in the opinion is that indicating the sector-wide collective agreement in force between 
organised management and labour as a ‘specific’ agreement in relation to the erga omnes 
agreement on minimum wages (‘TV Mindestlohn’); paragraphs 26 to 28. It is equally possible 
to see the ‘TV Mindestlohn’ as ‘specific’ in relation to the agreement between organised 
management and labour.  
182 Time and space do not allow redeeming the promise made in the second publication to 
come up with profound reasoning on this issue in this synthesis article. However, the issue no 
longer seems to necessitate such treatment.  
183 See section 4.10.4, pp. 124-125. 
184 I mean an employer that does not belong to a host state’s employer organisation that is 
party to the (sectoral) collective agreement concerned.  
185 A clarification has to be made. In the first publication I noted that there is, so far as I know, 
no case connecting Article 4 EC to the ‘leading Articles’ (2 and 3) of the Treaty. However, 
the Court has resorted to Article 4 EC so as to reinforce a competition argument at least in 
case C-198/01 Fiammiferi [2003] ECR I-8055, paragraph 47. The case concerned the national 
competition authority’s power and duty to declare national anti-competitive legislation 
inapplicable.   
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behaviour in exercising market freedom in a way that cuts the working conditions of 
posted workers to a level below the standards of the host state. The market wage 
claim fits into ordre communautaire social well, as does the fight against social 




2.5 The Right to Collective Action. International Law Argument  
 
As the first direct strike (collective action) cases (Laval, and International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ITF) and Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) v. Viking) are pending 
for a preliminary ruling as this study is being written,186 the European Court of Justice 
faces a great challenge in applying and protecting the fundamental right to 
strike/industrial action in the context of the free provision of services.187 The Laval 
case further deals with the position of the Danish-Swedish labour market model, 
crucially based on collective agreements, within the Community where it deserves its 
place.  
 
To begin with, there are strong arguments in case-law in favour of the solution that 
the Court would initially reconfirm the horizontal direct effect of Article 49 EC in 
Laval, hence finding that the action concerned was directed to collective regulation of 
gainful employment.188 The ‘old’ Member States and trade unions taking part in the 
Laval and Viking cases have denied such an outcome regarding both Article 43 and 49 
EC, mainly because of the lack of any regulatory effect by the collective action. Some 
of the ‘new’ Member States as well as Viking Line have referred to the formula used 
in Bosman and Wouters: ‘freedom to provide services would be compromised if the 
abolition of State barriers could be neutralized by obstacles resulting from the 
exercise of their legal autonomy by associations or organizations not governed by 
public law’189 (emphasis added) in the Viking hearing as an additional ground. 
 
In the second publication, I held that ‘collective regulation of gainful employment’ 
(the formula for the scope of Article 49 used since Walrave) 190  also covers a 
collective action targeted at the conclusion of a collective agreement because the 
reverse position would artificially detach such action from its purpose (a collective 
                                                 
186 In Laval the actual dispute and collective action concerns pay applicable in a classic 
posting situation. At issue in Viking is pay after re-flagging a ship in another Member State 
and replacement of the present crew with a new one paid about a quarter of the previous 
wages, subject to a threat by the FSU (as supported by the ITF) of a future collective action 
that Viking tries to prevent by a British type injunction under Articles 43 and 49 EC, as well 
as by virtue of Regulation 4055/86 on Maritime Transport Services.   
187 The more appropriate legal framework in Viking seems to be free provision of services. 
See footnote 322 of the second publication and footnote 291, infra, on the ‘rivalling’ or 
overlapping internal market freedoms. Another aspect is that the issue is not a genuine free 
movement case because Viking Line would continue the same route and just replace the crew 
on board MS Rosella with a cheaper one.  
188 See the discussion in the second publication, section 4.2. See also the position of AG 
Mengozzi in Laval in section 3.3, infra, supporting the horizontal direct effect.  
189 See Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 83, and Case C-309/99 
Wouters ECR [2002] I-1577, paragraph 120. 
190 Case 36/74 Walrave [1974] ECR 1405, paragraph 17. 
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agreement in these cases), which is an elementary aspect in discussing the limits of 
the right to such action. The Bosman and Wouters formula simply makes this clearer, 
because a collective action by the trade union as a quasi-public body under Finnish 
law is an exercise of their legal autonomy. Regarding Regulation 4055/86, the 
horizontal direct effect is by definition clear. It is however crucial for both Article 49 
EC and Regulation 4055/86 that they have never been adopted with an eye to 
restricting a collective action and that they cannot boldly trump the nationally and 
internationally guaranteed right to such action (Swedish law in Laval, Finnish law in 
Viking). Horizontal direct effect in itself does not settle the priority between or 
balancing of the market freedom and the fundamental right concerned, granting only a 
prima facie right to invoke a provision of EU law.191 Horizontal direct effect cannot 
alter the substance of the EU norm having such an effect. Thus, a real debate on any 
trumping effect, e.g., regarding Regulation 4055/86, becomes actual only in the 
wholly exceptional case that a trade union genuinely strives to prevent the ship-owner 
for good from using his right to free traffic through its collective action. This is what 
the FSU forcefully denies, a habitual strike action being at issue. One finally has also 
to refer to the ‘last line of defence’ by the ITF and the FSU against the horizontal 
direct effect of Articles 43 and 49 EC; namely, despite the differences in the details of 
the regulatory power (autonomy) attributed to the social partners in the Member 
States to settle employment (and job security) conditions by binding collective 
agreements, such a power still exists in the Member States. According to the ITF and 
FSU, it would be absurd to let the market freedoms (and the courts) penetrate into this 
traditional sphere of autonomy of the social partners, also recognised indirectly by 
Articles 138 and 139 EC, as a legal superpower. Needless to say, contesting the 
horizontal direct effect of Article 49 EC is line with purely ordre communautaire 
social thinking while not its indispensable element. 
  
However, the clash between the right to collective action and the market freedom to 
provide services in the internal market in Laval and Viking cases is a monumental 
legal discourse on the effect of the market freedoms on the fundamental right to 
collective action and even on a weighing of social values. Its fundamental rights 
aspects I have commented on in section 1.4.4, supra. In Laval, the legal discourse 
may lead to combined reasoning on the doctrines of fundamental rights and 
acceptable restrictions of free provision of services, strongly resembling Albany in its 
outcome. In Viking the FSU has asserted (along the lines in the submission of the ITF), 
by analogy with the Court’s reasoning on the social policy objectives present in 
paragraph 59 of Albany192 that 
 
it therefore follows from an effective and consistent interpretation of the 
provisions of Community law as a whole and the fundamental right to take 
collective action in accordance with the ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 that 
collective action in pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue of its nature and 
                                                 
191 This is the lesson from case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659 especially.  
192 Case C-67/96 Albany International [1999] ECR I-5751. On Albany, see the first chapter of 
the third publication and section II.2.6 of the first publication. The first reference question in 
Viking asked whether industrial action falls ‘outside the scope of Article 43 of the EC Treaty 
and/or Regulation 4055/86 by virtue of the EC’s social policy including, inter alia, Title XI of 
the EC Treaty and, in particular, by analogy with the Court’s reasoning in … Albany, paras 
52-64?’ 
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purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of Article 43 EC Treaty and 
Regulation 4055/86 (or Article 49 EC Treaty).193  
 
This assertion was complemented by the ‘nature and purpose’ conditions that the 
collective action ‘is genuine and pursues the improvement of working conditions in a 
general sense’.194 Self-evidently, the present author shares both assertions of the FSU. 
However, it remains to be seen whether the Court will resort to the Albany analogy or 
to the balancing between market freedoms and fundamental social right present in 
Schmidberger. In any case, the difference between Laval and Viking and 
Schmidberger is that the latter dealt with a classical conflict of rights whereas the 
former essentially involves a conflict of interest in which the courts can intervene only 
extremely exceptionally. I freely acknowledge that this idea imposes rethinking the 
line of argument present in the second publication, section 4.9.1, to a certain extent. 
Thus, resorting to the Albany analogy seems even more justified than what I wrote 
there (and in section 4.10.4).  
 
In discussing the lot of the right to collective action in cases like Laval and Viking, 
one has to go back to the basics. Thus, what can be said about the right to collective 
action in the light of the role and interplay between the economic and social factors in 
the EU? In these cases, its ‘economic’ and ‘social constitutions’ are on the table of the 
ECJ. This constitutional level first requires recapitulation of the fact that in founding 
the Community and adopting the Treaty of Rome, strike rules were not meant to be 
covered either by the market freedoms or by Community law in general. The 
Community was the European Economic Community, which essentially included only 
free movement rights of workers from the social dimension, not their and their 
organisations’ rights (or duties) otherwise. This state of things was in a way 
reconfirmed by Article 2(6) of the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement (three years 
after the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers), then 
enshrined in the EC Treaty as Article 137(5) EC by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Naturally, since the Treaty structure in principle included a ‘risk’ or opportunity for a 
legal clash between the right to collective action and the market freedoms from the 
outset, the history that witnesses the lack of any genuine ‘strike v. market freedom’ 
case in the ECJ until Laval and Viking is salient. The legal framework for these 
economic freedoms, i.e., the material legal content of the market freedoms has not 
changed paradigmatically during this history, but have been completed and refined. 
Mainly via the fundamental rights angle, the social factor has emerged and grown, 
being subject to judgments in these cases in its further development. It is very much 
akin to the relationship between collective agreements and competition rules, as we 
learn from Albany. On the other hand, it would not be sustainable doctrine to try to 
protect the national and ILO-based right to strike by escaping under national law and 
                                                 
193 The FSU’s submission, paragraph 3.27, made public here with the permission of the FSU. 
Regulation 4055/86, renders the Treaty rules on free provision of services (like Article 49 EC) 
applicable to the maritime transport sector. On this, see footnote 318 of the second 
publication. The Laval and Viking cases are not the first ones concealing the ILO Convention 
No. 87; see footnote 43, supra (however, the judgments concerned did not refer to 
Convention No. 87).  
194 Ibid., paragraph 3.28. The FSU continues by asserting how ‘[i]n the present case there are 
no grounds for concluding that the hypothetical collective action Viking seeks to prevent 
would pursue anything other than legitimate objectives’; paragraph 3.29.  
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claiming the non-competence of the EU in this matter.195 In all likelihood the cost gap 
in the enlarged internal market will produce more conflicts involving the 
interpretation and application of the EC law on market freedoms and labour/social law. 
This cost gap (roughly one to three or even four) is the ultimate driving force for the 
events in both Laval and Viking. This shows the capacity of the changes in the 
economic basis (radical deepening of the cost gap in the internal market in 2004, as 
demonstrated by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007) to generate or 
produce alleged consequences in law.   
 
Thus, the Laval and Viking cases show how these essentially economic conflicts may 
also dress themselves in a legal form under EU law by the initiatives of the employer 
side, imposing a decision by the ECJ because the European legislator has first omitted 
the issue (until 1992) and then declared itself unwilling to resolve the problem with a 
directive (Article 137(5) EC); i.e., building up a coherent European industrial 
relations model or at least its basis in addition to the European social dialogue.  
 
The events in Viking in particular also reveal the basic concepts of the role of 
collective action in the internal market. It also deals with the interplay of economic 
and social factors, as well as with the concept of the market. Unlike the Viking 
company, the ITF/FSU have asserted that by invoking the exclusion of collective 
action and bargaining from the ambit of Title III of the Treaty, they reject any 
assumption that the right to strike in connection with collective bargaining contradicts 
the functioning of the internal market. Rather, they maintain that collective action and 
collective bargaining positively promote market integration. The rationale for free 
movement is market integration and the rationale for the EU's social policy is to 
promote both improved working and living conditions and proper social protection. 
Finally, market efficiency requires collective action by workers and trade unions to 
ensure their voice is heard and their interests are taken account of. The ITF/FSU finds 
support for this interpretation from Maduro, who has stated (before becoming 
Advocate General) how the ‘…rights of participation and representation such as the 
freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to collective 
action should be considered as instrumental to a fully functioning integrated market 
which can increase efficiency and wealth maximization.’196  
 
No doubt the confrontation between market freedoms and labour rights outside the 
scope of purely domestic matters will also expose national collective labour law, 
strike rules included, to a so far obviously unexpected fundamental rights scrutiny 
under EU law. The prohibition of sympathy action in UK law and its excessive 
restrictions in German law are obvious examples of this, owing to the protection for 
sympathy action in the ILO (and Council of Europe) practice.197 Such actions are also 
                                                 
195 See section 4.3 of the second publication. 
196 Miguel Poiares Maduro, Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and 
Social Rights in the EU, in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, OUP 1999, p. 470. 
197 For the prohibition of sympathy (or secondary) action in UK law, see Section 224 of the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (TULRCA) of 1992. Only peaceful 
picketing around the work-place concerned is permitted. The withdrawal of civil law 
immunity for secondary action applies even when the employers have parallel shareholdings; 
see Simon Deakin and Gillian S. Morris, Labour Law, Butterworths 1998, p. 900f. Their 
conclusion is straightforward: ‘[t]his means that the scope of lawful industrial action is 
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normally illegal in Austria and Spain, while they are permitted in Italy and Greece, as 
well as being privileged in Sweden and Finland according to Robert Rebhahn.198 
 
I move on to consider once again the effect of international labour law commitments 
in the EU via a glimpse at fundamental rights in Laval and Viking. 
 
Thus, the value and impact of fundamental rights is paramount in the pending Laval 
and Viking cases. I recall that in the second publication I have described the right to 
collective action on the basis of the Laval case, as reflected in the ILO’s Constitution, 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 1948, the 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949, the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 1998, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1951, the European Social Charter 1961, 
the UN’s International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, the 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989, the Charter of 
                                                                                                                                            
defined entirely by the legal scope of the employment unit.’ On the ban on secondary action 
in UK law, see also footnote 226, infra. 
As to Germany, the strict legality assessment of a secondary action is based on case-law; the 
landmark decision was handed down by the Federal labour Court in 1985 as an interpretation 
of freedom of association enshrined in Article 9 of the Constitution (BAG 1985, AP Nr. 85 zu 
Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf). The essential ground for exceptionally allowing a secondary action 
is that the employer is not neutral in relation to the primary conflict. The employer normally 
loses his neutrality in the case of groups of companies, or due to a close sub-contracting 
relationship with the target employer of the primary conflict; see, e.g., Wolfgang Däubler, 
Arbeitsrecht 1, Rowohlt 2006, p. 423-4. Weiss has additionally noted that for the legality of a 
solidarity action the employer subject to a solidarity strike should have taken over the 
production or that the two employers should form one entity economically speaking. For 
Weiss these examples, endorsed by the Bundesarbeitsgericht, ‘clearly show that solidarity 
strikes are practically impossible.’ Far-sightedly, he also claimed that ‘the scope of the 
exceptional cases is much too narrow to allow solidarity strikes to become a relevant feature 
of industrial conflict’; Manfred Weiss, Federal Republic of Germany, in International 
Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations. Kluwer Law, 1994, paragraph 410. 
In the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers issued the Recommendation 
R ChS (98) 2 to Germany based on Article 6(4) of the European Social Charter (on the 
Charter, see section 4.4.4 of the second publication) in 1998, given that the written German 
law allows only strikes aimed at concluding a collective agreement. In its conclusion of 
30.9.2004, the European Committee for Social Rights (the present supervisory body of the 
ESC) recalled the Recommendation and highlighted the binding nature of the Charter 
obligations in strict terms (ECRS Conclusions XVII-1, p. 204; available via www.coe.int). 
This state of affairs, together with a corresponding situation regarding the ILO and ESC 
criticism of the UK, shows the weak nature (lack of real enforcement, thus other than 
statements on infringements and exclusion from the ILO) of the ILO provisions and the ESC. 
A correspondingly indifferent attitude by a Member State vis-à-vis a judgment of the ECJ is 
hardly imaginable.  
198 See Robert Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective (Part 
II), IJLLIR Vol. 20/1, 2004, p. 112. It is appropriate to elaborate the situation in Finland when 
a collective agreement is in force by noting that a secondary action can exceptionally be 
regarded as leading to a situation where this agreement essentially loses its role as a guarantor 
of industrial peace, making the sympathy action illegal (see, e.g., the judgment of the Labour 
Court of Finland, TT:1997-11). For a detailed discussion, see Juri Aaltonen, International 
Secondary Industrial Action in the EU Member States, Finnish Metalworkers’ Union 1999, 
pp. 28-47.  
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000, and the Member States’ 
constitutions.199 All the EU Member States have ratified the international instruments 
concerned, with some relevant reservations regarding the European Social Charter.200 
Protection of the right to collective action is ultimately tied to liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, the founding 
principles of the Union (Article 6(1) EU). However, the conclusion that the EU itself 
has to respect the ILO provisions (Constitution and Conventions 87 and 98) as the 
commitments of all the EU Member States, as to the right to strike, either as prior 
international agreements under Article 307, first paragraph, EC or finally by virtue of 
general international law is essential in the analysis of chapter IV of the second 
publication.201 Hence, the EU has to respect also the protection granted to sympathy 
actions in the ILO’s monitoring practice.202 To ease the pain of repetition, I call this 
respect the international law argument below. 
 
The author’s analysis of the Laval and Viking cases thus essentially relies upon the 
international law argument. As far as I can see, among scholars only Professor Ronnie 
Eklund has so far publicly adhered to this thesis in the context of Laval and Viking, 203 
which will also normally raise objections in the doctrine, Member States and on the 
employer side. But we are not that lonely. Professor Olivier De Schutter, as the 
coordinator of the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, 
highlighted the prior international fundamental rights obligations of the Member 
States within the UN, Council of Europe and ILO (counting 19 human rights treaties 
in all) in the Network’s first annual report (of 2002) and remarked their binding status 
under Article 307 EC, first paragraph, and ‘general public international law’. As an 
anchor he also referred to the rule that a State cannot free itself from prior 
international obligations by concluding a later treaty with other States (Article 30 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969). Reading the EU 
Charter in the light of international and European human rights law, De Schutter 
found simply objective, which avoids the institutions of the EU or Member States 
being surprised by the interpretation given to them.204 
                                                 
199 See sections 4.4.2 to 4.4.7 of the second publication.  
200 See footnote 224 in the second publication 
201 See sections 4.5 to 4.7 of the second publication. I repeat that the ECJ has confirmed the 
binding effect of general international law, especially in plenary cases Poulsen and Racke 
(footnote 107, supra).  
202 At present, the essence of the ILO right to collective action can be found in the recent 
publication Freedom of association; Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of 
Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO, 5th (revised) edition, International 
Labour Office Geneva 2006; available via http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/23e2006.pdf. The 
importance of the right to strike and its legitimate exercise, with the previous essential content 
(see footnotes 213 to 218 of the second publication), are dealt with in paragraphs 520 to 525. 
The right to call a sympathy strike is with previous contents in paragraphs 534 and 538: the 
former states that workers should have that right if the primary action is lawful; the latter 
notes that ‘[a] ban on strike action not linked to a collective dispute to which the employee or 
union is a party is contrary to the principles of freedom of association.’  
203 Ronnie Eklund, The Laval Case, ILJ Vol. 35, No. 2, June 2006, p. 207. 
204 Olivier De Schutter, Introduction, in EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental 
Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the European Union and Its Member 
States in 2002, European Commission 2003, pp. 21-23; 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc /rapport_2002_en.pdf. The 2003 report (this 
time with the authority of the whole network) stated how Article 307 EC means ‘even a legal 
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However, the author sees the international law argument as an example of natural 
evolution generated by a new event in EU law, although equally natural within 
economic activities, i.e., a collective action. If there is anything surprising in this 
argument, it is ultimately the simplicity of the legal solution or (double) formula by 
which the commitments of all the EU Member States within the ILO should be 
respected in EU law. Only the Laval case imposed thorough reasoning and led to the 
(double) argument. Furthermore, the status of the Court as the guardian of the rule of 
law leads us to presume that the argument will also be taken seriously in this context, 
although the ECJ may also have the chance to settle the issue by simply declaring the 
ILO provisions a source of inspiration for its fundamental rights reasoning. 
Accordingly, the binding effect of general international law in EU law also reflects an 
irrevocable evolution in EU law, given the role of the EU in the modern world. 
Besides, there is the strong moral argument that what the EU promotes and rewards 
externally it must also respect internally. Hence, it is not surprising that, according to 
the explanations of the Praesidium, the Convention drafting the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights did not base its Article 28 on the ILO right to collective action. 
There was hardly adequate debate in the Convention on this subject (i.e., the ILO 
connection). The same concerns the Convention that drafted the Constitutional Treaty. 
On the other hand, the Preamble to the Charter and its Article 53 recognise the 
international obligations of the Member States. Thus later I will not call the 
‘international law argument’ into question. This should be as natural as the 
significance of the European Human Rights Convention that binds every Member 
State as their international obligation, and thereby the EU as well.   
 
I am well aware of the possible arguments diminishing or mitigating the effect of the 
ILO right to industrial action by referring to the argument that the references in 
Article 136 EC make the European Social Charter and the 1989 Community Charter 
of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers part of the acquis, and there is moreover the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, a recognised source of EU law since Parliament v 
Council of 27.6.2006. In both dimensions the recourse to the ILO right may even be 
superfluous. There are several counter-arguments to this. The first is that Article 136 
EC refers to the Charters as something to be had in mind, not that they bind as parts of 
the acquis, although there is good reason to argue that the reference in Article 136 EC 
draws the two Charters into the ambit of the acquis. As to the ILO provisions, the EU 
promotes and rewards compliance with the rights covered by the 1998 ILO 
Declaration as absolutely a part of the acquis in its external relations (e.g., in 
Regulation 980/05/EC on the Generalised System of (Trade) Preferences) and 
development aid,205 and it is simply natural and moral for the EU to respect the same 
rights internally. The second counter-argument is that Austria, Greece, Luxembourg 
and Poland have not ratified Article 6(4) ESC. The third is that the ILO right to 
industrial action indeed also covers a sympathy action, which does not mean to deny 
the value of the negative conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights in 
                                                                                                                                            
obligation for the institutions acting in the framework of the EC Treaty, at least as long as 
there remains an incompatibility between the international undertakings accepted by the 
Member State before its accession to the Union and the obligations imposed by the Union.’ 
(see http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc /report_eu_2003_en.pdf, p. 21).  
205 It is no longer Regulation 2501/01/EC as I indicated in footnote 220 of the second 
publication. However, its substance has not been changed. In the field of EU development aid, 
the 2000 Cotonou Agreement includes the commitment to the core labour standards as 
defined by the ILO (Article 50); http://ec.europa.eu/development/ICenter/Pdf/agr01_en.pdf. 
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the cases of the UK and Germany, concerning the conformity of their national rules 
with Article 6(4) ESC.206 The fourth one is that the ECrtHR has not unequivocally 
recognised the right to strike under Article 11 ECHR (although it has recognised it as 
one of the most important means for the protection of occupational interests) 207 which 
also to a certain extent shadows the effect of Article 6(4) ESC. The fifth is that the 
ILO right to collective action is not subject to restrictions ‘necessary in a democratic 
society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ 208, unlike the ESC, 
while the ILO right is subject only to limitations regarding armed forces and the 
police,209 essential services210 and exceptional circumstances in society.211 The sixth 
counter-argument is that the ILO right is free from the possible diluting effect of 
references to national law that are included in point 13 of the 1989 Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights and in Article 28 of the EU Charter. Finally, the 
ILO right is free from the constraint that the EU Charter according to its letter in 
Article 51(1) is addressed to the Member States only when implementing Community 
law,212 as well as being free from the constraints (albeit limited ones) in Article 52(1) 
of the EU Charter, referring to restrictions that respect the essence of the rights and 
freedoms concerned.  
 
The reliance on the international law argument as a ‘protection base’ for the ILO right 
to collective action within the EU has also given rise to the counter-argument that it 
could provoke the Member States to denounce ILO Conventions No. 87 and 98, by 
                                                 
206 As to the Conclusions on the UK of the European Committee of Social Rights, see 
footnote 226, infra, and as to Germany, footnote 197, supra. 
207 Case Schmidt and Dahlström v Sweden, ECrtHR 6 February 1976, Series A no. 21, p. 16, 
paragraph 36. For instance, Rolf Birk has held that the ECrtHR has not recognized the right to 
strike under Article 11 ECHR; Rolf Birk, Arbeitskampf und Europarecht, in Oetker et al. 
(Ed.), 50 Jahre Bundesarbeitsgericht, Münchner Beck 2004, p. 1177. Idem (by referring to 
Schmidt and Dahlström) Bruno Veneziani, Right of collective bargaining and action, in 
Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Nomos 
2006, p. 323. Veneziani discusses Article 28 of the Charter extensively, including its coming 
into being. 
208 See Article 31 of the European Social Charter of 1961 and Article G of the revised Social 
Charter of 1996. 
209 See Article 9 of Convention No. 87. 
210 The ILO Committee of Experts for the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR) has stated that essential services should be defined restrictively: ‘the Committee 
therefore considers that essential services are only those the interruption of which would 
endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population’; Report III 
(Part 4B) Freedom of association and collective bargaining (General Survey), International 
Labour Conference 1994, paragraph 159. The Committee further found (in paragraph 158) 
that the prohibition of the right to strike of public servants should be limited to those 
‘exercising authority in the name of the state’, and that in borderline cases a negotiated 
minimum service might be the solution ‘when a total and prolonged stoppage might result in 
serious consequences for the public.’  
211 Ibid., paragraph 152, the CEACR (previous note) stated that these exceptional 
circumstances mean ‘genuine crisis situations, such as those arising as a result of a serious 
conflict, insurrection or natural disaster in which the normal conditions for the functioning of 
society are absent.’ 
212 Case-law requires respect for fundamental rights when a situation falls within the scope of 
Community law; see, e.g., case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraphs 73 to 
75. 
 74  
virtue of Article 307, second paragraph, EC.213 This article stipulates that to the extent 
that international agreements are not compatible with the Treaty, ‘the Member State 
or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities 
established.’ The author finds that this denunciation argument is simply not tenable 
because the Treaty (or secondary EC law) does not entail substantive provisions on 
the right to collective action. The only existing EU provisions are in the Monti-
Regulation 2679/98/EC (Article 2) and Services Directive 2006/123/EC (Article 1(7)), 
which both mean to protect the right to collective action. Politically any denunciation 
of ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 indeed also looks impossible, in this era of 
globalisation, highlighting the need to build up globally fair industrial relations, and in 
a situation where the EU promotes and rewards compliance with ILO Conventions 87 
and 98 in external trade and development aid as a part of the acquis. Furthermore, as 
paragraph 1 of the 1998 Declaration explains, the obligation to observe the core 
Conventions stems directly from ILO membership, i.e., from its Constitution.  
 
There remains the question of possible protection by EU law for a transnational 
collective action. 
 
The outcome that the Community has to respect the ILO right to industrial action also 
necessitates further comment about the lot of a parallel cross-border (sympathy) 
action, perhaps called by a European trade union organisation, in the spirit of ordre 
communautaire social. Is such an action protected under EU law? Answering this first 
necessitates a glimpse at the explanations that follow the EU Charter. Hence, the 
Bureau (Praesidium) of the Convention drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU wrote in its explanations to Article 28 that ‘Collective action, including strike 
action, comes under national laws and practices, including the question of whether it 
may be carried out in parallel in several Member States’. The explanations were not 
intended to have any legal value,214 while Article 52(7) of the Charter, added by the 
European Council in 2004, for its part states that the explanations were ‘drawn up as a 
way of providing guidance in the interpretation’ and that the Courts must give ‘due 
regard’ to the explanations.215 The Reform Treaty will reproduce this ‘due regard’ in 
                                                 
213 On the basis of this unofficial explanation, Finland counted the international instruments 
protecting the right to collective action and described them as binding in the hearing of the 
Viking case, but without a specific reference to the ILO right to collective action under Article 
307 EC, first paragraph, and general international law. As to the ILO/EU position, Novitz 
refers in this context to the mass denunciation of the ILO Convention No. 89 by the EU 
Member States, as conflicting with the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207; see Novitz, 
International and European Protection of the Right to Strike, p. 254. However, her reference is 
linked to fears among trade unions after the ‘strawberry judgment’ (C-296/95 Commission v. 
France [1997] ECR I-6959; rendered in the context of even violent attacks against free 
movement of goods) that its principles would be applied to collective action as well. Such 
fears are in any case obsolete and, besides, legally untenable for the reasons explained in the 
corpus text below. 
214 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/convent49_en.htm. The Convention document 
Charte 4473/00, Convent 49 states (on the front page): ‘These explanations have been 
prepared at the instigation of the Praesidium. They have no legal value and are simply 
intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter.’ Thus, the explanations were never drafted or 
approved by the Convention. Neither were they published with the Charter in the OJ C364/00, 
18.12.2000. 
215 The Preamble to the Charter as Part II of the failed Constitutional Treaty referred to the 
interpretation of the Charter with ‘due regard to the explanations.’ Bercusson has noted how 
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the interpretation, i.e., in the amended Article 6(1) EU, third sub-paragraph, but 
Article 52(7) will remain intact. How should this state of affairs be interpreted? First, 
until the Reform Treaty comes into force, these explanations remain of no legal value. 
Later they will be given ‘due regard’ only, and they are a ‘way of providing guidance’, 
not a priority excluding the cross-border action (normally but not necessarily a 
sympathy action) from the ambit of Community law, whereas it belongs there 
according to the wording of Article 28 of the Charter itself (‘…in accordance with 
Community law…’). One thus has to ask whether this also means protection for a 
‘parallel’, i.e., transnational action (or, sympathy action), in several Member States.   
 
The answer to this question is simple in principle. When the EU’s legal order is bound 
to respect the ILO right to collective action as a fundamental right, and this logically 
also applies to the ILO/EU Member States,216 it would indeed be illogical to deny this 
protection in a cross-border context when that right is used in parallel in several 
Member States or the action is called for or supported by a transnational trade union 
body. The raison d’être of EU law is to cover the cross-border use and effect of rights 
in particular. The simple legal-ideological rationale is that the Europeanized (cross-
border) economy must be balanced by transnational trade union rights. What could 
legitimize or justify such a denial in any case? Provisions and practices under national 
law such as the de facto prohibition of sympathy action in UK law and its excessive 
restriction in German law, or national case-law contrary to the fundamental right 
could in principle be the candidate bases for such a denial, as supported by the 
reference to national law and practices in Article 28 of the EU Charter and in Article 
1(7) of the Services Directive as well as by Article 137(5) EC, which allegedly 
implies the principle that governing collective action is fully a matter for national law 
from the point of the EU law. The author does adhere to this; see below.       
 
The references to national law and practices in the EU Charter are weak arguments 
because, according to Article 53, the Charter shall not restrict or adversely affect 
human rights as recognized by international agreements to which all the Member 
States are party. Furthermore, the Preamble to the Charter refers to rights as they 
result from the international obligations of the Member States. Thus the Charter 
cannot be interpreted as restricting the protection for transnational action, whether 
sympathy or primary action, covered by the ILO Convention No. 87. At the same time, 
                                                                                                                                            
Article II-112(7) reduced the explanations to a mere ‘way of providing guidance in the 
interpretation of the Charter’ (‘will be interpreted’ in the Preamble becomes ‘shall be given 
due regard’ in Article II-112(7)), and how Article II-112(7) took precedence over the 
Preamble; see Brian Bercusson, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Constitution 
of the European Union, in Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, Nomos 2006, p. 491. On the same logic, it is arguable that Article 52(7) 
of the Charter takes precedence over the amended Article 6(1) EU, third subparagraph; hence, 
that the explanations will remain guidance only.  
216 It would be wholly illogical to assert that the ILO Member States would not be obliged by 
the ILO fundamental rights when acting in the EU. For the fundamental rights’ binding effect 
on the Member States, see case C-260/89 ERT v. DEP [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 42; case 
C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraphs 73 to 75, and case C-13/05 Chacón 
Navas [2006] ECR I-6467, paragraph 56. All these cases define the ambit of the Member 
States’ fundamental rights obligation as effective within the scope of Community law, thus 
not limited to the measures implementing EU law, although Article 51(1) of the Charter so 
states. See also the remarks at footnotes 310 to 312, infra. 
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Article 53 of the Charter is the final argument against the impact of the explanations 
of the Convention Praesidium. The non-effect of the Services Directive looks equally 
obvious: whereas respect for fundamental rights is a condition of the legality of 
Community acts,217 the Services Directive cannot validly restrict the fundamental 
(ILO) right to collective action. As to the effect of Article 137(5) EC, I confine myself 
to repeating the interpretation that that proviso validly expresses only the reluctance 
of the Member States to enact on the right to strike under Article 137 EC without 
dealing with its substance and without making it a wholly national issue ‘EU-
constitutionally’; see also section 4.3 of the second publication.  
 
In sum, it looks as if the ordre communautaire social thinking, highlighting a 
consistent interpretation of the protection for fundamental rights, would result in 
finding the parallel use of the right to collective action in several Member States or 
other cross-border collective action in principle protected in Community law. The 
counter-arguments pointed out in Community and national law certainly do not look 
too strong. In so far as they are based on national law, it is logical to find that national 
restrictions on the ILO right to collective action must give way under the effective 
protection of fundamental rights (ultimately ensured by the ECJ), which is also in 
conformity with primacy of EC law.  
 
In the meantime, it is also appropriate to consider the ITF action in Viking as an 
expression of freedom of association with some complementary remarks on 
transnational sympathy action. 
 
 
2.6 Freedom of Association; the ITF’s Action 
 
A fundamental rights exercise can also be made regarding freedom of association as 
present in the pending Viking case. 218  The injunction against the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) has ultimately been sought because it sent a 
circular to its Estonian (and other) affiliates demanding that they refrain from 
negotiations with the Finnish beneficial shipowner (Viking Line), although it would 
prevent all the ITF’s own industrial actions (a boycott or any other action concerning 
reflagging of Rosella or wages after reflagging) and causing such action by others in 
this case. The Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) therefore, following the ITF’s flag of 
convenience policy (FOC), retained the negotiation rights.219 Similar ‘action’ by the 
ITF is of course predictable if the envisaged action by the FSU were ever realized.  
 
In a proper legal construction, the ITF’s action (thus, especially the circular) rather 
falls under the freedom of association because the ITF did not present any of its own 
or other supportive claims to Viking Line followed by a threatened withdrawal of 
labour or other collective action by the ITF. In this respect the question arises about 
                                                 
217 See Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, paragraph 34, and Case C-249/96 Grant [1998] 
ECR I-621, paragraph 45. 
218 See also footnotes 27, 154, 186 and 187, supra. I recall that in case C-415/93 Bosman 
[1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 79, the ECJ confirmed that freedom of association is a 
fundamental right in Community law. 
219 See paragraph 24 vi) in the Court of Appeal’s decision, which is available on the internet: 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/1299.html>. 
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the legal situation, i.e., the relationship between freedom of association and the 
economic rights (free provision of services) of the shipowner.  
 
The EU has its own clauses on freedom of association in the 1989 Community 
Charter (Article 11) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 12). The ILO 
Convention No. 87 guarantees that freedom both generally (Article 2) and so far as it 
covers international workers organizations (Article 5).220 The European Social Charter 
(Article 5) and the UN Covenants (Article 8 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that also mentions international trade union 
organizations; Article 22 in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) include it221 as 
the constitutions of the Member States generally do as well. Furthermore, Article 11 
ECHR enshrines it. The international law argument (see section 2.5, supra) applies to 
freedom of association as well. The outcome should be that an activity falling under 
freedom of association does not, by its nature (peaceful and genuine) and purpose 
(improved working conditions), fall under the provisions on free provision of services 
(or freedom of establishment). This would be an interpretation analogical to 
Albany.222 The Arblade-Schmidberger model, perhaps more likely to be applied for 
doctrinal reasons,223 may lead in practice to the same outcome that measures under 
freedom of association intended to protect workers by improving their working 
conditions arguably pass the proportionality test inherent in this model successfully.224 
There is nothing in Viking showing that the FSU pay claim exceeds the limits of an 
ordinary wage in this area. 
 
If, in the alternative, the ITF circular (in fact, the FOC policy) is in any case also 
regarded as a transnational secondary (sympathy) action, it is nevertheless protected 
in EU law by virtue of the ILO right according to which secondary action is allowed if 
the primary action is lawful.225 In other words, this model of interpretation would 
demonstrate the contradiction between the ILO and UK law concerning the (il)legality 
of sympathy action, as well as being complemented by the contradiction between UK 
law and Article 6(4) ESC).226 This will also logically lead the ECJ to take stand via 
                                                 
220 As to freedom of association in the context of an international secondary (solidarity) 
action, note that the complaint of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU), the ITF, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Maritime Union of 
Australia against Australia (ILO report No. 320, case No. 1963 (Doc. Vol. LXXXIII, 2000, 
Series B, No. 1)) also included a recognition of the international dimension of a solidarity 
action. The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association requested that the government ensure 
that in future ‘trade unions are entitled to maintain contact with international trade union 
organizations, to participate in their legitimate activities and to benefit from the services and 
advantages of such membership.’ See the report mentioned, paragraph 241(e).   
221 A first reflection of freedom of association in UN instruments appears in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. According to its Article 23(4) ‘Everyone has the right to form 
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.’ 
222 On the ‘Albany model’, see section 4.10.4 of the second publication.  
223 See p. 111 of the second publication, at the end of section 4.9.1. 
224 See p. 123 in the second publication. 
225 See especially footnote 217 of the second publication, and, footnote 218 on secondary 
boycotts; see also the next footnote here on the situation that a sympathy strike is lawful 
provided that the primary action is lawful. 
226 The ILO Committee of Experts for the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR) has on several occasions expressed criticism (according to Tonia Novitz, 
International and European Protection of the Right to Strike, Oxford University Press 2003, p. 
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preliminary rulings on a situation where an EU Member State is at variance with its 
international obligations,227 provided that the collective action falls under EC law as 
the ITF circular does. In fact, this would imply a stock-taking on the FOC policy in 
general (see also section 3.3, infra). The ECJ faces a profound challenge in deciding 
whether or not to protect the rights guaranteed in the international instruments in this 
kind of cross-border situation, in this case at least in the ILO and Council of Europe 
provisions – notwithstanding the disobedience of a particular Member State. The 
international law argument as to Article 307 EC is one of a de jure nature and of a 




2.7 Gender Equality; Especially Equal Pay 
 
Following the brief equal-pay comments in the first publication, I discuss it now on a 
somewhat broader basis and finally add some notes on the status of equal treatment in 
an ordre communautaire social approach. 
 
Developments regarding equal pay between genders form a telling example of 
changes towards a more mature status for the social factor, for its part now justifying 
the discussion on ordre communautaire social. As explained in the first publication, 
in Defrenne II,228 the Court emphasized how the aim of Article 119 EEC was at once 
economic and social, which showed that the principle of equal pay formed part of the 
foundations of the Community.229 The economic and social factors were put on an 
                                                                                                                                            
292, which is not her dissertation, as I indicated in my third publication on p. 84 but a 
developed version, in 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2000) against the 
prohibition of sympathy strikes in the United Kingdom. Lastly, in its report for the ILO 
Conference 2005, the Committee ‘once again’ reiterated its position that workers ‘should be 
able to participate in sympathy strikes provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself 
lawful and to take industrial action in relation to matters which affect them even though the 
direct employer may not be a party to the dispute, and requests the Government to continue to 
keep it informed in its future reports of developments in this respect’; Report of the CEACR 
2005, p. 123. The same substance was expressed in the Report for the Conference 2003, p. 
319. The 2005 Report presented the position of the British government (p. 123), being that ‘it 
believes that the restrictions on secondary and solidarity strikes reflect the United Kingdom’s 
experiences and needs and that strike law gives sufficient scope for unions to protect the 
interests of their members.’  
The supervisory organ of the European Social Charter, nowadays the European Committee of 
Social Rights, has found that United Kingdom is in breach of Article 6(4) of the European 
Social Charter, the prohibition of secondary action (except peaceful picketing at the worker’s 
own place of work) being one reason for this conclusion; see, e.g., Conclusions XVI-1, 
1.1.2002, pp. 688-690; available via www.coe.int.  
227 The infringement procedure under Article 226 EC does not cover disobedience of the 
international obligations of the Member States, but only direct obligations under the EC 
Treaty.  
228 Case 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455. 
229 See pp. 55-56 of the first publication. Retrospectively I may admit that the contention (p. 
56) that the Court would have granted precedence for the social factor over the economic one 
in the application of Article 119 EEC in Defrenne II is too straightforward. It is obviously 
more subtle to note that the Court essentially elevated the role of the social factor to equality 
with the economic one, which led to considering it a part of the foundations of the 
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equal footing in this way. It was of course crucial that the Court confirmed the direct 
effect of Article 119 EC (now 141 EC), although it did so ex nunc. Covering the 
horizontal direct effect as well,230 this decision was in fact more powerful than the 
enactment of the Equal Pay Directive 1975/117/EEC. The direct effect was opposed 
in the proceedings by the fact that Article 119 (as 141 EC) used the term ‘principle’ 
(of equal pay). The Court was straightforward in its assertion that “[i]n the language 
of the Treaty, this term is specifically used in order to indicate the fundamental nature 
of certain provisions, as is shown, for example by the heading of the first part of the 
Treaty which is devoted to ‘Principles’” (paragraph 28). By reducing a principle to the 
level of a vague declaration, the very foundations of the Community would have been 
indirectly affected (paragraph 29).  
 
Defrenne II has been referred to by 42 later decisions (on 12 February 2007), although 
in many of them, of course, because of the general question of direct effect in EU law. 
One of the recent judgments is Cadman in which the Court recognised that if the 
worker provides evidence capable of raising serious doubts about discrimination, the 
employer also has to justify pay differences in a context of rewarding seniority which 
in general terms is disadvantageous to women. In practical terms, the employer must 
be able to prove that longer experience has enabled the corresponding male workers to 
perform the tasks for which they are rewarded better. In practice, this binary rule on 
the burden of proof may often be excessively difficult for female workers. However, 
in Cadman the Court also reiterated the message stemming from Defrenne II that the 
principle of equal pay, ‘which is a particular expression of the general principle of 
equality which prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently unless 
the difference is objectively justified, forms part of the foundations of the 
Community’.231 Indirect discrimination was a novelty in most of the Member States, 
within Article 119 EC especially, later codified by the Burden of Proof Directive 
97/80/EC.232  
                                                                                                                                            
Community (paragraph 13 of the judgment). This was linked to the expressly foreseen 
implementation of the provision by 1 January 1962.  
230 That the direct effect has its limits, i.e., that it requires the single source of discrimination 
(state regulation, collective agreement or work rules established by a holding company) when 
the comparable male workers do not work in the same establishment or service, was 
confirmed inter alia in case C-320/00 Lawrence [2002] ECR I-7325, paragraph 18, and case 
C-256/01 Allonby [2004] ECR I-873, paragraphs 46 and 83. 
231 See case C-17/05 Cadman v Health & Safety Executive [2006] ECR I-9583, paragraphs 28 
and 40. The AG proposed a bold revision of the Danfoss judgment (Case 109/88 Handels-og 
Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (‘Danfoss’) 
[1989] ECR 3199), on the basis that ‘a system which excludes periods of maternity or 
paternity leave, although it is prima facie neutral, would result in indirect discrimination 
against women’; paragraph 63 of the opinion. The AG wanted, however, to exclude 
retroactive claims on indirect discrimination on this basis. In the judgment, the Court did not 
expressly dismiss the proposition of the AG but de facto left the decision for the national 
court, thus to be made in casu.  
232 According to the Directive ‘indirect discrimination shall exist where an apparently neutral 
provision, criterion or practice disadvantages a substantially higher proportion of the members 
of one sex unless that provision, criterion or practice is appropriate and necessary and can be 
justified by objective factors unrelated to sex’. Sacha Prechal has noted that in fact only the 
UK law included this principle independently of EC law developments; Sacha Prechal, 
Equality of Treatment, Non-discrimination and Social Policy: Achievements in Three 
Themes, CMLRev. 41: 533-551, 2004, at pp. 535-6.   
 80  
Inherent in the concept of indirect discrimination is a requirement that there should be 
a substantive notion of equality. 233  On the other hand, indirect discrimination is 
possible to justify by objective reasons unrelated to sex, the consistent application of 
which concept is debated in the literature.234  
 
An area where the legally established non-discrimination in pay does not have an 
effect is that of institutional or structural discrimination, that linked to generally low 
wages in sectors predominantly occupied by women. Otherwise it is obvious that 
equal treatment is much less guaranteed in the field of social security than in 
employment law. Discriminatory laws and practices can be concealed in the general 
margin of discretion in the application of the present directive 79/7/EC on progressive 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of 
social security, and even on its express derogations concerning inter alia ‘persons who 
have brought up children’ and ‘dependent wives’. Substantive equal treatment in 
social security is still short of unanimity, and will remain so in the Reform Treaty. 
 
Coming back to equal pay in Article 141 EC, the developments in pay equality have 
thus produced a rich case-law since Defrenne II which reflects the emergence of the 
human rights angle in addition to the fading out of the ‘semi-economic’ origins of 
Article 119 EC. In 2000, the Court in Deutsche Post v Sievers (as well as in Deutsche 
Telekom v Schröder) concluded that ‘the economic aim pursued by Article 119 of the 
Treaty, namely the elimination of distortions of competition between undertakings 
                                                 
233 This is the position also endorsed by AG Poiares Maduro in the Cadman case (footnote 
231, supra). Sacha Prechal (previous note) has pointed out that the Court has not been 
consistent on this issue. For example, cases C-170/84 Bilka [1986] ECR 1607 and 116/94 
Meyers [1995] ECR 2131 witness a substantive approach, whereas cases C-297/93 Grau-
Hupka [1994] ECR I-5535 and C-278/93 Freers [1996] ECR I-1196 show a formal approach. 
Of these cases, judgment in Bilka was given by the full Court. In Grau-Hupka the final issue 
was that Directive 79/7 on equal treatment in matters of social security does not require the 
Member States to grant advantages in respect of old-age pension schemes to persons who 
have brought up children or to provide benefit entitlements where employment has been 
interrupted in order to bring up children. On the other hand, in Freers, the Court in any case 
outlawed a national scheme that discriminated against part-timers, and thus women.  
234 See, e.g., Catherine Barnard, EC Employment Law, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press 2006, 
pp. 368-371, who comes to the conclusion that in the justifications there is a strict test (Bilka, 
previous footnote) for indirectly discriminatory conduct by employers, the weaker Seymour-
Smith (case C-167/97 [1999] ECR I-623) test for indirectly discriminatory employment 
legislation and the very dilute test for social security legislation in Nolte/Megner (cases C-
317/93 [1995] ECR I-4625 and C-444/93 [1995] ECR I-4741). The background is that 
directive 79/7/EC on progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women in matters of social security works in the framework where the Court 
acknowledges a considerable margin of discretion for the Member States, as the Community 
law now stands, where, in terms of Fitzpatrick, the objective justification for indirect 
discrimination de facto amounts “to little more than ‘reasonable subjective justification’”. 
Paragraph 35 of Megner was his point of reference. See Barry Fitzpatrick, Converse Pyramids 
and the EU Social Constitution, in Shaw (ed.) Social Law and Policy in an Evolving 
European Union, Hart Publishing 2000, p. 321. Thus, while the present author criticised the 
Fitzpatrick’s analysis in the second chapter of the first publication for his general framework 
in explaining the EU’s social dimension as rigidly subordinated to economic aspects, it looks 
as if Fitzpatrick’s analysis of the problems in equal treatment in social security is adequate, 
and is shared by Barnard.  
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established in various Member States, is secondary to the social aim pursued by the 
same provision, which constitutes the expression of a fundamental human right.’235 
This passage has been called both radical (Ellis), dramatic (Szyszczak) and a 
paradigm shift (Kenner),236 while Judge Rosas has remarked that ‘[t]his quotation 
from the Court’s case-law shows that the social dimension of the EU has to be 
considered as a value in itself, not necessarily subordinate to the economic freedoms 
inherent in the EC Treaty’.237 This statement, i.e., speaking of the social dimension in 
general terms instead of mere pay equality, is indeed justified given that the national 
court referred to the risk of distortion of competition between economic operators of 
the various Member States in the context of pay equality, fair competition being 
fundamental to the EU’s economic constitution.238    
 
It is indeed essential to understand the historical developments in gender equality 
since the foundation of the Community. Article 119 EC, based on ‘semi-economic’ 
and competition considerations has now been transformed as enshrining (in Article 
141 EC) a fundamental human right that is essentially social. In more general terms, 
while the details in the social security part of equal treatment (and the structural, i.e., 
extra-legal discrimination) still overshadow the overall picture, the fact is that even 
from a Nordic point of view gender equality in EC employment law has been a real 
source of practical development, pushing a positive change through, especially 
regarding pay. Today the scope of the EU gender equality policy is essentially broader 
than equality in the field of pay or working life in general (which also covers positive 
measures of the Member States in favour of the under-represented sex under Article 
141(4) EC). The addition of gender equality to the tasks of the Community in Article 
2 EC and the mainstreaming principle in Article 3(2) EC reflect these developments, 
which also reiterate the principle that ‘labour is not a commodity’. Article 13 EC is 
today the basis for general EU measures against discrimination based on sex. 
Furthermore, ‘equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, 
including employment, work and pay’ (including specific advantages for the under-
represented sex). This is recognized as a fundamental right by the EU Charter (Article 
23).239  It is therefore justified to state that gender equality is an elementary and 
irrevocable part of ordre communautaire social. However, the EU cannot assume the 
entire credit for these developments, which is obvious even in Defrenne II, a decision 
inspired by the ILO’s Equal Pay Convention No. 100, which embodied the principle 
of equal pay for work of equal value in 1950 (see paragraph 20 of Defrenne II).  
   
                                                 
235 Case C-270/97 Sievers v Deutsche Post [2000] ECR I-929, paragraph 57. 
236 See Evelyn Ellis, The supremacy of Community pensions equality law: a two-edged 
sword? European Law Review 2000, Vol. 25, p. 568; Erika Szyszczak, The New Paradigm 
for Social Policy: a Virtuous Circle, CMLRev. 38: 1125-1170, 2001, p. 1155; Jeff Kenner, 
EU Employment Law. From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond, Hart Publishing 2003, p. 462. 
237 Allan Rosas, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the application and 
interpretation of social values and rights, in Elina Palola and Annikki Savio (eds.), Refining 
the Social Dimension in an Enlarged EU, Stakes 2005, p. 199. 
238 I recall that the conclusion of the Court was natural in being given by a small chamber. 
The case(s) was (were) not supposed to give rise to dramatic new positions. 
239It is essential that ‘specific advantages’ not be construed as exceptions to the right to 
equality but as a building block of substantive equality; see, e.g., Yota Kravaritou, Equality 
between men and women, in Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, Nomos 2006, p. 249.  
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2.8 The Social Dimension in the Context of Competition Rules 
 
In this section I first shape the essential issues under this heading as analysed in the 
third publication and then make some ordre communautaire social comments. 
 
The case-law discussed in the third publication on the demarcation between the social 
field and competition rules showed the variable weight granted to social and 
economic factors. In fact Becu, Deutsche Telekom v Schröder and Albany show 
precedence granted to the social factor, 240  while Höfner and Job Centre show 
precedence for the competition (economic) values, although within the limits of a 
manifest incapacity to satisfy demand in a given market. In Höfner, its general value 
is also diminished by the fact that it concerned recruitment of executives, which 
frequently, if not predominantly, happens outside the monopolistic public placement 
service at issue in the case.  
 
The Albany debate in the third publication (section 1.3) shows that various criticism 
of this decision, in which the Court established a conditioned immunity of collective 
agreements from competition rules, exists. Vagueness in ratione personae (Evju), 
reflecting unfair precedence for the social factor (De Vos), lacking ‘law and 
economics’ aspects (Ichino) and an avoidable recourse to European collective 
agreements (Sciarra)241 were the main issues discussed. The present author does not 
find all of these convincing, the criticism by De Vos being in its own class as 
reflecting a purely neo-liberal legal approach. Albany is a constitutional decision 
which, however, being of the pre-Amsterdam era (as to the events at issue) avoided 
any fundamental rights discussion. While the immunity of collective agreements was 
confirmed against competition rules that are ‘fundamental for the Community’ (Eco 
Swiss), it is justified to find that the Court in Albany elevated the right to collective 
bargaining to a status essentially superior to these other rules ‘fundamental for the 
Community’ in practice, i.e., to a status equal to a fundamental right in EU law.  
 
Albany is also unique in declaring the interpretative method in its reasoning on the 
immunity of collective agreements: ‘effective and consistent’ interpretation of the 
provisions of the Treaty as whole. It is clearly a ‘sister’ of CILFIT,242 paragraph 20, 
which stated how ‘every provision of Community law must be placed in its context 
and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard 
being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which 
the provision in question is to be applied’. Thus Albany, unlike CILFIT, declared the 
‘effective and consistent’ interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty/Community 
                                                 
240 On the balancing in Albany between the economic and social values, especially the 
difference between the approaches of Advocate General and the Court, see also the discussion 
in the first publication in section II.2.6. Indeed, understanding that giving precedence to the 
economic (competition) values would have meant to subordinate first the collective 
agreements to competition scrutiny and then free them with a ‘social safety valve’ (and 
obviously from the then strict administrative procedure) is crucial. The Court did the reverse 
since the judgment implies a safety valve against masked distortions of competition via the 
nature and purpose criteria.  
241 See footnote 24 of the third publication. 
242 Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415.  
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law as a whole. 243  On the other hand, the CILFIT lesson on the evolution of 
Community law helps in the pre- and post-Amsterdam understanding and 
interpretation of Albany. As such, Albany itself also reflects the evolution of EC law 
by including in paragraphs 56 to 58 the references to European social dialogue in 
Article 118b EC and Articles 1 and 4 of the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement. 
Thus, Albany is important not only in the precedence given to the social factor over 
the economic one (competition values), but also in its status as a landmark in the 
evolution of European collective labour law. 244  Maastricht was its overall 
breakthrough (albeit initiated by Article 118b EEC that was introduced by the Single 
European Act) while Albany established its basic status in relation to internal market 
rules. It was a judge-created settlement of that relationship. It naturally raises issues 
possibly subject to analogous interpretations.   
 
A first question about the Albany analogy concerns the relationship between labour 
law enactments and competition rules; a ‘labour exemption’ or at least a ‘labour law 
exemption’. I found ‘social field’ as such too diffuse a concept on which to base an 
exemption from the application of competition rules. However, the conclusion in the 
third publication was that at least a ‘labour law exemption’ looks justifiable on the 
analogy of Albany, as indicated by Becu and Deutsche Telekom v Schröder. General 
caution in analogous interpretations naturally suggests that we may not forget an in 
casu approach.245 A second analogous question is posed by the national Court in 
Viking,246 which asks whether an industrial action ‘falls outside the scope of Article 
43 of the EC Treaty and/or Regulation 4055/86 … in particular by analogy with the 
Court’s reasoning in … Albany, paras 52-64’. Thus, the second analogous question is 
                                                 
243 The ‘effective and consistent interpretation’ can be seen also as a comment on the opinion 
of the Advocate General in Albany. None of its 480 paragraphs was expressly reflected by the 
judgment. Amongst other things, the opinion considered whether trade unions are 
undertakings in the sense of competition law and proposed a clearly more limited immunity 
than that of the Court. The AG thus proposed that ‘collective agreements between 
management and labour concluded in good faith on core subjects of collective bargaining 
such as wages and working conditions which do not directly affect third markets and third 
parties are not caught by Article [81(1)] of the Treaty’ (paragraph 194). For the sake of 
completeness it must be added that the AG also clearly saw the purpose of trade unions and 
collective agreements: ‘…the main purpose of trade unions and of the collective bargaining 
process is precisely to prevent employees from engaging in a ‘race to the bottom’ with regard 
to wages and working conditions. That is why collective bargaining is encouraged by all 
national legal orders, international legal instruments and more particularly by the Treaty 
itself’ (paragraph 178).  
244 On the other hand, the basic legal rationale in Albany for its part in a way mitigates or puts 
limits on its exceptionality. Where the Advocate General found that there is an agreement 
between the employers in a sectoral collective agreement in the sense of Article 81 EC, the 
Court upheld the labour law concept of a collective agreement. The tie between the parties is 
crucial, not that inside a party. This position, anchored in the leading Articles of the EC 
Treaty (paragraph 54 of Albany) and even in the European social dialogue and agreements, 
simply repeats the classic labour law concept of a collective agreement. 
245 On this analogy, see the third publication, section 1.3.5. 
246 The fundamental rights dimension of this case is discussed in section 2.5, supra, showing 
the need to build the protection for the right to collective action within EU law in section 3.2 
infra, and some other details are dealt with in section 4.10.5 of the second publication. I 
discuss an analogical interpretation of Albany in Laval in section 4.10.4 of the second 
publication; see also footnotes 312 and 313 therein.  
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the relationship between strike rules and the two market freedoms in question 
(freedom of establishment and services). Whereas the scope and purpose of the 
market freedom rules are not identical to those of competition rules, the Court 
obviously cannot literally repeat the reasoning of Albany in Viking.247 However, the 
social policy objective of improved working conditions is the same in principle as in 
Albany and the restriction on free provision of services (or on establishment rights) by 
a strike is inherent, as were certain restrictions on competition in sectoral collective 
agreements (Albany, paragraph 59).248 Thus there are relevant issues supporting an 
analogous interpretation of Albany regarding an industrial action restricting market 
freedoms.249 A third analogous situation would be a conflict between a strike and EC 
competition rules. In such a situation it would be entirely natural to apply Albany very 
literally, with the nature and purpose test included.  
 
What can be said about the social dimension in the context of competition rules when 
seen in terms of ordre communautaire social? It looks obvious that the analysis of 
case-law other than Albany and Deutsche Telekom v Schröder (the latter discussed 
above under Equal Treatment, section 2.7, supra), and thus Höfner, Job Centre and 
Becu, would not invite major modifications.250 Höfner and Job Centre seem to belong 
to the economic constitution of the EU in a way that will obviously be sustained 
irrespective of fundamental rights developments for the foreseeable future, even in the 
Reform Treaty; see section 3.4, infra. Their bottom line is that a manifest incapacity 
to satisfy demand in a given market trumps a national placement monopoly once 
established under the state’s social policy. Definition of a market is naturally 
debatable and subject to differing societal values, but it looks probable that a 
monopolistic placement agency may be prima facie trumped by the application of this 
‘manifest incapacity to satisfy demand’, even in the maritime field. Another aspect is 
that the international law argument present in the ordre communautaire social 
approach to fundamental rights could maintain such a monopoly under Article 307, 
first paragraph, EC, thus based on ILO Convention 179 (now under the Maritime 
Labour Convention, 2006), but untouched by the EC competition rules and market 
freedoms. In Becu, the regime on recognized dock workers reflects special protection 
in a dangerous profession. It is a tailor-made scheme with the status of the worker as 
its natural framework, thus reflecting the ‘labour is not a commodity’ principle. As to 
pay, the regime operates with an erga omnes collective agreement, reflecting the 
European social model. In this case temporary work was used to undercut the pay 
                                                 
247 See the second publication, section 4.9.1, p. 110, and section 4.10.4. The same substantive 
question (industrial action v. market freedom) is present in Laval while the Labour Court of 
Sweden did not put the question about a possible analogous interpretation of Albany. 
248 As a theoretical example (not purely so) I may take an industrial action in the banking 
sector (or just in a bank established in two Member States). An action by bank officials 
cannot in general terms become unlawful simply because it cuts rather than ‘infringes’ free 
movement of capital and payments between the Member States. Accordingly, drivers’ strikes 
may cut the free movement of goods but cannot be simply unlawful because of this. 
249 I recall the assumption that, had the collective agreement subject to judgment Albany 
emerged from a strike and had that strike also been subject to a challenge by virtue of 
competition rules, it would obviously have received the same treatment as the agreement. See 
also the reasoning on the ITF’s action in Viking, discussed in section 2.6, supra. 
250 The same concerns case C-222/98 van der Woude in which the collective agreement 
concerned led to subcontracting a sickness insurance scheme; this was covered by the Albany 
immunity (paragraph 26).  
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provisions in that collective agreement which did not gain support from the ECJ as the 
judgment expressly demonstrates.    
 
Albany, when considered in an ordre communautaire social way, reflects ‘labour is 
not a commodity’ first in the sense that labour is subject to protection independent of 
the competition law premises. It is noteworthy that the 1914 Clayton Act in the US 
had already stated that the ‘labour of a human being is not a commodity or article of 
commerce’ as a ground for antitrust immunity on unilateral activities of trade unions 
in the course of labour disputes.251 Second, Albany is at the heart of the EU’s social 
policy,252 more particularly improvement of remuneration (pension provisions in this 
case). Third, the fundamental rights angle is missing in the judgment as discussed in 
section 1.3.5 of the third publication. That aspect is the one where the ordre 
communautaire social thinking would essentially enrich the argument, although it 
would not radically change the outcome; i.e., the conditions for the Albany immunity. 
Fourth, Albany concerns national sectoral collective agreements declared erga omnes 
and belonging to the ‘hard core’ of the European social model. The essential historical 
and constitutional value of Albany comes from the fact that it represents an instance of 
valuing collective labour agreements, i.e., the essence of collective labour law, in their 
relationship to competition rules; ‘Article 81 EC (ex Article 85) constitutes a 
fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks 
entrusted to the Community’.253 It is true that Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired 
Rights) Directive and Posted Workers Directive operate with collective agreements 
(and even the Collective Redundancies Directive refers to them in Articles 2(1) and 
2(3)(b)(vi)), but Albany’s ‘added value’ comes from a higher level position, including 
as it does positioning of the social factor in its relationship with competition rules that 
belong to the ‘economic constitution’ of the Community. In so doing Albany is an 
elementary block of collective labour law in the ordre communautaire social.   
 
Is ordre communautaire social relevant in the context of Article 86(2) EC? It is so at 
least to the extent that the public service concerned may reflect or include features of 
collective labour law, such as in Albany (discussed in section 2.5 of the third 
publication) or in the case of the Finnish earnings-related pension scheme TEL 
(discussed in sections 2.6 and 2.7 of the third publication). In the former, the pension 
scheme concerned was directly established by a collective agreement (rendered 
binding erga omnes), while in the latter the social partners have concluded specific 
labour market agreements on the essential parts of the scheme comparable in their 
practical effects at legally binding collective agreements between management and 
labour. Both schemes are fruits of the European social model, beside embodying a 
                                                 
251 See paragraph 97 of the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany. As a curiosity, one may recall 
that AG Jacobs also noted that ‘in economic terms labour in contrast to raw materials - is not 
a homogenous commodity’; given the differences in productivity, ‘competition on labour as a 
cost factor is in reality strong’, the AG asserted (paragraph 182). 
252 Paragraph 54 of Albany noted the presence of both the competition law regime and social 
policy in Article 3 EC. Thus, if Article 3(1)(j) EC enshrining the EU’s social policy in itself 
perhaps offers ‘no peg on which to hang anything about the nature of Community 
competence’ (see Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the 
European Communities, 3rd ed. 1998, p. 1045) it may gain real impetus in a an actual context, 
as in Albany.  
253 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss [1999] ECR I-3055, paragraph 36. 
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considerable degree of solidarity.254 Another angle is that we may also speak about 
the ‘European social model’ in a different sense as highlighting (inter alia) the status 
of public services in the European welfare states. In this sense, even the Reform 
Treaty will reiterate the language of ‘general economic interest’ in describing the 
public services concerned, both in the new Article 14 and in (the old) Article 86(2) in 
the draft Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Expert knowledge remains 
the real effect of Article 86(2) as also sheltering services falling under a ‘particular 
social task of general interest’ (Albany, paragraph 98). A democratic ‘constitutional 
charter’ would also mean a treaty understandable to the general public. However, a 
step forward is the new opportunity to lay down community rules by qualified 
majority on the economic and financial conditions for the provision, commissioning, 
and funding of public services by the Member States, who will still retain their 
primary competence over these services (always respecting the Treaty). 
                                                 
254 See paragraph 108 of Albany. In the Finnish TEL scheme, solidarity is reflected especially 
by the pay-as-you-go system, which represents the main part in its financing. Workers 
(roughly a quarter) and employers (three quarters) finance the scheme; see section 2.6.3.1 of 
the third publication. As an example of the solidarity notion one may refer also to case C-
309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, paragraph 58, where the ECJ employed the phrase 
‘social function based on the principle of solidarity’ as a yardstick delimiting the ambit of 
‘economic activities’ and thereby competition rules.  
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Chapter III  
 
Ordre communautaire social in a Historical Perspective 
 
3.1 General Conclusions on ordre communautaire social 
 
In this section I will characterize and offer concluding general comments on ordre 
communautaire social, the tentative new paradigm of EU labour law. The issues 
discussed in chapter II enable us to explore and understand ordre communautaire 
social in a sense broader than merely the relationship between labour law and market 
freedoms, as well as competition rules. However, I will focus on that relationship as 
the hard core of ordre communautaire social. A further conceptual clarification is that 
in the literature on the EU social and labour law the term ‘social constitution’ is 
sometimes used as corresponding to the EU’s ‘economic constitution’ that covers the 
market freedoms and competition rules. In describing or shaping the EU’s new labour 
law paradigm, the conventional term ‘social constitution’ would be, however, too 
closely linked to the written primary law of the EU (whereas the material contents 
concerned are partially taken from outside sources or from EU Treaty or the Charters 
of Fundamental Rights of 1989 and 2000), so that it seems better therefore to stick to 
‘ordre communautaire social’. Equally, the concept of ‘social constitution’ is too 
limited if equated to those of the abandoned Constitutional Treaty. At the same time, 
it is appropriate to keep in mind that conceptual generalisations are not problem-free 
while they may help in understanding and discussing law and thereby even in creating 
it. On these postulates, ordre communautaire social can be tentatively characterized to 
mean  
 
a synopsis of the leading premises (‘labour is not a commodity’, European 
social model and the EU’s social policy) and principles (the EU’s founding 
legal principles, upward harmonisation and improved working conditions, 
respect for fundamental rights and non-discrimination) of European labour 
law, especially collective labour law that, in so far as they are principles, are 
to be understood as generally binding, or at any rate subject to compromises 
only as delimited by the principles themselves.  
 
In explicating this account, one may find that ordre communautaire social thus, firstly, 
‘works’ in principle regarding individual labour law as well, but its impact is 
essentially more prominent in collective labour law, owing to the underdeveloped 
nature of that area  in EU law. The concept (or paradigm) implies, secondly, that there 
is a multilayered corpus of Community labour law sensu lato (the Treaties, 
international and Community fundamental rights, and secondary law). Thirdly, while 
the market freedoms and competition rules are by far the most important counterpart 
or ordre communautaire social, the effect of this concept is implicitly broader than 
simply labour law. It is finally a concept that defines the status of the so far 
underdeveloped collective labour law in the acquis communautaire especially, most 
importantly in relation to the market freedoms and competition rules. Fourthly, it also 
implies that EU labour law is, although a part of the acquis, also an independent and 
already relatively developed area of EU law, despite all its still existing ties to internal 
market regulation, deficits and even certain incongruence, in which one may define its 
basic principles from the starting-point of real social needs instead of as a corollary or 
derivative of the EU’s ‘economic constitution’. It is a part of the ‘social constitution’ 
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of the EU but at the same time essentially more than that, given the partially extra-
Community fundamental rights especially. It has its descriptive (or legal-ideological) 
role in the doctrinal sense, but it includes normative and settled case-law elements as 
well, via the binding effect of fundamental rights, international law and the principle 
of non-discrimination. By the same token, the social values concerned are not to be 
seen as subordinated to economic ones, but are at least well balanced (see below) and, 
besides, examples of the de facto precedence of the social factor exist already. Fifthly, 
OCS necessarily also implies a sense of the basic status, nature and impact of labour 
law on the market freedoms (and competition rules; Albany) that underpin the 
‘economic constitution’ of the Community.    
 
Hence, the contents of ordre communautaire social invite us to consider further the 
basic concepts of the Community itself, in particular its ‘economic constitution’. I 
explore them briefly to background a discussion of the above components of ordre 
communautaire social. I take a streamlined positive story first. The Single European 
Act with its social dimension and introduction of the European social dialogue, the 
latter making its breakthrough in Maastricht, the Treaty on European Union and the 
new Social Chapter of the Treaty of Amsterdam together with the rather broad (and 
partially agreement-based) secondary labour legislation and relevant case-law such as 
Defrenne II, Albany, Mangold, Schröder and BECTU convince us to reiterate that the 
Community is no longer a predominantly economic organisation, but that it takes the 
social dimension seriously and genuinely respects labour law. The fundamental rights 
developments (the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) since Amsterdam further 
support this notion, which forms the historical basis for the ordre communautaire 
social. More elements to this positive story appear in the previous publications (such 
as those in posting of workers and gender equality in pay) and will follow below. The 
doubtful story is that the Community naturally also carries with it the history of the 
European Economic Community with the powerful although no longer generally 
overriding position of the economic factors. It still presents fundamental rights as a 
priori restrictions on the market freedoms, for instance (see case Schmidberger, 
paragraph 77), and will thus coherently recognise labour and social rights on an equal 
footing with the economic ones via the entry into force of the Reform Treaty by 
making the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding (see section 3.4, infra). 
It would also mean putting the economic freedoms eventually into a position which is 
natural in a social Union. However, in the meantime, the concept of ordre 
communautaire social can alleviate the pains in this doubtful story and also work as a 
symbol further reinforcing the status of labour law in the Community.  
 
The pain in this doubtful story can be eased to some degree by recalling that the 
Community has hardly been based on limitless market freedoms and competition. It 
includes features of that type, like the prima facie absolute freedom of establishment 
for companies which implies even the right to openly circumvent the share capital 
regulations as the Centros judgment shows.255 Public policy exceptions to the market 
                                                 
255 Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459; a Danish family enterprise with all its 
activities in Denmark, established itself in United Kingdom and wanted to register only a 
branch in Denmark, so as to avoid the Danish minimum share capital rules. This was accepted 
although with the recognised possibility of the Member States to combat abuses. The 
judgment generated writings considering a possible Delaware effect in EC labour law and 
affecting the evasion of the German co-determination (Mitbestimmung) system by 
establishing (a parent company) outside Germany. Such phenomena would be by definition 
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freedoms, however, have been in the Treaty since the beginning (Articles 30, 39(3), 
46(1) and 58(1)(b) EC) and accepting non-discriminatory restrictions by overriding 
requirements of public interest is consistent case-law. Furthermore, acknowledging 
the right of the Member States to extend their minimum wages either in law or 
collective agreements to posted workers in Seco in 1982 shows an important limit on 
the market freedom to provide services.256 Perhaps a more graphic although in a way 
trivial example of such limits is the judgment Renault v Maxicar that concerned the 
French intellectual property rights relating to vehicle body parts. A French judgment 
on forgery by manufacturing and marketing body parts for Renault vehicles was to be 
executed under the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters in Italy against Maxicar who invoked 
what the ECJ called a ‘principle of public policy in economic matters’ (‘principe 
d'ordre public économique’) against these rights,257 thus an alleged Community law 
principle of unlimited economic freedoms (free movement of goods and freedom of 
competition in this case). In its ruling, the ECJ implicitly accepted the French 
intellectual property rights and thus dismissed the idea of unlimited free movement of 
goods and free competition as a European public policy in economic matters. The 
analogy with ordre communautaire social is obvious: as much as the intellectual 
property rights inherent in a myriad of sophisticated businesses were capable of 
limiting the market freedom and competition, so corresponding limitations are not 
simply possible but are indeed natural on the basis of ordre communautaire social. 
The other way round, since the economic freedoms have to be interpreted and applied 
in conformity with it, the effect of ordre communautaire social is by no means 
unfounded but finds direct support in the prevailing interpretation of the market 
freedoms themselves (and in competition rules), i.e., in the ‘economic constitution’ of 
the Community. The theoretical dichotomy between an unlimited European public 
policy in economic matters and ordre communautaire social would naturally be the 
sharpest possible, if not insurmountable. Happily, such a dichotomy is only theoretical.   
 
So as to clarify the concept of ordre communautaire social further I may also refer to 
Maduro’s concept and broad reading of the ‘European Economic Constitution’. In 
‘We the Court, the European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution’ (1998), he describes this concept as twofold: (i) the constitutional (neo- 
or ordoliberal)258 interpretation of free movement and competition rules, or (ii) that 
                                                                                                                                            
not in conformity with ordre communautaire social. In a further establishment case C-208/00 
Überseering [2002] ECR I-9919, paragraph 92, the ECJ recognised in an obiter dictum that 
protection of the interests of employees may ‘in certain circumstances and subject to certain 
conditions, justify restrictions on freedom of establishment.’ A hard case judgment on the lot 
of co-determination when ‘harassed’ by freedom of establishment has not yet arrived. 
However, this Centros-Überseering doctrine as such must remain beyond this study.  
256 See section 1.2.2 of the second publication, at footnote 14.  
257 Case C-38/98 Renault v Maxicar [2000] ECR I-2973, paragraph 24. On this judgment, also 
see footnote 323 of the second publication.  
258 The essence of the (originally German) ordoliberal concept was setting up the economic 
rationale (market freedoms protected from public intervention) at the supranational level and 
leaving political intervention in the form of social policy up to the Member States. See 
Christian Joerges, What is Left of the European Economic Constitution, EUI Working Papers 
Law 2004/13, concluding on p. 17. 
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related to anti-protectionism.259 He analyses the traditional reading and models of the 
European economic constitution on the basis of Article 28 (ex 30) EC, rejecting its 
neoliberal reading and asserts, going beyond the anti-protectionism view as well, that 
the concept must be enriched by adding social and cultural values. He further takes 
Article 28 EC as a fundamental political right instead of an economic one and also 
foresees the development of fundamental social rights as playing a role in the body of 
values concerned. 260  In sum, he argues for the open character of the European 
Economic Constitution, ‘the economic model and powers of which will be the result 
of a discursive process…with competitive values, ranging from free competition to 
economic and social cohesion.’261 He has since developed this argument, meaning that 
rights of participation and representation such as ‘the freedom of association, the right 
to collective bargaining, and the right to collective action should be considered as 
instrumental to a fully functioning integrated market which can increase efficiency 
and wealth maximization.’262 Similarities in Maduro’s thinking with the concept of 
ordre communautaire social prior to his becoming Advocate General are obvious: 
both reject the dominance of the economic factors, require interpreting the economic 
freedoms in the light of fundamental social rights, highlight the evolutionary nature of 
the integration process, see the Maastricht Treaty as the essential ‘blow to the liberal 
concept of European integration’263 and both strive to bring something new into the 
European legal discourse. The difference is that Maduro ‘reread’ a well established 
concept whereas ordre communutaire social proposes a new one. 
 
In sum, the general conclusion is that ordre communautaire social links the evolution 
of EU labour law to the general nature of the Community, witnessing its overall 
development from the European Economic Community into a political and social 
European Union where the dominance of the economic factor is over and the 
economic and social factors have already reached a relatively balanced mutual 
relationship, although it is still evolutionary. It is also fair is to state that of the 
constitutive (although tentative) elements of ordre communautaire social, the most 
prominent is respect for fundamental rights, whereby highlighting the recognition of 
international rights in the EU might be the crucial added value of exactly this 
reasoning. Whereas their effect is most obvious in collective labour law, that area still 
deserves more elaborate discussion.  
 
 
3.2 Ordre communautaire social and Collective Labour Law. Future Perspectives 
 
The discussion on ordre communautaire social means arguing for a possible new 
paradigmatic notion of European labour law and its status in the EU’s legal order. Its 
five constitutive components have been shown to have considerable ties to and 
reflections in the examples discussed: directives on collective redundancy and transfer 
of undertakings (acquired rights), machinery safety, posting of workers, equal pay, the 
right to collective action, freedom of association and the social dimension (collective 
                                                 
259 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court, the European Court of Justice and the European 
Economic Constitution, OUP 1998, p. 2. 
260 Ibid., p. 166-7. 
261 Ibid., p. 168-9.  
262 Miguel Poiares Maduro, Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and 
Social Rights in the EU, in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, OUP 1999, p. 470. 
263 Maduro, footnote 259, supra, p. 160. 
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agreements in particular) in the context of competition law. Collective agreements are 
the common denominator normally present in one way or another in nearby all of 
these areas (machinery safety being the exception), although collective agreements 
also normally have a strong individual dimension by means of protecting a single 
worker in her/his employment relationship. The creation and legal consequences of 
collective agreements are their specific collective element. In any case, the debate on 
ordre communautaire social is predominantly one on collective labour law. I 
therefore concentrate on this below, without wanting to negate its impact on 
individual labour law, beside recalling that such a distinction is to a certain extent 
blurred in that equal pay, for instance, implies a collective element when assessing a 
legislative measure or collective agreement, or when discussing indirect 
discrimination. 
 
A couple of institutional historical remarks on the EU’s collective labour law ‘regime’ 
in order to pave way for further stock-taking on the present situation and future 
perspectives are in order. I have discussed the residual status of social and labour law 
at the inception of the Community and the ‘new deal’ in the 1970s in brief in the first 
publication.264  The latter stage involved even a debate about European collective 
agreements which understandably led nowhere. The next step was providing the 
opportunity for European agreements in the Single European Act of 1986 in Article 
118b EEC. The 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
was a similar fruit of the social dimension connected to the Single Market. The Treaty 
of Maastricht meant a further breakthrough in the basis of European collective labour 
law, also leading, in addition to the European Works Council Directive 94/45/EC, to 
agreement-based directives on parental leave, part-time and fixed-term work, as well 
as to sector-tailored solutions in the transport sector by way of the European Social 
Dialogue. Independent European framework agreements on telework, work-related 
stress, and harassment and violence have emerged since. Article F.2 in the original 
Treaty on European Union (now Article 6(2) EU) institutionalized the protection of 
fundamental rights in the ECHR and the constitutional traditions of the Member 
States as general principles of Community law, endorsing the ECJ’s case-law. 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam was essentially a codification of the Maastricht Social 
Policy Agreement and the old EC Treaty in labour law, also embodying the principle 
that the Community will not issue EC directives on pay, the right of association, the 
right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs (Article 137(5) EC by the Treaty of 
Nice) under Article 137.265 Even the Constitutional Treaty would have embodied the 
same provision (Article III-210(6)), contrary to many proposals made in the 
Convention drafting it, and the Reform Treaty will reproduce it. That provision stands 
in striking contradiction to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Community 
Charter of 1989, as well as with the obligations arising out of the ILO provisions 
binding every Member State. Article 137(5) EC arguably does not exclude the issues 
                                                 
264 See sections I.1 and I.2 of the first publication. It suffices to add concerning the initial 
status of labour law in the Community the description of the then first Advocate General, later 
Judge, of the ECJ, G. Federico Mancini, who has eloquently stated how ‘[t]he founding 
fathers of the Community – and the same applies to the Council and the Commission in 
Brussels – never sought, or at all events never sought as their first aim, to reform the lot of the 
man who sells his labour’. See G. Federico Mancini, Labour Law and Community Law, The 
Irish Jurist, Vol. 20, 1985, p. 1. 
265 See especially section 4.3 of the second publication. 
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concerned from the competence of the EU, which basically leaves the legal door open 
for at least EU measures under Article 308 EC or for a directive under Article 94 
EC266 covering the basics of collective labour law. Further qualitative steps were the 
introduction of fundamental social rights by the Treaty of Amsterdam within Article 
136 EC, i.e., with its references to the 1989 Community Charter and the European 
Social Charter, and the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union in 2000.  
 
The position now is that the EU has created rules (regimes) on information and 
consultation within collective labour law as well as the European Social Dialogue, 
whereas the Charter of Fundamental Rights has already had its effect as a substantive 
point of reference (thus obviously more than just a source of inspiration) for the 
Community and its Courts.267 Simultaneously the interplay between the economic and 
social factors in the Community since the beginning has witnessed the gradual 
although far from exhausted growth of the social factor or dimension. This current 
position also inevitably leads to discussing the limits and future of European labour 
law, collective labour law in particular. That discussion also stems from the claim of 
the European Trade Union Confederation on full transnational trade union and 
workers’ rights, in particular cross-border sympathy action including strikes.268 
 
Let us now discuss the principal position of transnational regulation of collective 
labour law. In this era of globalization, the proviso in the Preamble to the ILO 
Constitution: ‘Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of 
labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the 
conditions in their own countries’ is more convincing than ever. There is no 
comprehensive reason invalidating this statement regarding collective labour law. 
However, within the EU (of 27), even ‘some harmonisation’ (by Delors, see below) of 
collective labour law would be deeply biased by the national idiosyncrasies, such as 
the disparities in regulating (or even forbidding) sympathy strikes discussed in section 
2.5, supra.  
 
To begin a small doctrinal survey, I may note that Kahn-Freund had already expressed 
considerable doubts about the transplantation of collective labour law: ‘In each 
country the relations between management and labour are organized under the 
influence of strong political traditions, traditions connected with the role played by the 
organisations on both sides as political pressure groups promoting legislation, and as 
rule making agencies through the procedures of collective bargaining’. 269  His 
                                                 
266 See, however, the opposite position of Syrpis (on Article 94) in footnote 16, supra, and 
that of AG Mengozzi at footnote 289, infra. For a supporting argument, see the estimation by 
Ryan and the position of Wedderburn in footnote 286, infra. On the use of Article 308 EC as 
a legal basis, see the position of Judge Schintgen in footnote 286, infra.  
267 I recall the cases C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769, C-432/05 Unibet, 
judgment of 13.3 2007, nyr, and C-505/03 Advocaten voor de Wereld, judgment of 3.5.2007, 
nyr. See the comments in section 1.4.4, at footnotes 117-119, supra. 
268 See “Make Europe Work for the People”. Action Programme, adopted at the ETUC 10th 
Statutory Congress 2003, p. 24; similarly in the “The Seville Manifesto” adopted by the XIth 
ETUC Congress, Seville 21-24 May 2007. See my positive conclusion on cross-border 
(transnational) action in section 2.5, supra.  
269 Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, The Modern Law Review 
Vol. 37, 1974 No. 1, p. 20. On this diversity in regulating the basic concepts of collective 
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conclusion was straightforward: ‘In my opinion…individual labour law lends itself to 
transplantation very much more easily than …collective labour law. Standards of 
protection and rules on substantive terms of employment can be imitated – rules on 
collective bargaining, on the closed shop, on trade unions, on strikes, cannot’.270 On 
the other hand, in this context Kahn-Freund praised the work done by the ILO both on 
individual and collective labour law (Conventions 87 and 98) which is linked to the 
fact that impossibility in transplanting does not mean impossibility in setting up more 
general international rules while leaving the details to the Member States. 
 
The description by Antoine Lyon-Caen and Spiros Simitis in 1996 in a precise 
Community context was that the original harmonisation plan of the Community lost 
all its credibility in the 1970s271 although it has to be remembered that the original 
upward harmonization of working conditions (the ‘Common Market credo’) was 
accompanied by the expressly residual status of labour law and working conditions as 
well as the right of association and collective bargaining in Article 118 EEC, subject 
only to close cooperation between the Member States. This is what Article 140 EC 
still repeats. However, the semi-official harmonization idea appeared in a more 
modest form in the mid 1980s in enacting the Single European Act, which introduced 
not only Article 118b EEC but also Article 100a EEC (now Article 95(2) EC), 
proclaiming that provisions ‘relating to the rights and interests of employed persons’ 
were kept under unanimous decision-making in the Council. Without some kind of 
perspective or background debate on harmonisation of the rights and interests of 
employed persons this proviso would have been meaningless. Indeed, the Single 
European Act was enacted with the vision of Delors (and Mitterrand) in the 
background. Delors said that ‘…the creation of a vast economic area, based on market 
and business cooperation, is inconceivable – I would say unattainable – without some 
harmonisation of social legislation. Our ultimate aim must be the creation of a 
European social area’ (italics added).272 It is still noteworthy is that Delors did not 
expressly spell out harmonisation of collective labour law, while not ruling it out 
either. However, the Commission also gave up on harmonisation plans in its Social 
                                                                                                                                            
labour, i.e. freedom of association, the reach of the regulatory power of the social partners and 
the legal effects of collective agreements in the ‘old’ 15 Member States, see Olaf Deinert, Der 
europäische Kollektivvertrag, Nomos 1998, pp. 289-435. His conclusion is that in any case 
the regulatory power in all the (then) 15 Member States covers remuneration and other 
working conditions (while co-determination and participation in business decisions were 
outside his study).  
270 Kahn-Freund, previous footnote, p. 21. 
271 They qualified harmonization from the point of view of 1990s as remaining only as a fine 
idea; ‘it does not represent a reference framework for action nowadays’; A. Lyon-Caen and 
Simitis, Community Labour Law: A Critical Introduction to its History, in Davies et al. (eds.) 
European Community Labour Law; Liber Amicorum Lord Wedderburn, p. 13. Their 
envisaged broad line of progress relied on EU fundamental rights policy. As to their view in a 
broader sense, see section I.1.1 of the first publication. 
272 Mr. Delors was aware of the challenging nature of his proposal. He continued: ‘This idea, 
may I remind you, was rejected as Utopian, dangerous, and irrelevant to the Community 
venture a few years ago. Today its purpose is clear: to ensure that economic and social 
progress go hand in hand’; speech by Mr. Jacques Delors in presenting the Commission’s 
programme for 1986, Bulletin of the EEC 2/1986, p. 12.  
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Policy Agenda for 2000-2005.273 Accordingly, the Treaty of Nice added a provision 
on cooperation between Member States in social policy matters to Article 137(2)(a) 
EC, stressing that this open method of coordination process goes on ‘excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’. Issuing minimum 
directives was naturally the measure kept available under Article 137(2(b) EC, and 
Article 136 EC, first and third sub-paragraphs, in principle still maintains the 
(upwards) harmonisation target of social provisions.  
 
Catherine Barnard has pointed out the ‘striking imbalance between the rhetoric of 
collective rights in the EU Charters and the Community’s actual action’ (in fact non-
action) in the field. She further describes collective labour rights as a ‘Cinderella area’ 
in EU law and that ‘for the present they look destined to stay that way’. Since Kahn-
Freund’s non-transplantation position is her background reference, it looks as if she 
still finds this position relevant.274 Ruth Nielsen, however, has come to a differing 
conclusion on this position, finding that Kahn-Freund’s thesis ‘does not apply 
similarly to EU labour law which seems to be able to overcome the institutional and 
procedural barriers’ inherent in national law. She further sees a “clear trend towards 
more reform in areas of ‘tough’ law such as collective labour law”.275 
 
Meaning workers’ participation and collective bargaining, Weiss stated in 1990 that 
‘the notion of harmonizing collective instruments and structures should be abandoned. 
The relevant institutions and instruments are tied too closely to the unique 
environments of the respective Member States; there is no adequate common 
denominator’. 276  Rebhahn in principle sees more potential for a convergence 
regarding rules on collective agreements, less for conflict rules and no room for 
harmonization in workers’ participation beyond information and consultation. 277 
Despite the ‘non-regulation message’ of Article 137(5) EC, it is noteworthy that 
Blanpain’s European Labour Law of 2000 (7th edition) still included the idea of a 
fully-fledged European labour law278 although already complemented by a detailed 
presentation under the heading ‘Convergence or Divergence’. Blanpain’s conclusion 
today is that cost-related factors in labour law will unavoidably come closer to each 
other because of market, political, and trade union pressure, whereas labour relations 
and labour law (‘the way people are hired and fired, the way strikes are organised and 
so on’) will mainly remain disparate.279 More generally, Judge Schintgen has referred 
                                                 
273 ‘This new Social Policy Agenda does not seek to harmonise social policies. It seeks to 
work towards common European objectives and increase co-ordination of social policies in 
the context of the internal market and the single currency’; COM (2000) 379 final, p. 7. 
274 Catherine Barnard, EC Employment Law, 3rd edition 2006, p. 776. 
275 Ruth Nielsen, European Labour Law, Copenhagen 2000, p. 24.  
276 Manfred Weiss, Labor Law and Industrial Relations in Europe 1992: A German 
Perspective, Comparative Labor Law Journal, Vol. 11 1990, pp. 422. 
277 Robert Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective (Part II), 
IJCLLIR Vol. 20/1 2004, p. 132. 
278 Roger Blanpain, European Labour Law, 7th revised edition, Kluwer Law Int. 2000, p. 26.  
279 Roger Blanpain, European Labour Law, 10th revised edition, Kluwer Law Int. 2006, p. 
281. 
 95  
to a ‘hard core’ of rules governing (only) the employment relationship (la relation de 
travail) as a European goal.280   
 
Bercusson has written (1996) that ‘like it or not, a dynamic is at work whereby a 
framework of collective labour law at EU level is being formulated. EU legal 
interventions in areas of social policy and labour law lead inevitably to EU rules being 
established regarding collective labour relations – the “spill-over” effect.’ 281 
Bercusson sees the source of the dynamic finally in the ‘international European 
economy that dictates an EU-level legal framework’.282 Thus the economy ultimately 
creates or generates labour law. The legal basis of that economy is naturally the 
market freedoms and competition rules that have the endless capacity to challenge the 
national and international labour law structures. The present author shares 
Bercusson’s view, while stressing that it is of the pre-Amsterdam and pre-Albany era, 
and that the Community has already lived 15 years under the combined shadow of 
Article 2(6) of the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement and Article 137(5) EC without 
issuing EU legislative instruments on collective labour law unless on information and 
consultation. It is on the other hand necessary to note that something has genuinely 
happened in this field since 1996 since, in addition to Albany, the EU Charter has 
been adopted and has become a point of reference and source of EU law for the Court 
as well (while the EU Constitution has been abandoned but the Reform Treaty will 
make the EU Charter binding except in Poland and the UK; see section 3.4, infra). 
Another recent line of development is the growing number of various arrangements 
including contractual, in multinational companies, partially within the European 
Works Councils (which I do not explore further).283 Besides, the time-span regarding 
creation of transnational collective labour law certainly requires work spanning some 
decades.284 Furthermore, the spill-over effects in today’s perspective seem to stem 
essentially from the case-law that I explore below.  
                                                 
280 Romain Schintgen, La longue gestation du droit du travail communautaire: De Rome à 
Amsterdam, in Rodríguez Iglesias et al. (eds.), Mélanges en hommage à Fernand 
Schockweiler, Nomos 1999, p. 576. 
281 Brian Bercusson, European Labour Law, Butterworths 1996, p. 521. Bercusson indeed 
sees the roots of this European framework in the simple fact that national collective labour 
laws have not been developed with transnational industrial relations or collective bargaining 
in mind. He equally notes the necessity to respect national equilibria.  
282 Ibid., p. 522. 
283 The Commission has ordered a first report on transnational collective bargaining that 
explores the prospects in European sectoral social dialogue and multinational companies. See 
E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. Jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés Dal-Ré, 
Transnational Collective Bargaining; Past, Present and Future, European Commission 2006; 
the report is available via 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/labour_law/docs/transnational_agreements_ales_study
_en.pdf. The report proposes a European directive on this. However, UNICE has made it clear 
that it does not see any new legal framework as useful (p. 7). As to European sectoral social 
dialogue, the report indicates that 225 joint texts have been adopted so far, also reflecting 
growing relevance of negotiations at that level (p. 15). 
284 The lengthy process of preparing and adopting the European Works Council system in the 
form of Directive 94/45 is a graphic example. After the first debates started in 1960s, it still 
took 14 years from the proposal of the social Commissioner Vredeling in 1980 to adopt the 
Directive, beside not covering the UK until 1997. The Social Action Programme of 1990, 
gaining from the momentum of the social dimension related to the completion of the Single 
Market, re-launched the debate. 
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There is still one relevant approach, that which appears in an essay by Anne C.L. 
Davies, entitled ‘Should the EU Have the Power to Set Minimum Standards for 
Collective Labour Rights in the Member States?’ 285  Her answer is definitely 
affirmative, although she does not finally say on which Treaty article her proposed 
directive on collective labour rights should be based. In any case, she considers 
Articles 94 and 308 EC as possible candidates while finding that the ECJ might not be 
sympathetic to their use for this purpose.286  She foresees that the EU should be 
granted the competence to set minimum standards of freedom of association, 
collective bargaining, and industrial action to be observed by the member states.287 
She also notes that the major advantage of a Community measure (a directive in 
practice) would be the enforcement mechanism via an infringement procedure. A 
directive would also employ state liability, although it might be difficult to realise. 
She further notes some crucial points in such a directive: closed shops, secondary 
industrial action and strikes in essential services, making it difficult to achieve. 
Subsidiarity would be one hurdle. Furthermore, she admits that her goal looks remote 
at present but reminds her readers of the ability of European circumstances to 
change.288  
                                                 
285 Published in Alston (ed.), Labour Rights as Human Rights, Oxford University Press 2005, 
pp. 176-213 (Davies).   
286 The EU Charter, as it has been a recognised point of reference and source of interpretation 
of law since Parliament v Council, will obviously also have an impact on the problem of EU 
competence on collective labour rights. This is likely even if Article 51(2) stipulates that the 
Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify 
the powers and tasks as defined by the Treaties. As a background I recall that it is also 
contested that Articles 94 and 308 EC could be used so as to circumvent the interpretation 
regarding Article 137(5) EC (so also AG Mengozzi in Laval, paragraph 57 of the opinion of 
23.5.2007; see the quotation at footnote 289, infra) that excludes a directive on pay, the right 
of association, the right to strike and the right to impose a lock-out on the basis of Article 137 
EC (see, e.g., the position of Syrpis in footnote 16, supra). At least Bernard Ryan has referred 
to the possibility that a more benign reading of Article 94 could take place in consequence of 
Articles 12, 27 and 28 of the Charter, thus alleviating the prohibition to circumvent a more 
specific legal basis stipulation, like Article 137(5), in the Treaty; see Bernard Ryan, The 
Charter and Collective Labour Rights, in Hervey and Kenner (eds.), Economic and Social 
Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Hart Publishing 2003, pp. 85-6. 
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton asserted in 1992 that an EC instrument (directive) on freedom 
of association would be possible under 94 (ex 100) EC; Lord Wedderburn, Freedom of 
Association and Community Protection: A Comparative Enquiry into Trade Union Rights of 
the European Community and into the Need for Intervention at the Community Level, May 
1992, paragraph 35.1; Luxembourg, European Commission 1992. 
Judge Romain Schintgen, La longue gestation du droit du travail communautaire: De Rome à 
Amsterdam, in Rogríguez Iglesias et al. (eds.), Mélanges en hommage à Fernand 
Schockweiler, Nomos 1999, p. 571, has left it open whether a directive may cover Article 
137(5) issues with Article 308 EC as the legal basis. However, Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, (ed. 
Bray), Constitutional Law of the European Union (2nd ed. 2005), p. 94, have noted how ‘Art. 
308 may not be used’ to cover ‘excluded policy areas’ or instruments. This would normally 
leave potential only for a regulation on Article 137(5) matters using Article 308 as the legal 
basis. 
287 Davies., footnote 285, supra, p. 206-7.  
288 Ibid., p. 213. Davies asserts inter alia that the present protection in the EU of collective 
labour rights as human rights would be ‘of no assistance where a member state’s own 
domestic law fails to uphold those rights’ (pp. 206-7). I must disagree. In case C-260/89 ERT 
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For a labour lawyer, Davies’ approach is naturally sympathetic. The author has 
previously given support in the same spirit to the position that an EU directive on 
collective labour rights would be possible under Article 94 EC or Article 308 EC. In 
any case, it would be possible under unanimity and having ‘representation and 
collective defence of the interests of workers and employers’ in Article 137(2)(f) EC 
as the legal basis for collective bargaining, thus leaving freedom of association and 
the right to strike subject to national and international law. However, it is noteworthy 
that the ECJ could also adopt the position of AG Mengozzi in Laval, where he has 
asserted that ‘[i]f the effectiveness of Article 137(5) EC is to be upheld, the 
Community institutions could not of course resort to other legal bases in the Treaty in 
order to adopt measures designed to approximate the laws of the Member States in 
this field.’ 289  I still see Davies’ approach as supportable, having in mind the 
possibility that, taking the EU Charter rights into account, the ECJ would adhere to a 
more benign interpretation of Article 94 (as referred to by Ryan in footnote 286, supra) 
or 308 EC. It is arguable that this would not be a case of a new competence, which is 
denied by Article 51(2) of the Charter, but interpreting existing EU competences 
where it is justified to take the Charter (binding in future) into account as well. 
Realization of the binding Charter is a natural issue. It would be appropriate to let the 
ECJ decide on this competence question, an aspect that de facto implies first a 
unanimously adopted EU measure, challenged then by somebody directly concerned 
(Article 230 EC). 
 
Thus Davies’ approach seems akin to Delors’ idea of ‘some harmonisation’ of social 
legislation and is a direct application of Bercusson’s idea of a necessary and inevitable 
European framework for collective labour relations. Transplanting that idea into the 
internal market as enlarged in 2004 (and again to ‘EU 27’ in 2007) seems more 
justified than ever in principle, while even ‘some harmonisation’ and creation of a 
‘European social area’ by means of legislation is) behind unanimity in the Council 
and will also be so under the Reform Treaty, especially as to collective labour law (or 
‘provisions related to the rights and interests of employed persons’), whatever the 
legal basis. Indeed, from the legal point of view, the exclusion of even a European 
framework enactment can be based on a combined reading of Articles 140, 137(5) and 
137(2)(a) EC, depending on will. This author does not share this, given the formal 
inclusion of the harmonisation target in Article 136 EC and minimum directives to 
this end under Article 137(2) EC. Such an enactment is therefore rather unlikely in the 
foreseeable future.  
 
The unlikelihood of written EU collective labour law together with the obvious 
diversity of labour law regimes among the 27 Member States (emphasized by the 
reluctance to comply with the ILO and Council of Europe standards by some Member 
States) leads to the conclusion that it is more realistic to live with a reasonably well-
established ordre communautaire social as a doctrinal maxim with the protection of 
fundamental rights as its essential constitutive element. This does not go against the 
Community setting minimum standards for collective labour rights by legislation; 
                                                                                                                                            
[1991] I-2925, paragraph 42, the Court held that national rules invoked under Articles 46 and 
55 EC must be appraised in the light of human rights (in that case freedom of expression). 
Furthermore, in Schmidberger, paragraphs 73 to 75, for instance, the Court held that the 
Member States must respect human rights in all situations that fall under the scope of 
Community law.  
289 Parargraph 57 of the Opinion of 23.5.2007. 
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quite the contrary. Such a directive would be the ipso jure crystallisation of ordre 
communautaire social. The essential advantage of a directive would be a monitoring 
and enforcement mechanism by the Commission, and infringement procedures 
whenever needed. Finally, irrespective of Davies’ idea, the author’s view is that a 
European framework for collective labour rights will emerge in any case as a 
combination of case-law (or has to some degree already emerged in Albany), the 
binding EU Charter and the effect of the international agreements. On the other hand, 
the prospect of stipulating collective labour rights via a European framework 
agreement between the social partners looks at present a highly challenging future 
issue. 
 
In any case, the challenge in creating EU’s collective labour law is not as great as may 
be presumed on the basis of the warnings by Kahn-Freund, but is now characterized 
by the emergence of ‘EU 27’. Indeed, he wrote in a different era, with virtually no 
European labour law acquis at that time, except on the free movement of workers. 
Equally, his warnings cannot lead to ignoring the value of comparative labour law in 
developing European collective labour law and certainly will not be relevant after the 
judgments in Laval and Viking and the binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Besides, nobody now endorses the idea of a bold transplantation of a particular 
national labour law model as a European one.290  
 
In the meantime it seems necessary to consider the present substitute for written law, 




3.3 The Effect of Laval and ITF and FSU v Viking Once Again 
 
In the Laval and Viking cases, we see the clash between the right to collective action 
and a market freedom, in these cases the free provision of services, as well as, 
allegedly, freedom of establishment in Viking.291 Both cases have a final driving force 
                                                 
290 Barnard’s reliance today on Kahn-Freund’s warnings looks a rather British approach while 
the substantive issue is of shaping and creating of a European order in labour law. Besides, 
even the Laval and Viking cases alone show that the ‘Cinderella approach’ (which is not 
Barnard’s own approach) is outdated.  
291 On these cases, see especially chapter IV of the second publication (section 4.10.5 on 
Viking). The author has found it more appropriate to assess also Viking under free provision of 
services; see footnote 322 of the second publication on the ‘rivalling’ or overlapping internal 
market freedoms. In Viking the employer has maintained that the envisaged industrial action 
would also contradict (and even primarily) freedom of establishment (Article 43 EC). 
However, if a measure relates to two market freedoms at the same time, the Court, in 
principle defines which one is predominant on an in casu assessment, and deals with the case 
only on that basis. See footnote 322 of the second publication; equally in the recent judgment 
in case C-452/04 Fidium Finanz, judgment of 3.10.2006, nyr, paragraph 34. In that judgment 
the Court also confirmed that Article 50 EC includes only a definition of services (in relation 
to free movement of goods, capital and persons) but it does not imply an order of priority 
between the market freedoms (paragraph 32). Only exceptionally does the ECJ examine a 
case in light of two market freedoms simultaneously; see case C-390/99 Canal Satélite 
Digital SL [2002] ECR I-607, paragraphs 31 to 33 on telecommunication services; the ECJ 
found that it was difficult to determine generally whether it is free movement of goods or 
freedom to provide services which should take priority in the field of telecommunications 
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in the huge cost gap between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States. Both cases may 
have far-reaching consequences for the development of EU collective labour law. 
Nevertheless, the fixed academic time schedule obliges the author to finalise this 
study and prevents the opportunity to discuss the judgments in these cases.  
 
However, these cases show how the old, rigid concept that matters covered by Article 
137(5) EC) fall under the exclusive competence of the EU Member States definitely 
belongs to the past — whether we like it or not. The internal market freedoms and 
competition rules as regulators of the economy finally impose a European basic 
collective labour rights framework without this reducing the national rights. The 
international law argument292 brings the ILO right to industrial action into Community 
law, and it is also based on Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Since 
the basically similar respect by the EU for the ILO, ECHR (Article 11) and ESC 
(Articles 5 and 6) rules on freedom of association and on the right to collective 
bargaining293 is legally viable and defensible, effective protection of all these rights 
against the market freedoms and competition rules requires the basic legal parameters 
for such protection to be incorporated or demonstrated in the EU’s legal order itself. 
This is what the Court has already initially done in Albany and is what the binding 
effect of the ILO rights to industrial action and freedom of association should do, as 
also suggested by the other fundamental rights instruments.294 Judgments in Laval and 
Viking will arguably lay the necessary foundations for the protection of the right to 
collective action in EU law (thus, not just within these cases), which will have 
repercussions for the protection of collective labour rights in general. Finally, the 
reference questions in Viking also seek an answer to the status of the right to 
                                                                                                                                            
(paragraph 32). See also that in Laval the Swedish trade unions have urged in their 
submission dealing with the company Laval un Partneri as established in Sweden whereas its 
sister company Baltic Bygg was established there and the latter had no workers of its own but 
the former posted them from Latvia. If the ECJ, contrary to what I have supposed, treated the 
issue as a clash between the freedom of establishment and right to collective action in Viking, 
the same reasoning would apply mutatis mutandis. 
292 See section 2.5, supra, at footnotes 201-213, and sections 4.5 to 4.7 in the second 
publication.  
293 As to protection of freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining in the 
ESC, see especially footnote 99 in the third publication. Article 5 is the essential source for 
the protection of the right to collective bargaining within the European Social Charter. 
294 The incorporation of the right to industrial action into the EU’s legal order also 
necessitates a remark on the role of the national and Community Courts.The ECJ naturally 
cannot replace the national labour courts and tribunals in deciding over perhaps myriad of 
cases confronting collective action with market freedoms (or competition rules). In the second 
publication I presumed that the ECJ would decide anything having essential significance in 
EU law in Laval (and in Viking, I might add). The lessons from Bostock (Case C-2/92 
Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, paragraph 16) and ERT v DEP (Case C-260/89 ERT v DEP 
[1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 42) indicate that the ECJ must provide in a preliminary ruling 
all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national court to determine whether national 
rules are compatible with the fundamental rights whose observance the Court ensures. In 
weighing community rules, i.e., the market freedoms, with fundamental rights the solution, 
endorsing the uniform application of Community law, might in practice mean to set up the 
criteria for the assessment of proportionality (normally protection of workers or the social 
policy objectives of the Community). One finds criteria for the acceptability of restrictions on 
the right to strike in the ILO practice: narrowly construed restrictions may exist regarding 
civil servants, essential services and the police and armed forces.  
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transnational collective action (unless it remains under freedom of association) that 
for strong and in some sense inherent reasons merits protection by EU law; see 
sections 2.5 and 2.6, supra. Its profound importance for EU labour law as a whole 
cannot be denied.  
 
In the meantime, it is appropriate to deal with the opinions of the Advocates General. 
While the ECJ will hand down the judgments in Laval and Viking on 11 December 
2007, it is useful to discuss the main lines of the opinions of Advocates General 
Mengozzi and Maduro of 23 May 2007 (and relating only to proper wages in Laval). 
Both find the right to collective action a fundamental right in EU law (paragraph 78 
by Mengozzi, paragraph 60 by Maduro).  
 
Mengozzi’s analysis follows the line in chapter IV of my second publication in 
general terms, with a few exceptions. First, he recognizes as a source of EU law 
European Social Charter (paragraphs 65, 66 and 74) next to the ECHR, but does not 
say a word about the ILO provisions (Constitution and Conventions 87 and 98). 
Second, he does not discuss the ‘international law argument’ as I have done295 but 
takes the ESC as a ‘source of inspiration’ in the protection of fundamental rights. AG 
Mengozzi does not discuss the Albany approach at all but straightforwardly adheres to 
the Arblade-Schmidberger approach, sticking to proportionality assessment as a 
criterion of the legality of the action concerned (paragraph 241, with a reference i.a. to 
Arblade). In its practical application, Mengozzi relies on protection of workers as the 
yardstick of proportionality (paragraphs 249, 251 and 307), and reasons that the trade 
unions may resort to collective action so as to reach an agreement with the posting 
employer on the average wages 296  applicable to comparable domestic employers 
(paragraph 268). The outcome in the opinion would leave the Swedish regime (the so-
called lex Britannia included)297 intact as to proper wages, a view which has already 
generated criticism. 298  Bruun has come up with another type of criticism, thus 
reminding us that inexact guidance on proportionality assessment (which would be 
completely new in many Member States) may lead to ‘highly divergent assessment’ in 
the Member States and that it may also open floodgates to future cases on the legality 
of collective actions. 299  Blanke has asserted that the proportionality criterion 
                                                 
295 See section 2.5, supra, and sections 4.5 to 4.7 in the second publication.  
296 I have called average wages ‘market wages’, see the second last paragraph of section 2.4, 
supra.  
297 For lex Britannia, see especially section 4.9.4 of the second publication.  
298Norbert Reich, Gemeinschaftliche Verkehrsfreiheiten versus Nationales Arbeitskamprecht, 
EuZW 13/2007, pp. 395-6, has claimed that a proportionality assessment model 
(Verhältnismässigkeitsmodell) ‘used in collective action law’ (Arbeitskampfrecht) leads to 
establishing an impossibility of free provision of services in Laval via a mix of discriminating 
and non-transparent collective agreement regulations, which contradicts Article 49 EC and the 
purpose of the PWD. Reich clearly relies on a German type of proportionality that also 
includes a general reasonableness test (Angemessenheitsprüfung) which is not used in EU law; 
see the position of von Danwitz in footnote 131 of the second publication. Moreover, Reich 
regrets how Mengozzi’s outcome disregards the protection granted in the home state, the 
difference in ‘cost structure’ (Kostenstruktur) and deprives the posting employer of their 
competitive advantage; p. 396. This neo-liberal position the ECJ had already dismissed in 
Seco in 1982; see section 1.2.2 of the second publication, at footnote 14. 
299 Niklas Bruun, The Impact of National Labour and Social Law on the Law of the European 
Community; forthcoming, lecture on a colloquium by the German Presidency, Berlin 25 June 
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contradicts bargaining autonomy. 300  The author recalls that the proportionality 
assessment is also alien to the international instruments (ILO provisions and the ESC) 
which should indicate caution in its use. Declaring the protection of workers as its 
yardstick on the basis of earlier case-law301 seems a reasonable minimum for legal 
certainty, beside excluding a German-type proportionality assessment that also covers 
a general reasonableness test (Angemessenheitsprüfung) and consideration of third-
party interests.  
 
The opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Viking generates more criticism. Its first 
source is the fact that he mentions the fundamental rights aspect only in terms of the 
EU Charter, thus passing over the guarantees for the right to collective action in the 
ILO and Council of Europe instruments (both the ECHR and the ESC) in particular. A 
diffuse ‘social contract’, for him embodied in the preamble to the Treaty, is his basis 
for the right to collective action (paragraph 59). Otherwise he distinguishes between 
an action in pre- and post-reflagging situations.302 In the former, he finds the actions 
of the FSU and the ITF acceptable (paragraph 70 and the proposed third ruling). In the 
latter he encounters a slippery slope in building up restrictions for the right to 
collective action. He finds that in a post-reflagging situation both the national action 
of the FSU and the cross-border action (FOC policy) of the ITF would be illegal. In 
the national situation, his ground for the strike ban is analogy with the ‘strawberry 
case’ Commission v France303 (i.e., that the post-reflagging action entirely negates the 
rationale of the common market, paragraph 68) which passes over the fact that the 
FSU does not intend any ‘definitive’ negation of the shipowner’s right to free 
provision of maritime transport services. AG Maduro here seems to forget his earlier 
‘internal market rationale’, according to which strikes are instrumental for a fully 
functioning market.304 
 
As to the cross-border action, Maduro finds it readily subject to abuse, leading to 
partitioning of the labour market and being based on an obligation of the member 
trade unions to follow the organisation’s policy, which justifies his proposed ban with 
a simple intellectual effort (paragraphs 71 and 71). It is noteworthy that his basic and 
overall justification of EU restrictions on the right to collective action is the simple 
fact that there are also restrictions at the national level (paragraph 70). Thus, not only 
does he pass over the international guarantees of the right to collective action but he 
even neglects the EU-level delimitation of restrictions on fundamental rights, as 
                                                                                                                                            
2007: 50 Years of EU - 50 Years of Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice Concerning 
Labour and Social Law. 
300 Thomas Blanke, Observations on the Opinions of Advocates General Maduro and 
Mengozzi delivered on 23 May 2007 in the Viking and Laval cases, Transfer 3/2007 
(forthcoming). Blanke also directs this criticism against the opinion of AG Maduro in Laval.  
301 See, e.g., case C-60/03 Wolff&Müller [2004] ECR I-9553, paragraphs 43-44, discussed in 
brief in section 2.4, supra, and in more detail in section 2.2.5 (also mentioned in section 3.4, 
as to proportionality) of the second publication.  
302 The legal issue is whether free movement rules ban a strike concerning the reflagging and 
wages after reflagging a Finnish vessel in future (M/S Rosella) in another Member State 
(Estonia), planned to be followed by replacement of the predominantly Finnish crew by an 
Estonian one. The collective action would be realized mainly on the shipowner’s vessels other 
than Rosella. See further the second publication, section 4.10.5. See also section 2.5, supra. 
303 Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959. 
304 See his comment at footnote 196, supra. 
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manifested in Schmidberger, paragraph 80. Restrictions must be based on a pressing 
need in society, and shall not be disproportionate and impair the substance of the right 
concerned. Needless to say, restrictions proposed by Maduro on fundamental rights 
should emanate from a democratic process. Furthermore, freedom of association is 
guaranteed under the international instruments (as in Article 11 ECHR, and in fact 
already in Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in Articles 2, 
3 and 5 of the ILO Convention No. 87)305. It is therefore up to the international 
workers’ organisations to draw up their statutes and decide upon their policies 
whereby restrictions are acceptable only on essential public services (like protection 
of life and health, and the police and army) and otherwise under exceptional 
circumstances, as are the ILO criteria. All in all, following the opinion’s restrictions 
on the right to collective action in the judgment would seriously undermine the 
European trade union organisations’ ability to defend the interests of their members 




3.4 The Reform Treaty 
 
In shaping the future, I move on to the Reform Treaty. The Introduction to this article 
(p. 3) put the question about its impact on the overall balance between economic and 
social factors and on the ordre communautaire social both as to the relationship 
between the social rights and market freedoms and competition rules, and in more 
general terms. Although I have quoted only Bercusson’s, Maduro’s and Fredman’s 
assessments of the future binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, my thesis is that 
they represent, if not the view of the whole doctrine, at least the bulk of it by asserting 
that the EU Charter presents the social and labour rights constitutionally on an equal 
footing with the civil and political as well as economic rights for the first time in the 
history of the Community. 306  The Reform Treaty will set this basic balance in 
concrete by making the Charter legally binding (I touch on the UK and Poland 
exceptions below) and raising it to the same legal status as the Treaties. 
Retrospectively, the difference from the residual status of social rights in the original 
Treaty of Rome is already striking, but the binding Charter would obviously also 
influence the interpretation of EU legislative and other measures in de Búrca’s 
terms,307 leading to further reconsideration of the relationship between social rights 
and the market freedoms and competition rules. The former should be seen as rights 
on their own, not mere restrictions of market freedoms.  
 
                                                 
305 International trade union organisations are recognised by Article 5 of ILO Convention No. 
87. As to its effects, see, e.g., the complaint of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) et al. v. Australia, report No. 320, case No. 1963 (Doc. Vol. LXXXIII, 2000, 
Series B, No. 1), mentioned in footnote 217 and discussed in footnote 218 of the second 
publication. The international trade union organisations are entitled to independence as 
national ones. 
306 As to Bercusson and Maduro, see section 1.4.4, supra, at footnote 101. It is another story 
whether Maduro’s conclusions in Viking are in conformity with his general qualification 
regarding the Charter; see the previous section. As to the position of Fredman, see her 
comment at footnote 121, supra.  
307 See section 1.4.4, supra, at footnote 120. 
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In describing the (probable) forthcoming paradigm change in favour of an even more 
prominent role for fundamental rights in EU law, one may also refer to the perspective 
of AG Mengozzi in Gestoras Pro Amnistía: 
 
177. To give priority to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection 
and to disapply for that purpose the relevant provisions of the EU Treaty on 
the powers of the Court of Justice would necessitate recognising that there was 
also a hierarchy among primary rules and a kind of ‘supra-constitutional’ 
value in the respect for fundamental rights. I consider that such an approach, 
while not in itself alien, is not permissible in the present state of Union law, 
not least because the current treaties do not explicitly list the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Union. The Charter cannot, in my opinion, make good 
the lack of such a list, since it is only a source of inspiration for the 
Community court and national courts in clarifying the fundamental rights 
protected by Union law as general principles and has no binding legal force. 
That limitation would obviously no longer apply if all the Member States 
ratified the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Part II of which lists 
the fundamental rights, among which is expressly enshrined, in Article II-107, 
the ‘right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial’. (emphasis original)308  
 
He repeated the same idea of the present state of Community law in Laval:  
 
84. To reject in all cases the applicability of the freedoms of movement 
provided for in the Treaty with the aim of guaranteeing the protection of 
fundamental rights would in reality amount to upholding a hierarchy between 
the rules or principles of primary law which, if not necessarily entirely 
inapposite, is not allowed as Community law stands at present. 
 
In Laval Mengozzi naturally referred to the cited statement in Gestoras Pro Amnistía. 
Replacing the Constitutional Treaty by the ratified Reform Treaty, one concludes that 
Mengozzi takes into account a possible paradigmatic change in favour of fundamental 
rights in their relation to internal market rules, the former perhaps thus becoming 
superior to the latter. It suffices to note that following Mengozzi’s perspective would 
obviously also mean in cases like Laval (and logically those like Viking) reasoning 
strictly on the line dominated by the relatively tiny possibility of establishing 
restrictions on the fundamental right to collective action for internal market reasons, 
instead of any general balancing between these competing requirements of simply 
equal rank. It will remain to be seen whether this might influence actual cases. Thus, 
the question about the Reform Treaty affecting for instance the traditional judge-
created justification pattern for justifications of restrictions in free provision of 
services remains. Time will tell the result. In more general terms, the Reform Treaty 
with a binding Charter (by the amended Article 6(1) EU) can be said to be the final 
                                                 
308 Case C-354/04P Gestoras Pro Amnistía, opinion of 26.10.2006, nyr. It is noteworthy that 
AG Stix-Hackl came up with the idea of affording fundamental and human rights a ‘certain 
precedence’ over ‘general’ primary legislation in case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609; 
however, she continued by noting how the (fundamental) market freedoms can also ‘perfectly 
well’ be materially categorised as fundamental rights — at least in certain respects like in 
guaranteeing the general principle of equality whereby a conflict between the fundamental 
freedom and a fundamental and human right can also represent a conflict between 
fundamental rights; see paragraph 50 of the opinion of 18 March 2004. 
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step in endorsing a more comprehensive ordre communautaire social thinking, with 
the Charter rights as its natural basis. This will amongst other things essentially 
alleviate the underdeveloped nature of the EU’s collective labour law. 
   
Making the EU Charter legally binding via the Reform Treaty will also demonstrate 
the interpretation quarrels about the content of the Charter. The direct and indirect 
effect of the Charter as well as a very likely state liability for infringements would be 
such natural quarrel areas.309 However, the core labour rights (in Articles 12, 27 and 
28) are formulated in the Charter as real rights instead of mere principles.  
 
The broad-looking constraint in Article 51(1) about the Charter binding the Member 
States only when implementing Union law could for good reason be transformed in 
line with the general fundamental rights scheme of the Charter to continue the present 
protection of fundamental rights within the scope of Community law which is settled 
case-law, as Schmidberger noted.310 The restrictive wording of Article 51(1) of the 
Charter is based on the Karlsson judgment given by a small chamber, according to the 
Explanations of the Praesidium of the Convention.311 This concerned implementation 
of an EU milk regulation that certainly does not authorize any general conclusion 
reducing the field of application of the human rights requirements from that affirmed 
by the Court in plenum, either on the basis of Article 6(2) EU as in Schmidberger, or 
with a direct reference to the ECHR as in ERT. That Article 51(1) of the Charter does 
not reduce the protection of fundamental rights to Member States’ implementation 
measures is the position also taken by the EU Network of Independent Experts on 
Fundamental Rights.312 The author believes, in fact, that the wording of Article 51(1) 
resulted from a political bow towards the few Member States keen to reduce the effect 
of the Charter, for which the Praesidium’s Explanations give nothing but a blatant 
excuse. It is also to be underlined that Article 53 of the Charter recognises more 
extensive protection than that provided for by the Charter. Article I-9(3) of the 
Constitutional Treaty would also have allowed an interpretation against the letter of 
Article 51(1) of the Charter. Hence, a legitimate expectation is that the ECJ will cover 
                                                 
309 See Bercusson, Clauwaert and Schömann, footnote 101, supra, p. 48. 
310 See the core of the relevant case-law: case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 28; 
case C-260/89 ERT v. DEP [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 42; case C-112/00 Schmidberger 
[2003] ECR I-5659, paragraphs 73 to 75; and case C-13/05 Chacón Navas [2006] ECR I-
6467, paragraph 56.    
311 Case C-292/97 Karlsson [2000] ECR I-2737, paragraph 37. See the Europe Convention 
Praesidium’s explanations under Article 51(1) of the Charter in CONV 828/1/03, 19.7.2003 
(thus, after Schmidberger), available via 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00828-re01en03.pdf.  
312 See EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (with Olivier De Schutter as the writer 
here), European Commission June 2006, p. 392. The Commentary calls this use of case-law in 
the Convention Praesidium’s Explanations unskilled (‘malhabile’). The author agrees. The 
Commentary is available: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/rights/charter 
/docs/network_commentary_final%20_180706.pdf. Also Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (ed. Bray), 
Constitutional Law of the European Union (2nd ed. 2005), pp. 723-5, repeat the ‘scope of 
Community law’ doctrine without questions, relying on case-law since case 12/86 Demirel 
[1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 28 (‘…although it is the duty of the Court to ensure observance 
of fundamental rights in the field of Community law, it has no power to examine the 
compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights of national legislation lying 
outside the scope of Community law…’; emphasis added). 
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all the measures within the scope of Community law with the fundamental rights 
obligation in future as well; this means covering labour rights under the broad concept 
of ‘economic activities’ in Article 2 EC.313  
 
The variable references in the Charter to national law and practice deserve further 
elaboration. To start with, Tonia Novitz has noted about Article 28 of the EU Charter 
that the reference to ‘national laws and practices’ means that ‘the scope of any right to 
strike is to be defined entirely at the national level, which would ensure that no EU 
standard is set as regards scrutiny of compliance with the right’, as the explanatory 
text indicates (see footnote 228 of the second publication),. While this statement 
leaves the reference to Community law in Article 28 out of consideration, the 
reference to national law and practices naturally involves a debate on the real effect of 
Article 28 as a Community standard. However, as a ‘safety net’ she, too (like myself), 
refers to Article 53 of the Charter that recognises that the Charter is not intended to 
limit or adversely affect human rights and fundamental freedoms in other international 
instruments.314 Similarly, the Charter does not legitimate any infringements of the 
international legal obligations of the Member States. Clearly deviating from the 
position of Novitz, Bercusson has put a whole list of arguments against any diluting 
effect of the references to national law and practice. He argues inter alia that, next to 
the international law argument stemming from Article 53, (i) national laws and 
practices limiting the Charter rights would undermine the supremacy of EU law, to 
which the ECJ is unlikely to agree; (ii) the added value of the Charter can only be 
realised if national standards are treated as minimum standards beyond which the 
Charter rights may go; (iii) the references to national law and practice, especially in 
the Title on Solidarity, should be interpreted narrowly so as not to contradict the ethos 
of the Charter, i.e., solidarity, by assuring a common floor of fundamental rights 
throughout the EU.315 A third approach is taken by the EU Network of Independent 
Experts:  
 
In a number of cases, it is up to the legislature or the other national authorities 
to define the conditions for exercising a particular right, for example by 
regulating the exercise of the right to strike, setting up a social security system 
or entrusting certain tasks of general interest to service providers. However, 
what the national authorities have to do is to regulate the right in question, in 
other words, make it possible to exercise this right by defining its rules: a total 
                                                 
313  As to economic activities in Article 2 EC delimiting the scope of Community law, see 
case C-509/04P Meca-Medina [2006] ECR I-4601, paragraph 22, where the ECJ continued 
this doctrine. However, unlike the CFI (cited in footnote 205 of the second publication), the 
ECJ explicitly held that the qualification of a doping rule as “purely sporting” was not 
sufficient to remove the athlete or the sports association adopting the rule in question from the 
scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC (paragraph 27). In this respect, the exclusion of the social 
partners from Article 81 EC in paragraph 59 of Albany is to be regarded as a ‘self-executing’ 
lex specialis, meaning inter alia that the internal decision-making of trade unions is not 
subject to Article 81 EC. 
314  See Tonia Novitz, The European Union and International Labour Standards: The 
Dynamics of Dialogue between the EU and the ILO, in Alston (ed.), Labour Rights as Human 
Rights, Oxford University Press 2005, p. 228.  
315 Brian Bercusson, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and national laws and practices, 
in Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Nomos 
2006, pp. 423-433, a summary of arguments appears on p. 433.  
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suppression of the right in question or the imposition of excessively restrictive 
conditions for exercising it, resulting in a repudiation of its ‘essential 
substance’, would not be in keeping with the requirements of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the Union.316  
 
This position seems to be essentially closer to Bercusson than Novitz. The 
international law argument and those related to the supremacy and uniformity of EU 
law are also normally strong ones in the ECJ, which will in any case have the last 
word about the whole impact of the references to national law and practice in the 
Charter.  
 
The Reform Treaty is significantly marked by the ‘UK and Poland exception’ as to 
fundamental rights, i.e., by the Protocol to be attached to the EU Treaty which will 
confirm that the Charter ‘does not extend the ability’ of the European or national 
courts to find that Polish or UK laws, regulations or administrative provisions, 
practices or action are ‘inconsistent with the [Charter] rights, freedoms and principles’ 
(Article 1(1) of the Protocol).317 Next to this, Article 1(2) of the Protocol underlines 
the non-justiciability of rights in the Solidarity Title of the Charter in Poland and the 
UK, thus inter alia the right to collective bargaining and action in Article 28 of the 
Charter, unless there are corresponding justiciable rights in national law. Hence, the 
Charter will not become binding in Poland and the UK which is a result of a politico-
ideological choice by their present governments. Given the overall political climate, 
especially in the UK, this sidetrack may this time become considerably longer than 
the five post-Maastricht sidetrack years regarding the 1992 Maastricht Social Policy 
Agreement. In any case, the ‘UK and Poland exception’ shows a certain disregard for 
the universality of the human or fundamental rights, in particular as regards labour 
rights. In other words, at the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference, the UK was unable 
to prevent binding Charter rights, but at the Brussels June Summit of 2007 it was in 
principle successful as to its own territory, being later followed by Poland. To put it 
the other way round, the explicit negation of justiciable rights by the Protocol 
establishes the interpretation that outside Poland and the UK the Charter rights may 
be justiciable.  
 
The wording of the Protocol (‘does not extend the ability’) is subject to differing 
interpretations in the sense of whether it implies a certain existing ability which is 
however not extended (broadened), or whether it means to negate any competence in 
the given sense (in establishing inconsistencies with the Charter rights). Given the 
                                                 
316 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Report on the Situation of 
Fundamental Rights in the European Union in 2004, European Commission January 2005, p. 
14; the report is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/report_eu_2004_en.pdf. 
317 See Protocol No. 7 to be annexed to the EU and EC Treaties, doc. CIG 2/1/07 REV 1, 
5.10.2007; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00002re01en.pdf. In the 
Polish case the denial of the Charter’s binding nature is complemented by Poland’s 
declaration (doc. CIG 3/1/07 REV I, 5.10.2007) that, “having regard to the tradition of social 
movement of ‘Solidarity’ and its significant contribution to the struggle for social and labour 
rights, it fully respects social and labour rights, as established by European Union law, and in 
particular those reaffirmed in Title IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.” Paradoxically, Title IV is also headed ‘Solidarity’. It still remains to be seen whether 
this declaration may have any interpretative effect.  
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political framework concerned, especially in UK, the latter is probably meant, which 
obviously means to negate even the Charter’s interpretive value, against settled case-
law as well, in addition to negating its fully binding effect. This would be the most 
contradictory because the corpus text of the new EU Treaty (Article 6(1)) will state 
that the Charter shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. Indeed, the Protocol 
disregards both the uniformity of EU law and its primacy in relation to contradictory 
national law in Poland and the UK. For all these reasons, the Protocol should be 
subject to the narrowest possible interpretation. One consequence of such an 
interpretation is that the Protocol shall not affect the already existing interpretive 
status of the Charter. Another consequence is that the Protocol must not affect 
Poland’s or the UK’s existing international obligations within labour law, i.e., the 
rights overlapping with the Charter rights like those in the ILO Constitution (notably 
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining), in the ECHR and in the European Social Charter (e.g., the right to 
collective bargaining and action in Article 6(4) ESC where the UK has no reservation 
but Poland does).  
 
In practice, I mean a situation in which a UK trade union or their association would 
invoke the ILO right to collective action against the internal market freedoms (of 
establishment and services) before the ECJ as a shield of its transnational secondary 
action. This is in fact one of the two alternative ways to shape the situation of the 
International Transport Workers’ Federation in the Viking case.318 In line with the 
narrow interpretation, the Protocol arguably cannot affect the ECJ’s ability to endorse 
the ILO right as valid in the EU as well (the international law argument), although this 
would run counter to and override the UK law on secondary action. In this sense the 
Protocol seems a Pyrrhic victory for the UK and Polish governments. Naturally, the 
ECJ has the final word in this sense. 
 
As a Reform Treaty conclusion, hence highlighting the binding Charter rights of the 
legal value of the Treaties, one may in general terms state that collective EU labour 
law is developing from the level of the recognition of ‘general principles of labour 
law’ (see the General Union of Personnel of European Organizations, Amalgamated 
European Public Service Union cases, both 1974, and Maurissen II 1990)319 into a 
more articulated and mature stage of ordre communautaire social. This development 
broadly taken follows the Union’s general development from the European Economic 
Community to a political and social Union, the landmarks of which are the Single 
European Act (Article 118b EEC), the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers, the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam (insertion of the 
fundamental rights references in Article 136 EC) and, as to some more detailed 
features discussed in this study, the Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights) 
Directive, Seco, the Posted Workers Directive, Albany (also as to the developments 
under Article 86(2) EC), and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The pending 
Laval and Viking cases are of same constitutional rank. Still, it is undeniable that the 
UK and Poland exception in the Reform Treaty may cast a shadow over these 
generally positive developments for a considerable number of years. 
 
                                                 
318 See sections 2.5 and 2.6, supra.  
319 See the discussion in section 1.3, supra. 
 108  
In any case, the present situation highlights the role of the Court as a rule-maker on 
collective labour rights in the Community while it is dependent on the cases brought 
before it. The Reform Treaty shifts the emphasis towards the European legislator 
while the European Courts’ role as the referee in the application of the binding 
Charter will remain important, indeed the more important the less secondary 
legislation emerges, especially on collective labour rights. While the EU Charter is by 
definition in rather general language, it in any case includes a European consolidation 
of social rights on an equal footing with the economic constitution of the EU but will 
in the foreseeable future probably not be followed by further detailed secondary 
legislation on collective labour rights (in addition to information and consultation 
rights) given the unanimity requirement. The legal-ideological, paradigmatic 
argument gets more weight in this sense, highlighting the ordre communautaire social 
doctrine as well.  
 
Some perspectives might be open, especially in the application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, via the open method of coordination (OMC),320 although the 
Member States and the Commission have had this option in the field of labour law, 
freedom of association and collective bargaining under Article 140 EC (in terms of 
encouraging cooperation and facilitating coordination) since the beginning without 
any striking results. Obviously the degree of political commitment by the Member 
States will finally decide whether the OMC may produce significant results. There is 
also resistance in principle against dealing with fundamental rights via the OMC,321 as 
well as overall criticism vis-à-vis the OMC, stemming from the high value of the rule 
of law and rule-based governance in the EU.322 These remarks suffice for the purposes 
of this study to underline the need to conduct the possible OMC as not undermining 








                                                 
320 For a proactive approach on the open method of coordination see, e.g., Olivier De Schutter, 
The Implementation of Fundamental Rights Through the Open Method of Coordination, in 
De Schutter and Deakin (eds.), Social Rights and Market Forces: is the open coordination of 
employment and social policies the future of Europe?, Bruylant 2005, pp. 279-343. De 
Schutter sees the search for equilibrium in the conciliation of economic freedoms and 
fundamental rights as a part of this method, a balancing in which neither gets precedence; pp. 
338-340. When writing the areas of activities of the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency, 
established by Regulation 168/2007, are not defined. 
321 See for opposing the OMC (which is not subject to any judicial control) regarding 
fundamental rights, particularly enforceable ones, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, Why the Open 
Method of Coordination Is Bad For You: A Letter to the EU, ELJ Vol. 13, No. 3, May 2007, 
p. 341; he refers as a ground to the need to avoid varying OMC outcomes depending on 
political winds, or conflicts like that in Mangold (see section 1.4.4, at footnotes 102-112, 
supra), thus between a fundamental right (to non-discrimination on the basis of age) and a 
(neo-liberal) unlimited resort to fixed-term working contracts above a given age. 
322 See, e.g., Christian Joerges, What is Left of the European Economic Constitution, EUI 
Working Papers 2004/13, pp. 25-32. 
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3.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This study project is headed ‘From Internal Market Regulation to European Labour 
Law’ and thus is a development narrative. Hence, the already considerable body of 
individual EU labour law, together with the information and consultation rights, 
justifies speaking of European labour law as a specific area of European law. 
Moreover, the European Social Dialogue and the recognised status of the right to 
collective bargaining (Albany) together with the other labour rights included in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights show the emergence of European collective labour law. 
Laval and Viking will obviously develop it further. In addition, the European Union is 
bound by the international obligations of its constituent Member States, which further 
enriches European labour law. All in all, since the Union is a unique entity as a legal 
Community, its labour law is unique as well. A distinctive legal concept, the ordre 
communautaire social, looks useful in describing an elementary part of such a unique 
feature, i.e., most obviously its relationship with the market freedoms and competition 
rules, both fundamental to the Union, and more broadly in shaping the legal-
ideological substratum of the Community’s labour law order. 
 
Conclusively, the tentative reasoning on ordre communautaire social shows that it is 
worthwhile both at the level of interpretations of, legal reasoning on, and 
understanding of European labour law while it also includes normative elements like 
the binding effect of fundamental labour rights that come essentially from 
international law. It is thus, however, more than mere rights enacted or recognised by 
the legislator and courts and partially fills the gap created by the lack of collective 
labour law enactments (unless on social dialogue or information and consultation) by 
the EU. Thus, it is a proposal for a labour law paradigm at the Union level, especially 
collective labour law.   
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